What Is “Evidence” To Christians?

I look forward to reading this series, Tom.

I think there is a difference between Evidence and Evidence in favor of X. I haven’t thought to define the terms narrowly, but roughly speaking I would say Evidence is something that gets our attention in some particularly meaningful way, while Evidence in favor of X comes as a result of a reasoned and emotional response to the evidence. Not everything gets our attention in a meaningful way, so not everything is considered evidence. A rock next to a basket of dirty laundry doesn’t strike me as meaningful evidence for anything beyond the facts already stated. Put the two facts in a unique context, like a crime scene, and they might be very meaningful.

I don’t think we can, or should, dismiss the emotional component entirely. Some hyper-rationalists attempt to do that, and in the course of doing so, they make silly statements and turn reality into something that is unrecognizable to most everyone – including themselves. The intellect should rule over the emotions as a means of keeping them from getting out of control.

Anyway, those are my initial thoughts. I’d like to hear what others have to say.

Thanks for that link, Holopupenko. Peter Kreeft is excellent and I highly recommend his Fundamentals Of The Faith for Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

I would define evidence broadly (and simply) as any information that would tend to lead a person toward a conclusion.

I assume that by “any information” you do not mean to include false information. If, for example, a report of the miraculous restoration of an amputated limb at Lourdes lead someone to conclude the truth of the Catholic religion, I assume that information would not count as evidence if it were false.

Thus you’ll have to tell us how you differentiate between true and false information that will lead to a valid or potentially invalid conclusion.

Second, you need to define “lead to” more precisely. Again, I will assume that you mean “lead to” more narrowly: if observing that the sky is blue (somehow) leads someone to believe the moon is made of green cheese, we intuitively think that such a person has a very different conception of “leading to” than we do.

Regarding your evidences of Christianity:

1. The historical, documentary testimony of the Bible

From a naturalistic perspective, it is definitely the case that the extant texts of the Bible, indeed all extant ancient texts, are evidentiary: I can see these texts and directly verify their content. In other words, I know directly they exist and make certain definite statements. Assessing their veracity, however, determining whether the statements are true, requires drawing conclusions from the evidence of their content, as well from as the superstructure of all the evidence that we have regarding the general physical operation of the world.

2. Historiographical and bibliographical indicators that the biblical documents are what they present themselves to be

There’s a stronger statement: “Historiographical and bibliographical indicators that the biblical documents are literal reportage.” Why make the weaker statement?

3. Prophecies made and fulfilled in history

To a naturalist, this is not strictly an item of evidence, it is a conclusion that might or might not be validly drawn from the evidence. However, evidentiary arguments can be cumulative under naturalism: If I have evidence supporting some proposition, I can use that proposition as evidence for another.

I will, of course, mention that naturalists find the conclusion of prophecy to be one that can in principle be supported evidentially (i.e. it is a scientifically meaningful statement), but is not in fact supported by the extant evidence (i.e. it is a false scientific statement).

4. The existence of the Christian church as an historical movement

I will easily admit the historical and present existence of the Christian church is an undeniable evidentiary fact.

5. Changed lives of Christians

To be more specific, we have reports of some Christians’ changed lives. We must draw conclusions (on a case-by-case basis) on whether those lives have actually been changed. We also have millions of Christians (many commendable, some abhorrent) who do not report that their lives were changed by Christianity, as well as non-Christians and atheists who report changed lives; some whose lives have been changed by abandoning Christianity.

6. Miracles, signs, wonders, visions, etc., both historical and contemporary

Here the distinction between reports and actuality becomes more than a mere technicality as in 5. The actual evidence (to the naturalist) consists of reports that allege various actions and observations.

7. The self-authenticating wisdom of Biblical teaching; its close fit with the realities of human experience

I don’t know what you mean by self-authenticating. To the naturalist, authentication is an external process. I also don’t know why you mention Biblical teaching rather than the Bible itself.

And again, a naturalist would find some parts of the Bible (or biblical “teaching”) to be a close fit, and other parts — at least read literally — to be profoundly… er… counter-intuitive and a poor fit with present understanding of human experience.

8. A long list of philosophical evidences

I consider myself extremely well-informed regarding apologetic philosophy, at least for someone lacking any academic credentials (one provenance for my sobriquet).

I don’t know what you mean specifically by philosophical evidences; I do know that philosophical arguments are not typically evaluated in an evidentiary manner. Furthermore, apologetic philosophical arguments all seem fatally flawed.

9. The internal testimony of God in one’s life

Much depends on what level one is performing analysis. The evidentiary method does apply to one’s internal, subjective understanding of the world. However, in conversation, the naturalist considers “private” experience to lack evidentiary value: I have to be able to see or experience something for it to have evidentiary value to me; We both have to see or experience something for it to have evidentiary value in conversation.

Also, let me briefly list the evidence that I myself, as a naturalist and skeptic, rely on to conclude the non-existence of any deity, defined to be a personal being who is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent:

1. The existence of apparently unnecessary suffering.
2. The failure of anyone, anywhere, to propound scientific knowledge that can be plausibly explained by nothing except mysterious revelation.
3. The success of many people to propound scientific knowledge on the basis of observable evidence.
4. The incompatibility between modern ethical notions and the consistent actions during centuries, if not millennia, of supposedly authoritative religious organizations and institutions.
5. Errors, inconsistencies, absurdities and atrocities (by ordinary modern standards) in the literal text of various religious scriptures.

@Tom Gilson

Is there something about mobile computing (or whatever) that makes it hard for people to use the shift key and capitalize proper nouns?

I’m not sure what you mean here: a proper noun “is arbitrarily used to denote a particular person, place, or thing without regard to any descriptive meaning the word or phrase may have.” The only uncapitalized nouns I can see you might be referring to in Joseph A.’s comment refer to groups (not particular persons) and have descriptive meaning.

However, it is common usage to refer to religions and religious groups with capitalized nouns… perhaps we should see such descriptions as arbitrary and without descriptive meaning. (wink)

Come clean on your presuppositions, naturalists, and cut to the chase: what you consistently avoid admitting is your a priori commitment to “evidence” counting only as that data accessible to the five primary senses. What you despise—unscientifically and anti-philosophically—is the ability of human reason to arrive at knowledge that is not accessible to the five primary senses… even while you depend on such things all the time. (While all knowledge comes through the senses, not all knowledge is sensory knowledge.)

When you can provide us with direct sensory data (“evidence”) of the existence of the scientific method or the rules of chess or “the day after tomorrow,” we might begin to take you seriously. If you stop the inherent (if not intentionally hidden) reductionist nonsense (Paul comes to mind) that demotes concepts to “it’s all just neurons” (while employing convenient labels as “shorthand” symbols (such as “love” or “virtue” or “dignity”) that point to complex neural activities), then we might begin to take you seriously. When you can successfully stop using the “vague” labels “I” or “we” when referring to yourselves and play by your own rules that demand exclusive use of univocal scientific terms when referring to yourselves, then we might begin to take you seriously.

We challenge your implied claim (advanced, incidentally, in various forms by Marxists, deconstructionists, Islamists, Darwin-ISTS, etc.) that the notion of universal human rights is merely a species of Western cultural imperialism, and that there are no universal human rights because there is no universal human nature. We reject to your face your Hobbesian-inspired worldview where all are at war with all—animated by the unscientific and anti-philosophical claim that there is no universal human nature, and therefore no universal moral law, and therefore there is no possibility of a general conversation regarding the future of mankind.

Christians are far more capable of defending certain moral objectives (including universal human rights) than radical skeptics and naturalists are of defending religions freedom, freedom of speech, and other basic human rights. Because Christians defend the prerogatives of reason, we can far better defend democracy against irrational (and often violent) religion (jihadism) than the skeptic or moral relativist for whom the claims of reason are a mere cultural construct.

You guys just don’t (read: refuse to) get it: demonstrations for the existence of God introduce nothing new to the senses. (Another reason, by the way, why I reject Intelligent Design because they’re looking for God scientifically in DNA… but that’s another discussion.) Rather, human reason uses sensory data already in hand to reason to the existence of God—not in the way one reasons to the existence of the neutrino or black holes, but in a way similar to “seeing” that cooking the numbers in laboratory notebooks is wrong. No one who claimed to demonstrate the existence of God claims to employ the reductionist, sensory-only “evidence” ya’ll so narrowly define to suit your purposes.

I don’t need a logical argument to prove the existence of this or that tree because they are there for all to see, but I do need a logical argument demonstrate the efficacy of a deductive syllogism or the objective knowledge of virtues and vices or the existence of God because human reason is too weak to “see” (know) these things immediately. That is what science (writ large) is all about: mediate intellectual knowledge obtained through demonstration. You naturalists a priori limit knowledge to sensory knowledge. Critical thinkers are expansive: we reason to the existence of things beyond the senses. Theology and moral philosophy are “real” sciences because they trust in the capacity to human reason to obtain knowledge about those things beyond mere sensory import. The difference is that the standards of what counts as “proof” or “evidence” are different in the case of the MESs vs. metaphysics or moral philosophy. If you want to discount the efficacy of moral philosophy or metaphysics simply because they fail your self-serving preconceived notions of how the world should be, then by all means flail yourselves into non-critical thinking bliss. But, please, don’t expect to be taken too seriously.

Tom Gilson,

Like I said, I know I’m taking an outlier position here, but I’ll do my best to explain.

First, I should have qualified my mention of theistic hindus. My understanding of some schools of hinduism is that there is simply one God – Brahman. Any other god is not an actual separate entity, but just some manifestation of an aspect of this god, who is personal in nature. I won’t pretend I’m an expert on hinduism in general or even the schools specifically, but from what I’ve read, that seems to be the case. And Brahman certainly seems tremendously close in conception to the fundamental qualities of the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim God, though naturally there are differences (for one thing, a kind of idealism/panpsychism).

A second point: There are absolutely, positively differences between the religions. And I am not advancing the argument here that, say, ‘Islam is just another form of Christianity’ or any such piffle. But the statement I was responding to was specifically that of disproving the existence of other deities of different religions – and my response was that I don’t need to argue that Allah doesn’t exist, or that Brahman doesn’t exist, any more than I need to argue that the Jewish God does not exist, or that the God of the open theists does not exist, or that the God of the Calvinists does not exist.

You give a fair criticism with your presidential example, but here’s my response. With your example, you’re dealing with men. Limited beings that we know are in abundance – no mere man is utterly singular, in their own class distinct from all other men. When we’re dealing with the single, maximal Creator, things get more complicated. With Brahman, with the Neoplatonist God, with the Christian God, with the Jewish God, with the Muslim God, with (most concepts of the) Christian non-Trinitarian God, we are dealing with conceptions of God that fundamentally have so much of major, defining importance in common that it’s far more justified to treat it akin to my argument over Socrates rather than your arguments about presidents.

Third point: I am not at all saying that ‘anyone who worships god(s) is talking about the same God’. A person who is talking about, say.. Aphrodite, is not in my view talking about ‘the same God’. Even in that case I think there are going to be strong points of agreement between faiths, but clearly an anthropic, created, drastically limited entity is nothing at all like the Gods otherwise in agreement. At the same time, I don’t need to deny their existence and remain Christian – I can simply regard them as lesser entities, misunderstood humans, some other force, etc. Even in that case, denial isn’t required.

Fourth point: Since BB raised this point, I’ll mention it briefly. I actually don’t think ‘atheists’ are actually ‘atheists’ in a complete sense either. Nor do I, of course, think they ‘really believe’ in God (meaning, the God I believe is in common between Jews, Christians, Muslims, and some others). I do believe many/most are best regarded as believing in a radically different god. I won’t bother to expand on that since I’m already derailing this thread considerably, but I was called on it, so I respond.

Either way, I doubt what I said here will convince you I’m taking the right approach, but I hope it clears up where I’m coming from. No, I’m not using an utterly empty or generic idea of God here. No, not every god would qualify. No, not all *religions* are ‘the same’.

And, forgive my lack of proper capitalization. It’s not meant as disrespect, it’s just a side-effect of comment culture I’ve picked up and need to shake.

@Holopupenko

[Y]ou guys aren’t aware of the centuries–if not millennia–of arguments which people of faith reference either directly or indirectly.

I’m only one person. I’m aware of a lot of arguments; I just didn’t understand your argument. Argument by reference is tedious, anyway: give me the gist, not only of the position but the substantiation, and a solid reference for more detail.

This latter point has been raised over and over and over on this blog… only to be largely met with deafening silence.

I haven’t been reading this blog for long. I’m neither interested in nor responsible for others’ responses.

But your sincere admission that you “did not understand a single concept of your previous comment” should be more important to you than to us. At some critically-important level, you don’t “get it.” Note we’re not necessarily looking for agreement but for understanding. Unfortunately, that’s not what we get.

[shrugs] Perhaps I get it, and “it” is banal or wrong. Perhaps I don’t get it because you’re not explaining it properly. All I can do is read and do my best to try and understand. If I fail to understand, I’ll let you know. After that, it’s up to you. To be honest, earning your good opinion of my intelligence and character is not particularly high on my priority list.

I respond with arms thrown up wondering whether it’s worth spending the time necessary to teach (no condescension intended) highly-nuanced and quite important philosophical concepts.

You are under no obligation whatsoever to further my philosophical education. Do so if it pleases you to do so; otherwise spend your time in more pleasant ways.

Another example is your lack of understanding (both historical and formal) that the definition of science is “mediate intellectual knowledge obtained through demonstration.”

There are a lot of definitions of science. That’s not a bad definition, albeit somewhat vague.

[That definition] lies (to a significant extent) at the basis of the a priori limitation of evidence to sensory import and the incorrect characterization of any other form of knowledge as allegedly “subjective.”

There’s a lot of philosophy packed in there. We’ll have to unpack it to do any serious work. I’m interested in Tom Gilson’s view of evidence, right now, not in defining and defending the naturalistic, scientific view of evidence.

Let me just say that as the scientific method is a human invention, we are free to change and refine it as we see fit; we are not bound absolutely to any authoritative, immutable definition. If there is a flaw in either the scientific method or our philosophical understanding of it, we can correct that flaw.

I have an advanced degree in Sovietology from what is arguably the best university in the United States and another degree in philosophy… and I have a Ph.D. in engineering from the best engineering institute in the U.S…

I am categorically unimpressed by any credentials. Only actual arguments impress me.

Most certainly I don’t know your background, or whether you’ve spent extended time in any communist or former communist countries and really tried to live that life.

That’s not really relevant. Many factors other than ideology shape the political and social landscape of any society and culture, and few modern communists (and none that I approve of) wish to blindly replicate the entire culture of any historical society. Human history in general is a history of blood and suffering; no group — communist or capitalist, atheist or theist — stands blameless. No communist I know wishes to justify the unnecessary suffering of the past. But again, we digress; I’ll be happy to discuss modern communist ideology at a more appropriate time.

Let me say this: I am just one person. I speak only for myself. I am here, listening, as it were, with both ears. Impugn my character, my intelligence and my credentials as you please; poison the well as you please; pump up your own credentials as you please; I’m categorically uninterested in anything but actual arguments.

With all your credentials and vast philosophical acumen, it does not seem immoderate to ask you to deliver the goods.

Observer:
Where? To what are you referring? I don’t understand…

Barefoot:
I’m not convinced this is going to go anywhere. Risk of cherry-picking notwithstanding, when you assert There are a lot of definitions of science. That’s not a bad definition, albeit somewhat vague… it’s another example of your not being equipped (albeit unintentionally, I’m sure) with precise terminology. The definition isn’t “vague”–it is, in fact, quite precise. It is also, however, broad. There’s a huge difference, and it is particularly suited to a proper approach to understanding. We humans must start with what is most accessible to our knowledge of the real world (what is directly accessible to our senses, i.e., what is most “broad”) and then proceed to the less know (to those things not accessible to the senses and to those things that are more narrow in the knowledge obtained). That may sound like a “duh!” statement, but you’d be amazed by how many people violate the principle–especially among scientists. Many physicists, for example, start with subatomic particles and work “up”… which is inherently reductionist: an electron has spin, but a tiger does not.

