Thinking Christian

The Faith and Reason blog at USA Today tells us Tim Tebow is going to be featured in a commercial during the Super Bowl. Tebow, who just finished up his senior year of football at the University of Florida, is a natural for appearing on Super Bowl Sunday—many consider him the best college quarterback in the land, if not the best player in any position. (I’m not a Gator fan, by the way!)

What’s raising a ruckus is first, that he is an outspoken evangelical Christian, and second, that the ad is to be sponsored by Focus on the Family. The ad’s content has not been made public in detail, but the sponsor has made it known that it’s a pro-life message. Here’s how Cathy Lynn Grossman at Faith and Reason described the problem:

What’s not to love? What’s the issue here? How about…

I love my family more than you love your family” [sic] v. My love is as good as yours.

Or

God honors my choices, not yours.

That’s the subtext of the Tebow ad, an affront to anyone who would make a different choice, say those who strenuously object to CBS’ plan to air it. They see Focus on the Family — known for its stands against gay marriage, reproductive rights education beyond promoting abstinence, and opposition to legal abortion — delivering it’s [sic] views to a massive family audience on Super Bowl Sunday.

An ad that uses sports to divide rather than to unite has no place in the biggest national sports event of the year — an event designed to bring Americans together,” said Jehmu Greene, speaking for a a coalition of women who oppose the ad.

Is the Super Bowl the place for this or not? I really wouldn’t want the game turned into a battleground for worldviews. Thirty-second spots just aren’t the right medium for the kind of interaction that solves problems: the reasoned, mutually respectful sort. There might be good reasons to think twice about taking the culture war to a new battlefield. As genuine and as uplifting as Tebow’s story may be (and it genuinely is), someone else could surely concoct a commercial that feels as uplifting from the other side of the issue. Where does that get us?

But last I heard, CBS is going to run the ad anyway. If there are objections to it, here’s hoping they’re not raised for the wrong reasons—like the ones suggested in the excerpts I quoted above. I seriously doubt Tebow (and his mother, who reportedly also is involved in the spot) plans to communicate the first message there (“I love my family more…”). If he did it would be wrong, certainly, but from what I know about him, that’s just not going to happen. The suggestion that he would do that amounts to an advance scare tactic and nothing more.

What about, “God honors my choices, not yours,“ though? That would be wrong, too. It would be wrong in the same way as “Christians hold the truth” is wrong. If the message is to be, “I’ve got God in my hip pocket,” or “God is on my side,” that would be offensive not only to some sectors of a national audience, but to God himself.

I don’t expect them to make God a part of this ad. That’s just a guess, based on the media buzz I’ve seen so far. But since the Faith and Reason blog brought it up, I want to spend some moments on it anyway.

Suppose the message is, “I choose to honor God with my choices.” That’s different. That’s recognizing where honor belongs. It’s recognizing that God doesn’t pick one man or woman’s side over any others.

Note what happened when an angel of the Lord came to Joshua (Joshua 5:13-15):

When Joshua was by Jericho, he lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold, a man was standing before him with his drawn sword in his hand. And Joshua went to him and said to him, “Are you for us, or for our adversaries?” And he said, “No; but I am the commander of the army of the Lord. Now I have come.” And Joshua fell on his face to the earth and worshiped and said to him, “What does my lord say to his servant?” And the commander of the Lord’s army said to Joshua, “Take off your sandals from your feet, for the place where you are standing is holy.” And Joshua did so.

This Commander didn’t take Joshua’s side, but that’s not to say there were no sides in the battle. There was the Lord’s side, and there was opposition to the Lord’s side, and of course those who wanted to take the true and victorious side joined with the Lord. Joshua signified that by taking off his sandals in worship before this Commander (who many commentators think may have been the pre-incarnate Christ).

Make no mistake, there are sides in the battle for morality and for life. There is great confusion, though, as to how these sides are formed and named. There are those who think that morality is their own choice (or their community’s or culture’s choice). There are others who think morality is something we all grow into (biologically and/or culturally) and we don’t really have much choice over what we value or honor. For either group, there is morality but there is no moral authority, except in perhaps in history and culture (expressed by law and custom). There are other views besides these, but these are dominant in our culture.

