Continuing Discussion on “What Is Evidence…”

The discussion on What is Evidence to Christians has reached a new record: it’s exhausting the allowable memory from the server, and the page won’t load, at least not for me in Firefox. It is probably still working for some users in different browsers. There are some background cache processes going on for some users, too, which may make it seem as though it’s working for all, but it isn’t. So let the discussion continue here.

Update at noon: the problem may exist only for registered/logged in users. If the page is not loading for you there and you want to refer to it anyway, trying logging out and then re-loading the page. The discussion still remains here.

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31 Responses

  1. Tom Gilson says:

    For convenience here are the last eight or nine comments from that prior thread:

    Jacob says:

    May 2, 2009 at 5:26 pm

    Tom Gilson –

    I’m quite well aware of the claims of prophecy that Christians make, of which messianic prophecies are perhaps the most pertinent, so I thought that the way in which they can be interpreted are quite important to the discussion, as many are quoted directly in the NT.

    By the time I even track down and read the book, the conversation may not even be worth regurgitating, and I already know many of the arguments. If Wright makes some exceptional points that are interesting, you should quote them or sum them up in response to my arguments.

    What Luke thought is absolutely pertinent to a 21st century westerner. If I can’t track the methodology, then I will have trouble affirming a great many things in the sense that I can’t see the logic of his claims. You’re trying to use the logic of what could or couldn’t happen, but I can’t do that if it isn’t there. All I’m left with are the claims, and I have to suppose many things about them. Thus, I find it all wanting. Many historians back then were more thorough with their work.

    **********

    SteveK says:

    May 2, 2009 at 5:42 pm

    david,

    Its not my intent to imply that christians don’t employ reason at all.

    That’s not the way I interpreted this comment from you: “I’m quite convinced that there is no rational basis for believing the miraculous claims made in the NT are true.”

    Explain what you mean by ‘no rational basis for believing’. I hear that phrase a lot and I always interpret it as ‘belief is irrational’ but your comment above doesn’t support that. So what does it mean?

    **********

    Tony Hoffman says:

    May 2, 2009 at 5:56 pm

    MM,

    I have a better idea, since resources for all of those have been offered, at least in the citations given by Holding. Why don’t you start ponying up the contrary data instead of playing this sophistic game where all you have to do is say, “but I haven’t seen the evidence…show me more!”

    I don’t believe you have offered me a single citation regarding what I have asked for.

    Why should I go search for material that supports your argument when I have already expressed my skepticism about it? This is a blog discussion, not a book club. If you can’t be bothered to support your argument, don’t expect me to try and build it for you.

    **********

    david ellis says:

    May 2, 2009 at 7:22 pm

    Proverbs 20:15; Acts 17:11

    …and high standards of evidence…

    2 Peter 1:16; John 14:11

    … and telling potential converts not to believe until and unless they have examined the evidence thoroughly

    Acts 2:22; 1 John 4:1; 1 Thessalonians 5:21

    What’s with the christians on this blog? Always putting up the bare minimum, if anything, in defense of their claims.

    Here’s a thought. If you want to present a bible verse as evidence: quote it.

    Or do you prefer that readers of this blog just assume that those verses provide good support for your position (which they don’t) without looking them up when you know it would look pretty thin if you actually quoted those verses.

    **********

    david ellis says:

    May 2, 2009 at 7:38 pm

    david: Its not my intent to imply that christians don’t employ reason at all.

    Steve: That’s not the way I interpreted this comment from you: “I’m quite convinced that there is no rational basis for believing the miraculous claims made in the NT are true.”

    Explain what you mean by ‘no rational basis for believing’. I hear that phrase a lot and I always interpret it as ‘belief is irrational’ but your comment above doesn’t support that. So what does it mean?

    Yes, the belief is irrational. That is, christian apologetic attempts to argue for their beliefs are bad ones. You apologists attempt to employ reason in support of your beliefs….but you employ it very poorly. Using arguments that are obviously weak at best and frequently flat out ridiculous.

    I’m getting tired of exchanges that aren’t dealing with anything substantive and won’t respond to anything else not actually dealing with the arguments for belief in christianity.

    If you wish to talk about any of the apologetic arguments for your religion I’ll be happy to continue the discussion.

    But if you just want to go on and on about the fact that we disagree on whether belief in christianity is reasonable….rather than actually discussing the arguments themselves then you’re conversation is going to be one-sided. I have better things to do.

    **********

    MedicineMan says:

    May 2, 2009 at 9:33 pm

    Tony,

    I don’t believe you have offered me a single citation regarding what I have asked for.

    Now I feel like I’m in the twilight zone. I’ve pointed you towards quite a few resources that discuss the social and cultural composition of Judea. Two books, plus the Bible, plus the citations offered by Holding. You’re expressing doubt about whether or not we really know anything about a certain topic, and I’m directing you towards sources that indicate otherwise. To ask for anything more would be nonsensical – what do you want me to do, copy-past an entire textbook for you since you’re too lazy to check and see if it even exists?

    Then again, here’s the crux of your problem:

    Why should I go search for material that supports your argument when I have already expressed my skepticism about it?

    Ahh, yes. You’ve already decided that it’s not true, so you have no reason to investigate further. At least we’re being more open, now. Tony does not agree with my conclusions, therefore he has no reason to read anything contradictory. He can’t even read the citations listed on a page one click away. And if I quoted it here verbatim, he wouldn’t read it anyway, it seems.

    This is a blog discussion, not a book club.

    Then why in heaven’s name are you expecting? That’s precisely the reason I pointed you towards comprehensive sources. You’re doubting the extent to which we know something about ancient culture. What other appropriate response is there than to offer sources that contain that very information? It’s not a topic you cover intelligently in five seconds, Tony. I think you know that, but you’re trying to cover the fact that you made an extremely weak argument through sophistry.