Anyway, given this, how can anyone proceed with highly-nuanced philosophical arguments (no, the simple-minded sound-bite “summaries” you seek don’t work well in philosophy… nor should they: the job of philosophy is not to be vogue-relevant to zeitgeist de jure) when an allegedly open-minded person is not in command of important terms?

Barefoot:

By the way, regarding the various scientific methods being “subjective”: you are only partially correct. Of course, any methodologies are human constructs (mental artifacts), and hence they are subjective with respect to the subject (the knower), i.e., it is a “relation” thing. But that does not mean all methods (or knowledge obtained via these methods) are subjective by their natures. (“Nature” is used analogously here.) The various scientific methods are all objective subsets of the broader epistemic cycle, i.e., the way by which human know anything and everything. We employ logic, methodologies, mathematics, etc. precisely because we need to reason to knowledge about the world… precisely because our intellects aren’t angelic but dependent on sensory import as data. You’re strongly implying that the scientific methods by their natures are subjective. Surely, you don’t want to go there because the implication is all knowledge obtained by the MESs is subjective by its nature. If so, then the further implication is we can no nothing objectively about the world… which borders on Kant’s grave error that is ultimately so destructive to the MESs.

There are very few things we know immediately (i.e., without the need to reason), and because of that we know them with 100% certitude. (The first principles of real being, such as non-contradiction, are among them.) The modern empirical sciences, on the other hand, provide contingent knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is subject to updating, and as such is not certain. BUT, that’s not always the case: we know with 100% certitude that a human circulatory system involves two lungs for oxygen exchange, a four-chambered heart, arteries, veins, capillaries, etc. There is no new information that could ever be introduced that would change our 100% certain knowledge of the basic structure of a healthy human circulatory system. This is partially why the concept of “intersubjective empiricism” bandied about by Mr. Clark is in the narrower sense correct, but in the broader scheme of things a non-starter. And, since he’s employing “the rise of science and intersubjective empiricism” as the epistemic basis for naturalism, he’s really built his worldview upon epistemic sand… wet sand at that.

Finally, regarding my bona fides I qualified the point by specifically asserting you should not accept what I say on authority… which you seemed to miss (selective inattention?). Also, I understand you are “unimpressed” by a person’s credentials—and, to a certain extent, rightly so. But don’t you think—all things being equal—that I’m in a better position to be unimpressed by a self-proclaimed dropout who is not in command of nuanced terminology and hence is unable to provide sound arguments? (Cue: self-righteous indignation promulgated objectively…) The point, of course, is not about how intelligent you are (you appear to be highly intelligent), but about how little you know, how you build arguments upon that deficit of knowledge, and a deficit of intellectual humility as well.

What truth claim do the skeptics think Tom’s evidence points to, and why?

We must, of course, examine Tom’s evidence in more detail, but a superficial examination seems to point to the power and scope of the human imagination.

Compared to Tom’s list, superficial examination is much more prone to the vagaries, power, and scope of human imagination… as well as to horrendous errors. I believe the psychiatric term for it is “Wikipedism”. It’s kind of like quitting school and thinking one can learn philosophy and theology autodidactically from blog debates.
😉

@ Holopupenko

“When you can provide us with direct sensory data (“evidence”) of the existence of the scientific method or the rules of chess or “the day after tomorrow,” we might begin to take you seriously.”

High school science textbooks, chess rule books, and box office sales qualify as direct sensory data as to the existence of these respective clams. These are also all human inventions. God certainly then does exist using this logic but merely as a human invention…which is, I think, something other than you wish to claim.

“It’s kind of like quitting school and thinking one can learn philosophy and theology autodidactically from blog debates.”

Isn’t the blog debate the modern rendition of the dialogues of Plato’s writing? At any rate, attacking BB’s ideas on these grounds seems like an odd thing to do in a blog.

As for the OP, I find it trivial to attempt to justify faith on rational grounds. In my experience, faith and even the lack of faith are purely emotional responses. You believe in god because on a purely emotional level you must do so.

Regardless of the merits of formal instruction vs. self-instruction, formal instruction is simply not a realistic option for me. If Holopupenko believes only formal credentials establish standing to fully participate, or if he believes that a debate on the public comment section of a blog is a poor venue to seek the truth, I would suggest he focus his attention on academic journals rather than on, well, the public comment section of a blog.

I understand the difference between an insult and an ad hominem fallacy: clearly Holopupenko’s commentary falls into the latter (when he is not merely Poisoning the Well): the clear implication is that my arguments are false because I lack various credentials, because I have not yet supplied arguments outside the scope of the present discussion, or because he uncharitiably nitpicks trivial, irrelevant issues of terminology. (I’m a native English speaker, I have written professionally, and I understand the difference between “vague” and “broad”.)

On my own blog, I most definitely would not tolerate an atheist displaying behavior similar to Holopupenko’s. I relentlessly mock the stupid, but I demand of both myself and my commenters that they attack the substance — a charitable interpretation the substance — of any position, not peripheral, irrelevant and off-topic issues. Thus I conclude that because Tom Gilson has neither moderated nor responded to Holopupenko’s buffoonery, Gilson in some sense approves of or at least tolerates Holopupenko’s antics. That’s Gilson’s prerogative, of course: it’s his blog. It’s my own prerogative, however, whether or not I participate.

I comment for recreation: it is not my job and, outside my own blog, I have no specific agenda to push. I have my point of view, but I offer it only when I believe it has been solicited. As Holopupenko’s buffoonery has moved from mildly amusing to desperate and tiresome — and still without any substantive content whatsoever — the enjoyment of participating in an intellectual conversation here has been entirely nullified.

Barefoot:

You’re hiding behind a ghost you’ve created to avoid addressing the weakness of your assertions (faith is emotional, moral precepts are preferences, etc.): you claim “Holopupenko believes only formal credentials establish standing to fully participate, or if he believes that a debate on the public comment section of a blog is a poor venue to seek the truth.” Please show us where this occurs. In fact, I responded to your first attempt to do this by specifically referencing my comment NOT to consider arguments based on authority (which includes bona fides). I also intentionally applied your own medicine against you by comparing my bona fides with your bona fides precisely to emphasize why that should not be done. You missed the point, sir. Would you like to try again?

You then claim, repeatedly, that I’m not responding to the issues. Yet, you are the one who stated you don’t understand the material I presented. Your point is? Perhaps, because of your honest admission, indeed you’re missing something? Here’s a hint: when you assert some of the issues raised are outside the scope of the discussion, does this also apply to those issues which reveal the basis of naturalism (which I point out), why they are invalid, and hence why they cannot be used to support what you claim does or does not count as evidence… or cannot the wet sand upon which your worldview is built be criticized as it relates to what counts as evidence?

Then, you try to implicate Tom in this. Again, this is a defense mechanism used to avoid the difficulties pointed out in your position. Memo to you: you can’t cry moral “foul” if you’re a moral relativist… unless, of course, you’re resorting to a show of power to do so.

Finally, I wonder (help me out, here): was your label of “buffoonery” an objective morally-based criticism… or was it a personal “preference” of yours. If the latter, why should anyone take notice; if the former, what is the basis for your moral objectivity? The same applies to your attempting to turn the tables by saying you would never tolerate (on your blog) “an atheist displaying [similar] behavior…” Really? Again, is that, by its very nature, an objective moral imperative you’re imposing? By your own rules, no… and yet you grant yourself leave to apply it “objectively” (reference you’re point above) by utterly misunderstanding what “objective” means in the moral realm: you’re talking about the objective application (to all persons… which means you should have used “consistently” rather than “objectively”) and conflating that with the (admitted by you) “subjective basis” for any moral claim. Memo: get it straight–if the basis for moral imperatives is “subjective” (per your words), then it doesn’t matter whether you apply consistently. Wet sand is wet sand.

I have no specific agenda to push. Really? No comment…

Villain:

High school science textbooks, chess rule books, and box office sales qualify as direct sensory data as to the existence of these respective clams.

That’s not true and you don’t get it. High school text books don’t contain the “scientific method”–they contain pigments on paper arranged in very specific ways. I asked, very specifically, that you measure–employing only your five primary senses–real world properties of the scientific method. Do it now. I don’t care how many textbooks you show me: a mountain of pigments don’t add up to a method because pigments are ontological one thing, a method is something very different. You repeat the very mistake the young man in The Meno makes when asked by Socrates, “what is virtue?” you point to things and say, “there’s a scientific method, and there’s one, and there’s another one, etc.” That doesn’t at all tell what the scientific method is–it merely points to what you believe to be instances of it… and, again, even here you fail, for specifically-arranged pigments on a page are most manifestly NOT the scientific method.

This is yet another example of the sloppy thinking and presuppositions that enter into most of the points raised by naturalists’ and atheists’. They consistently and ubiquitously cash in on the centuries of thinking that went into carefully, painstakingly, and quite precisely defining terms… and then end up denying them (substance, nature, form, meaning, etc., etc.), and they objectively cry moral “foul” while decrying moral objectives. And, heaven forbid anyone point these painful mistakes out to them: the white-hot fury of ten-thousand suns cannot match the self-serving indignation of an atheist whose world view is punctured through with critical thinking.

Faithless,

I think you throw around too many loaded accusations in response to questions to make those criticisms worth taking seriously. You have exhibited a strong habit of responding to challenges to your views with some version of “I don’t have to answer that” and/or oversensitive indignation. Some of us simply expect answers.

Speaking of addressing the topic at hand….Barefoot attempted to answer my question here, but it was an answer that made no sense. Can anyone give me a reasoned response that makes sense?

Faithless:

I find your allegedly objective appeals to “charity” (one of three theological virtues) and “bearing false witness” (please point to a specific instance of this), etc., as deliciously ironic as they are pathetically hypocritical given the moral relativism lurking under the surface.

With respect to “meta-discussions,” that’s a convenient label to hide from criticisms of the presuppositions ya’ll bring into these discussions. You’re points cannot be separated from your antecedents, for those are what your points are based upon. (Tom Clark’s views of morality, whether you like it or not, ARE animated by his self-admitted scientism.) It’s not very productive to engage in back-and-forths in addressing some of the cultural war topics when, in fact, it’s your world view and the presuppositions upon which it so weakly rests that must be exposed. I’m all for discussing “evidence” or “choice” in killing unborn humans or what have you. But your views on these exceedingly important topics are nonetheless animated by some horrendous philosophical mistakes, a significant level of ignorance of what Christian faith is, and certain emotional commitments.

Tom:

Fair enough. However, I do take one issue: when someone claims they adhere to philosophical naturalism as a world view, to point out to this person that their antecedent presuppositions animate the mistakes they make in discussions of narrower issues (not to mention the serious problems this poses for their world view itself) is not to psychoanalyze them. Nor do I believe I even implied naturalists must have a command of Thomism. What I did demand is that they justify their antecedents and demonstrate a clear understanding of the terms bandied about… which, again, is not to psychoanalyze them.

Apart from that, you are correct. Thanks.

Those who argue for subjective morals in a classroom setting or on the internet, argue and behave as if they are objective when in a real life setting.

SteveK, what do you mean that we behave as if they were objective? Do you mean that we have preferences and we act on those prefences? Do you mean that we have as a preference that there be some order and control in society? Do you mean that at times, the preference of living in a society overwhelms other preferences and that I will forgo some things I may prefer in order to gain other things I prefer more?

Chris:

Regarding your first point, while the distinction you draw is well taken (and correct), it is irrelevant to what Faithless addressed and does not address the focus of my point—the nature of the moral act. In any event, where exactly did I bear false witness? And, even if I did, if neither you nor faithless believe this is objectively morally wrong, then why are you wasting your breath?

Your second point borders on the incoherent: you admit to moral subjectivity, you “prefer” people not be held as slaves against their wills, and yet you strongly imply you’d never be caught dead supporting slavery—even if you were the only one and didn’t want to follow the herd (as you say). Does that make any sense at all to you? You’ve literally eviscerated any sense at all for why you wouldn’t want to follow the herd: per your subjectivity, it makes NO difference one way or the other.

The “preference” thing is more damaging that you may realize. “Choice” or “preference” not a stand-alone goods but ones that should be ordered to the truth. Think about it: you’re actually making a moral claim (and hence trying to impose a moral imperative—albeit a disordered one) by putting forth “preference” because you believe, by it’s very nature and as an act, “preference” is somehow an objectively good thing… which is why SteveK is correct: you talk the talk, but don’t walk the walk.

With respect to your never having seen a good argument for why morally objective verities can be had, I find that odd. IF there is no God, then I have NO argument whatsoever with you or the loyal opposition. Why? Because then indeed the subjects (i.e., us, i.e., the creatures who act) give rise to the basis for moral acts. Crudely put, morals would be subjective because they would be subject only us—the subjects who are moral agents.

But, if there is a God (in the full sense of what God really is—Being or “Isness” itself, Goodness itself, Beauty itself, Truth itself, Life itself, etc.), then everything is contingent upon God. But if that’s true, even thought we are the moral agents (subjects), the ultimate grounding for morals is Goodness itself, i.e., God.

I’m not going to get into the differences between speculative and practical knowledge here. I’m not going to get into the three components of a moral act. I’m not going to get into the First (utterly unavoidable, utterly undeniable) Principle of Practical Reason. I’m not going to get into the differences between the Eternal Law, the Natural Law (“natural” here meant in the the realm of practical reason and knowledge), the Human Law, etc. And, I’m not going to get into a Platonic error lurking just beneath the surface of your words when you state, “an external objective wrongness to slavery beyond [me].” While these would make for interesting discussions, not only would we really stray away from the subject of this particular blog entry, but it would take a huge amount of time.

The one thing I will conclude with—quite adamantly—is you are quite incorrect and very broad-brushing when you state “It seems to me that those who argue strenuously for objective morals are merely stating their strong personal preferences.” If you study moral philosophy AND its historical development, it is anything but “personal preferences.” That’s not to say there aren’t people out there (usually of the fideist bent) who take this tact—there are. But that’s not what truth and philosophy and faith are about: personal opinions and preferences, when discussions orbit about vitally important issues, should be checked at the door.

Holopupenko –

One could describe it as a preference, but it is not merely a preference. If I say that blue is better than green, I have no objective basis. All I can say is that blue is personally pleasing to me, but words like “pleasing” and “nice” have no context. They exist merely to express opinion. But morality is based around concepts that generally any human can understand. In fact, such a thing cannot be helped. By merely acting, we are staking out moral claims. In this sense, there is no “try” to it. Imposition cannot be helped. Since we have to live with the actions of others, and they have to live with our actions, there is a constant process of justification. Just because it’s not “right and wrong are totally objective, independent, and unchanging” does not mean “it’s completely subjective because there is no basis whatsoever”. We must look in between those two extremes.

Because then indeed the subjects (i.e., us, i.e., the creatures who act) give rise to the basis for moral acts.

But the subjects themselves are bound to specific properties. The pressures of the universe, our “humaness”, our experiences, the way in which we develop…all of these things inform our values. There is a huge element that people cannot change or cannot change so easily. These objective elements form the foundations and allow us to relate or appeal to others.

SteveK

Those who argue for subjective morals in a classroom setting or on the internet, argue and behave as if they are objective when in a real life setting.

We agree on this!

However Mackie showed how this works, it is an error to think there are intrinsic values (error theory), and this error is caused by reifying our values as if there are intrinsic objective values (Objecification Theory).