If either of those were actually the case, then it would make sense to ask, “Who are you to say my morality is wrong?” And I think many people think that we are all operating out of that authority-free attitude toward morality. This, I believe, is why they can’t understand anyone saying someone else’s morality was wrong. For them, there’s no basis for saying that, and they think that’s what everyone should think. (That view often turns ironic, of course, when it bleeds over into saying “it’s immoral of you to say that someone else’s morality is wrong.” But I’ll just mention that in passing and leave it aside.)

The issue, as Brad Bright says, is God. If there is a God who is holy, good, and just, then there are sides. There is a right side and a wrong one. The wrong one is whatever opposes God, and the right one is the one that seeks to follow his ways. None of us could ever succeed in enlisting God to our own side, but anyone can enlist to join God on his side. Anyone can learn what God says is right and wrong, and if they speak of right and wrong, they do it not on their own authority but on God’s. If that is “an affront to anyone who would make a different choice,” it’s not just a person-to-person affront. It’s a confrontation with true, transcendent authority.

Anyone can honor God’s choices. I have a feeling that if this commercial says anything about God, choices, and honor, that’s what it’s going to say. We’ll see.

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Much of the discussion about ethics revolves around an analogy to matters of personal preference. doctor(logic) recently said,

Morality bears all the hallmarks of something subjective, like taste in food or taste in art.

And also,

My argument is that, unlike the objective sciences, morality has no more basis for objectivity than the things we regard as subjective (food, music, etc). In particular, there is no formal evidence that moral opinions are objective facts because the only thing predicted by morality is how members of our species feel about certain acts.

It seems to me that this analogy fails right where it counts most. I like chocolate and I dislike Brussels sprouts. I do not therefore conclude that chocolate is right and Brussels sprouts are wrong, or that eating one is right and the other wrong. It’s a completely different internal apprehension for these things than it is for murder or torturing children, or for loving and giving.

Morality predicts more than “how members of our species feel.” It predicts persons’ convictions and beliefs; and yes, we can tell the difference between feelings and convictions. The moral sense is not just one of personal liking or appreciation. It carries with it an incorrigible sense of rightness vs. wrongness. We do say that murder is wrong and that being a loving person is right, and most of us, when we say these things, believe they are actually true statements, not mere expressions of preference.

Granted there is some analogy between gastronomic or aesthetic taste and moral beliefs. The moral subjectivist can rightly say that the moral sense is another instance of personal preference or aversion, just as matters of taste are. We all say things like “I like chocolate,” and “I like it when people get along well.”

But when he says it is just another instance of personal preference or aversion he goes beyond what this analogy can support. We say things like “Murder is wrong,” but we do not say things like “Brussels sprouts are wrong.” But this is precisely the question of moral realism: whether statements like “murder is wrong” are really true. Any thoughtful person would say that “Brussels sprouts are wrong” is not a true statement. Only someone whose metaphysical views have successfully overridden his native knowledge would deny that “murder is wrong” is a true statement.

The analogy between morality and matters of taste fails at the point where we speak of something’s being actually true. And that’s exactly the point that matters.

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We cannot explain our moral experiences as purely subjective phenomena. Our moral experience includes the gut-level awareness that some things are really right and some are really wrong. Only a metaphysical commitment to belief in an amoral reality could quell that awareness.

If there are pure moral relativists who do not regard anything as really right or really wrong, it is because they have persuaded themselves that their metaphysics knows more than their moral sense does. Their metaphysical side has gagged their moral side, commanding it to “shut up, you stupid ninny, there is no such thing as right or wrong!”

But the moral side still wants to speak. If it hears of a gay man being murdered for being gay, it tears off the gag and screams, “that’s wrong!” The metaphysical side will be quick or slow to re-apply the gag, depending on how careful the person is to protect his or her metaphysics; for when the moral side screams, “that’s wrong!” that’s when the metaphysical beliefs are most in danger.

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This post differs from many others on this blog in that I am going to base it on my settled belief in the God of the Bible, and not try to make an argument this time in favor of that belief. In other words, you will agree with this or not based on your existing beliefs regarding God and the Bible. Or maybe, just maybe, by seeing how one atheist treats morality, some skeptics, agnostics, or atheists will come to recognize that to deny the God of the Bible is to take up a seriously untenable view of life.

In comments following my post on The Basis for Moral Realism, doctor(logic) has persistently stuck with his opinion that morality must be evaluated and regarding strictly in terms of one’s feelings. You can pick up that line of his starting about here.

