Steve Fuller, Professor of Sociology at Warwick University, England, presents a provocative question in his article The Darwinian Delusion:
The next time you want to stop a conversation among the soi-disant enlightened, ask what has atheism ever done for science. It’s one thing to admit that religious dogmatism has periodically halted the march of scientific progress but quite another to argue that atheism has actually advanced science.
His own answer, in summary:
More generally, atheism has not figured as a force in the history of science not because it has been suppressed but because whenever it has been expressed, it has not encouraged the pursuit of science. The general metaphysical idea underlying Darwinism – that a morally indifferent nature selects from among a variety of organic possibilities – has many secular and religious precedents across the world. In each case, it has led to an ethic of equanimity and even resignation, certainly not a drive to remake the planet, if not the universe, to our own purposes. Yet, so far we have got pretty far on that drive. The longer we continue successfully, the stronger the evidence that at least human life cannot be fully explained in Darwinian terms.
Hat Tip: Post-Darwinist
Update 9/6/08: I have turned off threaded comments, as explained here. This will unfortunately jumble up the sequence of the comments on this post, for which I offer my apologies.
Atheism has done a great deal to diminish humanity. It continues to insist that we are mere animals, therefore we act like animals…it’s only natural you know.
Theists tend to aspire humanity to reach toward God, in hope and in character.
Quite different the two.
If you are saying that humans can’t be mere animals because animals don’t exhibit behaviors like altruism that rise us above being mere animals, you should read some books by Frans Waal, a primatologist. The titles will give you an idea of the main thrust of the books:
“Good natured : the origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals,”
“Primates and philosophers : how morality evolved,”
“Our inner ape : a leading primatologist explains why we are who we are”
It turns out that even when we are altruistic, we act like animals.
That gave me a chuckle.
Paul, that’s not really what he’s saying. He used the word “ethic,” but what he meant is probably more in line with the word “ethos,” or attitude.
What the heck, though, I’ll follow you off-topic a ways. In Waal’s studies of altruism etc., do the animals consider what they’re doing to be “right”? Do they consider it a moral error if one of them does not participate? What in fact are their moral beliefs? What do these studies contribute to our knowledge of our own moral beliefs as beliefs?
Hi Tom. Yeah, I was careful to preface my comment with the word “if,” so if the shoe doesn’t fit . . . .
I don’t recall what Waal says about what the animals consider, although it seems like, without *significant* language skills (note the qualification), it might be difficult and a surmise at best, but, then again, scientists can be danged clever. I’m going to check out the last two books from the library this week, I haven’t read them, and if he says anything about your questions, I’ll let you know here. So it’s an open question as far as my memory and understanding stand right now.
Regarding your last question, I think such primate studies contribute an important part to an evolutionary understanding of humanity. It provides a necessary but not sufficient piece of the puzzle. That is, if we saw absolutely no hint of any tendency in primates of what we call moral behavior in humans, then the evolutionary basis of moral behavior would be seriously in doubt. But, we now see physiological, social, genetic, and even moral similarities between humans and primates. So we may continue considering the naturalistic hypothesis of our origins, as far as the single issue of the antecedents of moral behavior goes.
[Reply]
Thanks for looking into it, Paul.
Paul,
If you are to stay true to your relativistic roots then it IS seriously in doubt. What you see as a hint of moral behavior in primates can only be the result of your subjective/cultural/preference to see such things. It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for you to make this soi-disant naturalistic theory of morality fit the evolutionary data.
Can you come to know moral justice through your five senses, Paul?
In Paul’s defense, he could state the case as such:
The presence in some primates of what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, moral behavior provides a hint to the genesis of what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, human moral inclinations.
It ought to follow from that, though, that the presence in some primates of what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, immoral behavior provides a hint to the genesis of what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, human immoral inclinations.
Which leads to another question for Paul to research in Waals: is there any such thing as that which we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, immoral behavior in animals? Can animals be immoral, or behave unethically?
Next: Is there any scientifically or philosophically compelling reason for Waals to talk about moral-appearing behavior in animals, but not immoral-appearing behavior?