    If you can’t be bothered to support your argument, don’t expect me to try and build it for you.

    Let me again ask about the citations from Holding. He makes several references to authors, quotes their articles, cites their books, and so forth. I linked to his summary, and even that brief overview has a large number of such citations. I told you those were there. Are those not good enough? Is anything good enough?

    Yes, I forgot. Research is for losers. Only the truly intelligent make up their mind before they’ve read a single sentence of an opposing view. You say we don’t know much about ancient culture, I point you towards resources regarding it, and you think it’s unreasonable for you might look into them. If you can’t even click a link and scan through a document less than 10,000 words long, then you’re even more willingly ignorant than you seem. That’s intellectually lazy, at best.

    **********

    MedicineMan says:

    May 2, 2009 at 9:57 pm

    David,

    News flash: you are on the internet. There are literally dozens of rapid bible search sites. You could have found such a site, copy-pasted the verses given, and seen them, all in less time than it took you to type out that comically immature response.

    Or do you prefer that the other readers assume that you’re that lazy; that you can’t even take 60 seconds to look them up? Or, that doing so has inconvenienced you so much that you simply must complain about it?

    That’s pretty telling. It gives everyone a reasonably clear indication of how much effort you actually put into thinking about these issues. If looking up a handful of Bible verses is such a herculean task, we can safely assume you’re neither well-informed nor interested in becoming so. You set the bar awfully low on your threshold for effort.

    You haven’t demonstrated the slightest intention of considering what is being presented. Everything that has been mentioned has been met with drivel like “crackpot nonsense”. You so badly mis-state the claims you’re trying to refute that it’s almost embarrassing. References to – gasp! – books are dismissed, since anything you have to get out of your chair to examine is not a substantive answer, in your universe. (Second news flash: the internet is not the only source of information in the world, and having access to Wikipedia does not make you informed.) You’re more interested in whining about how hard it is to look up specific sources in the easiest book in the world to get your hands on. And in the mean time you’re actually trying to complain that the dialogue on our end isn’t “substantive”.

    I too, have better things to do, which don’t include risking the assumptions that arise when you argue with a certain kind of person.

    **********

    Tony Hoffman says:

    May 2, 2009 at 10:02 pm

    MM,

    Regarding Holding, you say,

    He makes several references to authors, quotes their articles, cites their books, and so forth.

    I am not having a blog discussion with Holding; I am having one with you. If not, I could cut you out because you’d just be a middle man.

    He [Holding] makes several references to authors, quotes their articles, cites their books, and so forth.

    I am bewildered as to why you will not draw my attention to the relevant passages in the relevant books by the cited authors’ that support your point. I wonder if you know how arguments are made.

    Do you have anything here, or is “Because that’s what Holding said!” going to be all you’ve got? Because if you’re only point is that someone named Holding wrote an article, and he used footnotes, then I wonder what you’re looking to discuss. (I don’t have much to say against that.)

    I think you should take a little break and try to put together an argument that opposes what I’ve said. (Hint: I offered two good options above — I think it should be around where I used the characters “a)” and “b)”.)

    **********

    MedicineMan says:

    May 2, 2009 at 10:34 pm

    Tony,

    Really, this is getting a little sad.

    I am not having a blog discussion with Holding; I am having one with you.

    So, I cannot link to a page full of citations and quotes? I have to type all of them out for you? What if I had given you a quote and reference from one of the same places Holding did? Are you going to say, “I’m not discussing this with that author. I’m discussing it with you. Stop using a middleman”?

    Give me a break.

    I am bewildered as to why you will not draw my attention to the relevant passages in the relevant books by the cited authors’ that support your point.

    You are not this intellectually deprived. I refuse to believe that you actually, really mean that, and that you’re not just engaging in deliberate immaturity. You doubted the extent to which we know about an ancient culture. On Holding’s summary page alone (link repeated here to save you the titanic effort of finding it above) there are citations of the kinds of relevant facts that we do know. In other words, you claimed we don’t know A, I indicated where our knowledge of A is discussed, you ignored it and claimed that no such “attention” was drawn. Do you need neon lights? Flashier HTML? Do you want me to buy the books in question, highlight the pages, and fly to your hometown to read them to you?

    If I gave you nothing, you’d say, “where’s the citations?” I linked to a page full of them…you say, “where’s the citations?” In fact, the link has more than relevant citations, it has quotes describing the very facts needed to weigh the question at hand. And, I referenced at least two books that also contain this information.

    I note, again, that you’ve provided not one single reference, link, citation, or source for your opposing view. That makes your attempted complaint hypocritical, in addition to blatantly, obviously false.

    So my argument is exactly as I stated before, though I guess my “gauzy” language might have obscured it. We have the relevant information you are discussing from appropriate sources, and here (linked a third time) is where you can see some of that data summarized, sourced, and the meaningful application of it discussed.

    I’m not going to act as an enabler for fatuous garbage like what you’re shoveling. Unless you can contribute something more substantial than feigned incompetence, I have nothing more to add.

    **********

    Tom Gilson says:

    May 3, 2009 at 6:32 am

    @Jacob:

    By the time I even track down and read the book, the conversation may not even be worth regurgitating, and I already know many of the arguments. If Wright makes some exceptional points that are interesting, you should quote them or sum them up in response to my arguments.

    To quote Wright on these points would require re-typing ten or twelve pages. If I summarized, then you would not get the argument. If he could have presented it more compactly I’m sure he would have done so.

    I would not answer the same way with every person in every discussion, but I think for someone such as yourself who “already knows many of the arguments,” I believe a mere summary would be inadequate and unfruitful. If you’re interested in the topic, it’s only about $15, or it’s an inter-library loan.

