John Loftus and His Hypothetical God

Does Loftus assert that it is, on all counts, 100% a matter of the intellect and data? As opposed to the real fact of the will and data? If so then the evidence regarding the doxastic experience clearly contradicts his thesis.

Routledge Studies In Philosophy has “Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.” by Miriam Schleifer McCormick which is interesting.

The core of the question seems to be related to the “hiddenness of God” argument which in its current evolution is probably best put forward by the atheist J.L. Schellenberg. When this argument was first put to me, I struggled with it for a while. This compilation of essays probably helped me the most through it:

https://www.amazon.com/Divine-Hiddenness-Essays-Daniel-Howard-Snyder/dp/0521006104/ref=pd_sim_14_2?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=BFABW8D82XDZPKH9SH1B

Tom, does Loftus cite any of the academic literature anywhere?

The easiest answer I often find is to make an analogy. God wants us to love Him for who He is and what He is, but not simply for the sake of what He can do.

Imagine a rich and powerful King who find himself deeply in love with a peasant woman in his kingdom. He knows that if he pulls up in a carriage in all of his regal splendor, and proposes marriage she will undoubtedly say “yes”, but it might not be because she wishes to marry him. It might very well be that she says “yes” because she wishes to marry his office, and his wealth, and his power. Nowadays they call this a “gold-digger” I think?

In any case- this king chooses instead to approach her as a poor beggar. He strips himself naked from all of his power and glory and approaches her in the street in complete humility. She might come to love him in this way, and say yes to his poor marriage proposal. It’s only then that he reveals himself for who he truly is, knowing that she loves the man, rather than the money.

In fact, the fact that the king chooses to do it the second way rather than the first might even make it EASIER for her to love him for who he is, since being human, we are naturally seduced by the allure of power.

Skep, does that seem to make things somewhat clearer?

I think God gives us plenty of good reason to think that he is real (see all of the philosophical arguments, or the instances of eucharistic miracles, or the miraculous appearances such as that of Our Lady at Guadalupe or Fatima, the list goes on), but not so much as to overwhelm us and compel us to try to act piously merely for the sake of ourselves. Those who find are those who sought to find.

On another note, one of the essays in that volume linked above drives home the very clear point that no matter what type of “evidence” God might choose to give us, the clever skeptic can always seek to rationalize it away. Let’s say that God were to inscribe into the moon in shimmering gold letters a passage from scripture every night, or some such thing. I think that if someone really wanted, they could conclude that the existence of aliens who might try to commandeer us by doing such a thing is a “more likely” explanation than the existence of God as the ontological grounding of reality itself, and so by “occam’s razor” would still dismiss the existence of God.

As a final note, I think that there is a fellow who has produced an excellent video to the same effect as my answer here, allow me to link it for anyone who might find it useful.

Travis Wakeman:

Schellenberg responds to Snyder’s New Essays in his papers The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (I) and The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (II). I also think your analogy and subsequent commentary misses the point of Schellenberg’s argument.

However, Schellenberg’s argument is not Loftus’ argument, so further discussion of that will probably be off-topic here. Perhaps Tom would be interested in making a new post specifically for discussion of Schellenberg?

Except Scripture has an answer for this also. Having chosen to not love God, humans proceed to deny his existence.

This makes sense, in a perverted sort of way. If God existed, I would have an obligation towards him (to love and to obey). But I prefer not to have such an obligation. Therefore I will believe he does not exist.

Travis:

Most notably, Schellenberg’s argument focuses on the mere existence of nonresistant nonbelievers, while Loftus’ focuses on nonbelievers in general (resistant or not), and whether there’s sufficient evidence in an objective sense.

Regarding your commentary, I’d argue that the king analogy doesn’t accurately reflect Schellenberg’s argument – a more fitting analogy would be one where the king was just already married to the peasant woman. Schellenberg doesn’t argue that God would eventually get around to convincing nonresistant nonbelievers; he argues that they wouldn’t ever exist in the first place. Furthermore, the “clever skeptic” in your scenario is not a nonresistant nonbeliever – a N.N. would approach evidence with intellectual honesty, not attempt to explain it away at all costs.

Skep,

I agree with Loftus and Schellenberg that rational disbelief exists, as does E. Feser at http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/07/road-from-atheism.html ~ Here’s an excerpt:

To be sure, like any other atheist I might have cited the problem of suffering when rattling off the reasons why theism couldn’t be true, but it wasn’t what primarily impressed me philosophically. What *really* impressed me was the evidentialist challenge to religious belief. If God really exists there should be solid arguments to that effect, and there just aren’t, or so I then supposed. Indeed, that there were no such arguments seemed to me something which would itself be an instance of evil if God existed, and this was an aspect of the problem of evil that seemed really novel and interesting.

I see from a look at my old school papers that I was expressing this idea in a couple of essays written for different courses in 1992. (I think that when J. L. Schellenberg’s book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason appeared in 1993 I was both gratified that someone was saying something to that effect in print, and annoyed that it wasn’t me.) ….. (by E. Feser)

The problem for Loftus / Schellenberg and their theses is two fold. First, every human being has his own unique “doxastic experience” within which the love of Truth and the love of Self come up against one another and we all, universally, engage in “that” truth stock exchange, as it were. The boy in Tibet who cannot read has one such interface, just as someone highly educated has such an interface, and that those two are unique and distinct from each other — yet both real and meaningful under their respective conceptual ceilings — is obvious.

