Zombies: The Movie

May 2nd 2008

Paul, frequent commenter here, sent me this link by email: Overcoming Bias: Zombies: The Movie. Some excerpts:

DOCTOR: David! David Chalmers! Can you hear me?

CHALMERS: Yes.

NURSE: It’s no use, doctor.

CHALMERS: I’m perfectly fine. I’ve been introspecting on my consciousness, and I can’t detect any difference. I know I would be expected to say that, but -

The DOCTOR turns away from the glass screen in horror.

DOCTOR: His words, they… they don’t mean anything.

OFFICER 1: State your business here.

MAN: Is this where you’re keeping David Chalmers?

OFFICER 2: What’s it to you? You a friend of his?

MAN: Can’t say I am. But even zombies have rights.

OFFICER 1: All right, buddy, let’s see your qualia.

MAN: I don’t have any.

Paul is right–if you’ve read anything on mind and brain, this is hilarious!

Posted by Tom Gilson under Just For Fun | No Comments »

Mind and Brain: Philosophy or Science?

April 25th 2008

Denyse O’Leary was the co-author (with Dr. Mario Beauregard) of a book I reviewed in the April issue of Touchstone magazine: The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul. Beauregard has published research (see links from here) challenging some neuroscientists’ view that spiritual experiences can be explained through physical brain science alone, and this book covers his work while also challenging those other scientists’ conclusions, and even their often-questionable research methods.

A few days ago on her Mindful Hack blog, Denyse raised a good question in response to my review, which, by agreement with Touchstone, I will not be posting on the web for at least three months. I’ll quote this much from near the end of it for context, though:

For my money, philosophical approaches are sufficient to put materialism* away for keeps. But that doesn’t make it any less satisfying to learn the heavily hyped “empirical evidence” for materialist neuroscience is distorted, weak, and contradicted by other research.

Denyse wrote,


On the whole, he seems to have liked the book, though he wonders why we cannot demolish materialism through philosophy alone…. Philosophy alone cannot decide the issue. We must look at evidence from science as well.

Well, of course she is right about this. I will not quote her reasons (they are in the ellipsis) since you ought to read them from the source.

She is right in that philosophy has not, in fact, dec ided the issue. “For my money” (as I said), I think it should have done so by now, because materialist views of mind seem to be utterly self-defeating. They place all causation in the literally mindless machinery of electrochemical activity. There’s no room left for any other causation.

Therefore things like reasons and thoughts, which cannot be identified with that machinery, don’t cause anything. If you disagree with that, your disagreement was not caused by any reasons you might have, but by that mindless machinery firing away inside you. That pretty much eliminates your ability to say you have reasoned your way to your conclusion. Your reasons don’t have any power to cause anything, including the conclusions you erroneously think you came to because of your reasons.

Those who try to disagree usually do so by saying that reasons and thoughts actually can be identified with the machinery; that the brain’s physical activity doesn’t have to be distinct from what feels to us like logical reasoning and free decision making. Others say that reasons and thoughts more or less “ride along” on top of the machinery. The first answer, however, makes an illusion out of our freedom to think and to decide, while the other retains the problem of thoughts and reasoning not causing anything at all.

I’m reminded of a comic strip from years ago in which a tiger (I think) jumped up on an elephant and growled out, “I’ve got you, I’ve got you!” The elephant, quite unperturbed, just continued on its way. Whereupon the tiger on top said, “Okay, now that I’ve got you, where am I taking you?” If thoughts “ride along” on top of the brain’s machinery, they’re as powerless to direct its ways as the tiger is to tell the elephant where to go. Less so, in fact: they don’t even have claws.

Though all this to me seems certainly to be correct, I know others disagree. I suspect that for many of them, it’s because they don’t like where this reasoning heads. If they jump on this elephant, it’s going to carry them (like it or not) toward belief in some kind of spiritual reality.

Therefore, with genuine appreciation I grant Denyse’s point: any support this position receives from science is more than welcome.

*”Materialism” here means a view of reality in which nothing exists except for matter, energy, and their interactions according to deterministic natural law or pure chance. On this view there is no spiritual reality.