Or does he even use that terminology?
It may be (obviously I haven’t read him) that he chooses the more neutral term “altruism.” Human altruism is a severe evolutionary enigma standing in need of explanation. But “altruism” so construed is stripped of its moral connotations; it is regarded in that context only as that which (at least on the surface) tends to decrease one’s availability or fitness for passing on one’s genes, especially if it’s in favor of increasing another unrelated person’s reproductive fitness.
Think Tale of Two Cities for a great example. (Haven’t read it? You must!) Was Sydney Carton a great moral example, or just an evolutionary oddity? What light do animal studies shed on this? Does Waals offer any information to help us with that?
SteveK, I’m a moral relativist, not a reality relativist. Words mean what they mean, and sentences can be determined to be factual or not. To say that we see the beginnings of moral behavior in animals *need not* necessarily descend into a disagreement about what is moral, that’s not where that particular issue is. Rather, we can see hints of human behavior in animals. Whether we call that behavior moral or not is another issue. The behavior in question is the same as behavior (note the word “behavior”) that, when humans do it, you would call it moral, and so would I, even if we disagree about the absolute and relative nature of morality.
Tom, allow me cut through what I see as tangle in your ideas by not addressing them one by one, but as a whole.
The key point is behavior, I think. As I said above to SteveK, we see behavior in humans that we (assume we have consensus on this) *label* (I’m choosing that word carefully) as “moral.” We see the beginning of the same behavior, if not exactly the same behavior in some instances, in animals. This helps (not sufficiently) establish an evolutionary link between animals and humans in terms of behavior.
If you want to add something else to morality, some essence of a soul exercising a free choice on a moral question, Waal does not touch that.
So that’s as far as intended to take my point – just with the behaviors, not the soul-choice.
But the interesting question is not behavior, Paul. Behavior just is.
I’ll accept that Waal does not touch the rest of it—that was what I was wondering, and I appreciate your supplying that information.
It could be that animal studies contribute to understanding of human behaviors, but they contribute nothing, as far as I can tell, to understanding human beliefs regarding morality.
So back to your original comment on this post. I think the straightforward sense of what you’re saying there is that there is nothing that raises us up above the level of animals, and that that is exactly what we are, even when we’re behaving altruistically. Is that correct?
Tom
Well, that’s exactly the point of my comment. It’s the same question to be asked about societies/cultures.
Is there any such thing as that which we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, immoral behavior in the Nazi culture inside certain concentration camps?
In all previous discussions that question has been answered ‘no’ with a bit of ‘well, that’s my opinion’ hedging added to make the answer not seem so cold and inhumane.
Now Paul (and Waals) wants to look at animal behavior and answer the question ‘yes’ because NOW we’re talking about the science of evolution. They are saying: We observe moral behavior (not just human behavior) in apes, therefore this supports the theory that there is an evolutionary basis for moral behavior. If true then morality can be known through the five senses and that knowledge is available to anyone. But they can’t say that because it destroys relativism.
Tom, would you say, then, that human behavior (including moral behavior) is completely driven by belief, and that belief would never be driven by anything materialistic (chemical, evolutionary tendencies seen in primates, etc.).
I would only say right now that we didn’t find a defeater. At minimum, primate behavior is consistent with a materialistic view of human behavior. If materialism was true, then we’d expect to see similar behaviors of humans in primates, so if we didn’t see them, we’d have a new opportunity to be suspicious of materialism.
All I was saying was that this one crow is black, and certainly not that all crows are black. They may well be, but I’m not good enough to prove that, if it’s even possible.
Tom, I just saw in important qualifier for your questions about immorality in animals.
Did you mean behavior in animals that
1. we would consider immoral if we did it, or
2. we would consider immoral if animals did it, or
3. behavior that animals consider immoral if they did it?
SteveK, I don’t understand your last point.
Just to clarify, when I say that scientists have found moral behavior in animals, that shouldn’t be taken as a moral judgment by scientists. “Moral” behavior is only, strictly speaking, a convenient label to talk about a certain class of behavior, they’re not making a moral judgment that such behavior is proper and right.
