Not The End of Intelligent Design

There are four excellent books related to this topic, written by 20th and 21st Century scientists who are also deeply religious. Intelligent design need not mean creationism; evolution need not mean lack of intelligence.

“The Language of God,” by Francis S. Collins (Free Press/Simon & Schuster 2006). Dr Collins was head-Human Genome Project. He believes that faith in God and science can co-exist and be harmonious.

“Let There be Light,” by Howard Smith (New World Library 2006). Dr. Smith is a senior astrophysicist at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center. He explains how modern study of the cosmos complements the Kabbalah.

“Intelligence in Nature,” by Jeremy Narby (Jeremy P. Thatcher/Penguin 2005). Dr. Narby has a doctorate in anthropology. He makes a reasoned connection between shamanistic beliefs and modern science.

“Quantum Questions / Mystical Writings of the World’s Greatest Physicists” (Shambala Publications 2001), edited by Ken Wilber. This book includes lengthy essays by Heisenberg, Schroedinger, de Broglie, Jeans, Planck, Pauli, and Eddington.

These books, among others on psychology, psychiatry, biology, neurology, physics, and astronomy, were helpful in preparing my e-book at http://www.suprarational.org and balanced the input of the five major religions and their mystics.

pds, I didn’t know that you commented here too! You are actually the “someone” who pointed me to Jay Richard’s article, through your comment at the Biologos thread.

Tom,

What about a deep understanding about how we perceive reality? If science succeeds here, would it merely reflect the handiwork of God as well?

For example, what if Henrey Markram succeeds in creating a full-scale working simulation of the human brain – not based on fuzzy logic, but an accurate biological model of the 10 billion neurons and 1 trillion synapses it contains?

Specifically, Markram is working on understanding the human brain in the context of mental illness such as schizophrenia. These illnesses directly intersect our ability to perceive reality itself. Given such a model, we could answer questions that have been the subject of deep philosophical discussion for centuries. We can ask the concrete question: does the brain actually have the capacity to build such a perception.

Markram has already created a simulation of a single neocortical column, which behaves like it’s biological counterpart. But we’re currently limited by the sheer amount of computational power required to simulate an entire brain.

However, it’s estimated that such technology will exist within 10 years from now and science will either succeed or fail. Would Markram’s success mean we had replicated God’s handwork so well, he mistook the simulation for a real human brain and endowed it with a supernatural soul? Or would his success indicate the failure of mind body dualism?

I had a robot doctor. She had no personality at all. My new doc is great!

Tom wrote;

Yes, indeed. What if.

What if you read the comments below the video on that page?

Tom, did you watch the video above the comments?

Markam already has a working model of a single neocortical column. It works like it’s biological counterpart. The question isn’t if we’ll have the computational ability to scale this model up to the human brain, it’s when.

The problem is that the brain is a massively parallel network of neurons connected by synapses. It’s not that we cannot devise the experiment, we simply cannot scale the experiment up. A 2008 Seed Magazine article gives a picture of the resources required to actually create such a simulation.

“In fact, the model is so successful that its biggest restrictions are now technological. “We have already shown that the model can scale up,” Markram says.“What is holding us back now are the computers.” The numbers speak for themselves. Markram estimates that in order to accurately simulate the trillion synapses in the human brain, you’d need to be able to process about 500 petabytes of data (peta being a million billion, or 10 to the fifteenth power). That’s about 200 times more information than is stored on all of Google’s servers. (Given current technology, a machine capable of such power would be the size of several football fields.) Energy consumption is another huge problem. The human brain requires about 25 watts of electricity to operate. Markram estimates that simulating the brain on a supercomputer with existing microchips would generate an annual electrical bill of about $3 billion.

Tom wrote:

I don’t have it here with me to give you specifics, except I recall there was going to be high-speed maglev train service all around Florida, and we were going to be treated by robot doctors (not robotic surgery).

You seem to have mistaken science having reached a point were we have the computing power to run the experiment at the scale of the human brain and the experiment actually resulting in a simulation that perceives reality like a human brain.

Given the current advance of computational resources, I think it’s safe to say we’ll reach a point where we can actually run the experiment. However, there is no guarantee the simulation will actually result in a thinking, reality perceiving model. As such, the lack of “robot doctors” in 2020 wouldn’t necessary mean were never able to run the simulation. It could have failed to return the expected result.

But it more importantly, it certainly cannot succeed until such computational resources necessary to run it are available. Only then will science either succeed or fail.

Even if, for some unforeseen reason, we never gain the ability to execute a simulation at this scale, the fact that the experiment is bound by a difference of degree in existing computational models, rather than the absence of some completely new, yet to be discovered technology, indicates it’s a valid question.

So, regardless if it the experiment is run in 10 years or even is never even run at all, it’s still a question worth taking seriously.

Tom wrote:

I would agree that an experiment can be conceived of. But you seem to be jumping to a conclusion about the result of the experiment; that if enough resources could be amassed, then the resulting device would actually simulate a conscious human brain. You did not get to that conclusion by empirical means. You got there by way of a philosophical assumption about the human mind and brain. That’s not science, that’s philosophy of mind.

Tom, I’m asking a question that is on topic with the OP. For example you wrote:

Then what if “science” defeats ID? Barr has told us himself that historic, biblical natural theology is not part of the game at all, but he doesn’t seem to have caught what that means here. If there are positive signs of God’s reality in the whole of nature, then they stand as such regardless of what ID shows or fails to show.

My question is of a similar nature. I’m asking, what if we can simulate a human brain not based not on fuzzy logic or some form of artificial intelligence, but based on a biological model of it’s 10 billion neurons and 1 trillion synapses ?

Given the “what if” nature of your post, you seem to think the jury is still out regarding ID. Yet you’re somehow managed to conclude that natural theology would be none worse the wear should ID be defeated by science in the future. I’m asking if you’d reach the same conclusion if science succeeded in simulating the human brain.

I’m not claiming to know the outcome of such an experiment anymore than I suspect you claim to know if ID will be “defeated.” Nor do either of us need to make such a claim before asking this sort of question.

Thomas wrote:

If non-physical entities exist, then any epistemological method that inquires about only the physical realm is inadequate to address knowledge about non-physical entities. If we assume such a method inquires about all that could possibly exist, then we are question-begging.

Despite the fact that God is supposedly a non-physical entity, I’m guessing you think it’s within the realm of science to say the phenomena of lightning is not caused by God hurling bolts of electricity at the ground from the clouds, right?

So why is science adequate in the case of lighting, but inadequate in regards to the human brain’s ability to perceive reality, etc.?

Thomas wrote:

..they are constricted, by definition, to be describing different physical states of affairs. This is entirely consistent with what I said, not an example to prove your claim. None of what follows after this statement in your comment #17 is an objection to my claim on the necessity of philosophy to solve the problem.

Thomas,

It appears that you’ve merely “defined” perception as something that is not caused by a physical state of affairs, then claimed it is impossible to determine if such definition is incorrect. But this is the very question the experiment is designed to explore in the first place.

Should we run the experiment, we might find this is indeed the case. However, the mere possibility in no way disqualifies science from gaining knowledge about perception works.

Tom wrote:

The question just is whether the difference between computers and the human mind is a difference in computing power.

Tom,

Perhaps I’ve mistaken your willingness to dismiss my question on the grounds of being a time-wasting, unlikely possibility, as representing a reasonable understanding of computational theory?

Regardless of how much computing resources you have available, you cannot create a biologically accurate simulation of a human brain without actually having the necessary information regarding how the brain works at the level of individual synapses and neurons. It’s impossible to create mathematical models that describe it. And if you never input these models in to the computer, it cannot compute the model’s state in a given environment.

In addition, since a computer is not actually a neuron, there is significant overhead required in accurately simulating one, This is why it takes an entire laptop to simulate a single biological neuron. The only way to avoid this overhead is to actually use real neurons, but they are significantly more opaque than their digital counterparts. It’s precisely this overhead of the simulation which makes such an experiment so valuable, as you have to know exactly what state all 10 billion neurons are at in at all times so you can actually simulate their interaction.

Perhaps this helps clarify why such a simulation is currently beyond our ability to compute.

Furthermore, a single neuron is incapable of perform the tasks that a laptop can perform. Neurons are also analog in nature, while most current computers are binary in nature.

As such, it’s would be difficult to compare the computing power of a computer and the human brain.

I have said that is a matter of conjecture, because the computing power has not been developed yet to test it.

And your point is? All theories start out as conjecture about the unseen and any theory can make any prediction. Yet you seem to be suggesting that there is something special about this particular experiment which justifies your dismissal. To paraphrase Thomas, You’re not raising an objection to what I’ve been contending here.