“Conceptual ceilings?”

Well yes. There is no such thing as a “high enough” ceiling when it comes to the ABYSS between “Man” and “God” and John Moore addressed that as he alludes to the fact that “More Facts” is not the issue with Lucifer nor with us. Reading is not a prerequisite to the Kingdom. It is not that some tree termed Knowledge / More Facts is “not good“, because there are no bad-trees in Eden (…as it were…). Rather, instead, it is that something else precedes and outreaches that, and that has to do with volition, with love’s reciprocity, and with the self. As contingent beings it is just unavoidable: at some ontological seam somewhere the self must find the Beautiful not in its own isolated self, not in privation, but instead in love’s reciprocity amid (…its own…) self and (…the immutable good…) which comes in the unicity of “Man in God / God in Man”. More-Facts is not the terminus of the problem:

““The problem with your question is that it assumes a purely humanistic, and perhaps even naturalistic, point of view with respect to finding the knowledge of God. It takes for granted that it’s basically up to us to figure out which religion is true. But whatever other religions may teach, this is not the point of view of Christianity. If God were to abandon us to our own intelligence and ingenuity to work out whether or not He exists, He would be a very cruel God indeed. As one of the students in my Defenders class remarked, getting into heaven should not be like getting into Harvard!”” (W.L. Craig)

That said, culpability and belief only come into play in [1] and [3] in the following:

1) Rational disbelief.
2) Rational belief.
3) Rational agnosticism (unable to comment period, mouth is shut).

4) Irrational disbelief.
5) Irrational belief.
6) Irrational agnosticism (sly meandering, mouth isn’t shut).

The rest, or those other four (….according to Loftus’ and Schellenberg’s premises…) are all that Scripture discusses ever being addressed by God and the reach of His “communique”.

But that’s false.

L and S both find [1] and [3] and then fail to follow through with Scripture — in that they fail to allow Scripture’s definitions on the reality of what does happen [A] without missionaries and [B] after the death of the physical body with respect to [C] the contingencies of time and circumstance. Now, both [A] and [B] with respect to [C] make sense given what the term “God” entails and given the fact that frail and mutable contingencies such as time and circumstance are just not “too much” for the reach of *God*, which is why we’re not surprised to find such events in Scripture. But I fear that both Loftus and Schellenberg would be resistant to the fact that we find such communique in scripture (…without the physical body / after death, and without missionaries…).

Given that those events and communique are found in Scripture, it seems Loftus’ and Schellenberg are arguing against a [SET] of facts (etc.) which Scripture does not affirm, and in fact which Scripture contradicts, which can be stated in the following summary:

Loftus / Schellenberg Summary:

In fact it is the case that God has neither the means nor the will to interface with [1] and [3] and/or in fact it is the case that Scripture demonstrates neither the means (…in God…) nor the will (…in God…) to interface with [1] and [3].

The LS Summary is not interfacing with truth as found in Scripture. Which is to say that the Divine Communique in question, which is in play in only 2 out of 6 doxastic experiences, does not have the terminus which the LS Summary asserts, but, instead, has a different and demonstrable terminus which Scripture’s truth-claims demonstrate.

In short: Scripture factually removes from the LS Summary the intellectual right to claim the terminus which the LS Summary is in fact claiming.

Interestingly, when we take Scripture on face value here, we find neither the need for nor the inclination to foist either “Molinism” or the free-will-annihilating vectors found in both Hyper-Calvinism and Universalism. Instead, we find exactly what the rest of Scripture’s terms and definitions affirm: informed and volitional motions amid the proverbial self and the proverbial other — between Man and God — constituted of what God has Decreed from the get-go and which therefore cannot be otherwise, namely the Image/Likeness of His Own irreducible substratum which His Own Trinitarian processions provide — as per the Imago Dei. And what is that? Well that is nothing less than love’s timeless reciprocity within which we find ceaseless self-giving.

In Eden the syntax of “More Facts” and of “Life” and of “Gospel/Good News” are all unavoidable: God intends from the get-go to fill with Himself, to avail Himself to and for, to Pour-Out Himself (…as the Means/Ends…) both for and into “Mankind” as, not unsurprisingly, “More Facts” vs. “Eternal Life” find the very same trio of Will and Intellect and Love in-play all over again just as in the LS Thesis. And, on this side of Eden the syntax of Gospel is, as expected, timeless and unchanged: God from the get-go in fact intends to Atone for, Pour Out Himself (…as the Means/Ends…) both for and into, “Mankind” with respect to “Every-Man” and that God in fact reaches into Time and Physicality to do just that and that God in fact will not fail to follow through with what must be — prior to the mutable putting on the immutable — nothing less than love’s proposal. Such just is the singular metanarrative of Scripture. More comments on that and why both [1] and [3] from the list of six doxastic experiences in fact have a different terminus than the LS Summary must claim in order to maintain rational traction are in the com-box at: https://www.str.org/blog/pauls-solution-problem-unevangelized-gospel#.WJhnR2IrJLU

Also, Tom: if the amount of evidence we have for God is fine-tuned and thus itself evidence for God, wouldn’t that mean that more evidence for God would be evidence against God?