    With someone who is new to these kinds of topics, a summary would be useful as a starting point. You’re not at a starting point, so I won’t treat you as if you are.

    David Ellis asked, “What’s with the christians on this blog? Always putting up the bare minimum, if anything, in defense of their claims.” (By the way, David, “Christians” is a proper noun. [See number 5 here.] You could look that up in any number of web dictionaries without even leaving your computer. Or do I need to provide those links?)

    What is it? I, for one, am trying to practice and model something better than trading summaries, touching lightly on the surface, and pretending that gives any kind of understanding of what the other person thinks.

    Still I’m going to try and fix one of the named problems by turning on a WordPress plugin that supplies the Bible passage for you when you hover your mouse over the reference, and also gives you a clickable link to it. I had it turned off because it was slowing page loads at a time when the passages referenced were many and long. We’ll see if that happens again.

    Back to Jacob:

    Many historians back then were more thorough with their work.

    Who? Name a source, please. What is it with the skeptics on this blog, putting up the bare minimum, if anything, in defense of their claims.

    And you also wrote:

    I’m quite well aware of the claims of prophecy that Christians make, of which messianic prophecies are perhaps the most pertinent, so I thought that the way in which they can be interpreted are quite important to the discussion, as many are quoted directly in the NT.

    I’ll be coming back to that topic later. This thread has gone far and wide, which is fine with me, but my original intent for it was to introduce a series with a few bullet points. I’m staying with that intent.

  2. MedicineMan says:

    I noticed that the popup for verses is interpreting the last set as Acts 2:22, 1 and John 4:1. It should be Acts 2:22 and 1 John 4:1.

    Thanks for catching that. I’ve fixed it [Tom G].

  3. david ellis says:

    If you ask me this discussion has gotten pretty completely off track.

    In an effort to get back to something substantive I ask:

    what role does religious experience (in christian terms, what Craig called “the self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit”, and what perhaps might more succinctly be called simply “faith”) have in respect to the question of whether belief in christianity is justified?

    We have tended to focus so far in this discussion, on the few occasions when anything of substance has been discussed at all, on matters involving empirical evidence and historical reliability.

    But those don’t seem to be the primary reasons for belief of any christian I’ve ever known. They tend to view such things as secondary support (if they think about them at all).

  4. Tom Gilson says:

    David, just to let you know my own response to this (others can treat it differently) you’re asking about something that is on my list to discuss later, which I will certainly do when the time comes. It’s a good question.

  5. david ellis says:

    Fair enough, its worth a post and discussion all its won.

  6. Jacob says:

    I’m not going to buy that book, but I will try to borrow it from a library if I can. However, I generally don’t like having a reading assignment in a discussion. I know that reading a text is, in fact, a better method of information dissemination, and I’ll often do it on my own time, but it makes a discussion ponderous.

    Speaking of which, I found some interesting readings by a man named Rodney Stark. The thing that bothers me about discussions like this is that it tends to treat people like homogeneous units. But the interesting thing about Stark is that he is a sociologist. Such a person would treat movements within the context of psychology. What I found especially interesting is that he said the number of converts that Luke* gives in Acts might be a mere rhetorical exercise, as they would have made Christianity a much larger force in Jerusalem than it actually was. He estimates that there were fewer than 10,000 believers by 100 AD. Similar numbers are reflected in the rise of Mormonism, which people were discussing in the previous blog post.

    Furthermore, he postulates that, using his own research, “cults” bubble up amongst those who harbor religious apathy (and who later are adamant that they were searching for something spiritually) or discontent, which makes sense since these kinds of people were probably more immune to the arguments that Christianity would have been distasteful to them. He goes on to say that Christianity spread amongst Hellenized Jews, who would have been more open to such things (and socially marginal, which is another important aspect). I would surmise that Peter’s initial explication of fulfilled prophecy would have looked even more impressive. Anyway, I wanted to see what other people thought of those explanations.

    *Which is why I say that Luke might engage more in religious exercise than true history. I probably overstepped my bounds by stating that there are other historians more qualified, as I’m no scholar on this subject, but I was merely trying to postulate that Luke himself, while attempting to tell history, was not bound by it.

  7. DrDeb says:

    I think this topic has generated so much discussion because accepting data that supports one belief and rejecting data supporting contradictory beliefs is at the heart of many people’s religious decisions. I think this is one reason why the creationism vs. evolution debate rages on, with headlines being made again this week:
    Judge rules against teacher who called creationism nonsense.

  8. Holopupenko says:

    Ellis’s personal judgment of what counts as evidence is fallacious in at least two related respects.

    First, with regard to question-begging Ellis fails to separate his personal filter from an objective account of what evidence is: what counts as evidence for Ellis must subscribe to his own epistemological limitations, and those limitations are to a large extent scientistic (as a survey of his recent comments under separate cover quickly reveals).

    Second, Ellis’s comments betray a sort of epistemological historicism: evidence from anything before the mid-19th century carries less weight because (as only one example) no photographic evidence is in hand. Think about how misguided that is: per Ellis’s reasoning, if we had video evidence Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, we’d be more certain Lincoln delivered it than with the presently-available photographic and documental evidence! Another example: the scientific method qua method is “more” certain these days (as implied by Ellis) than when Maxwell (a deeply-committed Christian) was developing his theory of electromagnetism. Perhaps Ellis would like to provide us with photographic “evidence” of any method qua method to support his personal assertion?