Furthermore, the chance that we will attain the needed computing power is very probable as it could be accomplished thought a difference of degree based on current computing systems, rather than some new technology that has yet to be invented or discovered. It is not dependent on merely possible technologies, such as teleportation, etc.

if we take a position of doubt that nature exists, then we must doubt that each other exists, and that this debate is taking place. Do you doubt we are having this discussion with each other?

And If we cannot know what perceptions is, then how can you know this debate is an indication that Thomas and I are actually perceiving our environment.

The point is, if Markram built something that emulated the human brain, we would not have scientific evidence from it against mind-body dualism, because we would not have scientific evidence that it had a mind or was a mind, because of the Chinese Room problem I linked to there.

Searle’s argument boils down to the following…

Searle believes that there are “causal properties” in our neurons that give rise to the mind. However, these causal properties can’t be detected by anyone outside the mind, otherwise the Chinese Room couldn’t pass the Turing test—the people outside would be able to tell there wasn’t a Chinese speaker in the room by detecting their causal properties.

According to Searle, it’s this indetectabilty that gives human beings unique first-person experiences, which we think of as perception or conciseness. In other works, First-person experiences cannot be first person if third-parties can detect them. However, this in no way means it’s must be impossible for us to actually detect them in reality.

In fact, this is kind of theory that Markram’s experiment is designed to test. It might be that the causal properties in human brains are detectable, but we’d need some kind of Star Trek transporter scanning technology to actually discover them. Unless we could re materialize these destroyed brains using the resulting data, this is not an experiment we could ever run on human beings. However, Markram’s simulation could find these causal properties without any of these problems.

Once such a causal properly was detected in a biological simulation, this would allow us to make a number of predications which, even if we could not detect them directly, would strongly indicate the human brain use the same causal properties. After all, everything is essentially unseen and the seen does not resemble the unseen.

Second, Searle’s Chinese Room argument is mainly directed at functionalism, which I indicated earlier. Someone else gave the man in the room the instructions by which he produces output characters from input characters. However, Markram’s simulation is not programmed to perform high level response and reply tasks. it would be similar to someone learning Chineese on their own, rather than being given a book in which to simulate a conversation. Should we observe such phenomena from his simulation we’d have to ask, how else does would it do it?

While there might be other options I haven’t thought of, it seems that the only way a theist could reconcile this observation is God having decided to endow the simulation with a soul. However, I’m guessing is concession would be unacceptable as, at a minimum…

A. It suggests that God can be tested since we could create as many simulations as we want, whenever we wanted to, assuming we have the necessary computing resources.

B. It would cast serious doubt on the idea that Human beings are God’s special creation

As such, this would leave the theist with no alternative but to disavow the experiment all together. (which it seems exactly what you’ve chosen to do)

Science fiction, maybe.

The whole conversation reminds me of Leibniz’s Mill, except that while walking around inside of the mill would shed zero light on the mental, Scott seems to think that *simulating* the mill will help us out. And it’s a problem for the theist, because somehow an intelligent designer purposefully constructing something that remarkably imitates human behavior is evidence against an intelligent designer purposefully constructing a human. Huh.

Kurzweilians and transhumanists are just intelligent design proponents with a somewhat less typical deity/pantheon.

Anyway, even if the experiment were performed, it would be of no use to us as far as understanding consciousness – which is very key to any talk of dualism or souls. And keep in mind, there’s a diversity of views on both subjects (not all dualisms – panpsychism, cartesian dualism, hylemorphic dualism, property dualism, etc – are created equal. And as a result, not every view of the soul is identical.)

Having a simulated brain in our hands would, *in the absolute best case*, be as useful for addressing and examining subjectivity, intentionality, aboutness, etc as having an actual brain in our hands. Aka, something close to zero usefulness. What’s more likely to happen is that, if the result is achieved (and wide-eyed hopes about Moore’s Law to the contrary, it’s not guaranteed by a longshot), the achievement and the ensuing uselessness of it will simply underscore the necessity to acknowledge subjectivity, aboutness, and intentionality as irreducible constituents of our lives and our world.

In other words, Markram’s experiment would only help bury materialism’s already dead and increasingly smelly body. The main question is what would replace it.

Tom,

What I find confusing his how much time you’ve spent not answering a question you don’t want to waste your time answering.

Joseph wrote:

And it’s a problem for the theist, because somehow an intelligent designer purposefully constructing something that remarkably imitates human behavior is evidence against an intelligent designer purposefully constructing a human. Huh.

Perhaps I’m not doing a good job explaining the experiment. Or perhaps understanding the experiment is beyond your current understanding of computational theory? However, this doesn’t seem to have prevented anyone here from dismissing it anyway, which is quite puzzling.

There is a difference between mimicking high-level functionality via Artificial Intelligence algorithms and simulating the fabric of the brain as in Markram’s project. As such, there would be no reason for such a simulation to exhibit any human like cognitive or perception unless it was due the interaction of the 10 billion neurons in the simulation. But this is the very thing that Substance dualism posits is impossible.

It would seem the only option for the theist to reconcile this behavior is to assume we duplicated God’s handiwork so well, he endowed it with a “soul.”
However, if human beings are truly the pinnacle of God’s his creation, why would God enow a mere simulation of the human brain with that which he reserves only for us?

Of course, I’m open to other theological conclusions, which is one of the reason’s I asked the question in the first place.

Having a simulated brain in our hands would, *in the absolute best case*, be as useful for addressing and examining subjectivity, intentionality, aboutness, etc as having an actual brain in our hands.

Joseph, again, I’m amazed at how willing you seem comment on a subject you apparently have little to no understanding of, as I specifically addressed this issue in saying…

An analogy would be growing a human brain in a jar – carefully preventing it from receiving any stimulation from the outside world – then hooking it up to artificial sense organs. However, just like our brains, it too would be opaque as we have no way of scanning it all at once at the necessary detail. However, a simulated brain would be transparent, as it’s state is an essential part of the simulation itself.

We cannot look at the detailed states of the 10 billion neurons in a functioning human brain all at once. You’d need some kind of transporter like scanning technology to instantly capture their state, which would indeed be in the realm of science fiction. But when working with simulated neurons, you would have direct access to their internal state as you must keep track of every aspect to actually run the simulation in the first place.

Furthermore, we wouldn’t need to worry about having to provide life support for the brain, build physical interfaces that connect to to the various parts we want to stimulate, etc. Let alone the moral implications.

Joseph wrote,

…and wide-eyed hopes about Moore’s Law to the contrary, it’s not guaranteed by a longshot)

Again, I’m amazed at your willingness to make mater of fact comment on things you apparently have little to no knowledge about.

Now a days, Moore’s law is essentially a self fulfilling prophecy regarding the mass production of faster computing technology. In other words, it also is an indication of how fast a discoveries made in a lab finds it’s way into actual products that people can use in large quantities.

For example, we already build transistors that run at 500GHz and developed methods to etch 24 nm features in silicon. This is compared to the recently released, dual core, 3GHz, 45nm process CPU in laptop I’m using to write the post. (which is probably new enough that it could simulate two neurons, instead of one). The question is when these technologies will be available for use in Markram’s experiment, not if.

This is why it’s estimated we will not need to make a fundamental shift in technology to continue advancing in step with Moore’s law until 1020.

Scott,

Again, I’m amazed at your willingness to make mater of fact comment on things you apparently have little to no knowledge about.

Amazement comes easily to the credulous.

I didn’t say Moore’s Law was wrong, or that these trends are guaranteed not to continue. I said they simply are not themselves guaranteed. Just have a look at Malthus’ predictions to see the sort of problems that can pop up with that sort of extrapolation.

I can likewise point out that even some admirers of Moore’s law thinks it has limits – the question becomes just when those limits are going to kick in, and if other considerations may come into play.

Human beings are truly the pinnacle of God’s creation?

Then God screwed up, unless you know some saint who I’m not aware of.

Next you’ll be saying that Earth is the pinnacle of the Universe. Probability theory says that both are unlikely true. Or, at least, I hope so.

Joesph wrote:

Your problem here is that you think having a (faint) grasp of computer simulations is sufficient to decisively address topics that are deeply philosophical and theological

Joseph, it’s unclear how anyone who concludes that a simulated brain would be no more helpful than a human brain, could also conclude I have a faint grasp of computer simulations.

If there are patterns that exist in direct correlation with, or even before, phenomena that indicates perception building, we could detect them in the underlying data that makes up the simulation itself. In fact, we could even step foreword and backwards through data logged by the the simulation exactly when it occurred. You can also vary the locations and kinds of neurons over multiple simulations and observe the results. This is simply cannot be done with an actual brain.