Travis, Schellenberg’s nonresistant nonbelievers need not successfully rationally undergird their nonbelief. All they need to do is be nonbelievers, and be both epistemically and personally open to changing their minds. To defeat this part of his argument, you need to argue for one of the following:

1. No one who has ever existed has ever been a nonbeliever.
2. Every nonbeliever who has ever existed has not been open to changing their mind.

Consider instead what I think is evidence that we actually have available to us, the existence of our own consciousness which seems inexplicable on a philosophical naturalist paradigm.

Even if that were true, it wouldn’t entail anything about atheism, so I’m not sure why you’re bringing it up.

The L.S. Summary moving further:

We cannot apply one wide, undiscerning, sloppy, and unthinking “definition” to “ALL” varieties of belief/unbelief. Rational disbelief, Rational belief, Rational agnosticism (unable to comment period, mouth is shut), Irrational disbelief, Irrational belief, and Irrational agnosticism (sly meandering, mouth isn’t shut), all emerge and diverge.

The Loftus/Schellenberg summary is only applicable in a third of “real world cases”, namely, [1] and [3] (….rational disbelief and rational agnosticism…). Given that the premise that there is such a reality as the terminus of the “un-evangelized” is untenable within Scripture’s narrative wherein God’s Act, Intention, Decree, Reach, and demonstrable Means/Will all clearly outdistance frail and mutable contingencies such as time and circumstance (…described earlier…), the LS Summary [A] fails to interface with the Christian metaphysic and [B] fails to follow through to a rational terminus with respect to the Divine Communique that has been brought to the table.

We can, for the moment, leave [A] as a stand-alone and make one further comment on [B], and that is that where [B] is concerned we must ask if the terminus presented by the LS Summary is even logically possible given the “trio” of, first, the universality of the human stock-exchange that just is truth-trading within the interface of *self* and *truth*, and, second, what the term *GOD* vis-à-vis “Being Itself” necessarily forces on the ground-floor of that stock-exchange and, thirdly, the Christian metaphysic with respect to “The Good” as it presses in upon the unavoidable doxastic experience within what cannot be less than an irreducible “…convertibility of the transcendentals…”. And, to remind us, [B] here is in addition to [A].

But what about the other two thirds of “real world cases”? There we find (…in a few, but not all, slices…) another interesting situation where our doxastic experience is concerned. To introduce that, a brief recap of one point made by T. Wakeman:

Quote:

On another note, one of the essays in that volume linked above drives home the very clear point that no matter what type of “evidence” God might choose to give us, the clever skeptic can always seek to rationalize it away. Let’s say that God were to inscribe into the moon in shimmering gold letters a passage from scripture every night, or some such thing. I think that if someone really wanted, they could conclude that the existence of aliens who might try to commandeer us by doing such a thing is a “more likely” explanation than the existence of God as the ontological grounding of reality itself, and so by “occam’s razor” would still dismiss the existence of God.

The argument:

1: Golden passages of scripture appear on the moon every night.
2: Such would only happen if there were a God.
3. Therefore there is a God.

Seems to fall apart on premise 2, where the skeptic could easily suggest the possibility of observing and manipulative aliens. Since the belief in such aliens doesn’t involve a paradigm shift in understanding the nature of reality as contingent upon a divine mind- they would probably not find it very difficult to go with “aliens”. In fact, I think skeptics would tout that reasoning as evidence against Christianity. “See, you used to think that there was a God, but this recent business with the moon shows that it was probably aliens all along.” They’d probably suggest that Jesus was an alien all along.

Likewise with a “voice” appearing in everyone’s head. Likewise with some sort of “alien artifact” which would probably be the easiest to dismiss for anyone who is familiar with video editing and special effects.

Consider instead what I think is evidence that we actually have available to us, the existence of our own consciousness which seems inexplicable on a philosophical naturalist paradigm. The existence of us as volitional beings seems to directly imply something about the nature of reality. To say (as we can with those others above) “ah well maybe there are other contingent, conscious aliens out there who made us” doesn’t actually seem to get us anywhere with consciousness but kicking the can down the street a little way.

You say, “Schellenberg’s nonresistant nonbelievers need not successfully rationally undergird their nonbelief. All they need to do is be nonbelievers, and be both epistemically and personally open to changing their minds.”

If one cannot rationally undergird their position (irrationality?), then how would one be epistemically and personally open?
It seems relatively intuitive to me based on my personal observations that nonbelievers often have an innate resistance to having their mind changed that has very little to do with reason. For many there quite obviously seems to be an emotional stumbling block which prevents them from making an accurate assessment of the data.

End quote. (by T. Wakeman)

True/Real Belief Within Self Deception:

One can in fact “truly believe” in, say, Not-God or Not-X and yet culpability within the universal human experience that is truth-trading will be found offended by one’s “volitional rock-bottom” or by one’s terminus within the *self* as such interfaces with *truth*. At the start of all of this we pointed out that “More Facts” is not always the solution and why is that? Well because the *Intellect* and data may be rescued by “More Facts” whereas, there is that ontological seam where the *Will* also has her say and therein “More Facts” may, or may not, be “enough”. As volitional beings we cannot just “expunge” that “slice” of what is “in-play” here. A meticulous picture of the process that is self-deception is in the following quote, and, to set the frame, it concludes with this:

“So, though I don’t doubt that some of these folks in some sense sincerely believe what they say, that doesn’t absolve them of the charge of intellectual dishonesty. Self-deceived people would not be self-*deceived* if they didn’t in some sense really believe what they say.” (by E. Feser)

The path to get there is not a pure, isolated box called “I-Will-Now-Deceive-My-Self” but is – as all human psychology is – comprised of an array of “boxes”.