As Thomas Reid wisely pointed out,

A feeling is a temporary state of sensory, subjective experience. It has different properties than a belief. It is not possible for a feeling to be true or false (my “happiness” is not false).

So we see that a feeling is not a belief, and therefore it is impossible for one to have a feeling of a moral proposition. This is not to say that feelings cannot have beliefs as their causual antecedents, of course.

Nevertheless, we cannot deny that there are propositions that can be attached to feelings. “I feel good,” or “Seeing people hurt makes me sad” are both propositions about feelings. But these are statements about self. So when doctor(logic) insists that all moral opinions and evaluations are feelings statements, he is saying that all moral opinions and evaluations are made with reference to self. Moral opinions are not about acts, he would say; they are about my reactions to acts.

doctor(logic) confirmed this by saying,

What do I mean when I say morality is subjective? I mean that if I draw a line around the mugger and his victim, morality is nowhere to be found there. But if I draw the line around you (as observer), the mugger and his victim, then morality is objectively in your preferences. It will be an objective fact that you will disapprove or feel bad about the mugging you are observing. However, the immorality will not be in the mugging itself.

Is mugging good? No, it’s not good. Is mugging bad? No, it’s not bad either. It’s neither, in itself. But you may disapprove or feel bad about it. That’s what morality is, to doctor(logic).

Even from a simply ethical perspective, this has a nasty, putrid, awful smell to it. It literally makes morality all about one’s preferences. It makes me my own king of morality. It is idol-worship of the worst kind, for it is self-worship, putting self in the place where all good and evil is decided, the place that is rightfully God’s.

On this view I can—or must, for I cannot avoid it—set up my own moral system over and against God’s. Quoting from doctor(logic) again:

Look, let’s suppose Horace is a rapist. He likes raping for lots of reasons, including the feeling of power he gets. He thinks that girls who dress in revealing clothes deserve it. He’s integrated his rape behavior into his personal identity. Jesus comes along and says that rape is objectively evil. If Horace believes Jesus is real, tells the truth, and is an authority on morality, wouldn’t Horace then be in some sort of conflict?

Which is followed by,

To Horace, God is subjectively evil, even if he believed God was objectively good.

doctor(logic) thinks Horace’s view is to be taken as equivalent to God’s. The next paragraph says,

If my space ship approaches yours, and relatively, our ships are inverted, I could say you were subjectively upside down. If the universe had an objective “up” direction, we might agree that you were right-side-up, but you would still be subjectively upside down to me.

Space ship 1 or space ship 2, neither has authority over the other. Horace or God, neither (says dl) has authority over the other.

Idolatry always leads to corruption. The form of corruption that comes from this particular idolatry, making oneself king over one’s own morality, is not just that one might decide to do anything, and call it right. It is not just that every person can be right in his or her own eyes. It is both of these. But it also entails the plainly unethical view that morality is whatever suits me best. What could be more obviously wrong than that?

This is the characteristic idolatry of our generation. It is the idolatry that at this point is likely astonished that I would state the matter so bluntly and negatively, and would fault me for doing so. But if I am wrong and these idolaters are right, then there is no fault in my act, just as there is no fault in mugging. The only charge they can bring against me is, “That made me feel bad! If you make me feel bad, then you’re an awful person!” My answer to that is, I do not glory in making others feel bad. I do not like to do it. But I do not accept feelings as ruling sovereignly over what is actually true, and sometimes idolatry must be confronted for what it is.

Moral relativism is idolatry. Those who do not know that God is the only God may not recognize the malodorous nature of this idolatry, but those who do know God in this way must realize that it is a stench in his nostrils.

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Jordan has been saying things on the Manhattan Declaration thread like,

Atheism does not entail moral relativism, and theism does not entail moral realism. I’m an atheist, and a moral realist.

…

I (imperfectly) perceive morality with my moral sense. What is the basis of your “alleged moral objectivity”? I imagine it will be long-winded and incoherent. Or maybe you’ll save us both some time with a good old-fashioned, “Goddidit!”

Everyone on that discussion agrees on one thing: that there are unchanging moral absolutes. The dispute is over the content of those eternal moral standards, and especially over whether they could exist without God. I want to lay out more thoroughly the reasons God is necessary for moral realism.

Moral realism is the view that moral duties and values have an objective reality that does not depend on any person’s or group of persons’ opinions or beliefs about them. Morality has an existence independent of human opinion. In fact, Jordan takes it that it is eternal, or at least as old as the Big Bang.