Posted by Tom Gilson under Origins and Science | 11 Comments »

“Dementia diagnosis brings relief, not depression”–Why?

March 8th 2008

This made absolutely no sense to me at first:

‘The major finding is that both patients and their families feel relief, not increased anxiety, upon learning the [Alzheimer's] diagnosis,’ says study co-author John C. Morris, M.D., the Harvey A. and Dorismae Hacker Friedman Distinguished Professor of Neurology and director of the Alzheimer’s Disease Research Centre.

‘Nobody wants to hear the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, but even that is preferable to recognising there’s a problem and not knowing what it is. At least having the diagnosis allows people to make plans for the future, including treatment as appropriate.’

One reason an Alzheimer’s diagnosis can be comforting to both family members and patients, suggests Carpenter, is that it provides an explanation for what’s been going on with the patient. Caregivers, he notes, are often quick to attribute symptoms of dementia to the person, rather than the disease, and patients wonder if they are going ‘crazy.’ This study confirms that most patients, regardless of their degree of impairment, tend to experience a sense of relief after getting their diagnosis.

[From Science Centric | News | Dementia diagnosis brings relief, not depression]

How could it be a relief to find out you have Alzheimer’s? My wife and I were at an Alzheimer’s patient’s funeral just last Monday. He was a friend’s father; we didn’t know him ourselves. One family member told me that in spite of the pain of the loss, his death “really was a blessing for him” because his last few years had been so difficult. It is truly an awful, dread illness.

So how can it be a relief to find out you have it? How can it help to know–for the study included people in very early stages of impairment–that this disease is going to rule your future? Only one answer seems to make sense to me.

Do you know what a relief it is when you find out a problem isn’t “all in your head”? If you poke around the web a bit–search for “it was all in my head”–you’ll read about people with Restless Leg Syndrome (which I happen to have), lupus, fibromyalgia and other syndromes with subtle beginnings. They’ve been told they’re imagining things, or they’re going crazy, or that they’re just trying to get attention. In other words, they have a psychological problem. When I first had RLS symptoms I thought, “what’s wrong with me–why am I so anxious?”

Then they find out there’s a genuine organic cause for their malady. The cause may not be well understood–diseases with well-understood causes usually get diagnosed more quickly–but at least there’s consensus that whatever it is, it’s physical. It isn’t mental. It’s not a psychological problem. They’re not going crazy. People with depression often find it some comfort to think of it as a chemical imbalance.

Note again what Dr. Carpenter said:

Caregivers, he notes, are often quick to attribute symptoms of dementia to the person, rather than the disease, and patients wonder if they are going ‘crazy.’

First, caregivers find out the person is not the problem, it’s the disease. Second, patients learn they are “not going ‘crazy,’” they have an illness. This really is a source of relief, the relief of finding out “it’s not all in my head.”

But of course it is all in their heads. Where else would it be? That’s the question that takes this decidedly important and personal issue to an even broader level of application.

There are those who believe that we as persons (our intellectual, emotional, volitional, and personality aspects, that is which is how I’ll use “person” for the rest of this article) are fully explained by the physical processes in the brains. On that “physicalist” view, the person is the brain and its processes, and nothing else. And on that view it makes no sense to “attribute symptoms to the person, rather than the disease.” The disease is in the brain and gradually takes over. There’s no distinguishing the person from the disease, because the brain is all there is. The brain is ruled by the disease. The person has actually changed. It’s foolish and contradictory to say, “she’s the same person on the inside, she’s just suffering a horrible illness.” Like it or not, on a physicalist view, the person really is going crazy.

That is most decidedly not my view. I have often contested physicalism. I’m convinced we are more than physical. Our personhood is both physical and non-physical, and the non-physical–the soul–is the core. We interact with the physical world through the physical body, but the physical body is not the sum total of the person.

On this view, Alzheimer’s patients’ relief upon diagnosis makes sense. There’s a genuine and proper distinction: “It’s not me going crazy, it’s my brain getting fouled up.” Caregivers are right to distinguish the disease from the person.