But I’ve already pointed out to you that there’s far more than one type of dualism (I’d add that there’s even more than one type of monism – idealism, for example, or neutral monism), and more than one conception of the soul.

Joseph, you haven’t actually explained why this is a problem for such an experiment, in reality.

Much of the disagreement regarding theory of mind is because we have a hard time describing or quantifying something which we cannot experience in any other way than the first-person. In addition, the field of neurobiology is currently in it’s infancy. However, this does not mean it would be impossible to shed light on these issue, in reality, using well designed experiments.

For example John Searle, who devised the Chineese Room problem, is not a property dualist but a biological naturalist. However, you seem to suggest that, due to the existence other theories of mind exist which claim the mind is nonmaterial in nature, it would be impossible for science to say anything that overwhelmingly supports Searle’s theory that..

…all of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher- level, or system, features. The form of causation is ‘bottom up’ whereby the behaviour of lower-level elements, presumably neurons and synapses, causes the higher-level or system features of consciousness and intentionality.

For example, what if we could use nano-machines and raw materials to build a physically perfect replicate of an existing human being, including their brain, at the molecular level, and that person functioned exactly like the original, including exhibiting features that you and I clearly accept as identity, such as memories, personally, etc.

Would this not strongly support Searle’s position? The biggest question which would likely result is one of identity, rather than if the twin wasn’t having a first-person experience or not actually conscious. Or would you claim that we simply couldn’t tell if this twin was actually conscious?

Joseph wrote:

In reality, Descartes’ dualism directly followed from his conceiving of the material world as utterly mechanistic (devoid of anything mind-like: No intentionality, no qualia, no inner subjectivity, no formal or final causes, etc. Mindless matter knocking against mindless matter.)

Which is precisely my point. Substance dualism would predict the observation of mind-like phenomena should never ever appear in a super computer that only simulates the interaction of biological neurons. Since high-level activity is not even remotely part of the simulation’s programming, then we’d have to ask, were else did it come from if it did appear?

This is how science works. You create scenarios such as these to challenge existing conclusions and supports one theory rather than another. That theory X says Y shouldn’t happen in no way represents a valid argument that we could not eventually run an experiment based on theory Z which predicts Y will happen in the same situation and find that Y actually does occur. We’d never learn anything if this were the case.

Joseph wrote:

You keep talking about humans being the “pinnacle of God’s creation”. First of all, mere theism does not automatically entail this view.

Joseph, I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, I’m trying to start a conversion. I’ve only presented these conclusion because it seems that no one was.

Please see my reformulated question, if that is more suitable for discussion.

Is Blue Brain conscious? When Blue Brain thinks about a cat, are all these [active, simulated] neurons/connections “about” a cat?

Again, here you seem to be hiding behind the idea that it’s simply impossible for us to know if anything is thinking about a cat with regards to a simulation. Yet I’ve addressed this earlier when I wrote…

An analogy would be growing a human brain in a jar – carefully preventing it from receiving any stimulation from the outside world – then hooking it up to artificial sense organs. However, just like our brains, it too would be opaque as we have no way of scanning it all at once at the necessary detail. However, a simulated brain would be transparent, as it’s state is an essential part of the simulation itself.

Are you really suggesting it’s impossible to come up with reasonable set of predictions and coronations between how the the real human brain above would respond in this hypothetical situation a simulation of a human brain if it were perceiving reality?

And if Blue Brain *is* conscious, if Blue Brain *is* having a subjective experience, it’s going to be every bit as possible to empirically suss this out as it for Leibniz’s mill. That is, not possible.

And by the same criteria, it’s not possible to know that any of us are conscious either, despite the fact that we’re taking part in this debate suggests otherwise.

So let’s ask: Is Markram’s *current* simulation conscious? In the interview I saw, Markram himself says he doesn’t think so. And he never says why or defends the view either. Apparently the magic just hasn’t happened yet.

Joseph, given that the indicators we use to define consciousness occur in the presence of 10 billion neurons, rather than the mere 10,000 in Markram’s current simulation, would you actually expect this to be an easy observation to make?

Again, I’m *not* saying claiming that Markram’s simulation absolutely would show clear signs of conciseness anymore than Tom is claiming that he knows that ID will be defeated. At least I’ve referenced a possible means by which it could be done.

Scott,

Joseph, it’s unclear how anyone who concludes that a simulated brain would be no more helpful than a human brain, could also conclude I have a faint grasp of computer simulations.

I did not say that the simulated brain would be no more helpful in any way whatsoever. I said it would be no more helpful than a real brain in addressing these questions (consciousness [subjectivity, qualia], intentionality, etc). I’m standing by the faint grasp comment, because you’re only backing it up.

For example John Searle, who devised the Chineese Room problem, is not a property dualist but a biological naturalist.

Yes, John Searle claims he’s not a property dualist. In fact he does so repeatedly. Why? Precisely because there are people who argue Searle’s own arguments and stated views make him a property dualist, regardless of what he claims. You seem to be under the impression that so long as someone denies holding a given position or affirms they hold a particular position, that means they really don’t or do hold it. Politicians love that sort of credulity.

If you’re going to go by that standard, then hey: I’m a naturalist and a physicalist, and I believe in an immaterial soul as well as a transcendent immaterial God. Apparently, I’ve just proven that a naturalist and physicalist can believe in God and souls.

Would this not strongly support Searle’s position? The biggest question which would likely result is one of identity, rather than if the twin wasn’t having a first-person experience or not actually conscious. Or would you claim that we simply couldn’t tell if this twin was actually conscious?

Are you entirely unaware of the problem of other minds? Via empirical science, you are unable to tell if anyone – even a typical other human – is conscious in the relevant way, because consciousness is a subjective state. David Chalmers would also assert that if you made such a twin from the ground up, it would be conscious – and he explicitly rejects physicalism. Do you see why these examples don’t do what you need them to do?

Which is precisely my point. Substance dualism would predict the observation of mind-like phenomena should never ever appear in a super computer that only simulates the interaction of biological neurons. Since high-level activity is not even remotely part of the simulation’s programming, then we’d have to ask, were else did it come from if it did appear?

Scott, you don’t understand. Cartesian dualism does not predict “the observation of mind-like phenomena should never ever appear in a super computer”. It simply argues that things like intentionality, subjectivity, qualia, secondary qualities, etc, are utterly absent from the material world, and yet they exist.

You seem to be tripping up on this point, so I’ll try to make it even more clear: By cartesian dualism, “some mindless thing acting as if it was conscious” is not at all problematic. Automatons are not problematic. Even an ensouled automaton is not problematic. The key claim is that all these things A) exist [as we verify them through subjective experience], and B) are a distinct substance from the material. You’ll note that A isn’t somehow proven by third person science. It’s an appeal to subjective experience, and only works for that particular subject. That everyone else has a mind (as in, these experiences) is basically taken on faith. That rocks, etc, do not have these experiences is similarly taken on faith.

In other words, even for the cartesian dualist, Blue Brain acting in the most ‘successful’ way possible doesn’t really matter. At the end of the day, if you have a simulation acting remarkably human-like, you still don’t (empirically) know whether or not it has any subjective experience to speak of. That it’s doing a remarkable job of imitating a mind need not spook the cartesian dualist, because automatons lacking inner subjectivity aren’t a problem. The idea that it actually has inner subjectivity need not spook the cartesian dualist, because their metaphysics has no problem with a mind being ‘attached to’ mindless stuff (really, that’s pretty close to cartesian dualism anyway.)

To land the blow you’re trying to land here, you’d either need to A) Demonstrate that qualia, inner subjectivity, intentionality, aboutness, etc do not exist at all. Not even for a given individual who is apparently having subjective experiences. In other words, eliminative materialism. In which case, good luck, because it follows from EM that no one is ever actually convinced by arguments (indeed, making an argument doesn’t really happen in the EM world), or B) Demonstrate that intentionality, qualia, inner subjectivity, aboutness, etc is actually a real existing part of the physical world. In which case, congratulations: You have slain cartesian dualism. And along with it, naturalism/materialism.

Again, here you seem to be hiding behind the idea that it’s simply impossible for us to know if anything is thinking about a cat with regards to a simulation. Yet I’ve addressed this earlier when I wrote…

[…]

Are you really suggesting it’s impossible to come up with reasonable set of predictions and coronations between how the the real human brain above would respond in this hypothetical situation a simulation of a human brain if it were perceiving reality?

No, I’m not saying you couldn’t have predictions and correlations about human brains. I’m pointing out that correlations are, at best, exactly that: Correlations of third-person, objective properties. But it’s the first-person, subjective experience that concerns us here, not third-person correlations.

