Pro-Choice Determinists

I think DoctorLogic subscribes to this way of thinking. Maybe he’s out there lurking and can confirm.

The second paragraph is a poster-child example of dumbness: what if it were in the “nature” of a thing to actually have the capacity for free will?

Well, Holo, what if it were? Well, then determinism would be false.. but this is an empirical question and I’m fine to go where the evidence leads. But to me, it looks like determinism is probably true.

Is rationality (let alone free will) even possible “under determinism”? Why is d trying to change our minds on this: what is the point of his baseless and fad-laden assertions if free will is an illusion?

Here’s the big pitfall in free-will discussions – compatibalists use different definitions of the terms “free will”, “choice”, etc than do libertarians, so people end up talking past one another.

So to answer your question, yes, compatibalist free will is possible under determinism (the type I described above) but obviously libertarian free will isn’t.

And I’m not aware of any problem between rationality, rules of logic, etc and determinism. You’ll have to show me where the problem is supposed to be.

If I oppose the force of gravity by intentionally picking up a rock, i.e., by intentionally operating against that force, doesn’t mean the very, ahem, “nature” of my intentionality is non-deterministic?

In my estimation, there’s nothing contradictory between intention and determinism, so no. Intentions could be determined by antecedent causes.

In that cause who or what is doing, i.e. responsible for, the intending?

Ultimately, physics and biology would be responsible (i.e. the cause) of the intentions.

First, you yourself acknowledged that on determinism everything “reduces” to physics. Second, if a process is caused by physical necessity, then its result is caused by physical necessity. If your thoughts are caused solely by physical necessity, then their results are, too. Solely.

Yep.

If you think the thoughts that come at the end of your “deliberation” have anything to do with reasons, then you haven’t caught the fact that physical necessity was the cause for your thinking those thoughts–solely (if determinism is true).

Again, it seems as if you might be presupposing some libertarian definition of “rational deliberation”. But whether the entire process of deliberating, including all the interplay between our values, consciousness, desires, information and ultimately our actions, is causally determined or not, it makes no difference. That interplay still happens, and that’s what I call “rational deliberation”

If you want to make it a problem for determinism that the whole process is a prisoner of physical necessity, well you’ll have to explain why – I don’t consider it much of a problem.

And for what its worth, I don’t think libertarianism does any better – at worst, its incoherent, at best it reduces choices to luck.

@16: “Yep.”

Boy, now that’s what I call rigorously supporting one’s deep emotion needs with reasoned argumentation.

@d:

Again, it seems as if you might be presupposing some libertarian definition of “rational deliberation”. But whether the entire process of deliberating, including all the interplay between our values, consciousness, desires, information and ultimately our actions, is causally determined or not, it makes no difference. That interplay still happens, and that’s what I call “rational deliberation”

It makes no difference?

You can call the process that goes on in your brain “rational deliberation” as much as you want (again, the nominalist stance that by changing the name of the thing we have changed its nature…), but under determinism you are nothing but a puppet and all your thoughts are nothing but the jerks occasioned by the string pulls of physical laws. You have come to a belief on determinism not because you have weighed the pros and cons and judged the pros weightier, but simply because of the relentless work of physical laws. Whether determinism is in fact true or not, it is irrelevant, because you have been overdetermined to believe that it is true. And since you are overdetermined to believe that it is true, I reject all your arguments for it — not that you have presented any for me to reject. Of course, you can reply that I myself am bound to reject determinism, but that should not bother you, should it? In fact, why are you here trying to convince us otherwise? Oh wait, you could not have chosen to act otherwise.

You can call the process that goes on in your brain “rational deliberation” as much as you want (again, the nominalist stance that by changing the name of the thing we have changed its nature…)

This is confused. I’m not trying to change the nature of things, I’m attempting to give a coherent view of certain concepts under determinism. If libertarianism is false, your ideas about all of those things are false. Compatibalists, at least, have argued that our thoughts about all those things can be refined in such a way as to salvage them, under determinism.