    The worst thing regarding Ellis’s approach is that it incorrectly privileges “new” for “old” propositions (which is not the issue) over “true” vs. “false” propositions, and it confuses (at some level even equivocates) the quiddity of evidence vs. the quiddity of arguments, which are ontologically two very different things. What this further reveals is a deep contempt for the capacity and expansiveness of human reason to obtain truth. Why? Because Ellis’s approach refuses to admit to knowledge obtained by means of evidence he personally deems inadmissible: he imposes a false demarcation upon ancient evidence that is related to or supports Christianity, but apparently (yet inconsistently) accepts knowledge of the ancient world that supports (for example) the existence of pre-democratic principles of the Roman Senate.

    Digression Strictly speaking, statements/propositions can be judged true or false, while evidence cannot except in a transcendental sense: it’s what rational creatures state with regard to evidence that matters, and it is those statements that are logically judged true or false. The next step up the logical chain is the proof which is judged either valid or invalid based on its formal structure. Finally, there is the demonstration whose formal structure is either valid or invalid, and whose material components (the premises) are either true or false. (The word “material” here is used in an analogical sense as applied to logic.) If a demonstration is formally valid and its premises are true, then it is a sound argument that leads to certain (i.e., “scientific” writ large) new knowledge. (“Science” is mediate intellectual knowledge obtained through demonstration.) Demonstration is the result of material evidence and formal structure: statements about evidence are the material medium of demonstration. There is no demonstration without evidence, but there may certainly be evidence without demonstration. End Digression

    Ellis also seems unaware of the four levels of knowledge obtained through logic: syllogistic demonstration, dialectical reasoning, rhetorical persuasion, and poetic revelation. While they decrease in certitude, these approaches increase in depth and significance of the truths they reveal. It is impossible (and it would be foolish) to impose syllogistic reasoning upon the poetic revelation that honor and courage exist and are fundamental virtues for how humans should live their lives, or that beauty can be objectively acknowledged. Similarly, one can never foolishly employ poetics to demonstrate the existence of a neutrino.

    By the way, the so-called “scientific method” (which pertains to many varied methods based on the formal and material objects studied by the many modern empirical sciences) is only one means for obtaining knowledge of the world that straddles demonstration and dialectical reasoning: some knowledge acquired through the MESs is certain and no new knowledge will ever change it, while much is contingent knowledge always prone to change as knew information is acquired. Is the healthy human heart composed a four-chambers? 100% yes. Is the Cygnus X-1 x-ray source a black hole? Less than 100%, yes. Are any of the neo-Darwinian theories currently in vogue fully capable of ever explaining all aspects of life on earth? A resounding 100% NO!, for to claim altruism is fully explainable on the basis of materialism or naturalism is to hugely beg ontological considerations of what altruism is.

    These four approaches witness to a symphony of means by which humans reason to truths about the world—whether the newly-acquired knowledge is about things that are directly accessible to the five primary senses or not. Ellis, to employ a metaphor, would reduce and limit the orchestra to the blaring (and in his case, out of tune) trumpet section. He refuses to admit the other instruments into the orchestra (or denigrates their efficacy), and even decries what counts as notes because Ellis’s presupposition that Christianity is false must be upheld. It is a thin, black-and-white (and, dare I say, “dogmatic”) vision of reality that lacks important nuanced distinctions, and it should be avoided by critical thinkers.

    Finally, Ellis’s claim that “belief is irrational” is both arrogant and ignorant (quite an achievement!). First, we humans are by our very natures rational creatures, and just because (based on the above) we don’t command 100% certitude in all knowledge (particular or general) obtained through the capacity of human reasoning, is in no way an argument that such knowledge is therefore “irrational.” Second, belief is a state of mind that assents to the truth of propositions not by virtue of their intrinsic evidence, but because of authority (which includes fiducia—trust). Roughly speaking almost all of us assent to the truth of the Special Theory of Relativity, even if most people cannot understand it or prove it: most of us literally take it on faith on the authority of physicists… even though, strictly speaking, we should not. Therefore, it is because humans are rational beings that belief does cover an intellectual assent to truths accepted on either human authority (credence) or Divine authority (faith).

    In fact, the only way we can assent to a truth is to employ our capacity to reason: demonstrative grounds (in the sense explained above) may be lacking, but this in no way argues against the conviction or belief as being a weakness of the mind or some imposed fideistic recklessness. While it would be a bit out of context (given the “loyal opposition” audience at hand and the subject of this blog entry) to deal with faith as a theological virtue, it is nonetheless correct that belief is not exclusively a function of the will but of the intellect as well: the properly-ordered intellect (an intellect ordered to truth) informs the will of the “desirability” of that which the intellect deems true.

    While I have not come close to doing justice to the exceedingly interesting, fruitful, efficacious, and important topic of belief, Ellis’s simple-minded sound-bite treatment does belief no justice.

  9. david ellis says:


    Ellis’s personal judgment of what counts as evidence is fallacious in at least two related respects.

    First, with regard to question-begging Ellis fails to separate his personal filter from an objective account of what evidence is….

    Expressing a personal about about the merits of an argument is not the same as failing to be aware that one’s personal judgements are capable of being mistaken.

    I’m quite aware of that fact. That does not, however, invalidate my simply having an opinion on the matter.


    what counts as evidence for Ellis must subscribe to his own epistemological limitations, and those limitations are to a large extent scientistic….

    If you care to argue the merits of other means of forming beliefs than that of empirical evidence (which I presume is what your accusation of scientism amounts to) then I’d be happy to do so. The difference between my approach, which puts by far the greatest weight on empirical evidence, versus the approach of most christians which tends to count religious experiences, faith experiences, the sensus divinitas and the like as good grounds for evidence is, I think, the biggest difference between our views and therefore probably one of the most important issues to discuss in the debate between religious skeptics and believers (of whatever faith).