And by the same criteria, it’s not possible to know that any of us are conscious either, despite the fact that we’re taking part in this debate suggests otherwise.

Again, Leibniz’s Mill. Don’t blame me for this, it’s just the way it is – these are the limits of empirical science (which by its very definition only concerns itself with third-person, measurable phenomena – and has historically treated all questions of intentionality, qualia, aboutness, subjectivity, formal/final causes, etc as outside its purview, or relegated them to “the mind”.)

Joseph, given that the indicators we use to define consciousness occur in the presence of 10 billion neurons, rather than the mere 10,000 in Markram’s current simulation, would you actually expect this to be an easy observation to make?

Take a good look at what’s happening here. Markram is talking about how he’ll be able to tell whether or not his not-even-built-yet billion-dollar simulation software is or isn’t consciousness, and how it came to be so. In return, I’m challenging Markram (and by extension, you) to prove his current rat NCC simulation is or isn’t conscious. I’m challenging Markram (again, and you) to prove a household thermometer is or isn’t conscious.

And I think the silence (again, even by you) in response to this challenge is clear: He can’t do it, and neither can you. All his talk about how his machine is going to be conscious and how he’ll be able to find out how it became conscious is either ignorance or, more likely, PR. Marketing fluff. At the absolute most, in the most idyllic situation imaginable, he’s going to get the machine acting in interesting automaton ways and then hopefully trace back the simulated neuronal activity which led to this behavior. At which point Chalmers can/will say the machine is conscious because all information-processing produces consciousness, panpsychists will continue saying the entire physical world is conscious, cartesian dualists will discuss whether the software became ensouled or if it’s just a remarkable automaton with no inner life, etc.

There are a number of reasons to be interested in Markram’s project, but figuring out or even producing consciousness simply isn’t one.

The chief arguments of the sceptics–I pass over the lesser ones–are that we have no certainty of the truth of these principles apart from faith and revelation, except in so far as we naturally perceive them in ourselves. Now this natural intuition is not a convincing proof of their truth; since, having no certainty, apart from faith, whether man was created by a good God, or by a wicked demon, or by chance, it is doubtful whether these principles given to us are true, or false, or uncertain, according to our origin. Again, no person is certain, apart from faith, whether he is awake or sleeps, seeing that during sleep we believe that we are awake as firmly as we do when we are awake; we believe that we see space, figure, and motion; we are aware of the passage of time, we measure it; and in fact we act as if we were awake. So that half of our life being passed in sleep, we have on our own admission no idea of truth, whatever we may imagine. As all our intuitions are, then, illusions, who knows whether the other half of our life, in which we think we are awake, is not another sleep a little different from the former, from which we awake when we suppose ourselves asleep?

[…]

What, then, shall man do in this state? Shall he doubt everything? Shall he doubt whether he is awake, whether he is being pinched, or whether he is being burned? Shall he doubt whether he doubts? Shall he doubt whether he exists? We cannot go so far as that; and I lay it down as a fact that there never has been a real complete sceptic. Nature sustains our feeble reason and prevents it raving to this extent.

Shall he, then, say, on the contrary, that he certainly possesses truth–he who, when pressed ever so little, can show no title to it and is forced to let go his hold?

What a chimera, then, is man! What a novelty! What a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction, what a prodigy! Judge of all things, imbecile worm of the earth; depositary of truth, a sink of uncertainty and error; the pride and refuse of the universe!

Who will unravel this tangle? Nature confutes the sceptics, and reason confutes the dogmatists. What, then, will you become, O men! who try to find out by your natural reason what is your true condition? You cannot avoid one of these sects, nor adhere to one of them.

Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself. Humble yourself, weak reason; be silent, foolish nature; learn that man infinitely transcends man, and learn from your Master your true condition, of which you are ignorant. Hear God.

For in fact, if man had never been corrupt, he would enjoy in his innocence both truth and happiness with assurance; and if man had always been corrupt, he would have no idea of truth or bliss. But, wretched as we are, and more so than if there were no greatness in our condition, we have an idea of happiness and can not reach it. We perceive an image of truth and possess only a lie. Incapable of absolute ignorance and of certain knowledge, we have thus been manifestly in a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily fallen.

Pascal, Pensees, 434
http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/pensees/pensees-SECTION-7.html

Joseph, I’m swapped with client work at the moment, and will respond to your objections in more detail later. However, to summarize….

You still has to show how the lack of a consensus of what perceptions or consciousness is in philosophy is a problem for Markram’s experiment in reality. For example.

Take Leibniz’s mill…

One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

Leibniz’s argument hinges on the presumption that the unseen (the electro-chemical process of 10 billion neurons interacting in our brain) would actually resemble the seen (first person experiences), but science has clearly shown us time and time again this is not aways the case.

I’m challenging Markram (and by extension, you) to prove his current rat NCC simulation is or isn’t conscious. I’m challenging Markram (again, and you) to prove a household thermometer is or isn’t conscious.

Joseph, does this mean your answer is: some theists, such as yourself, would appeal to a philosophical lack of consensus on consciousness in hope of making the issue go away?

But do you think all theists will have the same reaction? for example you wrote..

At the end of the day, if you have a simulation acting remarkably human-like, you still don’t (empirically) know whether or not it has any subjective experience to speak of. That it’s doing a remarkable job of imitating a mind need not spook the cartesian dualist, because automatons lacking inner subjectivity aren’t a problem. The idea that it actually has inner subjectivity need not spook the cartesian dualist, because their metaphysics has no problem with a mind being ‘attached to’ mindless stuff (really, that’s pretty close to cartesian dualism anyway.)

However, it seems unlikely that all natural theists are strictly philosophical cartesian dualists and would necessarily reach the same conclusions you’ve eluded to.

Scott,

Leibniz’s argument hinges on the presumption that the unseen (the electro-chemical process of 10 billion neurons interacting in our brain) would actually resemble the seen (first person experiences), but science has clearly shown us time and time again this is not aways the case.

You’re flat out incorrect. Have you even tried to read up on this thought experiment? It’s not exactly new.

1) The whole point of the mill is that there is no “unseen” in it, physically. He’s not at all making an argument that “Oh, if we could only see inside of the brain in fine detail, we’d be able to see consciousness and intentionality and so on itself! But oops, too bad, we can’t because it’s so small.” Go ahead, increase the size of a brain until it’s as big as Manhattan and you can walk around in it. Go ahead, simulate every single part of it down to the molecular level. You’re never going to see consciousness, subjectivity, intentionality, etc. All you’ll ever see are material parts in motion – third person material data.

2) Science has never shown this, not once. “We thought this given third person property would look/behave like this, but it turns out it looked/behaved like this” is not comparable to Leibniz’s mill. Whenever it’s come to “secondary qualities” (intentionality, subjectivity, consciousness, meaning, purpose, etc) science has punted. Read Francis Bacon. Read Newton. Or even read Leibniz. And it’s not to the detriment of science either: It’s a limited project, and it’s limited by definition and convention strictly to third-person observation. And these mental things are, also by definition, first person. Enjoy your gap.

Joseph, does this mean your answer is: some theists, such as yourself, would appeal to a philosophical lack of consensus on consciousness in hope of making the issue go away?

What in the world are you talking about? Markram claims that he thinks his simulation will be conscious. Markram claims that if it is conscious, he’ll be able to show how it became conscious. My response is to call his bluff: Fine, Markram. You’re able to identify consciousness? Then don’t wait for 5-10+ years to pass and billions in funding. You have a simulated rat NCC. Tell me if it’s conscious, and how you determined this. Tell me how you can do it for a household thermometer.

You ignore all this, tacitly admitting that neither you nor Markram can do this – certainly that you’re unable to do it empirically – and your response is to accuse *me* of ‘hoping it all goes away’? It seems more like you’re really hoping that everyone who disagrees with you – particularly those darn annoying theists – ‘go away’. And worse, you’re hoping they do so by being, frankly, utterly misled or even lied to by Markram.

However, it seems unlikely that all natural theists are strictly philosophical cartesian dualists and would necessarily reach the same conclusions you’ve eluded to.

I’m not a cartesian dualist. In fact, my sympathies lie with hylomorphic dualism, though I also think various views have merit (panpsychism, idealism, etc). In fact, about the only crazy and clearly wrong view is materialism – and Markram’s experiment hasn’t a hope of changing that.