No post-modernism here, as Holo accused, or nominalism… just discussions of determinism (or lack thereof) and all the implications of it.

but under determinism you are nothing but a puppet and all your thoughts are nothing but the jerks occasioned by the string pulls of physical laws.

Sure, maybe that’s technically correct, though it seems to be purposefully cast in extremely deflationary rhetoric (perhaps to poison the well against determinism).

I’d say it more like this: Under determinism, I am the proximate cause of my actions.

You have come to a belief on determinism not because you have weighed the pros and cons and judged the pros weightier, but simply because of the relentless work of physical laws. Whether determinism is in fact true or not, it is irrelevant, because you have been overdetermined to believe that it is true. And since you are overdetermined to believe that it is true, I reject all your arguments for it — not that you have presented any for me to reject. Of course, you can reply that I myself am bound to reject determinism, but that should not bother you, should it? In fact, why are you here trying to convince us otherwise? Oh wait, you could not have chosen to act otherwise.

Actually, thanks to determinism, I know that my actions and words will have some effect on you – they are a part of the causal river in which we all immersed. Maybe they won’t ultimately change your mind, but *something* in you will be affected.

Under libertarianism, this is not the case, which is one of the more troubling aspects of the theory.

@d:

You can call the process that goes on in your brain “rational deliberation” as much as you want (again, the nominalist stance that by changing the name of the thing we have changed its nature…)

This is confused.

There is nothing confused about my assertion. If you want to call the physiological processes that go on the brain “rational deliberation”, be my guest, but please do not try to convince me that those processes, completely determined by natural laws, can be identified with what is commonly called “rational deliberation”.

I’d say it more like this: Under determinism, I am the proximate cause of my actions.

The proximate cause but not the ultimate cause. And even “I am the proximate cause of my actions” faces enormous problems. What is this “I” that has causal power? Under determinism, all causal power is efficient causal power, and efficient causal power regulated by physical laws. Your actions are caused by a (complex) chain of necessary, physical causation. How do you smuggle an “I” that can act as a proximate cause, as distinct from efficient causation since the latter is all there is?

Actually, thanks to determinism, I know that my actions and words will have some effect on you – they are a part of the causal river in which we all immersed. Maybe they won’t ultimately change your mind, but *something* in you will be affected.

False.

Premise 1: You cannot alter the past or the laws of nature.

Premise 2: Under determinism, the future is completely determined by the past or the laws of nature.

Conclusion: you cannot alter the future. Ergo, you cannot have any influence at all over my beliefs.

STR made a video about QM and the subject of rationality – here.

Keep that term ‘rational deliberation’ all to yourself, if you like! But it troubles me not that this thing you call ‘rational deliberation’ does not exist under determinism.

Being the anti-rationalist you are — whether consciously so or not, it matters none — it is hardly surprising that it does not bother you that rational deliberation does not exist.

I don’t even have a clear idea what you take it to be (especially if it requires libertarianism – which I consider a failure in almost every respect where the libertarians think it suceeds), much less why I should be concerned over its non-existence. So, at this point, its just not an impressive or noteworthy problem to raise against determinism – it certainly isnt fatal.

You yourself quoted the expression “rational deliberation” from Tom Gilson’s post. In that post it has the sense “rational thought”, which is what I took it to mean. So the fact that under determinism, rational though does not exist is not a fatal objection?

Well, I’m not really going down the rathole of the philosophy of the self and what “I” is… there’s just not much there particularly pertinant to determinism.

Ah yes, the “rathole of the philosophy of the self”. What the “self” is it does not matter; that rational though is not possible under determinism is not a fatal objection… great wonder that by denying free will one embraces irrationality.

As for proximate causes, I was using it more in the legal sense, which is sort of like efficient causation, I gather. It simply means the closest cause.