    I’ll address the rest of your comments later. At least the ones that have any bearing on my actual position (which isn’t the for a large portion of your criticisms—much of what you say are attacks on a strawman version of my views and I see little time to bother with that—we’ve already wasted far too much time on matters of little or no substance in this discussion).

  10. david ellis says:

    I meant to say “good grounds for belief” rather than “good grounds for evidence” above.

  11. Philip says:

    From my perfunctory skimming of the discussion so far, it seems there has been a conflation of the questions “What is evidence to a Christian?” and “What is the evidence?” The former questions asks for a standard by which we determine what seems true about the world, and the latter asks what the content of the world actually is. It seems the former was supposed to be, at least for the most part, the primary focus.

    Although I don’t know why there is any distinction being made between a Christian and naturalist’s conception of evidence. While there may be an actual difference, sociologically, between the way they each think of evidence, evidence should be a normative concept. What is a reason for me to believe in God should be a reason for you to believe in God, as long as we are both observing the same fact with the same principle of reasoning.

    I think Tom’s definition that evidence is information that leads towards a conclusion is correct, but I also think we could get a little more specific. For that definition sort of begs the question, which evidence will lead toward the conclusion? How about this: Something is evidence for a hypothesis if it’s occurence makes sense given the truth of the hypothesis.

    The notion of ‘making sense’ can be referenced in many ways; a fact could “cohere with,” “fit well with,” “be explained well by,” or “be predicted by” a hypothesis.

    Specifically, this is a mental effect which a person experiences when they consider a fact in light of a hypothesis. This is how we understand everything we encounter in day to day life. If a car speeds by us in the morning, this is evidence for the hypothesis that they are late for work (or some other place), because it makes sense for that to occur if the hypothesis is true. It makes sense that Fred is eating if Fred is hungry. It makes sense that Ted gave a gift to Amy if Ted likes Amy. We go through mental processes like this all the time.

    This definition seems to apply to everyone, regardless of their worldview, not just normatively, but descriptively. That is to say, this is how people actually form their wordlviews. If a person tries to be a metaphysical naturalist, every fact they encounter they think of in light of a the hypothesis of metaphysical naturalism, and if it makes sense, it confirms metaphysical naturalism.

    Over time, if they can make sense of a lot of reality using that hypothesis, and have hope that everything can be eventually explained by it, that hypothesis will seem evident to that person.

    Now someone might point out that there are many things which could be explained by naturalism or by theism, so why would that fact count as evidence for either? Well, it is true it doesn’t serve as comparative evidence between those two hypotheses (unless one explains it better or with less strain), but it still counts as evidence because of the simple point that whatever hypothesis is *actually* true will be the hypothesis in relation to which each fact must actually be understood. The true hypothesis will make sense of everything.

    Naturalism and theism are both epistemically compatible with all the facts currently known about the universe, so right now there is a tug-of-war over which makes more sense of the facts, or which better explains everything. The standard of evidence seems the same, while the assesment of the facts using that standard is quite, quite different. One’s ultimate assesment of the facts will depend on how satisfactorily one’s hypothesis can explain them. For if we were living in the universe where that hypothesis is true, all the facts would make sense in light of it, which is why there is such a chess match over which hypothesis wins the explanation battle.

    The atheist trys some legerdemain to win the explanation war sometimes, for instance by saying that God is merely plugged into what he cannot yet explain in order to win the explanation battle. This is to his own detriment however; for in the universe in which God *was* the explanation of those phenomona, science would not be able to explain them, and God would. By disqualifying this possibility from consideration, the atheist is shutting himself out from finding the truth in one more world, which scarily enough many others claim is the actual world.

    More intersting conversation could come from Swinburne’s contention that simplicity is the ultimate criterion which indicates a hypothesis is true. But I don’t really understand everything that goes on in that conversation to go there.

  12. david ellis says:

    If I might make a suggestion. I see a great deal of time being spent in this discussion attacking views which are attributed to one’s opponent rather that the views which they have actually stated.

    Frankly, that’s just a waste of every one’s time. I, for one, will do my best not to attribute to any of you views which you haven’t actually stated. I would ask of you the courtesy of doing the same in your responses to my own opinions.

    If, for example, you think my statements imply something like an overly narrow scientism—-rather than just attributing to me views that may only vaguely, if at all, resemble my actual opinions—-JUST ASK what my views are on that particular issue.

    Then you can respond to and criticize those views without fear of attacking a strawman.

    Unless attacking a strawman is, for rhetorical reasons, exactly what you want to do. In that case I leave you to it.

  13. david ellis says:


    How about this: Something is evidence for a hypothesis if it’s occurence makes sense given the truth of the hypothesis.

    That’s on the right track but I would expand it a bit to say:

    Something is evidence for a hypothesis if it’s occurence makes sense given the truth of the hypothesis and would not make sense on any competing hypothesis.

    That, I think, works as a thumbnail sketch of the principle anyway.

    It would probably need a great deal of elaboration in actual practice though.

    For example, if my neighbor’s dog dies and he accuses me of putting a spell on the animal causing its death there might be all sorts of things which he, given his views about magic, seem to him evidence of my guilt if one assumes those views are true. So the issue of background beliefs and when and why they are justified would also need to be addressed in a full, detailed accounting of the matter.

    But I’m not sure any of us want to spend this discussion detailing a complete epistemological theory—-something which would require a book rather than a few paragraphs in the comment section of a blog post.

  14. david ellis says:


    Naturalism and theism are both epistemically compatible with all the facts currently known about the universe, so right now there is a tug-of-war over which makes more sense of the facts, or which better explains everything.

    Thank you for bringing up a fruitful and substantive issue for discussion!!

    There’s been far too little of that so far.