(Note also that I am a critic of subjectivist ethics, including theistic ethics).

On proper nouns I think Barefoot Bum is right. Whatever label such as atheist, naturalist, agnostic, secularist, free thinker, skeptic, theist,supernaturalist, deist, or fideist. So now I am quiet unsure of the need to capitalise religions such as christianity or buddhism, these do not look like proper nouns at all.
We do not capitalise political positions either liberals, socialists or conservatives etc. We do capitalise when mentioning specific political parties such the Conservatives.

So again if I refer to specific institutions I will capitalise such as Catholics, Protestants, Shia, Sunni, Theravads, Mahayana etc. but when I am referring to religions it makes more sense to lower case them as christians, muslims, buddhists etc.

For the gods ditto except when already noted in another thread I am referring to a specific deity such as Yahweh, God, Allah or Zeus. However christianity (i.e not just Catholics, Protestants or Evangelics etc.) suffers from having the generic singular term “god” as their name for god as in “God”, see when I am using this generically it makes more sense to lower case it. So that is how I intend to use it, for clarity. Is that Okay?

fg (and Chris),

However Mackie showed how this works, it is an error to think there are intrinsic values

As far as relativism goes, this goes without saying. Yet most DO think (not emote) there is intrinsic value when it comes to many real life situations. It’s duplicitous thinking.

I don’t know anyone who would equate the act of expressing violent force with the act of expressing a strong personal, moral preference. The reason they don’t is because they know they are not the same. Only in classroom or internet settings do you get the equivocation.

If real life thinking reflected classroom/internet thinking then there would be no intrinsic value as Mackie said, just various expressions of strong personal, moral preferences.

If real life thinking reflected classroom/internet thinking, rape would be an expression of one’s strong personal preference. Why make a law preventing people from expressing their preference of rape? Do we pass laws preventing people from expressing their preference wrt ice cream flavors or cars? No. Why the duplicitous thinking on the part of relativists?

BTW, there’s no intrinsic value in the concept of mutual consent so we can logically do away with that part of the law too.

SteveK

First I am too busy to engage further in this debate for now. When I do have time I wll be addressing Tom in the Euhtyphro debate.

All I will say is that I am a critic of moral relativism – and moral subjectivism including theistic ethics. There are no intrinsic values but that does not prevent being objective about values. In Mackie’s terms the satisfaction or not of requirements or needs or interests is quite objective. As Railton said Mackie was not an anti-realist he just denied a particular type of realism, what I call stereotypical realism – intrinsic prescriptivity – and argued for, what Railton labelled, a pragmatic realism.

Anyway all your points about relativism and subjectivism are quite irrelevant to me, although if you espouse a theistic ethics they are relevant to you. The problem with theistic ethics is that it shares all the flaws of stereotypical realism, relativism and subjectivism (excluding of course normative relativism which it denies).

Either someone else can take over my position or it will have to be dealt with another time.

I think this discussion is an excellent reflection of the ongoing debates between belief and non-belief, between creationism and evolution, etc. I see evidence of this played out even on the “fish” bumpers stickers on people’s cars. In Florida, the debate is moving into a new forum as legislators debate whether or not to allow Christians to have a custom license plate with a cross or image of Jesus:
http://www.examiner.com/x-7312-Miami-Interfaith-Spirituality-Examiner~y2009m4d25-Religious-license-plates-with-Jesus-Christ-or-cross-soon-a-Florida-reality

I don’t know whether religious license plates would be simple personal expressions, or whether they would fuel these kinds of discussions? Maybe either consequence would be OK?

Chris and fg,
Perhaps neither of you fit the description I have typed out.

If relativists would stop using moral terms when they really mean to speak in preferential terms, then the problem would go away. The terms (morally) ‘wrong’, or ‘evil’ do not mean ‘strongly prefer’ to most everyone. There is a distinct and meaningful difference. I suspect they purposely equivocate because they would like to use these other terms to their advantage.

By analogy, it would be like equivocating between ‘borrow’ and ‘steal’, and using the term ‘steal’ when you really meant ‘borrow’ because it gave you some emotional advantage. It’s dishonest to say the least.

If relativists would stop using moral terms when they really mean to speak in preferential terms, then the problem would go away. The terms (morally) ‘wrong’, or ‘evil’ do not mean ’strongly prefer’ to most everyone. There is a distinct and meaningful difference. I suspect they purposely equivocate because they would like to use these other terms to their advantage.

There are problems with this. I am not arguing that we ought to see morals as mere preferences but that subjectivism is a fact. Everyone is stating their preferences, in some sense, when they speak morally. So I face a dilemma. An objectivist will use terms such as evil or right or wrong when I know they are simply presenting their strongly held preferences (no matter how they claim otherwise) and consequently they privilege their moral propositions above a subjectivists strongly held preferences even though I see them as the same.

Also, I tend to refer to matters as moral or ethical when I so strongly prefer the matter that I wish to use societal coercion (laws or what not) to force others to follow my preferences (even if they do not actually prefer the matter.) I would call this matter as an example of an ethical right or wrong.

But, in any case, I do not believe I have used the term evil in this thread. I also try to make it clear that I mean preferences whenever I talk about morals. I wish everyone would do this.

Also it is not an equivocation unless the person uses the same term in two or more ways in one argument or deliberately uses someone else’s term with a different definition without making it clear. I agree it can be confusing for different people in a discussion if they use the same term in different ways, but not strictly equivocation. We both agree that there are moral propositions. People make them all the time. We are disagreeing on their nature.

Jacob,

Regarding your question in post #25: I’m not exactly sure what you’re referring to, for I would question the efficacy of the proofs on that list.

Evidence for Christianity, not proof of Christianity.

For instance, if I find a problem with the Bible and you rationalize it, what makes your rationalization superior?

You’re not answering the question I asked. I’m saying Tom’s list is evidence in favor of Christianity being true. You disagree, so without bringing in other evidence or arguments as a distraction, what are your reasons for thinking Tom’s list is evidence of some other truth (conclusion)?

You tell me what the other conclusion is and how that evidence got you there. If it helps to focus on one item on the list, then explain why you think #1 is evidence for some other conclusion.

SteveK –

The list may be evidence if it fits into a larger contextual girder, but standing alone they are mere claims, floating free from any mooring, which I guess is where I still need to understand you clearly. Do you want to examine the evidence for each claim? My last post was sort of getting at that. I was asking at which point, for instance, does an unfulfilled prophecy count against Christianity? For my only point is to prove that Christianity is not true; or, more specifically, it is hardly a profound, timeless religion that can readily account for all of these issues. So it’s important to establish when we cross the threshold of evidence counting against Christianity. For anybody can hold up a single claim and say, “See? There is no good evidence against it.” When in actuality it could be a house of rotting wood.

Anyway, I want to be clear about what you want to argue. For instance, I might say of the first claim, “The lack of historical, documentary testimony of the Bible is a mark against it,” and I’d give evidence A, B, and C as reasons. Is that what you were aiming for? Forgive me for being cautious here.

No, it is because if morality is not objective, then those who hold power in the world can decide what will be moral and enforce it on others.

This is true in any ethical framework.

Look at Pol Pot, Mao, Stalin, and even (closer to home) gay rights political activism, which has clearly been a successful power maneuver, with the result that one group’s morality is being enforced forced on others.


It is uncharitable that you place gay rights in the same category as Stalin, Pol Pot, et al. The only thing gays are forcing on you is the restriction that you not oppress them.

If morality is objective and grounded in a good God, then all of us, including the powerful, are subject to the same standards, and even the powerful will have to account for themselves in view of God’s justice.

Even assuming you are correct, how does this solve the problems you mention above? A person’s accounting would occur after death, would it not? Facing god’s wrath did not deter Stalin. People who are out of tune with god’s desires (whatever they are), or who are subjectivist can try to force their morals on others. You gave examples. But moral objectivist do the same thing. Take slavery. Was slavery the result of people not being in tune with god’s will. Or did slave owners simply read the bible and decide that slavery was consistent with god’s will. They held power and they forced their morals on others (primarily on the millions of africans who had different moral preferences concerning slavery). Those who were in tune with god’s “will” concerning slavery treated dissent as blasphemy against god. After all, slavery was a part of the old testament. Moses supported it. Jesus, who tells us to radically love our enemies never tells us to literally let your people go. But we now know better. God never approved slavery! Jesus hated it too. Almost 2000 years after Jesus we finally discover god’s true intent. The abolitionists were the one’s in tune with god’s will the whole time! How convenient! Few really questioned slavery 300 years ago.


Study the founding documents of the United States and you’ll find that view pervades their insistence on government of laws, not men, and of checks and balances.

A nation of laws is perfectly acceptable in a subjectivist or relativist framework. You are not suggesting that the laws come from some other source than men, are you? Besides, I think it is better to characterize us as a nation of people who govern.


Additionally, I believe moral objectivism is important because it is true, it is an expression of the character of God, and that alone would be enough to value it.

Well, I don’t have to value it. You have to give me a reason to value it. Even if you convince me god exists; even if you convince me that your conception of god is the true god; even if you can show me clearly what this god wants of me, you still have to provide me an epistemic framework that allows me to know that what god wants is truly what I ought to want as well.



Off-topic? Tom, my questions and Chris’ are at the heart of the topic. Is it that you have no response?

Well, I’m disappointed, Tom, but I understand that you have other things to do. I hope that someone else will take up your position or that you will address these questions in the future.

Tom,
Expanding on Paul’s point, at what point in your walk at William and Mary’s did you believe that gay sex is good and fine, and when did you decide it was a false belief?

I don’t wish to be pedantic, but if you say you had a belief forced on you, then you must of believed it at some point. I suspect you mean someone tried to force (use persuasive rhetoric, perhaps?) the belief on you. As Paul says, this is merely an example of free speech. That is the problem with democracy, even one built on laws and not men. It is messy. Unless you wish to support democracy in name only, then at the least, as our wise founders understood, you have to allow some speech that is difficult if not abhorrent for many others. And that means supporting free speech that might well go against what you believe to be God’s will. You feel it is God’s will that gays not be allowed to marry and that the gay lifestyle is a degradation. You can support that with passages in the Bible. I agree, that is exactly what the men who wrote the Bible believed was God’s will. I also believe that the Bible is clear about God’s will on the matter of slavery (hint: HE seems OK with it). Yet Christians now believe that it is a sin–that despite the clear teachings in the Old Testament in favor of slavery and the lack of clarity in the New Testament, Christians now see this as wrong. I guarantee you that there are plenty of clergy who believe the same about gay rights. They believe that gay rights are consistent with God’s will.

And this returns us to evidence. Much of your evidence will fall into this trap. How do you decide which clear moral rules in the Bible are genuine reflections of God’s will and which are not. If you say they are all reflections then you have to explain what epistemic method you employ to decide why we seem to have different moral standards today (within the church) than what God’s will (as recorded in the Bible) seems to advocate. One example is slavery. Why was slavery OK two to three thousand years ago, but wrong today. Why did Christians (or nearly all) see it as OK three hundred years ago? What did they do wrong? How would you decide today that a majority of Christians are wrong on a moral issue, as presumably you would have done if you were alive in 1730 concerning slavery? How do you know you are not wrong about gays? Most Christians in 1730 believed that black slavery was acceptable, too.

You asked me before what type of subjectivism I am. I am not sure about labels, but probably some form of constructivism. I admit I am influenced by Barefoot Bums Meta-Ethical Subjective Relativism, although I don’t pretend that I present it perfectly.

Chris,

If I may…

Why did Christians (or nearly all) see [slavery] as OK three hundred years ago? What did they do wrong?

They made the same mistake that critics who bring this up make. When we say “slavery” today, it’s a term that’s loaded with a lot of cultural and social baggage that didn’t exist in the term translated as “slave” or “servant” in the original text.

In a civilization without social security, welfare programs, or other social constructs, indentured servanthood was a better option than homelessness. If you actually read what the Bible says about the treatment of servants, you won’t see anything compatible with the chattel slavery we identify with the term today.

In short, what is described in the Bible is not the same as what was practiced in the 1700’s. I’m quite sure some will try to claim that distinction as invalid, but it’s actually a pretty big difference. The emotionally-loaded nature of the word “slavery” distorts the reality of what the Bible is actually describing.

In other words, those who have something to gain by associating the Bible with slavery (or just don’t know any better) make a false comparison between what they are doing (or did) and what the Bible actually discusses. So, I think you’re being premature in calling the Bible’s teachings on slavery “clear”, because a person with a clear understanding of the text and the culture in question wouldn’t see it the way you’re presenting it.

Regarding government, the Bible is primarily concerned with man’s relationship to God. The vast majority of governments, leaders, politicians the world has ever seen or ever will see could really care less what the Bible says about how to be a good ruler, or a good citizen. So, the Bible’s model is one of working within the system, but not necessarily one of theocracy.

There’s a recognition that humans will always tend to abuse power, which is why God never wanted a human king in the first place. Rather than call for theocracy, the Bible talks about submission (though not necessarily obedience), and a call for Christ-like treatment of others. This is why the primary commandments involve loving God and loving each other, and nothing about how nations should be structured. Suggesting that the Bible calls for theocracy (rule by the priests) is incorrect.

Medicine Man,

Certainly the OT did call for a theocracy, your claim that God did not originally want it notwithstanding. Jesus did not talk about government, but it is hard to see how democracy, especially when the majority goes against the will of God, derives in anyway from the teachings in the Old or New Testament.

I think you are partly right and partly wrong on the question of slavery. I do not doubt that some slavery back then was “better” than chatel slavery of 150 years ago. But to suggest that it was not really slavery is wrong. Slavery was an excepted part of the cultures back then and often horribly brutal, which is why I don’t specifically condemn the Jews of 3000 years ago, but nor do I look to their book for moral wisdom. In any case, God did condemn the Egyptians for their use of Jewish slaves (If we are to believe the OT) but did not condemn it universally. He did not even order the Egyptians to be better to their slaves. I guess being a slave under nice conditions was OK for everyone but not for Jews. I am sure that you will claim that it is obvious that the Egyptian slavery was brutal while Jewish slavery was benevolent. I think it is a just too convenient argument. I have been in many debates over these issues and every clear example of brutality that God commands in the OT is brushed away. Moses commands that the Jews kill defeated enemies and force the women to become wives. This is by definition genocide and rape. God kills all the first born males of the Egyptian empire (not to mention killing about everyone in the flood). I can understand why a small tribal group would do this in the brutal clime of the time or believe these about God, but concerning a tribe with the protection and support of the true God, it is morally repugnant today to suggest it was OK.

Obviously if Good is defined by whatever God decrees, then God is good. But I don’t have to buy into it.

Numbers 31:7 And they warred against the Midianites, as the LORD commanded Moses; and they slew all the males.
31:8 And they slew the kings of Midian, beside the rest of them that were slain; namely, Evi, and Rekem, and Zur, and Hur, and Reba, five kings of Midian: Balaam also the son of Beor they slew with the sword.
31:9 And the children of Israel took all the women of Midian captives, and their little ones, and took the spoil of all their cattle, and all their flocks, and all their goods.
31:10 And they burnt all their cities wherein they dwelt, and all their goodly castles, with fire.
31:11 And they took all the spoil, and all the prey, both of men and of beasts.
31:12 And they brought the captives, and the prey, and the spoil, unto Moses, and Eleazar the priest, and unto the congregation of the children of Israel, unto the camp at the plains of Moab, which are by Jordan near Jericho.
31:13 And Moses, and Eleazar the priest, and all the princes of the congregation, went forth to meet them without the camp.
31:14 And Moses was wroth with the officers of the host, with the captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, which came from the battle.
31:15 And Moses said unto them, Have ye saved all the women alive?
31:16 Behold, these caused the children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the LORD in the matter of Peor, and there was a plague among the congregation of the LORD.
31:17 Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him.
31:18 But all the women children, that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves.