You employed the expression first, and you are not even sure what it means? But, yes, I took it to mean “the closest cause”. No, it is not “sort of like efficient causation”. I will repeat myself:

1. You are not the ultimate cause of your actions. Ultimate has several different meanings, but in this context it means that some of the necessary causes of an agent’s action originates in the agent himself and not outside him. That you are the proximate cause I will concede for now, but the fact is that you yourself are whole and completely caused by causes completely outside of your control and influence. Genuine freedom of action entails that you, at least in part, are the ultimate source for your own actions. If you are not, at least in part, the ultimate source of your actions how can oit be said that you control your actions? Everything less than that is not freedom. Given your penchant for renaming things, I have no doubt that you will object to my definition of freedom.

2. Even being a “proximate cause” has severe problems. In order to say that you are a proximate cause, one must confidently locate a self that is an agent with causal power. But given that all causation is efficient causation — ultimately, interaction of particles described by physical laws — can you point me to where is this agent as distinguished from the fundamental particles that make up your body? If there is no such agent, how can one coherently say that oneself is the proximate cause of anything?

Tom Gilson’s already pointed out that you failed to undermine the argument that, under determinism, you have no power to affect the future. The only thing your argument proves is that prior states of the universe could influence my beliefs; we already know that. We do not even have to subscribe to determinism to accept that. And even granting a causal relationship between you typing a bunch of words and the alteration of my beliefs, that relation is efficient causation, that is, my beliefs would be altered ultimately because of particle-particle interactions, not because of the cogency of your arguments. In other words, you can drop the pretense of having a rational debate.

I’m surprised no one has brought up the Argument from Reason yet; it would seem to be the clearest way to show d why rational thought is impossible under determinism, and why it matters.

The problem is, I can’t find a good link or summary of it right now. The Wikipedia page really doesn’t do it justice. I remember writing a summary of the AfR on this blog for Gregory Magarshak a few months ago, but I can’t find it now. Tom, I know you probably have a lot of good resources related to the AfR… if you have the time, would you mind putting up a pointer or two? To be honest, I would benefit from it just as much as (and perhaps more than) d.

Thesis defense in one week!

Tom, I don’t know. I haven’t put much time into thoughts on abortion recently.

Thank you, G. Rodrigues, for the links 🙂

I was first introduced to the AfR when reading Miracles, and I found it powerful at the time, but I haven’t explored it very much since then. Although I have heard of Reppert, I haven’t read his book on the AfR. I, too, would love to read it, but it will probably have to wait until I have more time.

SteveK:

Why?? Your answer goes counter to the experiences of everyone, even your own, so YOU must justify your argument – not us. So please, go ahead. Without changing the definition of the word ‘choose’, would you say an 8-ball chooses to roll into the side pocket? Would you say a child chooses to eat cereal for breakfast?

Determinism doesnt go against our intuitions at all. Even libertarians have strong deterministic intuitons in most respects, they just feel like choice is an exception to the rules of cause and effect.

Actually, no libertarian has ever given me a good description of what a causeless free choice feels like, and how one intuitively distinguishes it from a caused choice in which the agent is unaware of all the causes.

I think the reality of libertarian intuitions are extremely overblown.

JAD:

Of course d is engaged here is similar non-sense. He is arguing for a point of view. But if my, or Tom’s or Holo’s etc. point of view is determined or pre-determined, then arguing with us is not going to change any minds. But then maybe d is predetermined to be argumentative… In that case (sigh!) we’ll never be able to shut him up…

You are confusing fatalism (no matter what one does, things will end the same) with determinism (there is only one possible future).

Determinism seems fatalistic in some ways, but the future unfolds on account of the things that happen, not in spite of them. Under determinism, my arguments could certainly effect others, and cause them to change their minds.

Tom:

d, this is not a debate over definitions, smily face or not. This is a debate over realities. The “rathole,” as you call it, of the philosophy of self is terribly pertinent under determinism. So is rationality.