Here’s the quote:

I agree that one must always be very careful about “psychoanalyzing” an opponent. However, there is a distinction to be made between:

(a) purporting to answer an argument by “psychoanalyzing” the person giving it, and

(b) “psychoanalyzing” a person in order to try to understand some odd behavior he is exhibiting.

Doing (a) amounts to a kind of ad hominem fallacy. But doing (b) is not fallacious. Now, what I was doing in the post above is (b). I was not saying “Coyne and Co. raise such-and-such objections to the cosmological argument. Let me answer those objections by uncovering what I take to be Coyne’s hidden psychological motivation for raising them.” That would be ad hominem. Nor, of course, did I ignore his actual objections. Instead, I explained how they rested on misunderstandings of the arguments he’s attacking. And of course, neither did I say (nor would I ever say) that atheists in general have the psychological motivations described in my post. (Of course they don’t.)

Instead, what I was saying is: “Coyne and others of a specifically New Atheist bent have a tendency to attack the same straw men over and over and over again, to ignore attempts to explain why they are straw men, to lash out even at fellow atheists who try to point out why these are straw men, etc. This is very odd and unusual, especially since these people are mostly not stupid. It cries out for explanation, and I think the explanation is this…”

But I agree that one needs to make sure that in doing (b) one does not slide into (a). And if Coyne ever actually tried seriously to respond to something I wrote, I would certainly not even get into (b) in replying to him, let alone (a).

Indeed, four years ago I really thought Coyne might do so when he said he was “dead serious” about wanting to find out what the best arguments for theism were, said he would read up on Aquinas, etc. I thought “Great, maybe he’s a decent guy after all and this could lead to a more interesting exchange.”

Hence it was very disappointing to see him almost immediately slide back into New Atheist hack mode and to see his pledge to look into the best arguments, study Aquinas, etc. go right down the memory hole.

I also want to emphasize that I don’t dismiss the work of Coyne, Dawkins, Dennett, or other New Atheists in general. I think that Dennett, for example, has very interesting things to say on issues in philosophy of mind despite the fact that I think his whole project there is misguided and ultimately rests on certain key fallacies. In general, you can really learn from someone who thinks through a position thoroughly and systematically, even when the position is ultimately doomed. In part this is because an erroneous position typically takes one aspect of the truth and exaggerates its importance, and often people who do that will see things that are missed by people who don’t make the same exaggeration. In part it’s because an intelligent and systematic thinker is unlikely in the first place to be wrong about everything, but will make important discoveries which can be disentangled from his errors. And in part it’s because errors themselves can be instructive in that we can learn how and why certain ideas and lines of argument which seem attractive ultimately won’t work. Similarly, I’m happy to learn whatever I can from Coyne and Dawkins when they write on biology and other areas in which they have some real expertise.

The trouble is that these guys simply don’t have anything interesting to say on religion, specifically. Many atheists do — e.g. Mackie, Sobel, Oppy, and many others I’ve mentioned over the years — but not the New Atheists. And it’s such a glaring defect in the thinking of otherwise intelligent people that, again, it cries out for a type (b) treatment.

…..[There] is the question of what we mean, or should mean, or might mean, by “intellectual dishonesty.” Certainly I don’t think Coyne or the more unreasonable people in his combox are consciously and explicitly thinking “I know this isn’t what theists mean, but I’m going to pretend otherwise for rhetorical purposes.” But I don’t think that intellectual dishonesty is usually as blatant or self-conscious as that. I think it is usually a kind of self-deception, and self-deception is, of course, by its nature less than fully conscious. It involves a tendency to avoid letting one’s attention dwell on unpleasant facts or ideas, a tendency to try to focus one’s attention instead on evidence and ideas that will reinforce what one wants to believe, and so forth. It also typically involves a kind of touchiness when some other person raises some uncomfortable piece of evidence that might jeopardize the self-deceiver’s attempt to convince himself that the thing he wants to believe is really true. Think of the alcoholic who doesn’t want to face his problem, lets his mind dwell only on ways of interpreting his behavior which make it seem within the normal range, minimizes behavior that other people would take to be clear evidence of addiction, gets touchy and defensive when the subject arises, etc.

Now, when someone like Coyne keeps attacking the same straw men over and over and over again, over the course of many years and despite the fact that even people who otherwise agree with him gently advise him to stop doing it, when he gets touchy even with atheist readers who call him out on it, when he doubles down on the rhetoric about how obviously stupid his opponents’ arguments are, etc. — well, that sort of behavior is pretty consistent with that of someone who is interested in convincing himself that he was right all along rather than that of someone who really wants to find out if he is in fact right. That is to say, it sounds like classic self-deception. And that’s the kind of intellectual dishonesty I’m talking about.