Genocide, rape, slavery, pure and simple. I am sure they were kind to the slaves, nice to the young virgin women, and killed the other men and women with one swift stroke of the sword.

It is amazing how behavior that common with every other tribal group at that time is elevated to moral goodness when the Jews did it.

Like so many discussions in comments here, this is dissolving into, “You’re stupid,” “No I’m not, you’re stupid;” “No, you’re stupid,” “no you’re stupid.”

How about we stop that and discuss the core of the issue, which is why does it matter whether morality is objective?

Ordinary Seeker,

Morals are objective or they are not. Our own preference is irrelevant to the truth of that fact. Of course, if they are subjective (which is what I hold) then moral reasoning is at some level preference. It is not a matter of that I prefer that morals be that way. They just are.

@Holopupenko

My apologies for the late reply.

First, I suspect you’re covering your tracks… but in due deference to Tom, I’ll let it go.

I don’t know what you mean.

Second, “bad form”?? Really? Because it forces naturalists, materialists, and atheists to actually THINK about beingness and existence as pointing to modes of existence beyond the senses, i.e., beyond that accessible to the modern empirical sciences (MES)? Because it forces them to employ their own scientistic and reductionist rules of the game… and then see those rules crumble into inefficacy? Puhleez…

No, because you seem to be holding those groups to a standard they don’t espouse, ie. that everything has to be empirically accessible in order to exist. I have yet to see any of those groups fail to grapple with the notion that things, such as the scientific method, can exist in a purely conceptual sense.

Third, “unanswerable”? Of course it’s answerable: you MUST explain the existence of the scientific method–no matter what mode of existence it enjoys.

Well, sure. My objection is that you phrased the question, deliberately as it turns out, in the form of a fallacy. You might as well have asked the Bum what colour the number seven is, and then taunted him for not answering.

Chris, you didn’t answer my question, which was why does it matter–to you, or to anyone else–whether morality is objective or subjective? Why are you engaged in this discussion here? What does it mean to you to think that morality is subjective?

To me it matters because I believe that it is more moral to believe that morality is subjective than that it is objective. I engage in this discussion to find out more about how others think about this.

Chris,

But will you fight using the democratic process to specifically align laws with the conception that God is not real?

Ordinary Seeker,

You ask:
Chris, you didn’t answer my question, which was why does it matter–to you, or to anyone else–whether morality is objective or subjective? Why are you engaged in this discussion here? What does it mean to you to think that morality is subjective?

It matters for a couple of reasons. Since I believe that the question is one of fact and not opinion, I have an interest in it like I might want to know about the world as a whole. I just like philosophy.

But also, I would certainly prefer that more people accepted that morals are subjective. Since morals are subjective, and since I do tend to avoid statements that contain words like “you should”, “you ought”, etc, I sometimes feel I am at a disadvantage. “Objectivists” simply have to state their preferences and demand fealty because they are “objectively” true.

Morals or ethics become an issue to the extent that we want to influence or coerce other people’s behavior when those people’s preferences do not match our own. I prefer that people understand this and I hope that because of this they will understand the importance of negotiation and dialog. Obviously, people can and do simply use direct and brutal force to coerce others (and for some few things I agree), but this is true of any moral system, objective or subjective. But when you realize that one’s preferences are just that and not some fiat from on high, then there is hope that one will pause for just a second and give some credence to other’s thoughts as well. But when one’s morals, benign or not, come from on high or are set in stone, then the temptation to dogmatism arises.

To me it matters because I believe that it is more moral to believe that morality is subjective than that it is objective. I engage in this discussion to find out more about how others think about this.

I am not sure what you mean here. How can it be more moral to believe one or the other. If you are a subjectivist, then I suppose you would prefer that it be true. But who cares. If you prefer to do X, and you are currently doing X now, believing that subjectivism is true, what would change if you were convinced that objectivism is true? If this leads you to new facts about X and you no longer preferred X, then the point is moot. You would stop doing X. But that is because your preference changed. This could have happened even if subjectivism is true. If, your relationship to X remained the same, how would your understanding of the foundations of morality change your mind about X?

Chris,

Also, don’t you think that a person can be dogmatically subjective? Or that an insistence on subjectivity of morals can help a person dogmatically self-justify certain moral positions? To pick and choose whatever suits them?

In other words, could I not say, “But when one’s morals, benign or not, come from the self or are totally subjective, then the temptation to dogmatism (and/or antisocial behavior or arbitrariness) arises”?

Medicine Man
Chris,
Also, don’t you think that a person can be dogmatically subjective? Or that an insistence on subjectivity of morals can help a person dogmatically self-justify certain moral positions? To pick and choose whatever suits them?
In other words, could I not say, “But when one’s morals, benign or not, come from the self or are totally subjective, then the temptation to dogmatism (and/or antisocial behavior or arbitrariness) arises”?


True.

But I cannot pick a meta-ethical framework based on hope or my wishes. Subjectivism is true. I have looked long and hard for over twenty years for some basis for objective morals and have not found it.

But since I believe that morals are subjective, then obviously, people do and can act in restrained and socially conscious ways without objective moral truth. Maybe this is because they believe morals are objective. Certainly many atheists argue that morals are objective (they are wrong.) But on the whole, over the centuries I think mankind has progressed (by my subjective standards) by fighting the perceived “objective” truths of those in power. This, I think, has happened because people just went with their gut and stopped listening to the traditionalists (hard nosed objectivists.)

But I am dogmatic only to the extent that I can only go to where the evidence seems to take me. Whatever my feelings about subjectivism, good or bad as a pragmatic societal strategy, I still believe that it is the true fact of the world.

Medicine Man,

You seem interested in having me look at the cultural and situational conditions of the chapter in Numbers. I don’t want you to get into that right now, but I want to ask you a question.

One group that the Israelites killed were older women. Medicine Man, under what conditions, today, or in some conceivable future, would you say it was acceptable to kill the older women of a defeated army?

Medicine Man says,

Chris,
I never said you used the word “absolute”. But even in your reply, you’re implying an objective sense of morality, at least personally, if not universally.
An all powerful God that did what is described in Numbers (and elsewhere in the Bible) under any personally conceivable circumstances, is not a good God.
As was said before, this supports the contention that subjectivist moralities exist only in theory. In practice, there are certain things about which every person will say, “that is always wrong”. You were just as clear before when you said (emphasis mine):

Notice how you go from acknowledging that these are my personally (subjectively) conceivable circumstances to “certain thing about which every person [emphasis mine] will say, ‘that is wrong.’” Clearly I never said or implied this. I don’t pretend that what I prefer is or ought to be universal. Obviously, Numbers 31 shows us that not everyone would say it is wrong. You also don’t seem to understand objective morals if you think that the fact that “every person will say ‘that is wrong’” is a sign of objective moral truth. Everyone in agreement is a sign that the proposition is not in fact a moral proposition. Do you mean that “everyone ought to believe it is wrong”? If that, then I definitely don’t believe that. While I support laws coercing behavior and do try to affect people’s preferences at times, I never (or rarely) say “you ought to do this or that.”

I can see what the laws of the OT were and can even understand why the nation might develop them. They are not however evidence of a good God. They are not good in any context.
On the flip side, what would be invalid, in your view, of me responding to your criticisms of Biblical morals by saying, “hey now, you need to acknowledge that morals are subjective. You need to be more understanding. These actions and situations are not moral, only our relationship to them is. So, I’m just as right as you are.”
You would be just as right if you were honestly stating your preferences. Our subjective beliefs are properly basic and their truth is not open to debate. When we feel so strongly about an behavior that we wish to stop people from doing it, all we can do is try to use persuasion to change their preferences or force them to change their behavior.

… I don’t want you to get into that right now…

Well, you might not want to get into it, but any sensible reply to your hypothetical would require exactly that. I’ve offered you an avenue to explore that, if you wish.

I could invent a situation, I guess, but why create one from whole cloth? I don’t have to be able to invent a different circumstance in order to assess the one at hand. If I lay one out in detail, you could always accuse me of 1) stacking the deck in my favor or 2) giving an example irrelevant as a comparison to the situation in Numbers 31.

I think that the full (and I mean full, not scattershot) context of Numbers 31 makes what happened morally defensible. That starts from an understanding that this was directed by God, and in a very specific way. I didn’t say I liked it, felt good about it, am glad for it, or am happy for it, but as you said, we shouldn’t choose our metaphysics on the basis of personal preferences.

I think you’re misunderstanding my point in comment #109, and I’ll take responsibility for phrasing it poorly. My point was that every person has their own set of certain moral positions to which they will never give approval, no matter what. They won’t even acknowledge that there could be a circumstance in which they would. In your case, child rape is an example. I obviously was not implying that everyone agrees on any moral idea. What you wrote afterward is based on that misunderstanding / careless phrasing.

You would be just as right if you were honestly stating your preferences.

So what, then? I’m right, you’re right, we’re all right. What’s the point of discussing it if there’s nothing more to morality than preference?

You do tend to switch gears in the middle of an argument.

You brought it up, Chris.

Hitler was deeply invested in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche believed that morals were just expressions of subjective feeling, and one of the things he hated most about Christianity was its insistence on actual, applicable, moral truths, which he found constraining. It’s the reason Nietzsche replaced “morals” with “values”. History tells us that a common theme with tyrants and depots is an assumption that there are no higher rules that apply to them. So, no, actually, Hitler would have been unlikely to define his moral outlook as “objective”.

That’s exactly what emerged at the Nuremberg trials. Defenses based on following the laws of Germany could only be countered by appealing to a moral law above that of German leadership. Without that assumption, there was no moral justification to pursue the charges.

My remark about “telling” a despot is the concept of appeal. If you look at a man running roughshod over a nation, and tell him that all morals are matters of subjective preference, you’ve just handed him another excuse to keep doing as he does. Like I said, if he’s right, and the people are right, then so what? Telling him what he’s doing is wrong, no matter what he thinks, at least has some philosophical weight in terms of changing his mind.

No offense, but I find it odd to see someone simultaneously indicate a rejection of God and claim that certain texts don’t “always” accurately reflect His “purpose and influence”. That seems like more of the pick-and-choose approach I was concerned about.

Medicine Man said:
So what, then? I’m right, you’re right, we’re all right. What’s the point of discussing it if there’s nothing more to morality than preference?

Because when others are doing things we really want to stop, or if others are failing to do things that we really wish they would do, then we have one of two basic strategies. We can negotiate or we can forcibly coerce.

That’s exactly what emerged at the Nuremberg trials. Defenses based on following the laws of Germany could only be countered by appealing to a moral law above that of German leadership. Without that assumption, there was no moral justification to pursue the charges.

One does not need a moral justification to pursue Hitler beyond one’s own preferences. But whatever moral justification you claim, you still have to use force to stop the atrocities.
There are no objective higher laws. In any case, the higher law that we would have appealed to if Hitler had lived 1000 (or three thousand) years ago would have been radically different from the one we appealed to in 1945.

No offense, but I find it odd to see someone simultaneously indicate a rejection of God and claim that certain texts don’t “always” accurately reflect His “purpose and influence”. That seems like more of the pick-and-choose approach I was concerned about.

I was referencing the liberal Christian tendency to treat OT passages like these as not really reflective of the will of God. In other words, they might argue that the Jews in Numbers were acting on their own accord and not God’s. I would simply add that there is no God’s will to discover.

Chris,

Full context of Numbers 31? Is this context different from what is actually written there?

If by “there” you mean the 31st chapter of Numbers only, then yes, “context” implies all of the relevant facts of the situation, many of which are not repeated in that exact passage. I know that you’re completely ignorant of that context, because you keep talking about these “older women” as though they were thousands of sweet little grannies dragged away from their knitting by a surprise attack. That situation is that situation – you keep trying to transpose it into some other place and time (literally de-contextualizing it) in order to make it easier to criticize.

What would you do if gravity made things fall upwards? What would you do if you woke up tomorrow with a “gut feeling” that burning your house down was a good idea? The first question should be meaningless as a hypothesis contrary to fact. The second is clearly relevant to you, since you don’t think morals are grounded in anything other than yourself. What’s described in Numbers 31 is a unique situation, directed by a sovereign God with adequate justification. God’s not a random, capricious character who’s liable to tell someone to nuke a capital city tomorrow. In fact, if someone made that claim, I’d have ironclad proof that they weren’t getting that from God at all. So, your attempt at moral indignation isn’t any more meaningful than saying, “you’d just tumble into the sky if gravity reversed, wouldn’t you!”

Let’s take the flip side, which is part of my point about application of subjectivism to real life. Are you suggesting that a person ought never, ever to do anything they aren’t fully in agreement with? Doesn’t that bring us right back to the “so what” problem of subjectivism? I can acknowledge that I’m not the supreme arbiter of morality, so I can acquiesce to a higher standard. A subjectivist has no reason to do anything (or stop doing anything) no matter what anyone else says. I could just as easily say that you could do anything you felt like doing – murder your family, burn down a hospital – since you don’t think a person ought ever deny their internal subjective moral feelings.

We can negotiate or we can forcibly coerce.

I’m being charitable and assuming that you’re referring to an attempt to convince the other person that your moral view is correct when you say, “negotiate”. Unfortunately, you have nothing to negotiate with, in that regard. When you believe that all morals are subjective preferences, there is no longer any reason for anyone to change their moral position. Force is all you have. I can appeal to an actual, real moral standard. I can at least present the possibility that the other person’s actions are truly immoral. I can tell the guy with a “gut feeling” that he wants to kill his wife that his “gut feeling” is warped. You can’t.

I’m referring to the Nuremberg trials, not the war. Force stopped Hitler’s army, but it takes moral justification to try and sentence a person for atrocities like the holocaust. The trials afterwards were not necessary to stop the acts from happening. They were about enacting justice for those acts. Your approach gives no justification for doing that. After all, according to you, I’m right, they’re right, everyone is right. What they did can’t be called “wrong” by any universal standard, according to you, so punishing them is just you committing “slaughter” purely on the basis of preference.

I was referencing the liberal Christian tendency to treat OT passages like these as not really reflective of the will of God. In other words, they might argue that the Jews in Numbers were acting on their own accord and not God’s.

Which is part of the problem with “liberal” “theology” (yes, separate quotes were intentional). The text is clear that this was a direct assignment from God, not the decision of some leader. I realize that some liberal approaches agree with you, that there is no God and the Bible is just another collection of books…but that makes talking about “the will of God” absurd. If we’re going to ignore the text we’re criticizing, what’s the point of criticizing it?

ordinary seeker can respond as well if he wishes, but here’s my 2 cents:

What the $%&*#@could “better” relationships possibly mean if morality is subjective?

I tend to imagine it would mean a relationship that satisfies more and/or greater desires on the part of the individuals involved, as compared to the previous one.

“Better” compared to what…

See above.

… and for what purpose?

Preference satisfaction.

That’s rich… once again we see moral relativists incoherently and hypocritically imposing absolutist moral categories:

I suppose if you insist on interpreting everything from within your framework, the other guy’s arguments are going to look a little weird.

it’s a thinly-veiled “might makes right.”

There’s a difference between claiming “human morality arises from human minds for the purpose of satisfying our desires” and “morality is whatever I personally say it is, and I intend to make you abide by it.”

What would you do if gravity made things fall upwards? What would you do if you woke up tomorrow with a “gut feeling” that burning your house down was a good idea? The first question should be meaningless as a hypothesis contrary to fact. The second is clearly relevant to you, since you don’t think morals are grounded in anything other than yourself.

If I woke up tomorrow with the complete and total preference to burn down my house, then I would have the preference to burn down my house.
What if you woke up tomorrow with the certainty that God really did accept gays and did accept their right to marry? You would just join a growing number of other Christians who agree with that. But I doubt that would happen. Nor do I imagine that I will want to burn my house down. Morals are subjective, but not arbitrary.