I think we all knew what you meant by “proximate cause.” I don’t think you’re getting what we meant by pointing out the weakness in that conception.

Your p1. etc. to c1 misses the point, too. No one denied that your words have causal effect. What was denied was that you have causal effect. Which, by the way, gets you looking down into that “rathole” again, if you think it through carefully enough.

Generally, one can casually refer human beings using terms like “I”, “me”, “you”, or “her” without first tackling any deep philosophical problems of the mind and self. Whatever the nature of the mind, self or what-have-you, those terms can simply refer to human beings. When I say “we are the proximate causes of our actions”, that’s how I mean it.

Our choices are caused causes under determinism, but rather than just blame the big bang for every good or bad thing that comes our way, we like to look at smaller, more informative slices of the causal chain. Bob throws a baseball at a window, we can say Bob, the human being, was the proximate cause of the broken window, even in determinism-land.

Compatibalists almost speak a different language than libetarians. It takes some extra effort on the part of both sides to understand one another. One can’t presume libertarian meanings of words in the determinist description of things, which I think is where the confusion is coming from.

If one understands determinism, it should be the charitable interpretation that when a determinist says something like “I am the proximate cause of X”, he does not mean he is the causeless cause of X, or through some force of will, he causes X happen – that’s libertarianism.

d, on further reflection, I feel the need to point out something to you, which is that it would do you good to pick up a good introductory philosophy book and give it a good read. When you say,

Well, I wouldnt disagree with you, my philosophy is self-taught, and a little haphazard in the materials I have studied. I havent spent much time with Aristotle. It seems some of the posters here might do well to have a refresher on determinism and fatalism as well – and perhaps some modern challenges to libertariansim (such as the problem of present luck).

… what you’re showing is that you don’t understand what you are talking about. A proximate cause in the legal sense is not very much like an efficient cause. And biology is not a cause, proximate or otherwise. As you are using it here it is a level of analysis. This is basic.

When I said “biology”, I really was thinking “biological processes” – which are certainly causes.

I’m not ragging on you, d, for I think you’re doing the right thing by engaging in discussion, as long as you approach it with openness to learning. I’m also not trying to be condescending; in fact, I’m trying hard not to be—but the fact is, with each comment you’re demonstrating as much what you don’t know as what you do. I think you want to do better than that, so I hope you’ll take some honest and realistic feedback, and some advice that you do some study so you can do as well as you obviously want to do.

The best introductory text I know of for you is one that would help fill another gap in your knowledge banks: Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Holopupenko has some disagreements with these authors. On this he and I are not in total agreement, but regardless, I think he would appreciate their treatment of basic logic and some of the basic questions of how to handle discussions of this sort.

Thanks for the suggestions!

G. Rodrigues

Genuine freedom of action entails that you, at least in part, are the ultimate source for your own actions. If you are not, at least in part, the ultimate source of your actions how can oit be said that you control your actions? Everything less than that is not freedom. Given your penchant for renaming things, I have no doubt that you will object to my definition of freedom.

If choices are causeless, nothing in “you” can account for that choice – in fact, nothing can. So libertarianism fails to account for genuine freedom.

2. Even being a “proximate cause” has severe problems. In order to say that you are a proximate cause, one must confidently locate a self that is an agent with causal power. But given that all causation is efficient causation — ultimately, interaction of particles described by physical laws — can you point me to where is this agent as distinguished from the fundamental particles that make up your body? If there is no such agent, how can one coherently say that oneself is the proximate cause of anything?

I addressed this in my reply to Tom. Being a proximate cause only entails that:

a) I am a living human being
b) I cause stuff (though, not causelessly)

Determinists don’t believe we have “causal power” in the libertarian sense, of course not.
But determinism entails that we human beings, will play a part in the causing future states of the universe. Therefore, we are proximate causes.