Does that affect your last point? I hope so, because I don’t understand your point if it doesn’t.
Why would a scientist talk about a separate behavioral class unless they have detected a difference worthy of a distinction? They do the same with genus and species and I don’t hear any arguments about genus/species being relativistic terms, but when it comes to moral behavior arguments ensue over whether humans torturing babies for fun *really* falls under the category of moral behavior as opposed to societal behavior, cultural behavior, animal behavior or just behavior.
Anyway, looks like a similar discussion was had recently so it’s probably not worth repeating.
Look at the contexts. At one point I very carefully delineated it as: “what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, moral behavior” or “what we take to be, or consider to be, or tend to regard as, immoral behavior.” Note the context on that. At another point I said it differently, carefully, in context.
Does Waals study “moral” behavior in his own understanding of the term? Or does he use the neutral term “altruistic”? I clarified the difference between the two earlier. If he does speak of animals having “moral” behavior, does he also speak of animals having “immoral” behavior? If so, what does it mean?
So I’m putting the question back to you, since you’re going to look up Waals for us. The interesting question to me is how he defines it.
Anyway, Paul, you need to cut to the chase. I asked you:
Again: is that correct?
Because the label “moral behavior” is a socially significant one, so scientists may adjust their research agendas so that they are relevant to society.
You’re conflating an objective description of behavior (and biological categories) with judgments of whether a behavior is described is moral or not. Those are two very different things.
Tom, that is not correct. What is correct is what I posted 2008-08-05 18:29.
Tom, just working from memory, I think Waals talks about altruism as a particular form of moral behavior; furthermore, he does not define moral behavior, but I think is using a general consensus in Western/American society as to what is moral. I think he wouldn’t argue with the Ten Commandments being a convenient summary of what most people in the West/U.S. generally consider to moral (there’s a lot of room for disagreement there, but, anyway). Or maybe it’s the Golden Rule, not the 10 Cs.
I’m pretty sure he doesn’t use altruism as a synonym for moral. Once I do some reading, I’ll report back.
Tom, one last idea: my previous post was not quite right. Your idea that you asked me whether it was correct or not might be correct, but I’d rather be conservative right now.
Paul:
I’m saying the classification Behavior:Human:Moral is known in much the same way that the biological classification Chordata:Mammalia:Dog is. We perceive differences and reason our way to know certain differences are *meaningful*. We perceive differences in dogs, but we don’t find any reason to think a short dog, or a two-legged dog is not a dog. We knew a short, hairless, two-legged dog was still a dog before science knew anything about biology – and peering into the cells of this weird, two-legged creature can’t help you figure this out in and of itself.
My apologies–I missed that.
Of course I wouldn’t say beliefs are never influenced by material factors. Why would that question come up?
It would appear though, that the propositional attitude we call “belief” is unique to humans, so it would appear that only humans can have moral beliefs. The distinction is worth making.
Whether that is correct or not makes a lot of difference, so I urge you not to let loose of it until you’ve settled on an answer.
SteveK, I think I agree with what you wrote in your last post, but I don’t get where it’s going or how it relates to the issue at hand.
Tom, if human beliefs can be influenced by materialistic factors, then the evolutionary basis for behavior, as described in Waal’s books, is relevant to understanding the human condition, including moral beliefs.
For instance, can it be a coincidence that we generally consider it moral that parents should take care of their children and that the evolutionary value of parents taking care of their children is obvious?
Can it be a coincidence that we generally consider it moral that parents should take care of their children, and that this reflects the character of a loving Father God?
The answer to both questions, yours and mine, is yes. It could be coincidental. Or rather, either of them could have arisen as an explanation for one common phenomenon. Can it be a coincidence that after decades or centuries of discussion, we have at least two explanations for parental concern and that both of them have at least some viability to them?
I always find it amusing when people point to successful biological phenomena or behaviors and call it evidence for evolution. What it’s evidence of is this: whatever or whoever caused that successful feature did it successfully.