Again, we all agree that moral duties and values really exist and always have, and that their essential principles are eternally unchanging. We also agree (as Jordan said) that we perceive morality with our moral sense, albeit imperfectly. The question I have is whether that makes sense on atheism. Jordan would ask whether it makes sense on theism.

Regarding the latter, I’m not sure how leaving out spaces between words—”Goddidit!”—turns their meaning around and makes them an argument against what they mean with the spaces included. Theism indeed says, in a rough sense, that moral values exist because God did it. That’s only in a rough sense, of course, because God didn’t “do” moral values. He didn’t make them up or invent them. They are an eternal aspect of his own character and nature. God has eternally been the ultimate instantiation and expression of love, justice, holiness, and so on; and since the universe he created is an expression of himself, those moral values apply in all of creation. Although Jordan said “theism does not entail moral realism,” the fact is that the Jewish and Christian versions of theism do entail it (Islamic theism may also; I can’t speak to that). If there is some form of theism that does not entail moral realism, it’s something other than Judaism or Christianity.

I’m also not sure why “good old-fashioned” counts against the theistic view eternal moral realities. If moral values and duties have existed from eternity past, then humans ought to have had some knowledge about them for longer than just the past couple of decades. I would say that “old-fashioned” counts in favor of a view on this topic. Jordan has tried to use negatively-laden language to take a bite out of the theistic view, but in fact it has turned around and taken a nip out of his own nose (metaphorically, of course).

(Now perhaps Jordan instead meant “Goddidit” was “old-fashioned” by its being some kind of non-answer, presented without any thoughtful justification. If that’s what he means, then I will simply say he is wrong. “Goddidit” is his word—if it’s fair to call it a word—not ours. As evidence that we don’t just settle for a mindless “Goddidit,” I would invite him to read the 48 or so posts I’ve written here on ethical theory along with all their attendant discussion; or better yet to visit some nearby seminary, and see how many books its library has on ethical matters.)

So let’s call Jordan’s phrase, “an old fashioned ‘Goddidit!’” what it really is: it’s his ironically failed and illegitimate attempt to marshall emotion rather than reason in support of his position. And let’s recognize that theism has a more than adequate space in it for eternal moral verities.

Now to the other question: can eternal moral realities exist on atheism? The idea presents numerous problems.

• What is a moral value or duty; specifically, to whom or what is it a value, and to whom or what is the duty directed, owed, or pointed?
• To whom or what was it directed, owed, or pointed when there was no person in the universe toward whom it could have been so pointed?
• Who or what held any responsibility for these moral values or duties before there was any intelligent life?
• In what did these values or duties inhere, or in other words, where did they exist?
• Was there such a thing as evil while the stars and planets were forming? What was it?
• Was killing immoral for the first 3 billion or so years of evolution, before humans arrived? Jordan says yes; but animals killing animals certainly wasn’t immoral then, nor is it now. There was no immoral killing until humans came, as far as I know.
• When humans arrived, what was it about us that made it (frequently) immoral for us to kill? Note that we take it that it’s not just about killing each other; we often consider it immoral to kill animals, too.
• Moral standards have changed over time, and in fact have oscillated back and forth on some issues (abortion, infanticide, homosexual relationships, for example). Jordan seems to take it that this moment in history represents the “right” moment on abortion, I think; he definitely takes it that this is the “right” moment on homosexuality. So where we’re heading as a culture on homosexual rights is in the direction of what has been eternally morally true. How can he be sure of this? What is the measuring stick? Is this not possibly chronological/cultural chauvinism?
• And to tie together two of the previous bullets, does Jordan think that seven billion years ago it was morally that same-sex couples should have the right to unite and call it marriage?

I propose that these questions are extremely difficult for the atheist who believes in eternal moral realities.

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For a recent talk at the Chapel at Kingsmill I spoke of Christians shining our light so that people may see and glorify our Father in heaven (Matthew 5:16). I used an extended historical illustration of Christianity and women’s issues: something that not all recognize to be one of Christianity’s great contributions to world history.

The microphone was far from the front, so the audio quality is diminished by room noise, but the message is still audible.

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From Franklin Mason:

Thus if we cling to our moral views – as we ought and should – we reveal that we are not relativists. If we know what we are to do tomorrow – and we do – we are not relativists.

The Philosophical Midwife: What are we to do tomorrow?

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