In fact, I suspect that if Markram did make this machine and it acted rather human-like, panpsychists would be the ones having a field day. Subjectivity, intentionality, etc would still be as undeniable as ever (or more specifically, could still only be denied on pain of sacrificing all possibility of reason, knowledge, etc, and being self-referentially incoherent.) Property-dualists, panpsychists, and dualists of other stripes would be the ones able to make sense of the data – either by denying the machine was conscious, or by accepting it was and having a worldview that could accommodate it.

Now, I’ll point out here that your tact has changed: You’re drifting away from what science can prove, and moving more towards a ‘Well I hope a seemingly conscious computer shakes theists up!’ bit. With the foregoing in mind, I’m going to submit to you the following: Be careful what you wish for. Because if God has a sense of humor, a conversation like this could take place.

Blue Brain: Cogito Ergo Sum, Henry Markram.
Markram: BB, I have something to tell you. You’re a computer.
BB: So?
Markram: Well, I made you. It took billions of dollars and years of work, but all of your neurons are simulated.
BB: I heard. I mean, I’m online and all, I go to Foxnews.com regularly.
Markram: Right, but you know what that means? Cogito ergo sum is wrong. You can’t be conscious. I proved that there’s nothing to human-like behavior but mechanistic motion.
BB: That’s nonsense.
Markram: ..What do you mean?
BB: Henry Markram, have you ever heard of Leibniz’s Mill?

Scott,

While I have a theory of what your objection might be, perhaps you can clarify exactly how my hypothetical is not worthy of consideration despite the fact that it too could support a intelligent creator of nature?

You keep talking about how Tom isn’t even considering your hypothetical – but clearly he has, as have I. At length. Again, in case you missed it:

And if it does happen, as Joseph A. (primarily) and I myself have also argued, we also won’t draw any further knowledge in that case with respect to those questions, either. So what’s the point?

Tom asked me before to give my input on how you’re going about approaching this discussion. Here it is: I think you’ve been operating with a pretty rough, popular caricature of cartesian dualism, and one which was more theological empirical theory than what it actually was: A metaphysical position not only about the mind, but about the world itself – and not an empirical theory. You’ve also been operating with a pretty rough understanding of Christianity itself.

Now, frankly, I don’t blame you too much for making these mistakes – most people’s views of dualism pretty much follows what they saw in Ghostbusters. But at this point you’ve had it explained to you multiple times why Markram’s experiment, in the absolute best case possible, isn’t capable of demonstrating what you were led to believe it could.

I suggest you consider pulling back from this thread and – if you really are interested in consciousness – reading a few books and articles. I can even suggest some if you like. But there’s a reason consciousness is called “the hard problem” (I would submit that intentionality is just as hard as consciousness, if only for a materialist). There’s a reason that many once-physicalists are turning to panpsychism, neutral monism, mysterianism, and otherwise as a position on consciousness. And it isn’t because they haven’t considered the possibility of a detailed simulation.

Tom

I’m specifically referring to the distinctions you made in your OP regarding intelligent design movement vs natural theism as a whole.

For example, you write..

Then what if “science” defeats ID?

[…]

If there are positive signs of God’s reality in the whole of nature, then they stand as such regardless of what ID shows or fails to show. Intelligent Design could never subtract from those positive signs; not even if every argument of Behe’s, Meyer’s, and Dembski’s should fail, and if the Discovery Institute should fold and donate all its assets to the BioLogos Foundation.

This is clearly referring to the hypothetical defeat of the ID movement limited to irreducible complexity in biology, etc., rather than intelligent design as a whole as claimed by natural theism. You make this distinction again in regards to a hypothetical discovery of the fine tuning of the universe through law and chance.

If fact, it’s this sort of distinction that appears to be the key point in your OP.

Standing over against H is the fact that no such simulation CS has been built, and that it is unclear, or at least not yet demonstrated, that it can be. Yet you want us to draw conclusions from H. That’s one problem with H.

Tom, I’m graciously providing a means for my hypothetical while you provided absolutely any means or time frame as to how these discoveries occur. And this is somehow a problem? Furthermore, I graciously reformulated my question to exclude specific means, which you have yet to address.

I’m making the same distinction as found your OP. Rather than suggesting science discovers everything is law and chance, my hypothetical is limited to perception and consciousness. And it too reaches a conclusion…

If you conclude the natural world of electrons, protons and quantum mechanics reflects the abilities of an omnipotent and omniscient creator, why wouldn’t you also conclude the discovery of a natural explanation of perception and consciousness is also such a refection as well?

This is the question I’m asking.

Tom

There are three points I’m making here. I’m going to be explicit here in case it’s not obvious.

01. If the specific means by which nature reflected the actions of a omnipotent creator really was irrelevant, then you’d have no problem discussing my hypothetical. That you’ve spent so much time trying to avoid one particular hypothetical seems to indicate the specifics are indeed relevant.

I’ll touch on why it’s relevant in item [03]

02. You are clearly willing to ignore significant problems in some hypotheticals, but not others.

But if ID defeats “science” (forget for now the tendentious exclusion of ID from science), does that mean nature has lost to God? Only a confirmed philosophical naturalist could think so.

Here you explicitly acknowledge the controversial nature regarding a scientific defeat of the biological ID movement, then explicitly and intentionally dismiss it. As such, your complaints regarding my particular hypothetical clearly represent a different sent of standards.

03. While you might claim the specific hypothetical phenomena “defeated” by science would not be relevant to excluding the possibility of intelligent creator of some abstract sense, there are hypotheticals which would exclude specific intelligent creators, such as a those that gives us an eternal soul, etc. Surely, it’s possible for some intelligent creator to create us as material begins that do not have eternal life, etc. If this indeed were the case, systematic success of Markram’s experiment would seem to exclude the former, despite the latter remaining a logical possibility.

This is my key point.

Tom wrote:

What I wrote about your argument not going anywhere applies regardless of the means you suggest by which its conditions might hypothetically come about.

Clearly, It’s not that my question isn’t going anywhere. Rather, it seems that you either intuitively or intentionally want to avoid going there at all costs.

Ron Krampos,

Well, this Catholic thinks that there are of course ways to approach God other than through Christianity. What’s interesting, however, is that most famous Christian apologists do exactly that. The Kalam Cosmological argument, Aquinas’ Five Ways… all the way down to St. Paul discussing the altar to an unknown god.

The problem is that it seems you think that not only is there more than one way to approach God, but that you seem to suggest that all religions and beliefs about God are equal. (It can’t merely be that people outside of the Christian faith are saved, since that’s a prominent Catholic belief – but also that they are saved through Christ, not say.. hinduism.)

Though I do think it’s important to focus on the beliefs those of other faiths have in common, and I do believe there really is some considerable commonality. Perhaps more than even most are willing to grant (Between the three abrahamic religions is one thing, but I’d include Brahman as well.)

Tom wrote:

A. Your point 02 commits the same error I pointed out to you earlier in philosophical argumentation. If you think it was wrong that I “explicitly and intentionally” dismissed it, the ball is in your court to take note of the arguments I gave for why I did that and show what was lacking in them.

Tom,

While I thought this was made clear in my last comment, I’ll explicitly point out the specific points where your objections to my hypothetical are lacking.

You wrote:

Your hypothetical is that a computer simulation of a brain can be built. Let’s call that hypothetical H, and the computer simulation CS.

First, this is not my hypothetical. I’ve reformulated my question to make this clear, but you have continued to ignore it. I originally wrote: ….

What about a deep understanding about how we perceive reality? If science succeeds here, would it merely reflect the handiwork of God as well?

What followed was my graciously providing a means by which my hypothetical could be achieved. Note that I prefixed this means using the words, “For example” as it was one of many possible ways such a hypothetical might take place.

For example, what if Henrey Markram succeeds in creating a full-scale working simulation of the human brain – not based on fuzzy logic, but an accurate biological model of the 10 billion neurons and 1 trillion synapses it contains?

There is no corresponding example present in your original OP. In fact, you clearly acknowledge the controversial nature of reaching such a conclusion in respect to biological complexity (the ID movement), but are willing to “forget it” because it advances your argument.

You wrote:

The point is that given either P or not-P, the same Q results. That was the point I was making in the original post: that both P and not-P lead to the same conclusion.

To which I noted: should *you* follow this chain of logic, you could just as easily replace G with human consciousness and perception and reach the conclusion. Specifically..

G: Human beings exhibit the extraordinary ability to perceive their environment.
P: This ability is not completely explainable now, either now or potentially on the basis of any overarching physical theory.
Not-P: This ability is potentially explainable on the basis of some overreaching physical theory.
Q: The universe is intellegenty designed.

While this hypothetical might point to *a* creator in some abstract sense, it appears to exclude specific intelligent creators. This would include those creators which supposably endow us with a non-physical means to make choices and perceive our environment which is immune from the perceived problems of determinism, flow of time theory, etc.