I don’t disagree with you that Waal’s findings may be significant with respect to the human condition. What it signifies, though, is in question. You beg the question when you say “the evolutionary basis for behavior, as described in Waal’s books….” And you still haven’t shown me how animal behavior and human moral beliefs are in the same category for discussion, or how they connect.
I didn’t offer the idea of parents caring for their children as evidence for evolution, that’s not the topic here, right? I only offer it as one example of the *possibility* that materialistic factors, working through evolution, influences morality, which I understand you to agree with when you say “we have at least two explanations for parental concern and that both of them have at least some viability to them?”
I’m merely trying to establish some materialistic, evolutionary influence on morality, I’m not trying at this point to exclude anything but that. I guess we don’t disagree at this point, actually.
Waal’s ideas signify that we act like animals in more ways than is commonly assumed. Exhibit #1 is the first comment in this thread. I understood the phrase “we act like animals” in that comment to not be a carefully constructed scientific conclusion, but a rhetorical critique of animal behavior that it was unworthy of humanity (“You’re acting like an animal, cut it out!”). So Waal’s ideas say that that is a canard and it’s losing its factual basis the more we learn about primates and the more we find the basis for our behavior, including morality, in their behavior.
You offered Waal’s work as evidence that no matter how we act, we’re basically animals. That’s an evolutionary viewpoint, contrary to a Scriptural viewpoint, so I can’t agree with your claim that you’re not trying to use this as evidence for evolution. Further, you can’t do this…
… without assuming or demonstrating that there is such a thing as an evolutionary influence on anything, which is one of the major points in question, isn’t it?
And I do want you to take note that while you have been using the word “materialistic,” I used the word “material” instead. I acknowledge that there are physical influences on behavior. That’s not controversial. Materialistic, on the other hand, is a term that refers to the philosophical doctrine that nothing exists but matter, energy, and their interactions. You said above that I agree with you on that. I most decidedly do not agree with any explanations involving the word “materialistic.”
Paul,
I’m trying to flesh out how you reconcile both of your positions and your agreement here seems to add to the tension between the two. Earlier you said:
In saying that ‘moral human behavior’ is just a label you are implying (or leaving open) that it *really* isn’t moral human behavior because, scientifically speaking, there is only one kind of behavior in humans – human behavior. Then you go on to say evolutionary scientists have observed moral human behavior – not animal behavior or human behavior – in other animals.
So which is it? Can a scientist observe moral human behavior or can they only observe animal or human behavior? Or perhaps only behavior.
The questions go deeper than that really. First off, what does it mean to be a human and to behave like a human versus be an animal and behave like an animal. If a dog appears to behave like a human does it mean humans behave like dogs or does it mean dogs behave like humans…or neither? The only way to answer that question is to know what it means to be a human and behave like a human.
Where did I do that to the absolute extent that you’re saying?
Yes, it’s an evolutionary viewpoint, but it is possible to leave aside the issue of whether evolution is correct or not. We can either assume, for the sake of argument, that it is, and continue on, or, if we can’t assume that evolution is true, then the argument merely reduces down to one about evolution, and we might as well not fight that one here. But nothing in that requires that I’m using Waal’s work as evidence for evolution, except to the extent that, which I’ve already said, Waal’s work is consistent with and doesn’t defeat evolution.
I stand corrected, I was meaning “material,” not “materialistic.”
One might draw that implication, but that’s not what I meant to imply. I’m leaving that question open. The only point I’m making is the one that relies on just the label aspect of “moral human behavior.” I merely want to establish first that some behavior humans call moral, or the antecedents of such behavior, can be seen in primates. Whether there are other sourcs for human moral behavior might be the next question, but it is a separate one.
All you need to do is to observe humans behaving thusly, animals behaving thusly, and note similarities and differences. Clearly, animals and humans share some behaviors and not others.
Okay, then … if we establish that there are some behaviors that we call moral in humans, and that similar behaviors can be seen in some animals, where does that get us?