    My own views on the naturalism vs theism issue are based on what seems, in my judgement, a sensible principle:

    I don’t include things in my view of the nature of reality which I don’t see reasonable grounds for believing to be real.

    And none of the arguments for theism seem even remotely good in my admittedly imperfect judgement—so my worldview currently lacks a belief in deities. And will continue to do so up to such a time as I become convinced good grounds for thinking a deity or deities exists are available.

  15. Holopupenko says:

    David:

    You note

    If you care to argue the merits of other means of forming beliefs than that of empirical evidence (which I presume is what your accusation of scientism amounts to) then I’d be happy to do so. The difference between my approach, which puts by far the greatest weight on empirical evidence, versus the approach of most christians which tends to count religious experiences, faith experiences, the sensus divinitas and the like as good grounds for evidence is, I think, the biggest difference between our views and therefore probably one of the most important issues to discuss in the debate between religious skeptics and believers (of whatever faith).

    This is actually a good summary of your errors.

    (By the way, there’s nothing wrong with “attacking views of opponents”… as opposed to attacking the persons themselves. Personal views, opinions, and preferences, while they may be interesting, are not what this blog is about: it is about truths independent of any person or their views, opinions, or preferences. If you are incorrect about something or acceded to a diabolical idea (say slavery or Nazism or atheism), that does not somehow decrease your dignity as a human being. Also, I didn’t say “narrowly scientistic,” but it is scientistic nonetheless—per your own comments under separate cover and in your immediate responses to me here: exclusivity may not be your problem, but preferentialism certainly is as these concern types of knowledge (the epistemological question) and kinds of existents (the ontological question).)

    First, your conflation of scientism with empirical evidence and then attributing that to me is wrong. Christians are, in fact, the strongest of empiricists: they DEMAND evidence be followed to a conclusion—no matter whether that conclusion is sensory accessible or not. Christians can reason to the existence of God precisely because there is evidence in the real world accessible to the five primary senses from which they can reason to His existence. (Please don’t confuse reasoning to God’s existence—one of the preambula fidei [certain truths of natural reason]—with belief in God… a very important distinction.) A hugely important principle by which Christians come to understand the world is “while all knowledge comes through the senses (i.e., empirical evidence), not all knowledge is sensory knowledge.” It’s the latter half of that principle that sticks in the craw of atheists and their fellow travelers because of their a priori commitment to dumbing down conclusions and existents to only those accessible to the five primary senses. That’s what I indicated in the underlying equivocation you practice between empirical evidence and non-sensory verities. And yet, you cannot in any way, shape, or form show me a “scientific method” with any of your five primary senses. If the scientific method qua scientific method cannot be accessed by any of the five primary senses, then does this mean the scientific method does not exist in some way?

    Second, since you place the “greatest weight on empirical evidence,” let’s turn that criterion back upon you: on what empirical basis are you judging “the approach of most [C]hristians which tends to count religious experiences… as good grounds for evidence” to be incorrect? Is that an “empirical” assertion? Of course not. Surely, you’re not going to open the door for me (per the paragraph immediately above) to trash the circularity of such an assertion, are you? Surely you’re not going to tell us that the evidence somehow speaks for itself or interprets itself, are you? What you’re missing is a very important point: your judgment of the “goodness” (try “validity” or “acceptability” instead) is not empirical itself but is either based on your personal interpretation of empirical data (which means you have to validate your interpretation) or (more likely) is an unsubstantiated presupposition you unquestioningly impose.

    The upshot of your position is to set up a false dilemma: no Christian that I know of disagrees with you over the efficacy and important of empirical evidence. Where we part company is your stopping there and not pursuing (through the human capacity to reason) to where such evidence may lead. Why do you do this? Because, again, you eliminate such possibilities (crudely put: “there is no God because I don’t see Him”) before the human capacity for reasoning has had the opportunity to pursue it. I raised this in my previous comment, so it will not be repeated. Why are “religious experiences” automatically suspect? Because they don’t succumb fully to your particular interpretation (your “grounds” as you term it) of empirical data?

  16. david ellis says:

    Again attacking a strawman version of my views.

    Have at it. I hope you enjoy yourself.

    Meanwhile, Philip has brought up substantive issues for what I hope will be a fruitful discussion.

  17. david ellis says:

    Thankfully, though, at the end you do bring up an actual substantive question which I am more than happy to answer (though I don’t doubt that you will again misrepresent my position when you respond).


    Why are “religious experiences” automatically suspect?

    Religious experiences are not automatically suspect.

    For example, if someone had a religious experience in which they felt that God was telling them that an asteriod would strike the town of Frogjump Tennessee (a real place) killing exactly 23 people….and the next day it occurred I would consider it far from suspect.

    Why I don’t place any credibility in most religious experience, however, has to do precisely with the principle that Philip and I were discussing:


    Something is evidence for a hypothesis if it’s occurence makes sense given the truth of the hypothesis and would not make sense on any competing hypothesis.

    The competing hypothesis that the religious experience is entirely in the believer’s mind and proceeds from no divine or supernatural source accounts for the data at least as well.

    Or do you disagree?

    How much credibility do you put in the religious experiences of those of other faiths? And, if you don’t credit them as being reliable but you do those of christians, what is your reason for this distinction?

  18. Holopupenko says:

    David:

    I find it rich that you accuse me of setting up a straw man caricature of what you believe when (1) you haven’t shown us where this occurs, and (2) you blatantly set up your own straw men based in ignorance (“belief is irrational” and your strong implication that Christians don’t value empirical evidence). Are you sure you’re not avoiding the problems with your position that I highlight?

  19. Philip says:

    David: Something is evidence for a hypothesis if it’s occurence makes sense given the truth of the hypothesis and would not make sense on any competing hypothesis.