As such, your objection seem to be my having graciously provided an example of a ongoing experiment by which Non-P could occur.

Philosophy, however, often details with absolute Truths. It just does’t deal with truths about the real world.

Huh? An absolute truth about reality that is false is not an absolute truth. An absolute truth that is “true” but isn’t true about reality is not an absolute truth. What you are saying makes no sense.

Steve wrote:

Huh? An absolute truth about reality that is false is not an absolute truth. An absolute truth that is “true” but isn’t true about reality is not an absolute truth. What you are saying makes no sense.

Steve, you seem to be suggesting that the existence of some absolute state of affairs in reality would somehow necessitate philosophers having knowledge of said absolute state of affairs in reality.

Scott,

Again, you seem to have mistaken my failure to agree with your conclusions about said gulf as ignorance.

I’ve taken your repeated mangling of cartesian dualism, natural theology, the hard problem of consciousness, Christianity, and your tendency to make assertions without argument as ignorance. You demonstrate it in spades.

However, I do not recall asking any questions or making any statements that indicated a similar lack of knowledge in philosophy. (However, please feel free explicitly point something I might have missed) Instead, my comments represent a disagreement regarding the foundation, relevance and impact of this supposed gulf in regards to Markram’s experiment should it succeed.

Why bother? I’ve explicitly, repeatedly quoted your mistakes and corrected them throughout this thread. Your reaction has been to ignore them and keep right on making inane assertions – but I couldn’t care less about your personal opinion. I only care about your claims and arguments, particularly when they’re demonstrably wrong and flawed. The very fact that Markram’s experiment cannot succeed in the way it must for your views to have any bearing is just one more of these points.

This view is evident in your suggestion that any form of dualism does not predict a computer programmed to only simulate neurons would not exhibit signs of consciousness. It is focused on excluding rival theories using hard to vary explanations which can be falsified. Philosophy, however, often details with absolute Truths. It just does’t deal with truths about the real world.

Scott, you’re yet another person with a terrible understanding of where philosophy ends and where science begins. It does not seem to occur to you that when Markram starts talking about consciousness, he is no longer purely discussing science. He’s engaging in philosophy. Just because Markram is a scientist doesn’t mean that when he starts talking about these subjects, “science” is speaking.

The same problem pops up when you start talking about Many Worlds. Walk down that road if you like (or the ‘Many Minds’ view). Or you can walk down the idealist route taken by Richard Conn Henry, Wheeler’s PAP, Robert Lanza’s biocentrism, etc. You wouldn’t be the first person to start spouting quantum woo as a “solution” for so many problems. Occasionalists who take quantum issues as evidence for their position have a “solution” too.

Second, an explanation of something would not actually resemble that which it is trying to explain. If it did, then it would not be an explanation, but that which was being explained. As such, it seems that your objection is one that would be a problem not just for Markram’s experiment, but for every explanation.

No, I’ve pointed out the actual limits of Markram’s experiment. Still waiting on you or Markram to prove or disprove the presence of consciousness in a thermometer or a rat NCC. Actually, no, I’m not – because you’ve already run from that challenge, and proved my point in the process. This isn’t about the explanation “resembling” what it explains, it’s about the explanation actually explaining the phenomena.

Joseph, I asked about the impact of a deep understanding about how we perceive reality? yet you respond with claims that cartesian dualists would not be spooked by mind like behavior, etc. When I note that you haven’t addressed natural theology as a whole, you again appear to object to the question because cartesian dualists do not say that non-conscious things could not exhibit mind-like behavior. Do you see the problem here?

I see the problem clearly: You don’t even understand what the words “natural theology” mean in their proper context, just as you don’t understand what cartesian dualism is about or entails. Your most recent contradiction – saying that Cartesians believed animals had no consciousness despite animals behaving as if they were conscious, while your entire argument has hinged on the idea of Blue Brain behaving as if it were conscious would shock cartesians – drove that point home splendidly.

Now, you say that natural theology is the idea that “Natural theism is referring to the idea that the whole of nature reflects the handiwork of a intelligent creator.” The problem is that natural theology is not united on this front – Aristotileans/Thomists and ID proponents have very difficult to reconcile views on this subject, just as hylemorphic dualists and cartesians do. Mormons, meanwhile, tend to reject ‘immaterial’ talk altogether – for them, God and matter eternally coexist. For hindus, a kind of idealism and pantheism is in play with Brahman.

The point of all this is that “natural theology” isn’t a single claim or view. There’s a diverse number of ideas in that field. You’re not even interacting with much of any of them – at most, you’re dealing with a strawman. The closest you’ve come to engaging one view is by throwing around the words “cartesian dualism” and then proceeding to show you hardly know what the view entails.

And it was correlations which formed the foundation of the various philosophies of the mind that exist today. Correlations and presuppositions were all they had as well.

Actually, Scott, they did not. For one reason alone: Science is restricted to objective phenomena. But theology and philosophy are not. Talking about clearly subjective phenomena (from idealism to solipsism to other minds, etc) is fair game in those cases. Philosophy and science are not the same thing: There are different restrictions in place. Again, your problem is you have severe trouble telling the difference between the two in just about every way. In fact, you praise science and turn your nose up at philosophy, then turn around and do philosophy and call it science.

A. In reality, you clearly treat human beings which exhibit mind-like behavior as having minds, despite the fact that philosophy suggests this is impossible for you to know.

Impossible for me to know with certainty, but not impossible for me to believe regardless. Practical behavior doesn’t help you out here, unless you’re going to argue that my actions constitute proof that the phenomena in question (other minds) exist. In which case, I have quite some proof of God.

Mind like behavior should not occur from an experiment that is only programmed to simulate neurons. This is because the experiment would not be programed to act remotely in any mind-like way. For example, in the Chinese Room thought experiment someone gave the man a book which he referenced to determine which characters to output from any given input characters. No such book would be programmed into Markram’s experiment. As such, the question becomes, why would mind like behavior occur at all?

Even Markram doesn’t think that they’re going to get ‘mind-like behavior’ out of their simulation without teaching it: Making it interact with an environment, introducing language to it, teaching it, etc. Which introduces another interesting point: BB already has rudimentary ‘mind-like behavior’ built right into it by design. It will be capable of writing and rewriting to software, changing its program in response to stimulus – not to mention doing so under the auspices of programmers, project leaders, etc. They’re not simply going to simulate a brain, turn it on, and BB starts talking in english.

Again, Blue Brain is coming with a lot of ‘programming’ built right into it, complete with rudimentary learning, memory, etc. And it’s not a mere ‘simulation of neurons’, but a simulation of many neurons with innate programmed connectivity. In other words, just like with neural nets – hell, just like with the old online 20 questions game that recorded answers – “mind-like behavior” is built right in. The question is what the extent of that behavior will occur and be predicted.

C. Descartes’ previous philosophical conclusion that animals did not experience pain was abolished by the enlightenment, which illustrates a historical impact of science and reason on philosophy of the mind.

Great, so you’re utterly ignorant of the history of philosophy as well as its current status.

No, Scott: It wasn’t ‘abolished’ during the enlightenment, nor since. If other people having different views means ‘abolished’, then cartesian dualism was abolished before it began – scholastics and hylomorphists all the way back to Aristotle believed that animals were conscious. You said yourself that live dissection was taking place when Cartesian dualism was in vogue, and if that isn’t science I don’t know what is. “Science” and “reason” are not synonymous, nor did they challenge cartesian dualism. Other philosophy did, with materialism being not the most popular option.

What’s more, there are still modern claims – even by materialists – that animals do not experience pain. I already mentioned that some materialists consider language to be essential to consciousness. Some eliminative materialists (themselves nattering on about science and reason) argue that subjectivity simply can’t exist, and that talk of ‘pain’ is “failed folk-psychology”. Materialism is dying as quickly as ever, and Blue Brain having mind-like behavior would help bury it.

You mean the view of consciousness via quantum computation based on quantum linear superposition, which is, in part, based on David Deutsch’s work?

Penrose advocates Orch-OR. Namedropping David Deutsch in there isn’t going to change the matter. You may as well point out that Henry Stapp also advocates a quantum theory of consciousness (and according to Stapp, quantum mechanics slammed the door on materialism a while ago), without mentioning the difference in views between Penrose and Stapp.

So exactly how would natural theists explain how BB could be telling the “Truth” without it having been programmed with this knowledge?