Second, it is true that analytic philosophers do, at least “officially” if (unfortunately) not always in practice, highly value a willingness and ability to try to reconstruct an opponent’s arguments in as plausible and fair-minded a way as possible. Certainly that was something drilled into me in grad school, and I have always been grateful for it. Again, there are analytic philosophers who do not live up to this ideal, and I can certainly think of some analytic philosophers with a prominent online presence who do not even try to live up to it at all when they think that refraining from doing so might further some political cause they favor. Still, it is an ideal that analytic philosophers all know they should strive to live up to. It is also an ideal that Scholastic philosophers value highly.

Now, as a Scholastic trained in analytic philosophy, it is certainly an ideal I value highly, and I confess that I have very little patience for academics and other intellectuals who don’t value it. I make no apologies for that, because the reason analytic philosophers and Scholastics value it is that philosophy, science, and intellectual pursuits in general are about truth, about finding out how things really are and not merely confirming prejudices, furthering agendas, etc. Trying to give an opponent’s views a fair-minded reading is just part of this project of attaining truth, both because you never know when an opponent might have seen something you’ve missed, and because getting into the practice of reading an opponent’s views fairly is a good way of training oneself not to be blinded by one’s own prejudices.

So, I don’t see a willingness to try accurately to represent an opponent’s views as merely a special interest of professional philosophers. I would argue that it is partially constitutive of serious inquiry of any kind, and thus of intellectual honesty. Hence, if someone is unwilling to make an effort to represent an opponent’s views accurately, I would say that he is ipso facto intellectually dishonest. So, since Coyne and other New Atheists have demonstrated this sort of unwillingness, they have to that extent shown that they merit the charge of intellectual dishonesty.

Furthermore, Coyne and Co. make a very big show out of how much they allegedly value evidence, not letting preconceptions color one’s inquiry, etc. So, they can hardly complain when they are asked to look at the evidence concerning what their opponents actually have said, and when they are expected not to let their own preconceptions about what theists believe color their interpretation of arguments like the cosmological argument. And they certainly get touchy when they think their own arguments have been misrepresented. So, they can hardly complain when someone expects them to show the same courtesy to their opponents.

So, though I don’t doubt that some of these folks in some sense sincerely believe what they say, that doesn’t absolve them of the charge of intellectual dishonesty. Self-deceived people would not be self-deceived if they didn’t in some sense really believe what they say.

End quote.

Roger,

The evidentialist argument which Loftus makes and which Feser comments on (etc.) is applied across the board irrespective of which Theism is under review. If you want to add to that argument that in your chosen paradigm volitional/can-do-otherwise is ultimately illusory vis–à–vis the fundamental nature of reality (etc.) then you agree with some slice of theism somewhere and therefore arrive again back at square one (….and in the “useful but not true” deflationary truth value in all your claims…). On the otherhand if you want to add to the evidentialist argument that in your chosen paradigm volitional/can-do-otherwise is ultimately real and irreducible in the ground of being itself then you agree with some slice of theism somewhere and therefore arrive again back at square one.

Roger,

We’re glad you agree with a huge swath of Christendom as both Scripture and our first person experience affirm the reality of volitional/can-do-otherwise. What is your evidence that a huge swath of Christendom has in fact gotten it right? Is it, say, “Feelings-full-stop”? Experience-full-stop? Physics-full-stop? Is it, say, that you agree that “Being Itself” is irreducibly volitional/can-do-otherwise? Or what? Agreeing with the majority of Christendom on planet Earth isn’t enough. You’ll need evidence for such claims. The evidential argument seems to be settled in your mind on the side of affirming most of Christendom as getting it right. Which, again, is fine. But as to what that evidence is, well you’ve not said.

scbrown

You agree that I have taken the side of a huge swath of Christendom. That huge swath of Christendom is what has basically come out of the Protestant Reformation of the church in the fifteenth century. Early Reformers like Luther and Calvin held strongly to the idea of the bondage of the will. They went in a completely different directions than the Catholic church on many issues including the freedom/bondage of the will. What was unique about the Reformers was their insistence on Scripture being their authority or evidence, as you suggest is needed. You ask, “What is your evidence that a huge swath of Christendom has in fact gotten it right?” That evidence is the preponderance of Scripture that teaches that the human will acts according to its own desires and nature. That nature and desire is always in the direction of sin, as a result of the sinful nature inherited from Adam. So if by free will you mean that a person can act as he/she chooses, yes, but he or she will always choose according to the natural inclination of his/her heart. The apostle Paul is the perfect example of that, as he gives his own testimony in Romans 7 of life apart from Christ. He says he is not able to do the good that he intellectually knows and even appreciates because sin (sinful nature) always leads him to act according to such nature. That’s also the point of Romans 8:7-10.

The argument you make for the freedom of the will is largely a philosophical argument which for most philosophers is made apart from Scripture and even for Christian philosophers is made mainly from human reason. The Calvinistic and Lutheran idea is derived solely from Scripture. So again, if you are listening, the evidence for such a view is the Bible.

In these comments, I’m not arguing in favor of one or the other (freedom or bondage). I’m saying that the historic Christian view says the human will is bound by a sinful nature to do what is natural according to that nature. And a choice for Christ is always made under the influence and empowerment of the Holy Spirit, as Loftus suggests would be ideal, especially if it was carried out in all people. But it isn’t. That’s what the Bible teaches, if one even believes the Bible.