    I thought this would come up, so I put a caveat about it a little later on. I don’t think the second part is *strictly* needed, and here’s why: let’s say there is a pool of ten hypotheses, and a fact under consideration which can be accounted for by three of the hypotheses. I would say that the fact is evidence for those three hypotheses, even though it is not evidence between those three comparatively. The real world application is that each new fact about the world disqualifies all the hypotheses that didn’t include that fact from being true, even though it might not be good comparative evidence between theism and Buddhism, let’s say.

    Of course, if there were a fact that was accounted for equally by and and all hypotheses, then of course that would not be evidence for any of them. But yes, yours is the definition I would use if only two hypotheses were under consideration, where a fact confirms one but not the other.

    I’m not sure I’m entirely clear on what the example of the dead dog is supposed to say about our background beliefs. But it is certain that our background beliefs are important, though it’s uncertain how much control we have over them in some cases.

    I don’t include things in my view of the nature of reality which I don’t see reasonable grounds for believing to be real.

    And none of the arguments for theism seem even remotely good in my admittedly imperfect judgement—so my worldview currently lacks a belief in deities.

    Do you view your belief about reality to be an abductive one which infers to the best explanation of everything? To me I view the pool of facts, the universe and all therein, including my specific life of experiences, to be what I need to make sense of, and then ask what belief best does that. Is it really that God doesn’t do that at all, or just that it’s too vague and inconclusive for there to be a God? So by “remotely good” do you mean “remotely sufficient,” or do you think there is some flaw that comes up in positing God as an explanation?

    Because for myself, I see some facts to fit better with God existing, and some to fit better with him not existing. For myself, I *can* switch back and forth between the two ways of thinking, and consider them both live options. The question then becomes one of weighing, where the power and cogency of arguments is assessed, and this is interesting because there is a lot of disagreement between people on how powerful certain arguments are, and one of pragmatism.

  20. david ellis says:


    Do you view your belief about reality to be an abductive one which infers to the best explanation of everything? To me I view the pool of facts, the universe and all therein, including my specific life of experiences, to be what I need to make sense of, and then ask what belief best does that. Is it really that God doesn’t do that at all, or just that it’s too vague and inconclusive for there to be a God? So by “remotely good” do you mean “remotely sufficient,” or do you think there is some flaw that comes up in positing God as an explanation?

    I do not think the “pool of facts” at our disposal is even mildly suggestive of the existence of God. Much less that his existence is a reasonable inference from it.


    Because for myself, I see some facts to fit better with God existing, and some to fit better with him not existing.

    What facts are they which you think fit better with his existing?

  21. david ellis says:


    let’s say there is a pool of ten hypotheses, and a fact under consideration which can be accounted for by three of the hypotheses. I would say that the fact is evidence for those three hypotheses, even though it is not evidence between those three comparatively.

    I would put it as it being evidence that one of those three hypotheses is true rather than evidence for each of them—in the sense that we cannot reasonably draw a conclusion until only one reasonable hypothesis fits the available facts. Just as we would not convict a man of murder if the available evidence pointed equally to two other possible suspects (at least I would hope we wouldn’t convict him in such a circumstance).

  22. Jacob says:

    I would say that the argument was a strawman in a sense. Some of the very best arguments for the atheist/agnostic position rests within the argument of a personal God. I get agitated when one simply dismisses the entire notion of God or the supernatural. It is best to consider them. Even Richard Dawkins attempts to disprove the idea of a ubiquitous innate knowledge of a specific God. In the ED thread the arguments about the nature of God were considered. This obsession with tagging the opposition with the a priori card leads nowhere. Many atheists or agnostics do, in fact, consider the Christian position, if at least on a cursory level.

  23. david ellis says:


    I would say that the argument….

    Which argument?


    …. was a strawman in a sense. Some of the very best arguments for the atheist/agnostic position rests within the argument of a personal God.

    I’m not quite clear on what you mean here. Rests within?

    Do you mean that most of the arguments for nonbelief only address a personal God rather than other conceptions of God (like pantheism and others)?

  24. Tony Hoffman says:

    MM,

    I’ve pointed you towards quite a few resources that discuss the social and cultural composition of Judea. Two books, plus the Bible, plus the citations offered by Holding.

    You have yet to provide me with a single specific citation that supports your point. Seeing as how you have the time to write many paragraphs mischaracterizing my position, I can only assume that time is not the problem with you finding a citation.

    I note, again, that you’ve provided not one single reference, link, citation, or source for your opposing view. That makes your attempted complaint hypocritical, in addition to blatantly, obviously false.

    I provided you with a top-of-my-head list of the types of different documentation that exists between two dramatically different periods in human history. You ignored the substance of this list and straw-manned my position.

    So, unlike you, I will provide a link from a real (associate) professor of history’s web page (http://www.philipharland.com/Blog/2008/09/17/non-christian-sources-for-the-study-of-the-historical-jesus/) and also (gasp) a cut and paste of the part that is relevant to my argument.

    One of the frustrating things about studying ancient history is the very limited nature of our sources, both in terms of quantity (only bits and pieces have come down to us) and in terms of quality. What I mean by quality is reliable and verifiable historical information (in a modern historian’s terms) regarding the figures and incidents literary sources describe. What the ancients were interested in telling us is seldom what a modern historian wants to know.

    This also holds for the study of the historical Jesus, an obscure peasant from Nazareth in Galilee. Archeology is indispensable in providing insights into the cultural context of that peasant, but does little for solving details about what that figure said or did. When it comes down to it, the ancient biographies known as the gospels (e.g. Matthew, Mark, Luke, John) remain our principal source of evidence, along with other more recently discovered writings (e.g. The Gospel of Thomas). Yet the authors of ancient biographies, or “lives” (bioi), had very little interest in what a modern historian looks for in studying a figure of the past. The ancient “lives” of Jesus were instead very interested in explaining what they thought the meaning of Jesus was for those who wished to follow him, and in promoting their own particular takes on that figure’s significance.