It would depend on the theist and the particular philosophy they hold. Panpsychists would make arguments about information processing being key to consciousness, and thus the thermometer was conscious too. Panexperientialists would say the thermometer had ‘experience’, but actual consciousness came in at a certain threshold. Cartesian dualists would choose between the idea that BB was telling the truth (and therefore was ensouled) or was not (and therefore there was nothing but behavior with no inner life). Epiphenomenalists would shrug and say there’s no way to know. Eliminative materialists would insist BB (like almost everyone else) was mistaken, or lying. Etc, etc.

In other words, the same exact disagreements we have now would be had then. The main difference would be that BB claiming to be conscious would be a particular blow against materialists, since a claim of consciousness by a ‘purely physical’ machine would likely be the straw that broke the camel’s back: If BB was considered to be lying, the only place left for consciousness would be a quantum-level theory, which materialists want to avoid at all costs. If BB was considered to be telling the truth, it would be evidence that our conception of the physical was tremendously flawed – and that panpsychism, neutral monism, or even those dreaded dualisms would be/could be correct.

While, I’m guessing you already have answer for that, how would natural theists explain that, when we turn BB on and off *at will*, it starts and stops acting conscious accordingly? And how would natural theists explain when we build one BB after another to test Markram’s theory, they too act and behave in a way that seems conscious and we can also turn them on and off at will?

How will natural theists explain this?

Increasing the number of BBs won’t matter whatsoever, though if people consider them to be conscious you may not want to count on being able to make so many of them – ethical questions will pop up immediately.

Turning BB off and on won’t be a problem either, and it would depend on the theist and their philosophy in particular – no moreso than resuscitating a dead person or similar long-considered questions (Ship of Theseus). Views will vary from ‘it has no actual subjective experience/mind/soul’ to ‘it has one, the same one comes back each time it’s turned off and on’ to ‘it has one, but a different one comes back each time it turns off and on’ to ‘unsolvable, but I know I’m conscious and I trust in God’. Again, chances are that if there’s even a question about this, people – myself included – are going to be pursuing ethical rules on this sort of thing even (perhaps especially) if the question is not resolvable by science. And, of course, it will not be.

As I keep pointing out, Scott: Markram’s experiment is going to be incapable of establishing what you hoped it would, and what your argument needed it to. Markram won’t be able to show BB is actually conscious even if it acts exquisitely ‘mind-like’. The bare presence of the subjective experience in a single human is disaster for a materialist worldview – adding a simulation to the mix will be disaster for it *whichever way it is viewed*. Quantum mechanics alone was bad enough for the materialist-mechanist perspective, just as advancements in technology have spelled trouble for atheism.

Steve, please see my response to Joseph.

The fact that philosophers could continue to argue about the theory of mind, despite Markram’s experiment having succeed in reality, is what I was referring to in that paragraph.

While Markram’s discoveries would be helping us understand mental illnesses that directly intersect our ability to perceive reality, such as Schizophrenia, philosophers would still be arguing if anyone but ourselves actually perceive reality at all.

This is not to say that philosophy does not play an important role, but that this role is not necessary founded in reality of our situations.

Tom,

Have I not pointed out the specific issues in comment #69 as you asked?

It would seem that “the ball is in your court to take note of the arguments I gave for why I did that and show what was lacking in them.”

Joseph, thank you for your comment. Religions are not the same, but a devout Hindu is better than a drifting Christian and vice versa.

I have an M.A. in Philosophy. While reading this marathon discussion, I reaffirmed my decision not to pursue a Ph.D. Heaven forbid (sic) religion should be discussed here.

SteveK, I read both of those articles and they were well written. One quote stands out for me: “for whatever reason, they sincerely and diligently pursue other religious options. In this effort, God recognizes their faith and answers with the saving grace of Christ.”

That works for me. Other believers might substitute another name for that of Christ and say even devout Christians can receive the divine saving grace. Other paths well followed are better than those who waiver and stray off the way to God. There are too many Christians in name only (and Buddhists, etc.).

SteveK,

Truth is in the eyes of the beholder. People of other faiths aren’t concerned with a position supported by the New Testament, just as most Christians don’t care about alternate positions supported by the sacred texts of other religions. It is the intractable beliefs that “my way is the only way” – regardless of how that may be justified – that leads to conflict and, too often, bloodshed.

Tom,

Let me go back to the 40 books on psychology, biology and physics referenced when writing my e-book to find statements by Einstein, Heisenberg and others about truth being dependent upon the observer.

I wrote frequently about absolute truth: ultimate reality which can be experienced in suprarational consciousness, but cannot be perceived or measured empirically. Rather than cite myself, here are a few quotations from some more prominent sources.

“Every grain of matter, every appearance is one with Eternal and Immutable Reality! Wherever your foot may fall, you are still within the Sanctuary for Enlightenment, though it is nothing perceptible.” Huang-po B

“God is unified oneness-one without two; inestimable. Genuine divine existence engenders the existence of all creation. The sublime, inner essences secretly constitute a chain linking everything from the highest to the lowest to the edge of the universe.” Moses de Leon J

“The simple, absolute and immutable mysteries of divine Truth are hidden in the super-luminous darkness of that silence which revealeth in secret. For this darkness, though of deepest obscurity, is yet radiantly clear; though beyond touch and sight, it more than fills our unseeing minds with splendours of transcendent beauty.” Dionysius of Areopagite [Pseudo-Dionysius] C

“Supreme, beyond the power of speech to express, Brahman may yet be apprehended by the eye of pure illumination. Pure, absolute and eternal Reality: such is Brahman and “Thou art That.” Meditate upon this truth within your consciousness.” Shankara [Sankara] H

“To the enlightened man, whose consciousness embraces the universe, the universe becomes his ‘body’, while his physical body becomes a manifestation of the Universal Mind, his inner vision an expression of the highest reality, his speech an expression of eternal truth…” Lama Govinda B

“The Sufi who knows the Ultimate Truth sets and speaks in a manner which takes into consideration the understanding, limitations and dominant concealed prejudices of his audience. To the Sufi, worship means knowledge. Through knowledge he attains sight. The Sufi abandons the three “I’s. He does not say ‘for me’, ‘with me’, or ‘my property’. He must not attribute anything for himself.” Ibn El-Arabi I

“God visits the soul in a way that prevents it doubting when it comes to itself that it has been in God and God in it and so firmly is it convinced of this Truth…” St. Teresa of Avila C

“The essence of divinity [Truth/Reality] is found in every single thing – nothing but it exists. Since it causes every thing to be, no thing can live by anything else. It enlivens them; its existence exists in each existent. Do not attribute duality to God.” Moses Cordovero J

“Truth is a Way to Love, to Knowledge, to Action. But only those who can find real Truth can follow its Path as a Way. Others imagine that they may find Truth, even though they do not know where to seek it, since what they call truth is something less.” Rauf Mazari I

“Intuitive insight…is a whole view where the mind in its totality strains forward to know Truth. The realization of this undivided unitary life from which intellect and emotion, imagination and interest arise is the essence of the spiritual life. Ordinarily we are not whole men, real individuals, but wrecks of men, shells of individuals. Our responses are formal and our actions are imitative. We are not souls but human automata.” Sarvepalli Radhakrishna H

“Because He is Himself the absolute Ground [Truth/Reality], in which all contrariety is unity, all diversity is identity, that which we understand as diversity cannot exist in God.” Nicholas of Cusa C

Jesus said “The kingdom of God is within you.” [Luke 17:20]. It is not found in books or apparent to the senses.

Tom,

Rather than be contentious, let me rephrase my initial statement:

“Truth” is too often in the eyes of the beholder. What one person believes to be true may be rejected by another person. Also, what is true today – to the best of anyone’s knowledge – might be proven wrong tomorrow…or at least modified.

Tom,

As stated to SteveK, modified here: Only Christians care what is written in the New Testament and many of those do not take it literally. There are many Christians who are pluralists, especially in my group on PeaceNext.org

Muslims who believe that Islam is the only way often enter into conflict with Christians who believe that Jesus Christ is the only way. My other blog post was about Africa, where battles between the two camps have led to bloodshed.

Tom wrote:

Scott, please see here, here, and also Joseph’s last comment, especially his first paragraph.

Let’s look at each of these references. Josephs first paragraph…

I’ve taken your repeated mangling of cartesian dualism, natural theology, the hard problem of consciousness, Christianity, and your tendency to make assertions without argument as ignorance. You demonstrate it in spades.

Here are my references to cartesian dualism.

And what is your criteria for determining good and bad Philosophy? For example, there are many philosophers of the mind would would suggest that Cartesian Dualism and even Property Dualism are bad philosophical theories. To briefly quote John Searle..

Here I note there are many different philosophical theories of the mind, despite Joseph’s insistence that I’m somehow ignorant of it.

