Methodological Naturalism and Regularism: A Postscript

I’ve finished this series; I’ve said what I intended to say about Methodological Naturalism, except for this: I’m regarding it as only a first draft. I plan to write it up as a unified article, removing redundancies, clarifying arguments, incorporating further research, especially from Robert Pennock, and including more ideas from comments. I appreciate any feedback you might be able to offer before I do that.

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Series Navigation (Science Doesn't Need MN):

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  1. Holopupenko


    Given the comments and the serious approach you’re taking, it’s not only my wish but also my conviction that you’ll do a better job than Plantinga. That is not meant as an invective against Plantinga: the time is ripe for this issue to be revisited. At the very least, that’s what these related post project loud and clear.

    The time is ripe because the discussions surrounding ID as a practical application of MN have provided the impetus. There are, of course, other areas of science and philosophy (say, the mind/brain discussion) for which this is quite important. ID/evolution is at the forefront because they ultimately touch upon what and who we are as human beings, and hence people are naturally touchy about it. I commend you for, in the words of Bill O’Reilly “being a stand-up kind of guy.”

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