1. Narrowly, what I said in the last paragraph of my 2008-08-06 12:23 comment.
2. More broadly, it meets one requirement in the case for materialism. It would cast serious doubt on materialism if all human behavior suddenly appeared out of nowhere, without any primate antecedents.
Note that I’m not saying that materialism is proved by this.
3. However, if the antecedents of human moral behavior is seen in animals, and we agree (I think) that (non-human) animals work on a purely materialistic (I’m being careful in choosing that word) basis, then we don’t need to hypothesize a non-materialistic basis for moral behavior in humans on the basis of the relationship between animals and people and their behavior.
If you want to argue that a non-materialistic basis for moral behavior in humans is proved by the existence of God, the validity of the Bible, the existence of the soul, etc., that’s fine, but then our argument reduces merely to those issues, and has nothing special to do with the connection between human and animal behavior, and so we’re done here with that issue (I shudder to think that!).
Nowhere really without first establishing what it means to be human. What we call unconscious in humans can also be seen in modern day plant life. Where does that get us, Paul?
Why?
Nowhere, I think, but you’re the one who brought up unconsciousness in plants, so I don’t know why you’re asking me about *specifically* unconsciousness in plants. I think, though, you mean that idea as a analogy to my idea that moral behavior in humans can be seen in its antecedent form in animals, but I don’t think you’re working the analogy the right way. And, anyway, plants are probably more exactly non-conscious (they have no consciousness at all, lacking a nervous system).
I’m sorry, SteveK, I’m not following your logic.
Paul, you asked,
Well, a t the top of this thread you wrote,
I have absolutely no idea where there is going, Paul. Maybe we really are done with this. You’ve established that animal behavior, as we’ve been discussing it in this context, does not disprove materialism. If you have more that you want us to learn from this discussion, would you please phrase it in some focused fashion?
Paul,
How am I looking at it the wrong way? It’s not an analogy either. It’s another example of observed behavior in one species found in another species. Many of our behaviors are done unconsciously and all of a plants behavior is done unconsciously. What does this say about evolution, if anything? Why should ANY observed behavior, except change itself, tell us something about the evolution of a species? It’s a serious question.
Sometimes I don’t follow myself very well either. I’m having a hard time understanding where this is going and this is probably the reason for my scatterbrained thoughts. No worries though. We can just end it here. 🙂
The original point of this post is well-taken. George Sim Johnston argued similarly in 1996, riffing on the work of Catholic priest and physicist Stanley Jaki:
“…science was “still-born” in every culture – Greek, Hindu, Chinese – except the Christian West. Science is a precarious enterprise that cannot get off the ground unless first given permission by philosophers and theologians. And this permission has been granted but once in history: by the great Catholic thinkers of the Middle Ages.
What is it about Christianity, and medieval scholasticism in particular, that paved the way for Newton and Einstein? First, the belief that the universe is rational. It was created, after all, through the Word, the divine Logos, which is rationality itself. When we read pagan accounts of the origin of the world, we find nothing but chaos. In the ancient Babylonian account, the universe, instead of being the deliberate act of an all-wise Creator, is the accidental byproduct of a drunken orgy. The Greek gods are somewhat more decorous, but even they decide things mainly by argument and deception – not by a single, definitive fiat.
Second, the Catholic philosophers of the Middle Ages formulated a realist metaphysics, without which science is impossible. Catholics believe in the reality of matter; the physical world is not simply a veil of illusions, as the Eastern religions would have it, but an order of being that has its own dignity and built-in laws. Buddhist science for this reason is a nonstarter.”
Sorry, Tom, I led you astray, but I didn’t mean to. The comment in my first post was meant more rhetorically, SteveK even laughed at it, which I appreciated, it was a bit of a joke (with an element of truth in it).
The other issue is that I was trying to go slowly. When the discussion got complicated, I thought it best to take it one step at a time, leading to my “at least it doesn’t defeat materialism stance.” You wanted me to drop the other shoe, though, and you’re basically right, and I realized that I should get there, too, and did so in my August 6th, 2008 5:11 pm: post, especially #3.
So I did go back and forth a bit, sorry about that.