Roger,

You’re arguing for TULIP as the real-deal. That’s fine. It seems to be the only melody you know. So keep singing — it’s not a bother. But you should know that the majority of Christendom disagrees with you. In fact, that same majority argues quite convincingly that history is on its side.

It seems that our entire first experience in fact affirms what that same majority of Christendom tells us about volition/can-do-otherwise.

If you want to disagree with the majority of Christendom and with your own first person experience, well you are certainly free to do so.

Does the evidence lead you in that direction?

If you want to agree with the majority of Christendom and with your own first person experience, well you are certainly free to do so.

Does the evidence lead you in that direction?

Roger,

Unfortunately for you on the evidential problem of volition/can-do-otherwise, the historical and present majority of Christendom agree with our own first person experience and with the data of psychology 101. Apparently that your melody sings of said history and said majority that they’ve no Scripture is somehow soothing to your ears. QED on Psych 101 and Feser’s described modes of self-deception.

BillT

You say, “Since, it seems, Roger is like the proverbial “dog with a bone” here is his question asked…” Bill it seems you are more like the proverbial dog coming back with the same question you asked about from another article. You apparently seem to think I’m concerned about the billions of people who have never heard the gospel. Where does that come from? Talk about the proverbial dog with a bone. Do you have a mirror?

Roger,

Since you claim that the largest swath of Christendom has no Scripture or makes no use of Scripture, it’s just not clear what your point is.

If you reject data/information about our own humanity in the arena of psychology or any other arena, that’s fine. But don’t expect the Christian to ignore “the rest of reality” when Scripture instructs us to embrace the whole of reality.

If your proverbial T.O.E. or paradigm does not like seamless coherence well again don’t expect the Christian to follow you in that move.\

Roger,

“I am suggesting that “you” don’t use Scripture, which is unusual for Christianity…”

And your premise there is that the largest swath of Christendom “therefore” does not have its roots in Scripture nor in convergence with our universal first person experience.

Is that an evidence based premise?

Another premise you now introduce is that sola-scripture ought to lead us away from convergence and synergy with “the rest of reality“.

Is that premise an evidence based premise on your part?

Christianity is evidence based and you seem to think all the different arenas of reality ought to be diverging from synergy.

Huh?

Roger,

The evidence based seems illusive to you. Your premise is that the fragmentation of the knowledge of good and evil contradicts the landscape affirmed by Scripture and, also, that it contradicts the predictions of Scripture with respect to Man, God, Knowledge, and the means to The Good.

Now, how is it possible that those premises — which obviously contradict [1] Scripture’s descriptions of our current reality and [2] our universal first person experience — can ever be evidence based?

Please explain.

Roger,

The largest swath of Christendom and our universal first person experience affirm that we can in fact intentionally move into self-giving within love’s timeless reciprocity amid one another and into/out-of our embrace of The Good.

It’s not complicated.

The technical term for it is reality.

On humanity’s Peaks and Nadirs through the centuries which scripture and our universal first person experience testify of:

[A] As fragments of our brokenness come closer together over time and knowledge *grows* and we move towards light, is that evidence of No-God?

[B] As fragments of our brokenness descend and *decrease* in knowledge and we move towards dark, is that evidence of No-God?

[C] Does it surprise you that God’s kiddies constitute a blemished and spotted group of misfits?

The evidence based: A, B, and C are tangible facts affirmed by both Scripture and our universal first person experience.

Evidence based premises regarding both Scripture and the real world as we actually find it all gel with increasing synergy.

Why do you willingly choose to dance against the evidence?

So as I take it, the Calvinist and Lutheran positions are built on silly premises and stand outside the pale of Christianity. You apparently hold this as such a fundamental issue (like Calvin and Luther) that you would exclude those holding a position different from yours as outside of the arena of Christianity. Your exclusionary view does cast suspicion on the validity of Christianity.

scbrown

There are so many exceptions to your so-called rule of freedom of the will, that the rule itself holds no validity. I would assume that God above anyone would have a freedom of the will, but does he have the freedom to sin? No, because he always acts according to his righteous character. Or what about Christians who have reached the final destination of heaven and reached a state of complete sanctification? Do they have the freedom to sin in heaven, or do they also, like God, act in accordance with their redeemed character? Or what about Satan? Is he free to do both good and evil? Or does he always act in accord with his fallen and evil character? Your idea of freedom fails to take into account such examples (we could include fallen and heavenly angels as well), and disproves your point on freedom of the will. Humans are born with a sinful nature and also consistently act according to their nature. That, again, is the Bible’s position and accords with the evidence of experience.

As you say, “Evidence is all around. But if you treat it like the way you are in this thread, well, it’s no wonder you are confused about the Knowledge of Good and Evil.” You must be talking about yourself.

