“Barefoot Bum” may hold the record for the most casual nom-de-blog of any commenter here on Thinking Christian. Nevertheless he asked some great questions in a comment here not long ago:

I am still quite curious precisely how theists would a) define evidence, b) define how conclusions are drawn from evidence and c) put forth an evidentiary case for the existence of the Christian God and c) put forth an evidentiary case for the non-existence of Allah or Krishna.

I’m going to use these questions to kick off a new series of blog posts, starting (naturally enough) with the first question: how would theists define evidence? I will of course be speaking from the standpoint of Christian theism as I understand it, and not from other versions of theism.

I would define evidence broadly (and simply) as any information that would tend to lead a person toward a conclusion. Evidences are not always proofs—a court will consider circumstantial evidence, and rarely does a case turn on one piece of evidence alone. Evidences may qualify as such even if there is contradictory evidence. If she smiles at you, that’s evidence that she might like you; if she smiles even brighter at another man, that doesn’t mean her first smile wasn’t evidence, it just means that it needs to be interpreted in a broader context. Evidences can be misleading and still be evidences; otherwise the whole genre of mystery fiction would collapse overnight.

Evidences specifically for Christianity would include any information that would tend to lead someone toward any or all of what we might call a packaged set of conclusions, including ideas such as that there is an infinite, personal creator God, that he has spoken through the Bible, that he has personally revealed himself through Jesus Christ, that we humans were created for relationship with him, that we are being called from a state of alienation and rebellion from God, back into relationship with him through Jesus Christ, that Jesus Christ is the king of creation, and so on.

As I think about this I can’t help thinking of what Sam Harris wrote in The End of Faith (p. 23):

“In fact, every religion preaches the truth of propositions for which no evidence is even conceivable.”

He must have been thinking of some different definition for evidence. I find it hard to come up with any charitable interpretation; I think he was thinking of evidence along the lines of “something that a committed atheist like me would accept as proof for God, which of course I know in advance doesn’t exist, so since I can’t conceive of it, it must not be conceivable, even though millions of people throughout history have thought it was.” Actually there are mountains of evidence for Christianity’s claims. As one of the Gang of Four “New Atheists” he doesn’t find it convincing, to say the least, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

I think, though, that Barefoot Bum was looking for something more than just some general definition for evidence. What kinds of information do theists have in mind when we speak of evidences for Christianity? I’ll list some of them in bare outline form. You might view this as a sort of table of contents for future blog entries, in addition to being part of the answer to Barefoot Bum’s question.

  1. The historical, documentary testimony of the Bible
  2. Historiographical and bibliographical indicators that the biblical documents are what they present themselves to be
  3. Prophecies made and fulfilled in history
  4. The existence of the Christian church as an historical movement
  5. Changed lives of Christians
  6. Miracles, signs, wonders, visions, etc., both historical and contemporary
  7. The self-authenticating wisdom of Biblical teaching; its close fit with the realities of human experience
  8. A long list of philosophical evidences
  9. The internal testimony of God in one’s life

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There’s a potential false conclusion to steer clear of as you read Edward Tingley’s article, “The Skeptical Inquirer,” on which I blogged yesterday. He refers to Blaise Pascal’s statement that God cannot be known through the senses. One might suppose that he is saying that it is impossible to perceive God in any way. Whatever Tingley and Pascal might say to that, I would put it this way: While it is not impossible to see God, it is possible not to see God.

I was thinking about this on my drive home from the office, on the Colonial National Parkway between Williamsburg and Yorktown, Virginia. The drive begins in a forest of tall pines, dogwoods, oak, and maple trees, and continues along the York River, a place of unusual calm and beauty. I could certainly see God in that (his workings, that is, or better yet, his artistry). I can see him in the members of my family, and hear him in the birds singing as I sit on the back porch now.

Psalm 19:1 says “the Heavens declare the glory of God.” Romans 1:19-20 adds that

what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. 20For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made.

And yet many do not see God there.

The same could be said for the historical evidences for God in Jesus Christ. There is ample evidence for the life of Christ in history; see Craig Blomberg’s article on this, for example. As for his death and resurrection, it’s marvelously explanatory. It makes sense of the generally agreed facts surrounding the events, and it explains the remarkable turn history took following Jesus’ (by ordinary standards) relatively obscure life. It lays the foundation for answers such as no other system of thought can provide for deep existential questions regarding the human condition, and what is to be done about it.

Yet many can see the same questions and consider the same answers, and not see God.

The classic philosophical arguments for God, likewise, explain conundrums like consciousness, reason, purpose, the existence of the universe, and more. They, too, are persuasive arguments for the reality of God.

I and many others see God there, yet still others do not.

Though it is not impossible to see God, it is possible not to see him. This, I think is the point to be taken home from Tingley’s and Pascal’s skepticism regarding finding God through the senses. Evidence can be interpreted in multiple ways, so in the end, though the senses can speak to the question of God, they cannot decide it.

Tingley’s important reminder for us is that they cannot decide against God any more than they can definitively decide for God. Those who seek a final conclusion on the matter must look elsewhere. Pascal suggests the heart as one place to look. It’s a suggestion worthy of real reflection.

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