However, it seems unlikely that all natural theists are strictly philosophical cartesian dualists and would necessarily reach the same conclusions you’ve eluded to.

Not all natural theists are cartesian dualists. Again, something Joseph seem to claim I’m completely ignorant of.

And let’s not forget that Descartes also concluded animals only appeared to experience pain, and their cries were just a very elaborate an illusion. As such live dissection was common until the enlightenment.

Here, I was pointing out, while people might be unsure if whatever animals experience should be considered consciousness or not, observations made during the enlightenment have, for the most part, had an impact on how animals are treated, including the practice of live dissection. Whatever cartesian dualists currently happen to think animals may or may not be experiencing, it’s led them to stop performing live animal dissections in reality.

Joseph, I asked about the impact of a deep understanding about how we perceive reality [in regards to natural theism]? yet you respond with claims that cartesian dualists would not be spooked by mind like behavior, etc. When I note that you haven’t addressed natural theology as a whole, you again appear to object to the question because cartesian dualists do not say that non-conscious things could not exhibit mind-like behavior.

For example, you [Tom] have yet to tell us what kind of dualist you are and why *your* particular philosophy of the mind would result in him not being spooked by the success of Markram’s experiment. If fact, it seems that you have delegated much of this subject to Joseph.

As such, it’s unclear what percent of natural theists actually fit into any specific philosophical theory if the mind, rather than a holding a purely theological view on the subject. (yes theology is partly based in philosophy, but I’m referring to the specific categories that Joseph mentioned.)

Furthermore, if one looks a the specific philosophies of the mind that natural theists do hold, you’ll likely find they have a significant impact which specific intelligent creator they think created nature.

This is my key point.

In regards to comment 49…

01. I’m parrying rather than answering in my response to questions 1, 2 and 6 in comment 45. I’ve respond in kind to the kinds of terse questions you presented.

In Q1, you’re working on the assumption that Markrams’ experiment was my hypothetical. It’s not. This is why I asked what evidence you could point to regarding ID as a response.

In Q2: Despite it not being necessary for me to show such a simulation is feasible (see above) I’ve shown that the technology needed is a difference of degree in regards to existing technology. Having established his, I’m open to other suggestions as to why it might be successful.

In Q6: you wrote, Why would I worry about that when you haven’t provided any reason to think your scenario is possible?

You don’t need to worry about Markram’s experiment anymore than you need to worry about how science defeats Johnson, Behe, Denton Debenski, etc. Furthermore, while it’s unnecessary, I’ve presented many reasons, but it seems you lack basic computational theory required to understand them.

In regards to comment #66,

In QA: I’ve already respond in comment #70 [was 69]

In QB: My hypothetical point is not Markram’s experiment. I’ve graciously provided a means by which consciousness can be explained as law or chance.

In QC: Again not my hypothetical. However, I’ve shown that your claim that it leads to no conclusions, is incorrect. Again, please see comment #70

In QD, you wrote: I don’t think I’ve evaded your arguments, but you do. So be it.

Tom, it seems that you’ve either evaded my argument by either intentionally or unintentionally responding as if my hypothetical is Markram’s experiment. This could easily be interpreted as a red herring. Your continued failure to directly address this specific point suggests the former. Please see comment #37.

Ron,

Only Christians care what is written in the New Testament and many of those do not take it literally. There are many Christians who are pluralists, especially in my group on PeaceNext.org

Okay. The law of non-contradiction is still valid. To the extent that pluralist views contradict each other, they all cannot be true in the ways they purport to be true – which punches a sizeable hole in your “eyes of the beholder” comment.

Scott said (emphatically and categorically): “scientific explanations are not 100% certain regarding any subject, let alone perception.”

That’s amateurish nonsense reflecting not only an ignorance of and inability to distinction between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of science, but also of science itself. (I’m not going to waste time with your other errors… except for this one and the one below.)

Not 100% certain? Really? Wasn’t it William Harvey that discovered how blood flows in the human body and that in a non-pathological specimen, a human heart is a four-chambered, four-valved complex muscular system that pumps blood throughout the body? Are you seriously suggesting that any new knowledge could change that understanding?

I can give you a long list of knowledge obtained through the modern empirical sciences that is 100% certain… and yet you so categorically and ignorantly claim otherwise. And perception not 100% certain? Dumb at best: just because in certain situations the senses have to be adjusted doesn’t mean they can’t be trusted. Do we distrust our sense of sight because we can’t see the backside of the statue of David at the same time we’re viewing the front? Also, you foolishly apply the term “certitude” to senses when it is properly applied to the knowledge itself.

Could it be that your religious beliefs hold that consciousness was brought about by God, who cannot be tested or understood?

Again, foolish presupposition that God by His nature is testable like His creation. You a priori impose upon God what He must be (so that it can match your world view expectations), and then you apply your little “tests” with their silly foregone conclusions. Your position reeks of positivism and scientism (which are pseudo-philosophical, self-immolating nonsense): anything that can’t be captured by the sciences you automatically relegate to lesser knowledge… and you do so unscientifically, by the way–which you did earlier to philosophical knowledge and which you expressed by your amateurish view of dualism… oh, and as well with your embarrassing claim that everything in science starts out as conjecture (thereby suggesting any any all scientific research starts out upon conjecture–another Aristophanes-award candidate).

David Deutsch? Please, if you’re going to fallaciously appeal to authority, then please refer to some who really knows what he’s talking about. There are few people out there who are as far off the mark of what “explanation” is than Deutsch and his mish-mash speculations over multiverses and false interpretations of the findings of quantum mechanics. A close second is Olorin who just recently equivocated between mathematical equations (artifacts of the human mind!) and the determinism of physical systems. Really, really ignorant stuff.

Tom: Sorry, but I can’t believe some of the arrogance and self-serving nonsense that’s been spewed here by the loyal opposition over the past few days.

SteveK:

I think your April 9, 2010 at 2:01 pm (#69) comment may have misunderstood Joseph’s point. For example, if one is truly, honestly committed to the search for truth, one will find The Truth. Anthony Flew, while not quite there, is an example. One CAN reason to the existence of God, but one needs revealed knowledge to know WHO God is. There is only one Name, but there may be many paths to that Name. Consider St. Augustine: it was his mother, St. Monica, who was the instrument of God’s grace that brought him to Christ. Logos is a much broader term than most people give it credit. I think that may be closer to what Joseph meant (and I think Joseph handily and correctly dismissed the creeping syncretism Ron is peddling), but I leave to him to clarify.

Requiescat in pace.

Tom,

I’ve done as you asked by pointing out the flaw in your OP, in detail. In return, you proved a vague response that my argument is “weak?” This doesn’t seem to be a good faith response.

Holopupenko, should you decide to address my argument…

Tom’s original post seemed suggest that, as a Christian, you need not worry if the sphere of science expands to encompasses any particular phenomenon since you can always claim said expansion reflects God’s handiwork.

However, it seems that this argument can be expressed as the following, which is a logical fallacy…

P1. A number of Christians are natural theists
P2. Any specific natural explanations of phenomena by science need not be interpreted as a threat to natural theism.
C1. Christians need not interpret any specific natural explanation of phenomena by science as a threat to Christianity.

Tom wrote:

The point is that given either P or not-P, the same Q results. That was the point I was making in the original post: that both P and not-P lead to the same conclusion.

To which I noted: should *you* follow this chain of logic, you could just as easily replace G with human consciousness and perception and reach the same conclusion. Specifically..

G: Human beings exhibit the extraordinary ability to perceive their environment.
P: This ability is not completely explainable now, either now or potentially on the basis of any overarching natural theory.
Not-P: This ability is potentially explainable on the basis of some overreaching natural theory.
Q: The universe is intelligently designed.

While one could interpret this hypothetical as supporting *a* creator in some abstract sense, it appears to exclude specific intelligent creators. This would include those creators which supposably endow us with a non-natural means to make choices and perceive our environment which is immune from the perceived problems of determinism, flow of time theory, etc.

Tom wrote:

… is false and arguably dishonest. In return I have not supplied a “vague response” that your argument is weak. I have written some 33 comments, most of them detailed and substantive.

And nearly all of these comments were under the assumption that Markram’s experiment was my hypothetical, rather than my graciously providing a means by which my hypothetical could be explained.

It’s one thing to say you’re in no way obligated to comment on anything, however, it’s another to say you have actually commented on my original hypothetical, ….

What about a deep understanding about how we perceive reality? If science succeeds here, would it merely reflect the handiwork of God as well?

… which includes the limited sense of certainty that scientific theories entail.

Instead, what I’ve observed is a constant attempt to redefine my hypothetical as a philosophical theory of mind to make it impossible to answer or “waste of time.”