Roger,

You don’t seem to think things “through to the end” as it were. Can that which the Christian referents with the term *GOD* in fact create a rock so heavy that He can’t move it? What is stated when the Christian referents “Being Itself“? What about when he referents “Goodness Itself“? What about “The Good“? More generally, how does that unpack with respect to the rational mind’s approach to that which is in all worlds being’s ultimate explanatory terminus as such compels reason into what cannot be less than the metaphysical wellspring of all ontological possibility? From there, then, we find ourselves racing towards the epicenter of our own particular world defined by the Divine Decree of the Imago Dei. Within that paradigm, our paradigm, when it comes to the trio of Eden, Privation, and Heaven we find them all pressing in on the following caution to Non-Theists in general: You probably think the metaphysics of love’s proposal isn’t necessary for the metaphysics of love and you probably think the metaphysics of two becoming one – of a wedding – is the same as the metaphysics of the proposal. It is at that juncture where you will need to stay with the Christian if you mean to interface with the Christian’s metaphysic. It is at that juncture where you will need to delineate some of the necessary differences with respect to the metaphysics of love when one is within (….on the one hand…) the arena of “God” or “Trinity” as opposed to when one is within (…on the other hand…) the arena of contingent beings in relation to the Necessary Being (…God/Trinity…). But, again, there’s no need to go into that rich soil given that you don’t ask. Instead you just run about splashing paint you know not where.

Roger,

Probably about three times so far I’ve taken you up on your confusion with an offer to you to quote a part that is tripping you up and what you suppose it might be discussing so that we can work through it. So far you’ve offered accusations without ever following up for clarification. It’s a pattern of yours. I see no need to replay that dance a fourth time.

On your bizarre premise, explain how “The Good” not doing evil is problematic. Be sure to include in your reply what [A] “The Good” entails and what [B] “The Good Minus Something” entails. Can A be B? Can Being be Non-Being? You’re premise must answer “yes”. So please explain your premise.

Good Day to All,

I know that I am late to comment on this post, and I know that some of what I say will be the same as what others have already mentioned, but given that this post concerns the so-called issue of “divine hiddenness”, I would like to comment anyway.

Point 1: So, when speaking of the issue of divine hiddenness, and the issue of so-called ‘rational unbelievers’, the first point to note is that, technically, no amount of evidence that God could provide would ever be sufficient to non-coercively overcome a disbeliever’s doubt if the disbeliever did not wish to be convinced. Indeed, given the ability for hyper-skepticism to create doubt no matter what the evidence is, it must be pointed out that no matter what God did, a skeptic could always—if he wanted—attribute the event to aliens, or a hallucination, or that he was in a computer simulation, etc. And skeptic Michael Shermer even has a “law” which states that any sufficiently advanced alien intelligence would be, to us, indistinguishable from God; as such, atheism and naturalism are thus unfalsifiable if they wish to be given that any seemingly miraculous event could always be attributed to aliens rather than God. In fact, I know a prominent atheist who admitted that even if the stars spelled out the Apostles Creed and the whole world saw it, he would likely go mad or believe everyone had gone mad rather than believe that God had made a miracle occur. So, the point here is that even God could not freely convince certain unbelievers to believe in Him no matter how much evidence He might provide; and since God knows this to be the case, then this fact no doubt factors into His thinking when He provides the evidence that He does.

Point 2: When speaking about rational unbelievers, it is actually questionable whether any such individuals exist, at least if they are neurologically-typical. Indeed, one can doubt both the “rational” part and the “unbeliever” part of the idea of a ‘rational unbeliever’. For example, I have seen some of the reasons unbelievers use to claim not to believe in God, and it is at least questionable whether those reasons can be considered rational. Next, for neurologically-typical individuals, it is plausible to question whether any such individuals truly are unbelievers. Indeed, I am actually just finishing up a 12,000 word essay which claims that it is plausible, and even reasonable, to believe that neurologically-typical individuals who claim to be unbelievers actually do believe in God, or, at the very least, do not actually disbelieve for rational reasons but rather for psychological and/or moral ones. So again, the idea of a rational unbeliever is at least open to debate.

Point 3: If rational unbelievers with “open hearts” do indeed exist—and I do not doubt that some do—there is evidence to suggest that such unbelievers are neurologically-atypical, such as being high-functioning autistics, and so their unbelief is non-culpable, just like a color-blind person cannot be held responsible for not being able to see the color ‘red’. And indeed, there is mounting evidence to suggest that atheism is linked to autism; consequently, I think it can be predicted that rational unbelievers are also people who are neurologically-atypical. Thus, the rational unbeliever is neurologically-atypical, whereas the neurologically-typical individual is not actually a rational unbeliever.

Con’t…

Con’t….

Sub-Point C: It can also be noted that God’s main desire is that all men be saved, and since God being obvious could actually lead some men to resent Him and deny salvation, then it is not clear that God being obvious is necessarily in keeping with His main desire and His loving nature. Again, think of the police. Although the police are there for the good of the people, someone who sees the police on every street corner, and watching everything that they do, might actually come to resent the police rather than appreciate them. Indeed, in certain people, a certain disdain and willful disobedience (see Point B) might come about precisely because the police are so obvious. And it could be the same with God. Thus, the non-obviousness of God could be leading more people to salvation rather than away from it.