God’s not a random, capricious character who’s liable to tell someone to nuke a capital city tomorrow.

Could have fooled me. You obviously don’t pay much attention to radical religious groups.
In fact, if someone made that claim, I’d have ironclad proof that they weren’t getting that from God at all.

I want to see your proof. There are thousands of theologians who would like to see it as well. They would love to have a clear epistemic method of determining what God does and does not decree.
So, your attempt at moral indignation isn’t any more meaningful than saying, “you’d just tumble into the sky if gravity reversed, wouldn’t you!”

This makes no sense.

Let’s take the flip side, which is part of my point about application of subjectivism to real life. Are you suggesting that a person ought never, ever to do anything they aren’t fully in agreement with?

I don’t ever claim someone “ought” to do anything at all. I do plenty of things that I am not in full agreement with. Sometimes because I have competing desires and sometimes I do things because it is preferable to going to jail or paying a fine or getting fired. But all things considered, if I want to do X, and I can do X without it impacting on other things I value, then yes, I always do X.
A subjectivist has no reason to do anything (or stop doing anything) no matter what anyone else says.

I usually have a reason why I do things. I desire to do them. I will sometimes stop doing things if I am asked. Why? Because I am a nice guy.

I could just as easily say that you could do anything you felt like doing – murder your family, burn down a hospital – since you don’t think a person ought ever deny their internal subjective moral feelings.

I do not hold that any proposition containing the word ought is objectively true. Please be precise.
Of course I could try to do anything I felt like doing. But you are vague on what you mean by internal subjective feelings. I choose to do things that on the whole I want to do. This is grounded on subjective considerations. But internal reasoning as well as feelings all are a part of this. I rarely act merely on my immediate feelings.

Unfortunately, you have nothing to negotiate with, in that regard. When you believe that all morals are subjective preferences, there is no longer any reason for anyone to change their moral position. Force is all you have.

This is silly. Of course we can negotiate; we do it all the time. You do realize that we are a nation of divers religions and a large number of non-religious citizens. We all negotiate all the time. Are you saying that only Christians who agree with you (or that part of the Bible you think is correct) can negotiate? And if there is a higher standard, why negotiate at all? Just read the standard.
We negotiate when we lack agreement—when we do not agree upon the higher standard or do not agree on what the higher standard actually says. A fundamentalist Christian and an atheist who holds to objective morals have great trouble negotiating primarily because both sides demand that the other adhere to their higher standards.
You are not looking to negotiate. You want people to follow your standards.

I can appeal to an actual, real moral standard. I can at least present the possibility that the other person’s actions are truly immoral. I can tell the guy with a “gut feeling” that he wants to kill his wife that his “gut feeling” is warped. You can’t.

How well does that work to wag your finger at him ? If he wants to kill his wife, he might not agree that your higher standard is his. If he is a Christian, he might well believe that he is acting in accordance with God’s will. Oh, but you have proof he is not doing what God wants. Well, he might not just by into your proof.

After all, according to you, I’m right, they’re right, everyone is right. What they did can’t be called “wrong” by any universal standard, according to you, so punishing them is just you committing “slaughter” purely on the basis of preference.

No, there is no objective right or wrong here. A person is only right in that they know their own preferences. I am sure the Israelis committed slaughter based purely on their preferences too. They just believed those preferences were OK’ed by God.

Which is part of the problem with “liberal” “theology” (yes, separate quotes were intentional). The text is clear that this was a direct assignment from God, not the decision of some leader. I realize that some liberal approaches agree with you, that there is no God and the Bible is just another collection of books…but that makes talking about “the will of God” absurd. If we’re going to ignore the text we’re criticizing, what’s the point of criticizing it?

Because there are people today who wish to hold the Bible as a standard for our laws today. I have no problem with that, per se, (you can use any standard you want as part of negotiating) but I do think that it helps me more than you if people read the OT a little more closely.

To Holopupenko,
Re: response to Fortuna
And if Jeffrey Dahmer’s “preference” is to hurt you badly… then how can you justify imposing your “preferences” over his? Because of the numbers (which means might make right), because you “prefer” it that way (which exposes the silly gerbil-on-a-wheel circularity of moral relativists’ assertions)? How is your “relationship” with Dahmer improved by an imposition of your personal “preferences” upon him?

We don’t have to justify our preferences to anyone. You don’t have to justify your preferences. Of course, if you wish to stop us from doing something, or force us to start doing something else, then you might want to negotiate with us (or just try to use force or pass a law). The same goes for us. It is when we try to impose our will on others, that the question of justification comes up. But negotiations amount to the parties in question being clear about what they value, looking for common ground, willing to give up something to get something else and being respectful (or you could just be a dogmatic despot and force your will.)

It would be easier to understand your argument if you would write more clearly and avoid the silly attacks.

I realize relativists are eschew objective truths (epistemological, ontological, moral) because they “prefer” it this way… but give us a break, please.

When you get into an argument with a relativist who holds that there are no epistemological or ontological truths, let us know.

Also, to respond briefly to your earlier message, you are covering your tracks, aren’t you… and you know it. You might as well have asked the Bum what colour the number seven is, and then taunted him for not answering. Bingo! You got it because you had to be taunted (my personal “preference” by the way) to get your thinking out of a rut. Now, consider this (per your own realization): “You might as well have asked the naturalist why only sensory evidence counts as evidence… or, why can’t we “see” virtue?” Because virtue CAN’T be seen. Get it?

So, your earlier lack of clarity was really a cover to get us out of a rut. Fortuna, do you get it now? Virtue can’t be seen. Amazing.

First its “better relations”. That didn’t work, because no “justification” is needed… and hence it’s as empty as the one pushing for “better relationships.” Now its “you might want to negotiate with us.” Really? Why… because now “negotiation” is the “preference” of the day? As with “better relationships,” what possible value could “negotiation” have in a world of subjective values. Sorry, but Dahmer prefers imposition–not negotiation, and the only way that you can stop him is by forcefully imposing your “preferences” upon him. That, and all other examples you provide, is precisely why–sooner or later–moral relativism leads to might-makes-right.

If you didn’t get the other stuff… oh well.

MM,

The very act of trying to convince someone to change their moral position implies that there’s a right or wrong way to approach that moral issue, and that only one of you is actually correct. If everyone’s right, there’s no reason for anyone to change their mind.

I was going to comment on this so I’m glad you did. If there are reasons (argument) that drive the changing of one’s mind then it’s no longer a matter of personal preference…it’s the reasons. If the reasons don’t do anything to support the change then why bring them up? Just state your preference and be done.

SteveK

I’d like to respectfully disagree on one point of yours;

I was going to comment on this so I’m glad you did. If there are reasons (argument) that drive the changing of one’s mind then it’s no longer a matter of personal preference…it’s the reasons.

From within a desire utilitarian framework, one could still maintain that intellectual positions are rooted in personal preferences, even if there are reasons/arguments capable of changing an individual’s mind on a given issue. It may simply be the case that one party believes themselves to possess a more effective means of meeting the other party’s desires (which may or may not be common to both parties.)

For instance, two individuals debating the merits of different economic systems may both hold in common the desirability of minimizing human suffering, while still holding differing views on the relative effectiveness of their preferred systems at satisfying their shared preference.

In other words, reasons/arguments could, in principle, change the mind of one person or another, while the issue at stake would still be preference satisfaction.

Adding to #128 (piling on, actually)

This is perhaps a better example of how relativists et-al. run into trouble with everyone around them. Reasons are NOT the same as preferences. I think the implications of that equivocation are obvious and devastating to the concept of rational thought and the sciences.

Knowing that, why not restate your preferences over and over hoping the other person will eventually come around out of subjective preference (or fatigue)? I can only think of three reasons why that isn’t done…

(a) the desire to purposefully mislead and manipulate the other person by making it appear like there are reasons for changing ones mind. They are purposely equivocating terms of reason with terms of preference. Of course this falls under the same category of subjective preferences so in their mind there’s nothing morally wrong here. It’s a case of sloppy reasoning done purposely, or…

(b) they didn’t realize they were doing something that made no sense, or….

(c) they actually think there are reasons that we can all attest to.

Fortuna,

From within a desire utilitarian framework, one could still maintain that intellectual positions are rooted in personal preferences, even if there are reasons/arguments capable of changing an individual’s mind on a given issue.

If true then I think this destroys universal concepts altogether, which destroys science and the concept of evidence (the subject of this post).

Perhaps Holo would be so kind as to give a brief explanation as to why. 😉

Along that line, then, I think it’s disingenuous and blatantly biased to tolerate disrespect and gratuitously antagonistic speech from those who share your close-mindedness, and to demand a different, higher set of standards from those who oppose your views.

Of course, that’s only meant as disrespect for a viewpoint, not for a person.

MedicineMan –

But according to Christians, no man is truly innocent. This makes the justification easier. It’s not like God hasn’t wiped out nearly everybody on the planet before or ordered punishments that went far beyond the crimes. Without a knowable standard, the idea of true objective morality in this context runs against many problems. And I would argue about Hitler’s motivations, but certainly men can justify their actions through God. What are you going to tell them? That God hasn’t ever ordered anybody’s death? How do you even convince them that God really doesn’t want such a thing? So we’re back to the same problem of imposing morality if God merely waits until after death to judge (of course, if God was actually interacting with us on a more physical level like the Bible talks about, it would help to clear things up).

Holopupenko and MedicineMan –

No one is arguing for a world of complete relativity. For if we observe simple human behavior, then we would see that people do negotiate with one another. And I would say that negotiation has nothing to do with right and wrong. Morality is much like any debate. I might argue that Tom Brady is a better quarterback than Peyton Manning. I’ll use things like stats and championships to back up my arguments. There is nothing inherently true about either opinion, for we’re talking about human values, but Tom Brady is still a better QB than, say, Gus Frerotte. If anybody with an ounce of football knowledge can see this, then there is clearly a basis for believing so.

It is true that there is no stopping somebody who is determined. I would argue, however, that it does not mean might makes right. By our very acts, we are probably imposing standards upon someone. That itself cannot be helped. But we generally understand the concept of positive and negative consequences. One still knows that burning a house down will probably effect someone negatively, but maybe such a thought is outweighed by a desire for revenge or just a plain desire. It can be reasonably argued that we generally want positive consequences for everyone – or at least very few negative consequences. Because we have to live with each other. People generally want stability, and they recognize the consequences of their actions. Right there we have a basis to work off of. When someone does harm another badly enough, it’s usually because of an ego or some kind of “mission”. And certainly the idea of might can go a long way – but so does the idea that sometimes we have to answer for what we do to our fellow man.

SteveK –

Reasons are not preferences, but that doesn’t change the consequences of things. One could say that employing good reason and good judgment will reduce consequences. Of course, people try to reduce consequences in other facets. You can look at the current fiasco in which people got rich by causing a financial meltdown – there was no impetus to do anything but cause a windfall. But that’s reality, not abstract philosophy.

@Tom Gilson:

I don’t feel like repeating myself, as I feel like I adequately responded to most of the points in my last post. I will just say that terms like subjective and objective are woefully unrepresentative of the true nature of what we’re arguing. We all use some combinations of the two.

I would say that morality is like philosophy itself. Maybe there isn’t such a thing as right or wrong philosophy, but sometimes there just is better philosophy – because ultimately we have a foundation to appeal to each other and argue. It’s a strawman to argue like most naturalists considers actual moral preferences as equal forces merely expressing themselves with no basis whatsoever. Most people, regardless of moral foundation, don’t act that way, so naturalists don’t argue it. It is true that some people cannot be reasoned with. Neither can you reason with a Muslim terrorist or someone who blows up an abortion clinic or a church that protests the funerals of soldiers. For every Klebold, there is someone willing to give his life for religion. At least with naturalism, we would not expect a higher power to put them in their places. So I hardly find that a theist properly characterizes the argument. It’s hard to explore the full implications under that context.

Among other things, it’s scary the loyal opposition now demands people of faith think like them: we MUST–in morally absolutist terms–“respect” their ideas, preferences, opinions, etc. no matter how disordered, goofy, or diabolical they are.

One of the characteristics of fascism is to overtly and formally forbid and suppress criticism and opposition… period. Isn’t that the goal behind the clearly-stated complaints here? These guys demand criticism be stopped and that we “respect” their ideas… or else they’ll whine about “bullying”. Sheesh.

I couldn’t help notice that this kind of disordered thinking is behind the push to enforce the so-called “[un-]Fairness Doctrine”–a policy of the FCC that required (under pain of license suspension) the holders of broadcast licenses both to present controversial issues of public importance and to do so in a manner that was (in the view of the FCC) honest, equitable and balanced. So, the FCC (hence the administration in power) gets to decide what rates as “honest, equitable, and balanced” instead of what the people decide (through market place pressures) to what they want to listen. If an atheist wants to promulgate his views, should EWTN or the 700 Club be forced to grant air-time… even if it’s paid airtime? No morally upright person would impose such foolishness: if an atheist wants to promulgate his views, let him set up his own radio station and exercise his lungs as much as he wants, and then ride the wave of what the market decides. NOTA BENE: I’m not suggesting a vote or the market place decide what is formally morally good–I’m suggesting let the people listen to what they want to listen, and not be forced to listen to what they do not, well, “prefer.”

You certainly talk a very big game, but I’m very unimpressed by what you’re saying. I think that somewhere along the way you’ve managed to out think yourself and convince yourself of the superiority of your own views. Unfortunately, everything you’ve argued fails to back up your claims. I think it’s much worse that you’re puffing your chest when you can’t even address all of the arguments. Stomp on the grave afterward.

We understand quite clearly that Nazism, racism, atheism, deconstructionism, positivism, necrophilia, burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands, female circumcision, moral relativism, etc. are disordered ideas or psychoses.

This is precisely what I’m talking about. Of course, you and Holopupenko have whatever opinions you have. But given this opinion, discussion is simply not possible. In just the same way, I refuse to discuss torture, slavery and genocide: I disapprove, and my disapproval far outweighs any interest in discussing these topics.

I unequivocally support your right to publish and condone opinions such as Holopupenko’s. But it is ridiculous to expect people who do not consider atheism, deconstructionism, positivism and moral “relativism” to be the moral equivalent of Nazism — as well as those who find Holopupenko’s substance-free bullying tedious and banal — to waste their time contributing to your venue.

That is a blatant lie. On your blog you engage in insults and name-calling.

That’s not my assertion. I don’t deprecate insults and name-calling per se. As I mentioned in my comment, I require that insults and name-calling be directed towards the substance of comments or positions. Since Holopupuenko started the name-calling and insults before I had contributed any arguments of substance (I was, in the spirit of the OP, making my own introductory remarks), my position is consistent.

There’s nothing wrong per se with mutual hostility. I merely remark that civilized conversation is difficult if not impossible under such conditions. On my own blog, I’m not particularly interested in civilized conversation with Christians; after a decade of attempts, I’m convinced the endeavor is, if not completely impossible, too difficult to be worth my time. My experience here has done nothing to change my opinion.

As I mentioned in my comment, I require that insults and name-calling be directed towards the substance of comments or positions.

Also a lie. Calling someone a “moron”, a “f***ing idiot”, or saying that your cat is smarter than them, are not remarks directed at the substance of their positions. Those are direct personal insults. And you know it.

On my own blog, I’m not particularly interested in civilized conversation with Christians…

Obviously. So why come here and pretend that you are?

…after a decade of attempts, I’m convinced the endeavor is, if not completely impossible, too difficult to be worth my time.

If throwing feces is what passes for an attempt at dialogue in your mind, then it’s no wonder you have so little success in discussions. If what’s on your blog is even remotely representative of your decade of “attempts”, then I’d have to say you don’t make any effort at all.