But surely my August 6th, 2008 5:1 post, especially #3, answers your last comment, “I have absolutely no idea where there is going, Paul. Maybe we really are done with this. You’ve established that animal behavior, as we’ve been discussing it in this context, does not disprove materialism. If you have more that you want us to learn from this discussion, would you please phrase it in some focused fashion?”
No problemo, SteveK.
That point #3, then, was this:
Perhaps we don’t need to hypothesize a non-materialistic basis for human behavior. If, however, we’re going to have a sound basis for calling it moral human behavior, your evidence and argument do not supply it. On this basis, it is nothing but a confusion to introduce the term “moral,” because it doesn’t mean anything.
Further, there is nothing in animal behavior to supply us the basis for human moral beliefs or attitudes.
Tom:
You said to Paul:
“If you have more that you want us to learn from this discussion, would you please phrase it in some focused fashion?”
I’m just popping my head in from about three weeks ago when, in another discussion about morality, it was seen Paul was manipulating the discussion… As I recall, SteveK and Charlie realized Paul was not to be taken seriously because responding to him was futile in the face of the shenanigans.
Well, Paul’s doing it again. The manipulation is not necessarily intentional in the sense of misleading from the truth of a proposition (although Paul has done this previously), but intentional in the sense of not knowing what one is talking about and trying to lead the discussion in sound-bite, “multi-vector” directions (which, interestingly, is a characteristic of unitarian universalism) that will not reveal such ignorance… or not reveal the lack of sound reasoned arguments in support of one’s position.
It all might be humorous… if it didn’t happen so often.
The difficult part in making these Q&A sessions go smoothly is all of these topics run together. Questions like Paul’s question can’t be discussed to the depth they require/deserve without sorting out the background first, or along the way – which leads to rabbit trails. Oftentimes you’ve got to sift through epistimology, science, philosophy and the problems with materialism, scientism, idealism, nominalism, etc. before you can thoroughly answer the question…at least it seems that way to me.
That’s true. I had hoped that the new threaded comments function would be useful for sorting some of these things out, but since it mixes up the chronological sequence I’m not finding it so helpful after all. What do you think?
I had the same hope, but I’m in agreement with you. Not so helpful.
As I said to SteveK, I think, calling some behavior moral as a scientist is not a judgment, it’s only a label that rests on commonly assumed judgments from society as a whole. Whether something *should* be judged moral or not is not part of this scientific conclusion.
Surely there is: cooperation.
I got that from Waal’s “Primates and Philosophers” that I just picked up. His first point is that Huxley, a supporter of Darwin, actually ran counter to Darwin by suggesting that human and animal nature was basically “red in the tooth and claw,” I think the expression is, and Waal’s point is that it is clear at evolution has simultaneously equipped many organisms with strong tendencies to be social, cooperative, etc.
This is the kind of response I was trying to dig into earlier. This common judgement is rooted in an objective reality just like the common judgement that the being before you is human, ape or canine – or the object before you is a tree, painting or car. You make it seem like scientists are playing along all the while snickering at all the rubes who *really* think they are looking at moral behavior (The category. Sleeping is not part of this category because it obviously doesn’t belong). No. These scientists *really* think they are observing moral behavior, just like they *really* think they are observing fish in a body of water. If they didn’t they wouldn’t waste their time or their money researching this stuff….or would they?
SteveK, I agree, the tangle of the discussion gets pretty thick at times. I’ve suggested in the past that we try outlining the argument to keep track of things (I think Google Documents would be good), but no one has every taken me up on my offer.
To clarify…the common judgement that I’m referring to is the judgement about moral human behavior. Scientists (everyone, really) see this in humans very clearly, but there’s considerable question as to whether it is seen in animals. Can an animal be morally guilty or innocent?
SteveK, scientists don’t judge that a certain behavior is moral based on its merits, characteristics, etc., unless they already have a definition of what morality is. Can you give me a counter-example? What’s the experiment they do to determine if something is moral? They’re starting with a commonly assumed definition of moral behavior and then drawing scientific conclusions beyond that starting point, assuming that starting point. I don’t know of any scientist who says “I have proved that behavior X is moral.” Do you?