Sub-Point D: Finally—and I think this is the most important point, plus the most unique one—the non-obviousness of God is also necessary for believers! Why? Well, think about what unbelievers often accuse believers of doing: namely, believing merely for self-interested reasons and as a means of avoiding hell. So, in light of this, why is the non-obviousness of God relevant? Because by making His existence non-obvious, and possibly doubtful—although not reasonably doubtful—God thus creates the conditions for believers to love Him in a truly genuine and selfless way. Consider this illustration: when a husband loves his wife, but the wife loves the husband back and totes on him endlessly, it is always possible to view the husband’s love as self-interested rather than selfless. After all, the wife constantly gives back to the husband and he might be staying with the wife not because he genuinely loves her, but because she gives him stuff and treats him well. By contrast, now imagine that after five years of marriage, the wife suddenly falls into a coma and a vegetative state. Now, the husband has no idea if his wife, as a person, is even still alive or not, or if she will ever come out of the coma. But now imagine that for the next fifty years, the husband visits his wife daily, cleans her, takes care of her, and still loves her even as he is unsure if she still really exists or not. Now, in such a situation, the husband has the opportunity to truly and genuinely love his wife with no guarantee of reciprocation. The husband’s love is about as selfless as possible, with very little doubt that he is doing what he does simply because he loves his wife, not because he is getting something from her. But now think of this situation with God. Take Mother Theresa for example. Early in her life, she had a number of intense divine experiences, but then those experiences went away and she even doubted God during her long career. Why would God allow this? Because by doing so, Mother Theresa could show a selfless love which could not fully or deeply manifest itself if God constantly and continually reciprocated to her. After all, we are told to be perfect, like God is perfect, and God selflessly loves the very sinners who either hate Him or do not believe that He exists, and so by being non-obvious, God is also giving believers the chance to love Him just like He loves us: namely, in a truly selfless way.

Sub-Point E: As a side-note, it should also be noted that even if a person does not believe in God’s existence, this does not necessarily stop the person from desiring that God exists and acting like He does, much the same way that a woman who does not know if she can get pregnant can nevertheless still hope to have a baby and prepare a room as if a baby is coming. So this is also a key point: that a person does not need to believe in God to act as if He does and desire that He does, and such a course of action, in my view, will count for much in the eyes of God.

So, in the end, when all these points are considered, it is clear that God has very good reasons not to be obvious.

Cheers!

Damian Michael
http://www.reconquistainitiative.com
http://www.damianmichael.com

Roger,

With respect to #56, #57, and #58, the following came up elsewhere and I thought I’d put it here to add some clarification as to the nature of the proposal contrasted to the nature of the wedding and so on. Keep in mind that when the Christian referents “reality’s irreducible substratum” he is referencing “Trinity” and the relational nature therein (…etc…). So, with that said:

The résumé and the proposal and the wedding and the begetting……..

With respect to the premise of “…..Sin A or Sin B or Sin C or Sin D or Sin E, and, well, “IF” Sin A or B or C or D or E, “THEN” one will not ultimately see Man’s final felicity – Man’s true good….”, a few points of clarification:

Our syntax has to be precise. Sin matters. The purpose of man and reality matters. “The Good” matters. *Yet* our sins are not what decide our fate or inheritance. Not ultimately. The résumé which we freely and volitionally hand to God is what decides what we inherit.

[A] If on said résumé I am listed as the all-sufficient, then I’m given my preference, my preferred heaven, my first love – the isolated or privatized self – the “Pure-I”, that which is Me/Man minus God (….or minus immutable love….).

[B] If on said résumé the all-sufficient is found instead in the immutable love of the Necessary Being – Who Himself Pours Out, and Fills – if the all-sufficient is found in Christ – then I am given my preference, my preferred Heaven, my first love – the community or unicity or wholeness of self/other – of God in Man / Man in God – and therewith – finally – immutable love wherever I shall motion, whether above my head or beneath my feet or into my own chest – ad infinitum.

Neither our sins nor our righteousness can win the day. Only God’s righteousness wins the day. Only Christ. Our condition does not matter. Only our volition and will to freely embrace Life, to freely embrace Christ. Changes will come following that interface, but we all change at different paces and through different degrees. Just ask Peter and others in the book of Acts and in Corinth ….and so on all the way up through modernity and the Christian journey.

It’s the résumé which the applicant submits. It’s not the applicant.

Reason and logic press in and compel our definitions:

The résumé vs. the applicant cannot be some other way in any possible world given the two facts of [1] the Decree of the Imago Dei and [2] the fact that we are contingent beings. We cannot rise to the level of being our own means given the end that is the immutable love of God – the immutable love of the Necessary Being.

That’s on the pure force of logic – and that Scripture’s metanarrative comports with that is as expected. Going one step further we find that the same goes for love and contingent beings:

It is logically necessary that the metaphysics of love house love’s proposal, just as it is logically necessary that the metaphysics of love’s proposal house two possible outcomes amid self/other with respect to the contingent being’s reply, just as it is logically necessary that the metaphysics of that proposal are not and cannot be the same metaphysics which we will find in the Wedding which follows the proposal as “proposing” and “begetting” are not identical.

Being careful with terms:

We must always delineate some of the necessary differences with respect to the metaphysics of love when one is within (….on the one hand…) the arena of “God” or “Trinity” as opposed to when one is within (…on the other hand…) the arena of contingent beings in relation to the Necessary Being (…God/Trinity…).

Conclusion:

One of the reasons I am a Christian is that in that paradigm alone reason and logic are satisfied that love’s timeless reciprocity is in fact a contour of reality’s irreducible and immutable substratum and is thereby seamless with the rational. What the rational mind claims as ontic-truth is thereby in fact the highest ethic vis-à-vis love’s timeless reciprocity. Reason as truth-finder is compelled by the unrelenting demands of both logic and love to chase after Christ, and after His Means, and after His Ends.