I know you’re in a busy season, Bill, but when time is available, Reppert’s book is not only well-argued but also pretty short. You won’t need as much time with it as you might think you would.

Thanks, Tom. I will put it on my short list. After my thesis is defended and submitted, my wife and I plan to take a good, long vacation with plenty of time to catch up on reading 🙂

@d:

Tom Gilson already responded to most points. I would only add the following:

Our choices are caused causes under determinism, but rather than just blame the big bang for every good or bad thing that comes our way, we like to look at smaller, more informative slices of the causal chain.

“We like”? So now this is a matter of liking? As Holopupenko rightly scorned, this is the perfect example of an emotional hang-up. And should I remind you that under determinism, your likings are overdetermined by the Big Bang and the relentless operation of physical laws, and could not be any other than what they are? So you like to look at “smaller, more informative slices of the causal chain”. Well, I like to look at ultimate causes.

I addressed this in my reply to Tom. Being a proximate cause only entails that:

a) I am a living human being
b) I cause stuff (though, not causelessly)

Determinists don’t believe we have “causal power” in the libertarian sense, of course not.

I see that you have not addressed my first point. Tom Gilson has shown that you have failed to address my second point. You keep repeating that you can be a proximate cause, but fail to address the point that you (something which you have not deigned to clarify what is exactly) have no *independent* causal power: for to have independent causal power would mean that you could act in a different way such that a different fact would obtain — but this is what determinism denies. To put it in other words, in order to explain any of your actions there is absolutely no need to make reference to yourself. You are a proximate cause? So what, apply Ockam’s razor and you can be safely erased from the explaining picture.

I also note that you have replaced “I” by “living human being”. What do you think that buys you? You can replace living human being by dog, rock or whatever physical object you care to name, it is all the same under determinism.

But determinism entails that we human beings, will play a part in the causing future states of the universe. Therefore, we are proximate causes.

The same causal power that the 99th domino in a row of hundred dominoes has when he is the proximate cause of the falling of the last domino — a completely hollow freedom.

I see that you have not addressed my first point. Tom Gilson has shown that you have failed to address my second point. You keep repeating that you can be a proximate cause, but fail to address the point that you (something which you have not deigned to clarify what is exactly) have no *independent* causal power: for to have independent causal power would mean that you could act in a different way such that a different fact would obtain — but this is what determinism denies. To put it in other words, in order to explain any of your actions there is absolutely no need to make reference to yourself. You are a proximate cause? So what, apply Ockam’s razor and you can be safely erased from the explaining picture.

Whether one talks about events at the lowest levels of causation (ie, big bang inevitably caused Bob to break the window), or at higher levels (ie, Bob broke the window), depends on what one is hoping to accomplish.

If you’re hoping to discover the ultimate and most precise reason why Bob broke the window, you’ll have to examine things at the lowest levels. If you want to say, determine whether Bob we should hold Bob responsible for the window repair, you might look at it from higher, but less precise levels.

Under determinism, we know that if we require Bob to pay for the window repair, his future choices to throw balls at windows could be affected in such a way that dissuedes him from doing the undesirable deed of breaking people’s windows.

So we still have plenty of reasons to examine things at the higher levels, with questions like, “who caused X”.

d,

To a determinist, we take part in causality – we don’t have power over it.

Yes, so please stop using words like “try”, “reason”, “indend”, etc. Under determinism, and as a participant with no power whatsoever, there is only “do”. No try.

Yoda explains.

Tom:

I don’t ” disbelieve in the existence of choice”, I disbelieve in the existence of choice outside the chain of physical causation, i.e. ultimately free choice.

So d could not have done otherwise than believe in determinism and yet you want to regard his conclusions something to be praised?

I would never say my conclusions deserve praise. Praise and punishment would both be actions that increase or decrease the desirability of future actions.

“Choice” would be defined something like “a decision to act, caused (proximately) by the desires of the chooser”.