Richard Lewontin said science has proved there is no such thing as morality. That’s not quite the same as what you asked about, but it’s in the same category.
Paul,
The answer is, none that you and I can’t do ourselves using the same five senses and the same ability to reason. That’s why they call it common judgment. Your scientism is showing again. My last comment gave other common judgments so let’s start with some we can all agree with. What’s the experiment they do to determine if something is an atom, a molecule, a planet, a force, a distance…or to use PETA’s list… a rat, a pig, a dog, a boy??
Are they – really? Do they do the same with respect to the examples above? No.
SteveK, we’re winding into territory that doesn’t seem fruitful. We’ve tried to show that morality can/cannot be objective, I’d rather not re-tread that ground.
Tom, I don’t understand how Lewontin’s comment can be true. It certainly isn’t standard fare or commonly assumed in science, as far as I can tell.
We agree on something! It can’t be true.
Yes, Tom, it can’t be true if we agree on it, eh?
May I summarize? Off-topic from the OP, I think we have established that, while there may be some things that distinguish us from animals (a soul, etc.), the mere fact that we have a moral sense and can act morally doesn’t require anything more than what evolution would explain because we can see the antecedents of morality in primates.
Follow-up #1: I did find an example of Waal mentioning an anecdote in which a primate behaved badly, now I can’t find it. I think that’s not his focus because it’s long been assumed that animals behave badly, so his research focuses on seeing if they behave well.
Follow-up #2:
“The dilemma faced by behavioral science today can be summarized as a choice between cognitive and evolutionary parsimony. Cognitive parsimony is the traditional canon of American Behaviorism. It tells us not to invoke higher mental capacities if we can explain a phenomenon with ones lower on the scale. This favors a simple explanation, such as conditioned behavior, over a more complex one, such as intentional deception. This sounds fair enough. Evolutionary parimony, on the other hand, considers shared phylogeny. It posits that if closely related species act the same, the underlying mental processes are probably the same, too. The alternative would be to assume the evolution of divergent processes that produce similar behavior, which seems a wildly uneconomic assumption for organisms with only a few million years of separate evolution. If we normally do not propose different causes for the same behavior in, say, dogs and wolves, why should we do so for humans and chimpanzees?”
From “Primates and Philosophers”
Paul,
Fine. I think you are way, way out of bounds when you start implying that scientists are the only group of people capable of judging/knowing what a thing is.
I didn’t say they were the *only* ones who could do that, just that they do. We don’t need to start with whether they are the only ones who can, let’s not go there, OK? (We’ll probably wind up there again soon enough anyway!)
For anyone’s further edification about animals:
“When a bonobo [ape] named Kuni saw a starling hit the glass of her enclosure at the Twycross Zoo in Great Britain, she went to comfort it. Picking up the stunned bird, Kuni gently set it on its feet. When it failed to move, she threw it a little, but the bird just fluttered. With the starling in hand, Kuni then climbed to the top of the tallest tree, wrapping her legs around the trunk so that she had both hands free to hold the bird. She carefully unfolded its wings and spread them wide, holding one wing between the fingers of each hand, before sending the bird like a little toy airplane out toward the barrier of her enclosure. But the bird fell short of freedom and landed on the bank of the moat. Kuni climbed down and stood watch over the starling for a long time, protecting it against a curious juvenile. By the end of the day, the recovered bird had flown off safely.
The way Kuni handled this bird was unlike anything she would have done to aid another ape. Instead of following some hardwired pattern of behavior, she tailored her assistance to the specific situation of an animal totally different from herself. The birds passing by her enclosure must have given her an idea of what help was needed. This kind of empathy is almost unheard of in animals since it rests on the ability to imagine the circumstances of another. Adam Smith, the pioneering economist, must have had actions like Kuni’s in mind (though not performed by an ape) when, more than two centuries ago, he offered us the most enduring definition of empathy as ‘changing places in fancy with the sufferer.’ ”
Frans de Waal, “Our Inner Ape”