You can click to them.

I think I just may do that.

As I read those comments, he has responded to my call for him to focus on the arguments.

But notice those times that H.’s ideas are still about the other person, and not that person’s ideas:

April 24, 2009 at 9:40 pm

First, I suspect you’re covering your tracks

Because it forces naturalists, materialists, and atheists to actually THINK about beingness and existence . . . .

To avoid answering the question is to evasively avoid critical thinking . . . .

April 28, 2009 at 1:04 pm [oops, this is an actual personal attack]

once again we see moral relativists incoherently and hypocritically imposing absolutist moral categories

April 28, 2009 at 3:22 pm

Also, to respond briefly to your earlier message, you are covering your tracks, aren’t you… and you know it.

Still, this is a vast improvement.

See below for corrected links
Recent stirrings in the comments section as orbiting about moral relativism nicely exposed some important fault lines, and also brought to light the intentions, tactics and a priori commitments of the loyal opposition. Now that this is over and we see how dedicated (if not emotional) the loyal opposition is to moral relativism (instead of focusing on “evidence”), may we move on with “evidence”?

Regarding “evidence,” I responded to Villain here, but it appears he lost interest in being incorrect and went to his own blog entry to be incorrect again… AND he went to Barefoot Bum’s blog to, well… I’ll let you read his and other atheists’ charitable comments here (recall, this is the same Barefoot Bum who claims not to tolerate such practices… while even participating himself in such practices per Medicine Man’s exposition).

NONE of them touched with a ten foot pole Villain’s candid disagreement with philosophical naturalism or his apparent agreement that not all things are physical and hence sensory accessible (but nonetheless demand an explanation). Chris tried to respond but only focused (almost exclusively) here on attempting to buttress moral relativism by not grasping the nuanced points I made regarding morality (Chris appears not to have a strong grasp of analogical language). Of course, I’m dammed if my responses are too long, and in this case dammed for a summary response which is full of densely-packed highly-nuanced points… but that’s okay.

Perhaps we should restart the “evidence” topic under a new entry, but not permit off-topic comments (for example morality)… or is that too limiting?

From Tom: Holopupenko emailed me corrected links. I have a busy morning going on, so I can’t take time to insert them into the body of the comment. Here they are:

4th link “here”: https://www.thinkingchristian.net/2009/04/what-is-evidence-to-christians/#comment-12854

MedicineMan –

Of course not every justification is sound, but you offered a very general criticism of the point. God has condoned death before. People have gotten away with a lot in their own minds because they think that God is on their side. This can be very subtle, as people try to seek the justification of the “good” of a give situation, but we don’t actually know the standard in which murder is separated from killing. So people use God to justify all sorts of acts. They think that they’re doing good in the eyes of God.

Even stats have certain standards based on objective criteria, for the rules of the game are already set. We just need to know how best to accomplish them. For instance, many would argue that the RBI is a relatively useless stat when evaluating individual performance. It’s contingent on a teammate in scoring position. Or, perhaps, I can say that yards thrown are meaningless if interceptions are high. There are all sorts of fundamental things I can appeal to that bridge the gaps between opinions. And morality, like sports, is situational. Maybe it’s better to bunt in a given situation. We can build an entire argument off of that. It uses philosophy, debate, and opinions. If one’s views are silly, then perhaps they are wanting, and one can be “better” than others. But other times it simply does depend upon who is effected. If a wildlife area gets mowed down for a school, then what is right and wrong? To some people it might be very positive, to others very negative. It’s all contingent on individual values.

I would argue that instability is the problem. Most dictators gain power because people allow them to. The usual problems are the corruption, selfishness, and poverty that breed such men, so it’s hardly a simple matter of his preferences. It’s the preferences of the people. Naturalism holds water because ultimately human behavior is predictable. When people grow desperate, they lash out in negative ways. Instability leads to rash leaders, which lead to even more instability. This cycle of violence perpetuates itself everywhere, and it does not end well for anyone. But the more secure of an environment, the more harmony that is achieved. Even if it means that people know they cannot do things against the pack, it helps to reduce negative behavior. Without functioning structures, things tend to degrade. While people think that they’re fulfilling themselves, they actually tend to hurt themselves. So those are ideas that can be built upon and have been built upon throughout the centuries of human civilization.

I would define evidence broadly (and simply) as any information that would tend to lead a person toward a conclusion.

I would suggest that this definition needs one small refinement: as information which would JUSTIFIABLY lead a person toward a conclusion.

We can all, I would imagine, think of a great many cases where people were inclined toward a conclusion by information when, in fact, that information in no way supported the conclusion. In other words, your definition fails to take into account logical fallacies and errors of reasoning.

david ellis,

Your comment is noteworthy. We’ve discussed the justification aspect of belief/knowledge many times and I’m glad you brought it up again here.

If you disagree with Tom’s conclusion that his list is evidence for Christianity, then you are saying a person is not justified – EVER – in thinking the things on that list support the conclusion that Christianity is true. How so?

If you disagree with Tom’s conclusion that his list is evidence for Christianity, then you are saying a person is not justified – EVER – in thinking the things on that list support the conclusion that Christianity is true. How so?

Perhaps another distinction needs to be made:

between the idea of “evidence for” a proposition and reasonable grounds for believing a proposition.

For example, if a person claims to have personally been abducted by aliens his testimony constitutes evidence for the claim that aliens exist and visit earth.

I think most of us would agree, though, that it doesn’t constitute anything approaching good grounds for being convinced that aliens exist and visit earth….or even for taking the claim particularly seriously as a possibility.

And I don’t think that the list of 9 kinds of evidence for christianity stated in the conclusion of the post constitute anything approaching reasonable grounds for being convinced christianity is true.

Some of them dont even seem very pertinent to the question.

OS,

Well, this is an expression of the highest level of morality according to Kohlberg: the understanding that the needs of the other and the self are interchangeable, that the needs of the other are as important as the needs of the self.

More or less, yes and no, but close enough for the point at hand. That’s why the two greatest commandments are to love God with everything you are, and all you have, and to love your neighbor as yourself. The problem is that simply stating that this is the highest moral virtue, with nothing to anchor it to, is just another preference. Highest virtue, according to who?

Again, this is still internal, as was Fortuna’s example. It’s also another aspect that’s subject to diffusion by subjectivism. What if my personal preference is not to care for the needs of others? Simply saying that that’s a virtue, especially if you espouse moral relativism, is no more valid than my view or any other.

A Christian can say that altruism is both pragmatically good, and morally good, because of a belief that the God who created us knows the best way to “run the machine”, so to speak, and that those concepts of good are rooted in an objective source: His unchanging nature. I can tell someone else that altruism is actually good. A subjectivist can merely say that is “most preferable”, and preferences by definition don’t apply to everyone.

That’s why I said that subjectivism can only be used to plead for permissiveness. It’s logically contradictory to argue for moral restrictions from a subjectivist position.

MM,
If you know Kohlberg you know that he theorized that people developed morally not by being “told” what is “actually true,” but by being exposed to moral dilemmas. In other words, the more we practice subjectivism–which is really standing in the other guy’s shoes–the more ethical we become.

Related question:

If I try to see through the eyes of Jeffrey Dahmer, why should I reject his view and accept someone else’s? The idea that we learn what is moral by examples makes sense, I guess, but don’t you still have to have a way to know when you’re “progressing” in the wrong direction?

Or, I know that rapists would be terribly angry, unhappy, and depressed if they were put in jail. What justifies me rejecting their feelings unless there is a greater standard of morality guiding my decision?

If I try to see through the eyes of Jeffrey Dahmer, why should I reject his view and accept someone else’s?

Are you familiar with ideal observer theory in metaethics?

I think it provides a good answer to that question. One far less problematic than theistic moral systems (I’ve never encountered one that wasn’t devastated by some variation of the euthyphro dilemma).

I don’t understand the distinction between evidence and justification, as it pertains here. If the evidence is legitimate, is real, and is applicable, how can belief on the basis of that evidence not be considered justified?

I thought my example made that fairly clear. Basically, the fact that X is evidence for something doesn’t not necessarily mean its GOOD evidence for something.

When, for example, one is on a jury and a person testifies to seeing the defendent stab a man to death this is, strictly speaking, evidence.

However, if the person testifying hated the defendent, has good motives for lying about the defendent, has been shown to have lied in previous testimony about the case, and even has motive for commiting the murder himself, I think we could judge the evidence provided by his testimony to be very weak indeed and nothing approaching grounds for belief the defendent is guilty.

That X is evidence for a claim is not the same thing as X being reasonable grounds for believing the claim. X might be only very weak evidence. Or X might be good evidence in and of itself but not quite strong enough to consider the claim more likely than not to be true. Or other, better evidence, may contradict X (for example, the many cases where a jury convicted a man on a eyewitness testimony but DNA evidence later showed the man to be innocent).

I think Tom’s point about the existence of the church has more to do with the “impossible faith” hypothesis than it’s existence.

OK. I’d like to see a good defense of that one.

You might, of course, but ED has been under discussion even here recently, and (in short), it’s a false dilemma.

Before we even discussed it in relation to your views on meta-ethics I’d have to know what particular theistic meta-ethical theory you subscribe to. If you have a solution to it I’d like to see it. If you’ve actually solved it you’d be the first person in history to do so.

MM,
We don’t learn morals by example, we become increasingly ethical as we experience and respond to moral dilemmas. When, for example, we have to decide whether and how to remain in relationship with someone who has hurt us; or we have to decide whether to take the personal risks in being a whistle-blower; or we fall in love with someone we know our family will reject, we develop our capacity for ethical thinking and behavior.

It’s not solely about empathy. Do you remember the scene in the last MASH episode in which the Korean mother smothered her crying infant so that the baby wouldn’t give away their location to the soldiers? Our reaction to that isn’t just empathy, it’s a full-on understanding of all the complexity of humanity. And it’s when we have that understanding that we have the greatest understanding of morality.

David,

I thought my example made that fairly clear. Basically, the fact that X is evidence for something doesn’t not necessarily mean its GOOD evidence for something.

I guess the question then is really how you choose to interpret the list Tom gave. Not to be crude but…duhh. These are not issues that have never been considered before, and Christians are not somehow ignorant of what constituted good or bad evidence. When reference is made to the gospels and the testimony of the Bible, for example, what is not being said is that the mere existence of those written words is good enough for us. It’s the Bible existing as a document supported by external sources, archaeology, history, and so forth in ways which give us good confidence that it’s an accurate and honest source.

There’s a rough outline of the impossible faith hypothesis here.

Regarding ED, I have to politely say that we’re not going to discuss it at all. It’s been a major topic of conversation here just within the last few days, and frankly I’m completely disinterested in going through the same baloney over and over again. That’s especially true when you’re giving me more ED cheerleading. Dilemmas don’t have to be solved to be answered; they can be shown false and therefore not a dilemma at all.

Check the post from this blog about the Atheist Ethicist for more on that.

This isn’t an attempt to dodge the issue, it’s just an honest statement that I’m all ED’d out right now. Plus, the way you’re talking about it sounds to me like this probably sounds to you: “If you have a solution to the Ontological argument, then I’d sure like to hear it. If you’ve actually solved it, you’d be the first person in history to do so.”

MedicineMan –

One man’s justified killing is another man’s murder. One man’s justice is another man’s revenge. The Bible does not reasonably define one from the other, so we don’t actually have a definable standard here. Has God ever killed a sinner? I can certainly find many examples from the Bible. Christians justify it by saying that it was justice being done, but they can’t tell you why one man might deserve justice and another mercy. Because of that, people can’t actually tell when justice needs to be done, even if it does sound reasonable at the time. This is dangerous, for even if you could prove that atheism is amoral, it is just as bad when a man thinks he has justification and the objective source of morals is not there to rebuff him. No one can convince him, and other people can only try to stop him.

I would also argue that people recognize when something is “good” or “bad” in the sense that they are positive or negative. In a neutral world, most people would love to promote life and happiness. But we inevitably chafe against one another, and so we try to justify our actions to other people. My entire point is that we use certain “metrics” to accomplish this by appealing to basic human impulses and desires. I made this point before, and it’s a better one: morality is essentially like philosophy (I used the sports analogy because a lot of philosophy is used in sports). There are certain standards in philosophy that we use to appeal to each other. If atheism is amoral, then it’s also aphilosophical. But I would actually say that the ability to understand and appeal to others is absolutely pertinent to atheism, for a species would not be able to survive without it. It’s true that no one really has to listen to other people, but that’s not generally how things work, so it’s an argument only half based in reality.

Of course a dictator’s preference matters in a sense, but he is irrelevant if people don’t allow him to come to power. It’s pertinent because the Christian argument is essentially, “What’s stopping anybody from doing anything?” Well in this case it’s millions of people that stand between him and power. He can’t just do whatever he wants and “take life for what it’s worth”. People have an innate response to fear for the consequences in this life. There are some who don’t fear for the consequences, but that is as true of a religious terrorist as a school shooter. The sense that this world does not matter pervades both worldviews.

There are many benefits that are universal to humans: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness most definitely. This idea of trying to limit any one person’s power so that no one person’s freedom can be infringed upon too much I think is the best system possible. I’m a big believer that weakness, stupidity, or desperation are the root causes of 90% of the world’s crimes. The allure of power or ego probably account for the rest. Again, I think that atheist morality works because these things are quite predictable. If you look at the genesis of morality from a naturalist view and the way in which the mind actually works, then we can see the general system that humans work in innately. True, no one has to listen to you when you tell someone “no”, but people do listen, most certainly under specific circumstances, and that ultimately is what makes the entire thing run. So we have to look at the general principles of humanity and the ways in which they express themselves throughout society.

EDIT: To response to something ordinary seeker said: I’ve held that experience is absolutely key to a moral system. How others effect us has a lot to do with it, but there are also ways in which we effect ourselves.

David,

I had seen Carrier’s analysis of the TIF, and found it pretty thin. I’d refer you to Holding’s response, which actually prompted Carrier to change some of his arguments…which actually made them worse.

As long as we’re referring, have you read “The Testimony of the Evangelists” by Greenleaf? It’s one of the many answers to your question about what evidences are reasonable to use as support for Christianity.

I had seen Carrier’s analysis of the TIF, and found it pretty thin. I’d refer you to Holding’s response, which actually prompted Carrier to change some of his arguments…which actually made them worse.

Care to get into specifics? Personally, I found Holding’s arguments thin before I had even read critical responses to it.

I think another point that needs to be made is about co-supportive evidence (if that term means anything).

There seems to be a habit by skeptics of looking at single pieces of evidence (a la the 9 Tom gave above), and declaring each one to be insufficient to prove (or give good reason to believe in) Christianity. They reject them one by one, then declare that belief is unjustified.

The problem is that it’s not one single piece of evidence, but the combination of them. Each additional piece of evidence adds to the reasonable-ness of believing. That each individual piece of evidence, by itself, is not a self-contained airtight case is not a problem.

You’re still being impossibly vague with the first point. God is always right because he’s perfect, but we don’t necessarily understand what is good about the acts of wrath or mercy he commands, for we must suppose that the things that come from God are good in nature. What was necessarily good about the flood? One must certainly have faith that such an act is good because God is perfect. And so all it takes is one man convinced that he knows God’s will. He will say that it is a good act because it conforms with the goodness of God. How many times in a war have you heard that God is on one’s side? But the entire thing is just one big guess. My intention here is merely to show that Christian ethics uses a similar process of justification, putting it on a similar level to the atheist system. For even if you have certain rules, you can find an exception to any one (except maybe sexual deviances, but a lot of people think that some of those tend to defy human nature anyway), making the rules themselves pointless, and many of them don’t seem to have an easy answer. Don’t kill…unless you’re justified in doing so. Don’t disobey parents…unless you’re justified. Well that’s a wide, subjective berth we just opened up. Even if there were obvious and totally objective principles, it’s still contingent on people knowing them. When most people in the world don’t follow a specific religion, you can hardly use eternal consequences as a defense (most invent reasons for why they’re going to get into heaven anyway, just for being as they always were). When even believers sometimes deviate wildly on right and wrong, then it’s even less palpable.