Compatibalists will argue that desires are determined, in tune with what Lee claimed in a previous post – but to act in accordance with one’s desires, free or mostly free from imposition, is a compatibalists version of “free choice”

And Tom,

For what its worth, it scares ME that many people tend to divorce praise and punishment from any actual purpose, and instead think of them as fulfilling some vague notions of “intrinsic goodness”.

Even if we decided things are intrinsically good or bad, nobody is in any authoritative position to declare what is and isn’t good or bad – we all have to rely on evidence, reason, and can ultimately only bring about a world which values these things by consensus (in other words, might makes right).

Even opinions about what God is or believes ultimately fall on that sword – so nobody really has an advantage there.

“Define “choice,” please, within the chain of physical causation. Surely you recognize how such a thing must fly in the face of human experience and normal-language understandings of “choice.” So I’d like to know what you think it really does mean.”

An act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities. (google web definition)

Tom,

I disagree – I mean I can somewhat empathize with the suspicions you hold towards my views – but none of these are really that much different than the mountains of philosophy out there that comes from a non-theist perspective, which has given to us by many a thoughtful, moral, good people who value things like freedom.

I think the evidence and history makes it obvious – freedom (in the sense of the law), is vitally important in order to have a world where humans flourish, and are happy. Equally as important is the strict limitation of powers granted to any governing body. Bad things happen when those two things are not respected.

That’s why I’m content to discuss my views on blogs, relying on my meager powers of persuasion, and have absolutely no desire to become a tyrant and enslave everyone in the name of my beliefs!

d,
If you don’t mind, please comment on what I said here.

The term has no meaning under determinism, yet you know the meaning. What put the meaning in your head – the mechanism of determinism, right? Then determinism is false according to your statement.

SteveK:

If determinism is true, the traditional concept of “deserve” becomes nonsense (and therefore so does the retribution theory of punishment) , but that doesn’t mean one can’t think about what it could mean if some other theory (like libertarianism) were true.

So nothing is falsified here, at least not by that account.

And look, I’m not out to deny or diminish any important contributions to our intellectual history, on the part of Christianity… it surely contributed a great deal.

But many of these claims are tenuous at best.

Certainly! I believe the difference lies in predictability. Fatalism is the idea that all events are predetermined, from start to finish. Determinism, in my view, is the idea that the future is fluid, but the the events in the next moment are determined by the state of the previous moment. I can readily admit my ignorance on quantum theory, but from what I understand of it, there is true randomness at some fundamental level of reality, making the type of prediction inherent to fatalism impossible in principle. So while it is true to say that if you had all of the relevant information, you could predict the future course of events into infinity, I don’t think it’s possible to have that information, so even at the level of individual decision, there remains more than one possible course of events. That’s not to say that an agent freely chooses between A and not-A, that is still determined by the agent’s desires, etc., but a and not-a remain possibilities nonetheless.

Hopefully that makes sense 🙂

Lee.

@Lee:

Certainly! I believe the difference lies in predictability. Fatalism is the idea that all events are predetermined, from start to finish. Determinism, in my view, is the idea that the future is fluid, but the the events in the next moment are determined by the state of the previous moment.

You are grievously confused. Whether we can predict the future is irrelevant for the discussion at hand; the only thing relevant is that the *defining* characteristic of determinism is that at any given possible instant there is only one possible future, and thus by necessity, human agents have no alternative possibilities to choose from. You admit as much when you write “Determinism, in my view, is the idea that the future is fluid, but the the events in the next moment are determined by the state of the previous moment.” This just means that the future is univocally determined by the past, and ultimately by the initial state of the universe. Since humans have no power either over the laws of nature or the past, they have no power over the future.

note: An illustrative example are classical systems exhibiting chaotic behavior. Their behavior is not predictable in practice due to exponential divergence in the phase space trajectories but are still completely deterministic (although an infinite intellect with the capability of making measurements with infinite precision could make such predictions).