Daniel Dennett, a leading physicalist philosopher of mind, calls these beliefs mistaken, a “folk psychology” attributable not to any correspondence with reality, but to some evolutionary advantage it has conferred. I acknowledge his objection. I can’t tell you how wrong I think he is.

I’ve argued this on a more formal level (a series beginning here, and also more recently here). This time, on an admittedly more emotional and informal level, I throw in my lot with the Alzheimer’s patients and their caregivers. The patients are not just their brains and bodies. They are not their disease. At their deepest core, they are not going crazy. Their souls survive the disease and, I think, actually escape it to become what they were apart from it. In the meantime they are experiencing a tragedy, but the tragedy is not who they are, it is something happening to them.

It takes a non-physicalist view of personhood to be able to say that. Most patients and their families have probably never thought about it in those terms–but surely if they view it that way, as most apparently do, they are on the right track.

Posted by Tom Gilson under 21st Century Faith & Origins and Science | 6 Comments »

“How thoughts arise”

January 8th 2008

Science Centric has a report on a new, more effective approach to simulating neural networks:

In their doctoral theses, Arvind Kumar and Sven Schrader have simulated large neuronal networks that, for the first time, take this neuronal feature into account. Especially in the neocortex, neurones are intensely interconnected, i.e. they receive many input signals that can modify the integration of subsequent signals. Taking the special features of such highly interconnected networks into account yields simulations that are in excellent agreement with recordings from biological nerve cells in the intact brain. The new virtual network thus reflects reality better than previous models.

This is of course relevant to the mind-brain question we’ve looked at often here. The article’s headline is “How thoughts arise.” For a dualist like myself, a better headline would be, “How neural aspects of thoughts arise,” or “How neural correlates of thoughts arise.” For it seems quite obvious to me that viewing thoughts as strictly neural events will not work. I’ll re-state one problem with it here.

We know that thoughts cause things. Suppose someone says to me:

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Is Socrates mortal?

My thoughts will run through what I know about men, and I will agree that all men are mortal. I will assume for the sake of discussion that Socrates is a man (he was once, at any rate). I will consider whether the answer is logically entailed by the statements I’ve been given. So I will think, yes, Socrates is mortal. Then I will answer aloud, “Yes, Socrates is mortal.” (Or I could be a wise guy and say, “Who wants to know, and what do I get if I answer right?”)

I have thoughts, which cause other thoughts, which ultimately cause physical actions in the world. Note that the progression of causes is in virtue of the content of the thoughts. It’s what the thoughts are about. The scientists quoted in this article want to address that question:

‘But it does not suffice that the brain is just active,’ adds Rotter. ‘The activity pattern must somehow be connected to a meaning.’ When we remember, our brain has to make associations and has to produce meaningful behaviour. How meaningful patterns arise in the ocean of neuronal network activity will be subject of new investigations by Rotter and his colleagues at the Bernstein Centre.

But there indeed is the rub for those who would say thoughts are just neural activity. That activity must “somehow be connected to a meaning.” The activity must be about a meaning. It is the meaning of the Socrates question above that causes the subsequent thoughts and spoken words.

Nobody has yet determined how a physical state, condition, or action can be about something else. How can a rock be about a seashore? It can be on it, it can be near it, but it cannot be about it. How can ink on a page be about love? That’s a little tougher, in the case of a love sonnet, for instance; but the answer is it can only be about love if there is a translation to that in the mind of the reader. The ink itself has no aboutness to it. The rock on the seashore cannot mean anything in itself, unless there is a mind to make a link of meaning with it.

There is good reason to believe this aboutness problem for physical entities cannot be solved; that a physical thing could never, in principle, be about something else. Thus neurons, no matter how complexly interrelated, cannot by themselves by connected to a meaning.

There is even better reason to believe that even if there were a solution to this, it wouldn’t be discovered through science. It’s a philosophical question, not an observational question. Still, it can’t hurt for them to work on it, and I wish them great success in learning more as they proceed.

[From Science Centric | News | How thoughts arise]

Posted by Tom Gilson under Origins and Science | 22 Comments »