I say that ethics exists in a general sense because ethics only exists as an approach. In reality, ethics has to be general, for absolutely no specific system could be used to accommodate the values of every single person. It is simply easier to concentrate on the way in which our morals clash. I don’t know why you’d claim atheist philosophy but not morality. For with atheism, no one should “ought” to believe or listen to anything. But there are some things that people just believe given logical connections. If one can appeal to another with philosophy, then one can appeal to another with morality. And you haven’t really met that point yet. Many people want to be appealed to or can be appealed to.

Why not get what you want? Because most people can’t get what they want unless others capitulate. We’re only individuals, after all, in a sea of humanity. Humans are naturally meant in a psychological sense to fit into a social framework. Many are already prepared to deal with self-control, especially if one grows up with that attitude. And then, of course, there is the entire issue of whether one can actually find happiness by doing what one wants. Usually these kinds of people are searching for something and are rather child-like in a sense. But then again I’m very distrustful of people’s decision making ability and thus the ability to make moral decisions. There’s a huge connection between the psychology of an individual and their actions. So what people want may be no more than a product of psychology, and one has to ask in what sense that is real. I would argue that psychology is the defining factor in morality, not necessarily religion (or afterlife), but I’ll get into that later, for there are many such topics we can delve into, and they are all pertinent as ways in which we can appeal to people. These are things rooted in human nature, which might themselves sometimes call upon universal truths, but to us the “innateness of our humanity” is all that matters, so I don’t think they’re arbitrary in that sense.

I do have one thing to say about evidence: it may take awhile to build up a case for Christianity, but it can be torn down pretty quickly, as it espouses quite a bit that is supposed to be inerrant and ineffable. Anything that casts doubt on that hurts quite a bit, in my opinion.

Do you have a link to a statement of the minimal facts argument in something in the form of text rather than audio?

Jacob,

I think the charge of vague-ness rings a little hollow coming from a subjectivist or a-moral position.

There are not exceptions, only a hierarchy. Obedience to parents is not more important that obedience to God, for example. no matter how you slice it, Christianity provides some objective, external moral guidelines that atheism does not and can not. Even if you choose to see those as subject to self-justification, you can’t argue that those justifications are as easy or as valid as those for atheism.

When most people in the world don’t follow a specific religion, you can hardly use eternal consequences as a defense (most invent reasons for why they’re going to get into heaven anyway, just for being as they always were). When even believers sometimes deviate wildly on right and wrong, then it’s even less palpable.

As you said, they “invent” reasons. What happens under philosophically or metaphysically inconsistent circumstances is not the fault of that philosophy. That many people disagree on a truth does not mean that the truth does not exist, which is more or less what that argument implies.

David,

Re: Carrier and modern sensibilities, that’s just an impression from when I read his response. He seems quick to dismiss Holding’s supportable claims about how people in that culture thought and acted. IIRC, he claimed that Christianity was just meeting a “market demand” for ways to improve one’s status…ignoring the idea that bucking the system was the worst way to do just that, in that time, for instance.

What it comes down to for me is simply that the central claim Holding makes is pretty obviously nonsense.

Then perhaps you’re considering a different claim than the one he makes. He’s claiming that Christianity’s spread and success in the early years are explicable only if it’s backed up by very strong evidence and reasoning, since it had so many strong drawbacks. Holding mentions how false faiths had rapid success and died quickly, or grew slowly and died later. He’s not ignorant of flash-in-the-pan faiths.

The fact that you mention such groups is part of the point. With all of the drawbacks it faced, Christianity survived and thrived specifically because it could be verified in ways other claims could not. That’s why they died and it survived. Holding confronts the glib dismissal that “well, people are irrational, so who cares.”

The claim is not that absolutely no one, ever, could possibly have believed in Christianity in that day. It’s that the speed, nature, and mechanism of its spread doesn’t make sense given all of its cultural drawbacks – unless it also had some very powerful supporting evidence (i.e., it was actually true).

When the critic responds with, “well, people are just irrational,” that’s just a dodge, in my mind.

I don’t know if it exists in text form. Google is your friend.

Yeah, I googled it and found some people presenting variations on it but nothing written by Habermas. I preferred for you to link to a text version of the argument rather than me so that there could be no accusation that I was just attacking a weaker, less well stated, version of the argument.

The argument seems to have some fairly obvious flaws from the start.

The essay WHY THE MINIMAL FACTS MODEL IS UNPERSUASIVE (found at: http://evaluatingchristianity.wordpress.com/2009/03/05/why-the-minimal-facts-model-is-unpersuasive/ ) has what I think are some good criticisms of the argument. One example below:

Worse, Habermas also concedes that for the linchpin “fact” in his argument — the empty tomb of Jesus — the level of agreement among his sources is not 95% but only 70%. Think about that for a moment. What Habermas is really saying is that, among Christians who have dedicated their lives to studying the Bible, nearly one in three denies the empty tomb!

In other words: Habermas’s case is, on close inspection, a powerful argument against the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and a good reason for even Christians to take seriously the work of skeptics….

He also discusses the obvious problem that most biblical scholars were christians going in. That’s why they became biblical scholars in the first place. So the fact that 70 to 90 percent of them believe these “minimal facts” is hardly surprising. Clearly, in most cases being christians before even beginning their studies of the bible, they may have more than a little bias going in.

How seriously would you take an argument based on the assent of 70 to 90 percent of scholars specializing in the Koran regarding it’s claims? Not very, I suspect. Since you’d probably think them less than objective, mostly being committed muslims.

Medicine man: Christianity provides some objective, external moral guidelines that atheism does not and can not.

So christians claim. I’ve never seen a good argument for that conclusion though.

Holding mentions how false faiths had rapid success and died quickly, or grew slowly and died later. He’s not ignorant of flash-in-the-pan faiths.

That christianity was the one from that period of the Roman Empire than rose to prominence is no reason to think it true. If false faiths (even one’s making demonstrably false claims) can flourish quickly why could not christianity, even if false, do the same? There is obviously no credible reason to think it couldn’t.

With all of the drawbacks it faced, Christianity survived and thrived specifically because it could be verified in ways other claims could not.

This is patent nonsense. How would some lower class convert hundreds of miles from where Jesus supposedly died verify the claims of christian missionaries like Paul? Whether it was true or not, most of its early converts would have little or no means to either verify it or falsify it. It only had to convert a few in its early days to survive long enough for its claims to become totally unfalsifiable. To claim that there weren’t enough people in the whole Roman empire who might have been attracted to it for that to occur unless its claims were true is an absurdity.

The supposed “drawbacks”, even if attractive, or at least not sufficiently unattractive, for christianity to appeal to only one person in 10,000 (or less)would be enough for the religion to get off the ground.

It is simply not plausible that culture throughout the Roman empire was so monolithic for this to not plausibly occur.

This impossible faith argument is crackpot nonsense.

That so many christian apologists come to the defense of it only weakens the credibility of christian apologetics to any nonchristian with a modicum of critical thinking skills.

It was/is not contradicting much of what the prevailing population wants/wanted to believe about God. There are no comparable social stigmas, levels of persecution, or socially contradictory messages involved, as there were with early Christianity.

Are you kidding?

A. American christians considered the canon of scripture closed. Adding a new book was, and remains, a serious no-no among christians.

B. Polygamy was, and is, completely against American mores.

C. Mormonism massively alters christian theology. Its not even remotely similar. It was, and is, pure heresy to most christians.

And I’m sure someone who’s more knowledgable than me about what Mormons believe could add many more.

MM,

Mormonism is/was not attempting to grow in the ancient middle east, 2,000 years ago.

This is a statement, not an argument.

It was/is not contradicting much of what the prevailing population wants/wanted to believe about God.

False. Mormonism popped up and flourished in an almost entirely Christian nation that looks for the second coming of Christ, not a new prophet.

There are no comparable social stigmas, levels of persecution, or socially contradictory messages involved, as there were with early Christianity.

Right. The Mormons, starting with the founder, had such fun with mobs they couldn’t concentrate on their religious studies so they decided to relocate to Utah for the climate. And there wouldn’t be any stigma to polygamy in the U.S. (I’m not sure what socially contradictory means.)

To be precise, Holding is talking about the early church, not any religion at any time, so the fueling of adherents in the face of resistance is not being posited as a blanket statement for all cases.

To be precise Holding’s arguments have to stand scrutiny, and one of the best ways to put them under scrutiny is to examine the claims against analogs in other religions. If you’re not willing to put the argument to the test against similarities in other religions then you’re just begging the question.

david,

There is simply too little evidence of any sort to draw any hard conclusions about what went on.

The claim of facts being actual facts stands by way of your statement below**, until you can supply facts that undo that reasonable conclusion. Common sense, critically examined will do the job but first you have to give me facts that will lead me away from my current conclusion. Got any?

** “you have reasonable grounds for belief in something when the evidence or arguments in its favor is such that its implausible that such evidence could exist and the claim be false.”

Tony,

This is a statement, not an argument.

Yes, and…? Did you really need me to add the “therefore your analogy to Mormonism is a false one”?

Mormonism in practice doesn’t blatantly contradict the mores of a Christian society, outside of polygamy. The early Christian church was seriously bucking the prevailing attitudes towards behavior. America was far more permissive and less concerned with conformity – those who were theologically wrong in the US had nowhere near the backlash that they got in Judea.

You mentioned isolationism – that was another point I made to you once before. The early Christian church did not have the ability to pull away from their critics as Mormons did. That’s exactly the kind of factor that I’m talking about. Having the freedom to be left alone, avoiding criticism, shunning dissent, and so forth? That’s awfully conducive to ingraining false belief. Are you trying to help me prove my point, or what?

Analogs in other religions are no problem – but you seem to think that any religion that didn’t get a red-carpet welcome was just as opposed as Christianity was 2,000 years ago. It’s those very comparisons that you’re not bothering to make, as shown above wrt Mormonism.

The claim of facts being actual facts stands by way of your statement below**, until you can supply facts that undo that reasonable conclusion. Common sense, critically examined will do the job but first you have to give me facts that will lead me away from my current conclusion.

Your current conclusion is not a reasonable one. There is far too little evidence to support ANY conclusion about what went on with the very early church. There can only be speculation. That you draw firm conclusions on the basis of so little supporting evidence only shows that your position is not based on reason or evidence.

There is far too little evidence to support ANY conclusion about what went on with the very early church. There can only be speculation.

Then on what basis can you possibly argue with the impossible faith hypothesis? Your response has not been, “I can’t agree or disagree,” but, “you are wrong.” You keep saying that the rise of Christianity was perfectly plausible…what evidence do you have that counts in ways ours does not? Referring again to your comment before, how is this not a blatant self-contradiction?

Tony,

I gave you examples of the differences, and why they matter.

Mormonism is not as contradictory in practice to recent US Christianity as early Christianity was from the surrounding culture of the time. Mormons were able to flee from rebuttals and become isolationist – removing the opportunity for falsification and giving time to develop ingrained belief without criticism. Mormons were never subjected to the level of physical and legal abuse that Christians were in Judea. The culture of the US was very permissive in comparison to that of the ancient middle east, making it much less personally costly to deviate from the norm. And so on and so forth.

In summary, Mormonism had nowhere near the challenges to its growth or survival that early Christianity did. That’s why the differences matter. Saying that TIF is powerless by pointing to Mormonism is unwarranted.

I’m not going to insult you by believing that you can’t grasp the concepts in my “gauzy (sic)” language. The social stigma of polygamy in the recent US is not nearly so strong as the social stigma of crucifixion in the ancient middle east. Moving to where you can be left alone is not the same as being thrown into the arena to be eaten by a lion. Saying, “love your neighbor” in a culture that already believes it is not the same as saying, “turn the other cheek” in a culture steeped in honor and revenge.

Honestly, Tony, if my statements are backed up by nothing, then we’ll have to use negative numbers to say what yours are backed up by. I’m at least giving you the reasons why I can draw a distinction between what happened to Mormons and what happened to Christians. All you’re giving me is a juvenile “nuh-uh!”

When mentioning the “theological challenge”, you’re again ignoring the fact that Mormons had the (comparative) luxuries of isolation and a highly permissive society. They had the ability to say, “leave me be” in a way that early Christians could not.

If you don’t think the two cultures can be compared, then what possible reasons can you have for making any claims about similarities between Mormons and early Christians, anyway? Saying that we know “so little” about the culture of Jesus’ day is profoundly ignorant.

Then on what basis can you possibly argue with the impossible faith hypothesis? Your response has not been, “I can’t agree or disagree,” but, “you are wrong.” You keep saying that the rise of Christianity was perfectly plausible…what evidence do you have that counts in ways ours does not? Referring again to your comment before, how is this not a blatant self-contradiction?

What’s self-contradictory in saying we don’t have enough evidence to know what really went on in the early days of christianity and saying that a religion that makes the claims christianity does could have been embraced by at least some people in the Roman Empire of that day?

Nothing.

You’re quite sure, and very determined, so let’s please not feign otherwise.

I’m quite convinced that there is no rational basis for believing the miraculous claims made in the NT are true.

That is in no way inconsistent with my claim that we have far too little evidence to come to any firm conclusion about the real events of early christianity….rather, its a direct and inevitable consequence of that position.

What’s self-contradictory in saying we don’t have enough evidence to know what really went on in the early days of christianity and saying that a religion that makes the claims christianity does could have been embraced by at least some people in the Roman Empire of that day?

That’s contradictory itself. If you know enough to know that it could have been embraced, you know what went on. How do you know it could have been embraced? You’re willing to make that decision, what’s wrong with positing the contrary (which…again…is not what the TIF says, but for the sake of my point…)

This is a simple logical issue. Either you say, “I can’t say if TIF is valid or not”, or you can say this…

It is simply not plausible that culture throughout the Roman empire was so monolithic for this to not plausibly occur.

This impossible faith argument is crackpot nonsense.

…but not both.

You’re expressing exactly the kind of skepticism here:

That is in no way inconsistent with my claim that we have far too little evidence to come to any firm conclusion about the real events of early christianity

That you’re not in the above baloney about “crackpot nonsense”. Make up your mind. Either we know enough to say TIF is invalid (or that it is), or we don’t know enough. You can’t pick the friendly parts of both. This is just classic self-serving-skepticism, where we must doubt Christianity, but we cannot doubt that which contradicts it.

david,
I haven’t got caught up with the comments yet. You said this in #216

Your current conclusion is not a reasonable one.

How so? If reasonable conclusions aren’t reached via a formula – if it’s a matter of common sense, critically examined – then explain why my conclusion doesn’t fit the criteria for reasonable grounds. Why ought I not think my conclusion is reasonable?

That’s contradictory itself. If you know enough to know that it could have been embraced, you know what went on.

I embrace two positions:

a. we don’t have enough data to know how the christian claims came to be what they were.

b. however those christian beliefs came to be what they were, it is not implausible that some people of the time might have converted to christianity.

Those are two quite distinct claims. One does not entail the impossibility or even the implausibility of the other.

David,

Your a) is false. We do have data telling us how the positions came to be what they were; you simply insist that it can’t exist or that it’s irrelevant when it is presented, e.g. here:

I’m quite convinced that there is no rational basis for believing the miraculous claims made in the NT are true.

Which followed assertions to the contrary that you characterized as nonsense, crackpot, and other assorted terms. If you don’t want to look, I can’t help you.