    What would help in this situation would be some non-Christian sources regarding Jesus which could be carefully compared with these ancient, insider “lives” of Jesus in order to assist the historian in reconstructing with some level of probability a picture of the historical Jesus or of certain aspects of his life. Such sources are few and far between, so it’s important to note the ones we have.

    So you want to fill in the blanks and claim whatever you want about the social milieu surrounding the first century or two of early Christianity you’re free to do so. But claims of clear historical documentation for that argument are hung on the thinnest of evidence — both, as the professor says, in terms of quality and quantity.

  25. MedicineMan says:

    Tony,

    I provided you with a top-of-my-head list of the types of different documentation that exists between two dramatically different periods in human history.

    Quick note, before anything else: on what basis can you call them ‘dramatically different’? On one hand, you’re trying to tell me that we don’t know enough to say that Mormons and Judeans were in different situations, on the other you want to say they’re “dramatically different”. No kidding, they’re different, and we know how they differ, hence my point. Are you even reading your own writing any more?

    At any rate, you expressed an off-the-top-of-your-head doubt about an entire category of knowledge. I gave you an appropriate response to a general or categorical question: general or categorical sources. Your complaint on this issue is as puerile as David’s wrt Bible verses. (And are you, also, allergic to books, or is just a preference to get everything you know from the internet?)

    I gave you a resource full of references to studies on ancient culture and social structures. There is no “specific citation” to dispute general skepticism. You were given plenty of supporting information, so pretending otherwise is asinine.

    Take three seconds to read what your link actually says, please. You’re so focused on these pedantic games that you linked to a source contradicting your point. The link you gave is certainly relevant (and contradictory) to what you were attempting to say. This person indicates that information about specific persons can be hard to find (“figures and incidents”). But…he also says exactly what I am saying about our ability to compare cultures, namely:

    Archeology is indispensable in providing insights into the cultural context…

    He draws a direct distinction between the difficulty in learning about specific people, and the difficulty in learning about the culture in general; the difference is not kind to your absurd argument.

    On top of that there is a link from your very helpful page which goes to PACE, a collection of resources on…ancient cultural and societal structures via the works of important authors. Their goal? To provide clear context for events of the past, so that we can better understand cultural interactions today:

    The purpose of this project is to provide an online resource, focused but open-ended, for reflection on issues of cultural identity and interaction in the Greco-Roman world.

    In other words, your own source indicates that we do have exactly what I said we did: cultural context. TIF looks at exactly the kinds of cultural / societal factors that are most readily accessible with the data we have. We have plenty of information to illuminate the pertinent differences between ancient Judea and whatever later culture you want to think about. And the link I gave you features a great number of sources and quotes demonstrating this very information.

    As I said, we don’t need to have exactly the same quality or quantity of evidence, in all spheres, to compare the two cultures. We have enough information about the “cultural context” of Judea to know that the situation Mormons were in was clearly, objectively different, as I noted.

    But claims of clear historical documentation for that argument [re: the social milieu] are hung on the thinnest of evidence — both, as the professor says, in terms of quality and quantity.

    That is quite clearly not what the professor has said. So this is either an expression of gross incompetence or deliberate warping on your part. You may have forgotten what the actual disagreement was about, but thanks for providing a link clarifying your error. Let’s end this before you wind up here again, with the same result.

  26. Tom Gilson says:

    Phillip, thank you for a very positive, substantive contribution to this discussion!

  27. Tom Gilson says:

    Holopupenko,

    Thank you, too, for several very clearly communicated comments here.

  28. Tom Gilson says:

    David,

    You complain about Holo responding to straw man versions of your beliefs, but (a) Holopupenko’s arguments don’t necessarily have to be all about your beliefs (it’s not necessarily all about you, is it?), and (b) I think to a great extent he actually is addressing what seem to be your beliefs. They at least fit into a larger set of beliefs that tend to travel together with the beliefs you have articulated here; just as you might suppose, and very justifiably so, that my expressed belief in God might also be accompanied by a belief in eternal life for his followers (which I have not expressed here any time recently).

    So if you want to say he’s attacking a straw man, you might at least explain how that is the case. Otherwise it would appear that you are following the path of least resistance, sneering off something rather than responding to it.

    I do not think the “pool of facts” at our disposal is even mildly suggestive of the existence of God. Much less that his existence is a reasonable inference from it.

    Closely reasoned, extensively argued. Thank you, also.

  29. David Ellis says:


    So if you want to say he’s attacking a straw man, you might at least explain how that is the case.

    I’m not going to spend my time constanting correcting ideas he attributes to me which aren’t what I actually believe.

    If he wants to respond to my ACTUAL opinions, he can quote what I’ve said and respond to it. Otherwise I’m just not going to bother responding to those parts of his comments where he is making assumptions (almost always incorrectly) about my views. He’s welcome to ASK what my views are on any particular topic he may think relates to the discussion.

  30. Tom Gilson says:

    David, you’re not spending any time on any arguments at all. (More on that here.)

  31. Jacob says:

    david ellis –

    I was addressing Holopupenko, but he hasn’t responded to me once, so I didn’t bother to say who I was addressing. Anyway, I was trying to say that we should respond to the Christian claims directly. It removes all arguments that atheists or agnostics are making assumptions that are antithetical to Christianity. For if you are able to cast doubt on Christianity even if you take up their methods and assumptions, then that entire notion is dispelled.