Under determinism, any suggestion we actually choose from real, alternative possibilities can be nothing more than an illusion foisted by the brain. Besides, the idea that “at the level of individual decision, there remains more than one possible course of events”, that is, that ignorance of the actual future constitutes a basis for freedom, is so preposterous that defies qualification.

I can readily admit my ignorance on quantum theory, but from what I understand of it, there is true randomness at some fundamental level of reality, making the type of prediction inherent to fatalism impossible in principle.

Quantum Mechanics makes arguing for determinism harder, but since that is exactly what you are doing, it is irrelevant for the current discussion. And I do not want to sound condescending, but my suggestion is to simply admit your ignorance of Quantum Mechanics and speak not of it.

Late note: it just occurred to me that thinking that the lack of predictability (that is, lack of knowledge) of the future is a basis for choice is the negative version of the mistake committed by those that think that God’s Omniscience necessarily entails Predetermination.

Does A really have a choice? That’s still the question.

That depends on what you mean when you say ‘A’. More below.

A’s desires come from somewhere, and if that source of desire is determined by physical necessity and/or quantum chance, then A is still a puppet of non-personal forces, right?

A is the person, the sum of the desires, so in that sense, a puppet can’t be puppeteer to itself. There is no ‘A’ being led around by the nose, A is doing the leading. The ‘A’ you keep talking about as a puppet is, in my humble opinion, the illusion.

G:

If there is a fork on a road, and no one ever desires to take the left fork, is it still a choice? If God offers you everything you desire, with no downside, on one hand, and offers to take away everything you hold dear, with no upside, on the other, is it still a choice if there is no possibility(i.e. you never would) of you taking the second offer?

that ignorance of the actual future constitutes a basis for freedom, is so preposterous that defies qualification.

Basis for freedom? I thought I was pretty clear up front that I don’t think such freedom is anything but an illusion. My point is only that if you can’t, even in principle, predict the course of events, then human desires select between two(or more) possible outcomes. This doesn’t free them from causation, obviously.

Late note: it just occurred to me that thinking that the lack of predictability (that is, lack of knowledge) of the future is a basis for choice is the negative version of the mistake committed by those that think that God’s Omniscience necessarily entails Predetermination.

I think the failure of fatalism entails the failure of an omniscient being to predict the future. The only way to say a god could predict the future is to ascribe to fatalism, all else is just intellectual hand-waiving.

If there really is freedom of the will, ultimate freedom from the chain of causation, and there is no possibility even in principle of predicting the outcome of moment to moment human action, true freedom, God couldn’t know the future because there would be nothing to know. This has always presented me with a problem when considering the claim that God has a plan. However, I don’t think omniscience entails knowing things it is not possible to know, so I don’t agree that it entails fatalism.

Heh, Molinism.

One of the few philosophies that could, by comparison, even make a determinist who professes belief in multiple possible futures the picture of clarity and sanity!

I’m evidently missing something important, so I’ll simply leave my most recent comment to the wolves and rest my (apparently insane and hopelessly ambiguous) case as it stands. I enjoyed the discussion immensely, thank you for having me!

Lee.

I came across this article today…

http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/article/1062950–do-humans-really-have-free-will

What is wrong with this picture, especially this quote?

Once upon a time, many philosophers drew a rigorous distinction between the brain and the mind. Known as dualists, they accepted that the brain was a biological entity, composed of flesh, blood and nerves, but believed that the mind was set apart, formed of some more exalted material or not made of physical stuff at all.

For dualists of a religious bent, the term “mind” was closely linked to the idea of a soul.

But there aren’t many dualists left anymore, or not among the ranks of philosophers employed by degree-granting academic institutions.

“A lot of people who are not philosophers believe in some sort of dualism,” says Walter Glannon, professor of philosophy at the University of Calgary. “But most philosophers are not substance dualists. Most philosophers are materialists. They do believe the mind is generated and sustained by the brain.”