Your b) is true, but means nothing to TIF as stated. Once again, you clearly have not read TIF, or bothered to understand it at all. TIF does not say that no one, ever, in any way, could ever have possibly believed this unless it was true. It says that the rate and level of growth that Christianity experienced strongly suggests that it was convincing, supported, and factually solid enough for people of that time to overcome some colossal hurdles. If only ten people at a time believed it for forty or fifty years, your comment might mean something. That tens of thousands living in the immediate time/vicinity believed almost immediately makes TIF worth considering.

@MedicineMan

Pragmatically, and theoretically, that’s true.

Yay! Agreement.

Objective morality gives a person a reason not to do action X, even when they know (think) they’ll never get caught for it. Subjectively, people who think they won’t get caught, or are above/outside the law aren’t swayed by that kind of thinking.

For that matter, people who do think that morality derives from on-high don’t appear to be reliably dissuaded from committing crimes by that belief alone . Surely you’ve noticed?

Sorry, that probably reads more sarcastically than I’d really like.

And in any case, the hypothetical consequences of holding/not holding to objective morality are irrelevant to its actual truth. I know that’s not strictly apropos of anything, but in the interests of arguing openly, I should probably point out that I’m a moral subjectivist because I see no convincing reason to think moral objectivism is actually true. Whether it’s useful to some people is an interesting question, but not really relevant to me personally.

If anything, it perturbs me a little when people focus on the utility of moral objectivism, rather than its putative truth. Left unsaid is that it could well be a noble lie.

Your preferences, as you’ve explained, give you cause to act…but you can’t use a subjective view of morals to tell someone else that they should act (or not act).

I think it would be more accurate to say that a subjective view of morals can’t be used, by me, to tell another person what they should prefer. In the examples I used, it’s presumed that the other person cares about their personal fulfillment; we have that in common. They can’t obtain fulfillment if their goals are frustrated, or if they’re dead. So as a matter of fact, I would have a basis for getting up in their business, no objective morals required.

Fortuna,

Sorry, that probably reads more sarcastically than I’d really like.

No, no no. Sarcasm by itself isn’t an issue. Give me lively and open over stilted and meaningless any day!

Besides there’s some important truth in your point. Realize that, in Christian terms, every moral failing violates an objective principle, and every person who breaks one is behaving inconsistently with their professed beliefs. The original sin was pride: “you will be like God, knowing good and evil!” (i.e. pick your own good and evil!)

So, that people sin (break what they think are objective morals) at times isn’t evidence that those morals aren’t true (as you inferred later). It is an indication of how consistently they are adhering to what they claim to believe. “Reliably” gets fuzzy, and if that means, “guaranteed”, then no moral view is ever “reliable”. If “reliable” means, “more than otherwise”, that’s part of what Tom was getting at with changed lives, etc.

Philosophically, it is superior in no uncertain terms. Belief in objective morality at least gives a framework for a person to believe that “good” is not subject to their preference, that they can lie or hide or fool others, but it doesn’t make it right. Belief in subjective morality allows the (philosophically) legitimate ability to wriggle out of any moral statement a person does not like.

Law vs anarchy is a decent enough example. Passing laws does not mean everyone plays by the rules. People still commit crimes…but knowing that those laws exist and that they are not subject to their preferences will dissuade some people from breaking them. It will give (some of) them pause. From a purely practical standpoint, law is better than anarchy (everyone just do what feels right or what is good for everyone).

The reason I tend to argue on practical grounds is that most subjectivists aren’t interested in discussing whether or not objective morals are really true or not. I completely agree that practicality does not affect truth. But I won’t discuss something in terms that the other person has already rejected, if I can avoid it.

I think it would be more accurate to say that a subjective view of morals can’t be used, by me, to tell another person what they should prefer.

Agreed.

So as a matter of fact, I would have a basis for getting up in their business, no objective morals required.

But no basis for your business getting up in theirs, so to speak. As you said, your subjective morals can influence you, but they have no weight (strictly speaking) with anyone else’s subjective morals.

Remember how I said that I didn’t want to live in a tyrannical/violent/brutal society? Why would that stop being the case if, FSM forbid, I were to be put in charge?

The reason you don’t is that you don’t want to be oppressed in return. But, if you were really in a situation where you could become the ultra-powerful dictator, the “knowledge” that there’s no “real” reason you couldn’t do it would be an accelerator where a sense of objective morals would be the brakes. Power goes to people’s heads in a real hurry. So does a belief that there are no real consequences. That’s why otherwise normal people become flaming, filthy, nasty ogres on the internet. They don’t want to live in a world like that…but given the chance to do it with no consequences…

MedicineMan –

No, I’m simply operating on the Christian’s ground. If the Christian ethics is so superior, then it should be born out. That is irrelevant of what I believe. However, I think you just confirmed what I said. If obedience to God is everything, then one needs only to be convinced that one is doing God’s will. No other normative guidelines could dissuade such a person. And that’s the problem. The biggest argument against atheism is the lack of normative principles. But you equally cannot convince someone of what to do if they do not agree with you. Therefore, the subjective becomes no better or worse than the objective that most people don’t follow. In reality, most people deal in their own subjective principles anyway, so we must operate on those grounds. I’d like to think that much of what I say about the way in which we work with human morality conforms with the world as it actually is. I’m really more agnostic than anything, so I look toward actual human psychology, and I really think that you’re mischaracterizing the way in which people do think.

Jacob,

TIF is The Impossible Faith, discussed above. The details supporting it answer some of your points.

Is the following valid?

The biggest argument against anarchy is the lack of normative principles. But you equally cannot convince someone of what to do if they do not agree with you. Therefore, having no laws becomes no better or worse than having laws that most people don’t follow. In reality, most people deal in their own personal rules anyway, so we must operate on those grounds.

In other words, I think there’s a sensible parallel between legal statutes and objective morals. Not everyone obeys every acknowledged legal statue. However, we know that there are many people who are dissuaded from certain illegal actions purely because they know that it’s illegal. We don’t argue that laws should be jettisoned, or treated subjectively, simply because they are not universally obeyed, even by those who agree with them. Obviously, that makes the foundation of those statues critical, but clearly Christians are comfortable with that requirement.

We all agree (I think) on free will, or at least it’s a required assumption for this conversation to make sense. So the fact that everyone will ultimately choose what to do or not do is noncontroversial. But both sides are interested in appealing to others to see moral positions their way. Only objectivists have philosophical grounds for saying, “this applies to you whether you want it to or not.”

All,

Here’s a perfect example of “wriggling”. I happen to know that someone by the name of SteveK has, at times, cheered for the L.A. Lakers. Yet, so far as I know, he claims to stand for what is good, what is right, and what is true.

But he wriggles right out of all of that and habitually roots for They Who Shall Not Be Named. Now, I can appeal to him on the subjective basis that rooting for “Them” is not preferable for me, for sports, or for good taste. Or, I can appeal to the objective principle that…it’s the Lakers. When he chooses to root for LA despite the self-evident moral principle at work, he’s acting as a subjectivist, saying that such things are purely a matter of taste.

Now, if he wants to get right with God and cheer for Cleveland, he’d be submitting to some fundamental truths about the universe.

One small comment on the ongoing discussion of morality:

subjective does not mean arbitrary.

Illustration: being in physical agony is an intrinsically “bad” or undesirable thing.

Why? Not because it does not fit some “objective” standard. Its precisely because of the subjective content of the experience that is an indisputably bad thing to be in agony. To look anywhere besides the subjective content of the experience for the reason why one shouldn’t want to be in agony is to fail right from the start—you will never find the reason anywhere else.

Because the reason for not wanting to be in agony is subjective doesn’t, of course, mean that there is no truth of the matter in the question “is being in agony a bad thing”, “is it something I ought not to want”.

This thinking has relevence to moral issues as well. There is no morality in the absence of beings capable of experiencing happiness, and suffering—who are capable of subjective states of mind.

The whole issue of values IS DIRECTLY related to subjective experience.

And, again, subjective does not mean arbitrary.

The reason, for example, that love is intrinsically worthwhile is precisely because of what it is like to love and what it is like to part of a community of loving individuals.

It is not to external standards imposed from without that we are to find real moral truth but in the living experience of rational beings trying honestly to discover the best way to live in the world.

And, finally, I would point out that the theists in this dicussion of the basis of morality have not, so far as I’ve seen, actually stated what meta-ethical theory they subscribe to.

This seems a rather major oversight.

Mine, by the way, is ideal observer theory. If anyone wants to know.

david,

I would appreciate a response to my comments in #226 and #227 when you get the time. Thanks.

All,
Here’s what I don’t understand about the term ‘evidence’ being discussed. David brought this up in #170 and it got me thinking.

He said (paraphrasing) that a claim is evidence for a claim, but not evidence in favor of the conclusion made by the claim. However, a second claim that confirms what the first claim said is considered evidence that the first claim is true – or is it not?

In legal cases if we have 10 people that claim to have seen Joe at home on the night of the crime, that is considered evidence for the conclusion that Joe did not do the crime. There may be other evidence that counters those 10 claims, but still, isn’t this evidence in favor of the conclusion?

All,
Here’s what I don’t understand about the term ‘evidence’ being discussed. David brought this up in #170 and it got me thinking.

He said (paraphrasing) that a claim is evidence for a claim, but not evidence in favor of the conclusion made by the claim. However, a second claim that confirms what the first claim said is considered evidence that the first claim is true – or is it not?

A suggestion: don’t paraphrase. Quote. Your paraphrasing doesn’t much resemble what I really said.

What I actually said concerning evidence and conclusions, in the most relevent passage of that discussion was:

“That X is evidence for a claim is not the same thing as X being reasonable grounds for believing the claim. X might be only very weak evidence. Or X might be good evidence in and of itself but not quite strong enough to consider the claim more likely than not to be true. Or other, better evidence, may contradict X (for example, the many cases where a jury convicted a man on a eyewitness testimony but DNA evidence later showed the man to be innocent).”

In legal cases if we have 10 people that claim to have seen Joe at home on the night of the crime, that is considered evidence for the conclusion that Joe did not do the crime. There may be other evidence that counters those 10 claims, but still, isn’t this evidence in favor of the conclusion?

Yes, but depending on other factors and relevent information (like the reliability of the witness, physical evidence contradicting their claim, etc) it may or may not be GOOD evidence for the conclusion. That is, it may or may not be sufficient grounds for a verdict of not guilty.

All of which is clear from what I actually said about evidence and drawing conclusions (unlike your mangled attempt at paraphrasing).

Yes I honestly think reason will lead you to the conclusion that Christianity is true. I and others reason our way to conclude that the evidence is GOOD evidence and STRONG enough evidence to support the conclusion.

Sorry, I guess its my fault for not noticing all those passages in the Bible praising critical thinking and high standards of evidence and telling potential converts not to believe until and unless they have examined the evidence thoroughly.

And I guess I forgot all those hymns you christians sing in church exhorting the virtue of critical thinking in matters of religion. Unlike those muslims who sing songs that say things like “you ask me how I know he’s real, he lives inside my heart”

Oh, wait. That’s you guys, isn’t it?

You and others have not given an argument that supports your claim that we don’t use reason or that the evidence is not GOOD and STRONG.

My conclusion is based on how incredibly bad the arguments christians employ are; in those cases where they bother to employ argumentation rather than emotional appeals.

Naturally, you disagree with my opinion. As you are more than welcome to do.

David,

Sorry, I guess its my fault for not noticing all those passages in the Bible praising critical thinking…

Proverbs 20:15, Acts 17:11

…and high standards of evidence…

2 Peter 1:16, John 14:11

… and telling potential converts not to believe until and unless they have examined the evidence thoroughly

Acts 2:22, 1 John 4:1, 1 Thessalonians 5:21

To start with, anyway. So yes, it’s your fault, because apparently the Bible, like just about everything else that might disagree with you, is not something you’ve bothered to take seriously enough to actually read, consider, or think about. You don’t even understand what is being claimed before you start calling it “crackpot nonsense”, so coming for you, this…

…I find the arguments so obviously bad that its difficult for me to consider them anything but after the fact rationalizations for beliefs held for reasons having little or nothing to do with reason or evidence…

…is about as meaningful as Barefoot Bum’s complaining about being spoken inappropriately. You literally have no idea what you’re talking about.

Tom Gilson –

I’m quite well aware of the claims of prophecy that Christians make, of which messianic prophecies are perhaps the most pertinent, so I thought that the way in which they can be interpreted are quite important to the discussion, as many are quoted directly in the NT.

By the time I even track down and read the book, the conversation may not even be worth regurgitating, and I already know many of the arguments. If Wright makes some exceptional points that are interesting, you should quote them or sum them up in response to my arguments.

What Luke thought is absolutely pertinent to a 21st century westerner. If I can’t track the methodology, then I will have trouble affirming a great many things in the sense that I can’t see the logic of his claims. You’re trying to use the logic of what could or couldn’t happen, but I can’t do that if it isn’t there. All I’m left with are the claims, and I have to suppose many things about them. Thus, I find it all wanting. Many historians back then were more thorough with their work.

MM,

I have a better idea, since resources for all of those have been offered, at least in the citations given by Holding. Why don’t you start ponying up the contrary data instead of playing this sophistic game where all you have to do is say, “but I haven’t seen the evidence…show me more!”

I don’t believe you have offered me a single citation regarding what I have asked for.

Why should I go search for material that supports your argument when I have already expressed my skepticism about it? This is a blog discussion, not a book club. If you can’t be bothered to support your argument, don’t expect me to try and build it for you.

david: Its not my intent to imply that christians don’t employ reason at all.

Explain what you mean by ‘no rational basis for believing’. I hear that phrase a lot and I always interpret it as ‘belief is irrational’ but your comment above doesn’t support that. So what does it mean?

Yes, the belief is irrational. That is, christian apologetic attempts to argue for their beliefs are bad ones. You apologists attempt to employ reason in support of your beliefs….but you employ it very poorly. Using arguments that are obviously weak at best and frequently flat out ridiculous.

I’m getting tired of exchanges that aren’t dealing with anything substantive and won’t respond to anything else not actually dealing with the arguments for belief in christianity.

If you wish to talk about any of the apologetic arguments for your religion I’ll be happy to continue the discussion.

But if you just want to go on and on about the fact that we disagree on whether belief in christianity is reasonable….rather than actually discussing the arguments themselves then you’re conversation is going to be one-sided. I have better things to do.

David,

News flash: you are on the internet. There are literally dozens of rapid bible search sites. You could have found such a site, copy-pasted the verses given, and seen them, all in less time than it took you to type out that comically immature response.

Or do you prefer that the other readers assume that you’re that lazy; that you can’t even take 60 seconds to look them up? Or, that doing so has inconvenienced you so much that you simply must complain about it?

That’s pretty telling. It gives everyone a reasonably clear indication of how much effort you actually put into thinking about these issues. If looking up a handful of Bible verses is such a herculean task, we can safely assume you’re neither well-informed nor interested in becoming so. You set the bar awfully low on your threshold for effort.

You haven’t demonstrated the slightest intention of considering what is being presented. Everything that has been mentioned has been met with drivel like “crackpot nonsense”. You so badly mis-state the claims you’re trying to refute that it’s almost embarrassing. References to – gasp! – books are dismissed, since anything you have to get out of your chair to examine is not a substantive answer, in your universe. (Second news flash: the internet is not the only source of information in the world, and having access to Wikipedia does not make you informed.) You’re more interested in whining about how hard it is to look up specific sources in the easiest book in the world to get your hands on. And in the mean time you’re actually trying to complain that the dialogue on our end isn’t “substantive”.

I too, have better things to do, which don’t include risking the assumptions that arise when you argue with a certain kind of person.