@Victoria:

I have not read the article, but I would like to address the following snippet you quoted:

“A lot of people who are not philosophers believe in some sort of dualism,” says Walter Glannon, professor of philosophy at the University of Calgary. “But most philosophers are not substance dualists. Most philosophers are materialists. They do believe the mind is generated and sustained by the brain.”

I am not a philosopher, but arguments from popularity do not impress me. And on what rests this presumption for materialism? As far as I can see, the few arguments advanced are all very weak. I will deal with just one (although my response will touch on a couple more).

Materialism is itself a nebulous term and I will not bother to make it precise. Sometimes it is identified with physicalism, sometimes with the idea that the mind is reducible to brain states. The former is strictly stronger than the latter.

Argument from the appeal to Science: this the favorite argument of the science fetichists. From the impressive successes of materialist science, and through an inductive generalization, it is claimed that there is no place for non-material entities. I find this argument laughably weak.

First the argument is an inductive one and highly questionable at that. Why should we suppose that the successes in some areas will automatically translate in successes in other areas? The induction is based on a reduction of knowledge to empirical science. Mathematics has been spectacularly successful. The objects it deals with are obvious not material, but are we justified in making the leap that there are non-material realities? A Platonist would respond with a resounding yes (by the way, I am not a Platonist).

Second, what counts as material? Presumably, what the strict empirical sciences like physics can account for. But then the argument is strictly circular. Is it a great a wonder that a man restricted to look through a microscope cannot find any stars? No. But it would be ludicrous that because a microscope cannot detect stars to decree that the latter do not exist.

In order to gain some traction, one would have to reduce all sciences to physics. Reductionism works for chemistry, that much I am willing to grant, but already at the level of biology it fails miserably. Not to mention when we step up to the level of the sciences dealing with human beings and on to the social sciences. Not a whiff of materialist reduction can be found in history or economy. Phenomena like consciousness, identity and unity of the self, intentionality and mental causation, etc. have *not* been explained by any version of materialism, are intractably difficult to deal with and in fact, constitute the springboards for powerful arguments *against* materialism.

@d:

Tom Gilson already said the more important things, so I will content myself with a couple of humdrum comments.

I wouldn’t put it that like that. A more reasonable materialistic scientist might say there is no reason to yet appeal to the supernatural or immaterial to explain X.

Thanks for making my point even more forceful. If you follow the “more reasonable materialistic scientist”, then you are not even allowed the luxury of asserting that there are no supernatural entities; the best you can squeeze of this is a sort of agnosticism in regards to supernaturalism.

there’s been few if any findings within the modern field of neuroscience that seem overtly friendly towards dualism

The idea that when neuroscientists discover some neural correlate of this or that mental event or process, this is some sort of evidence to the fact that the mind is reducible to, or supervenient upon, neural processes is what the philosopher of the mind Tyler Burge aptly characterized as “neurobabble”. There is absolutely nothing in the neuroscientific evidence to support reductive materialism.

And by the way, what version of dualism are you referring to? Cartesian dualism? Property dualism? Hylemorphic dualism? All of them?

It really just introduces yet another black-box into the mix – and one with no clear explanatory value, at that. So materialism clearly has the stronger position, even if it is a weak one.

One of the reasons why the mind-body problem in all its miriad ramifications is so intractable for materialism is because the mechanistic conception of nature leaves out huge swaths of phenomena, for example, sensory qualities. The solution? Sweep them under the rug, which in this case means kick them up to the level of the mind and cross your fingers in the hope that they can be explained away. Of course the same strategy does not work for the mind itself and thus the pretty pass we are in today. Already Malebranche (died in 1715 — almost 300 years ago) argued powerfully over the paradoxical quality of a mechanistic philosophy: in the measure that it kicks up a whole range of phenomena to the level of the mind, it necessary entails a radical mind-body dualism.