Why Would You Deny Objective Moral Values?
I raised this question in comments
on Thursday. It may seem a little stark, a bit obvious, even rather horrifying,
but I had a reason for approaching it that
way:
Consider two actions:
1. A mother providing adequate love, care, shelter, nourishment, etc. to her newborn baby.
2. A mother grinning in glee while she lets the baby starve, gaining pleasure from watching and hearing the baby cry, and occasionally getting extra pleasure by burning the baby in various places with her cigarette.
Now, is one of those mothers (and her actions) morally more right than the other? Or are they morally equivalent?
Consider two actions:
1. A mother providing adequate love, care, shelter, nourishment, etc. to her newborn baby.
2. A mother grinning in glee while she lets the baby starve, gaining pleasure from watching and hearing the baby cry, and occasionally getting extra pleasure by burning the baby in various places with her cigarette.
Now, is one of those mothers (and her actions) morally more right than the other? Or are they morally equivalent?
Why would I ask such a question? It was in the
course of a dialogue with atheistic commenters "ordinary seeker,"
"doctor(logic)," and Paul about relative vs. absolute morality. They have taken
a position that all morality is relative, as illustrated by ordinary seeker's
(os's, for short) response:*
"Tom, you are asking what I think personally about your examples (1) and (2), you are asking for my personal opinion. Why? Whether I think (1) is more moral than (2) is a product of my culture and time in history. My point is that in another culture or at another time, I would very likely think differently; I would think according to the norms of that time and place, and my morals would be shaped by such. If I were raised in the culture that considers rough child rearing practices to be good, then I would think that rough child rearing practices were good."
Os was unwilling to commit to Mother 1's actions being actually, really, more morally right than Mother 2's. This is one manifestation of relativist ethics.
The question, again, is whether all morality is relative, or whether there exists some absolute reference point for some morality. The relativist position is that there is no such reference point. Moral realists (non-relativists) need not show that every moral question can be answered in terms of an absolute. We need only show that there is an absolute reference for at least one moral question. If an absolute reference point exists for that one moral question, then an absolute reference point exists.
Thus I asked, is it true that Mother 1 is morally more right than Mother 2? Os told us he has an opinion on the matter, but he says it's conceivable that in some culture somewhere, it could, with justification, be considered morally more commendable, more right, for a mother to starve and torture her baby than to nurture and feed her baby. Not only that, but we must conclude that if os landed in that culture somehow, he could not raise any moral objection to the way mothers treat their children. He could say he disagrees, that he finds their practice distasteful, not preferred; but he most certainly could not say to the cigarette-wielding baby-burner, "Stop it! That's wrong!"--for their moral basis would be as valid as his own.
I think this strains credulity and defies the evidence. No such culture can be imagined, and I'm sure none has ever been realistically described in anthropology or literature. If, per impossibile, one stumbled into such a culture, I'm sure that visitor would find it simply true and obvious that they were treating their babies wrongly. If os stumbled in there, he would quite certainly want to say, "That's wrong! You don't torture your own babies for your own pleasure!" It seems to me that, from the dispassionate distance of a blog dialogue, os is reaching for refuge from something, from a conclusion he would have to face if he allowed that Mother 1 really and truly is acting in a more morally commendable way than Mother 2.
That conclusion is that there is a God. William Lane Craig has a series of podcasts (the "Moral Argument" sessions here ) in which he argues:
(1) If objective moral values exist, then God exists (where "objective values" means values that are valid and binding independently of whether any human person believes in them or not).
(2) Objective moral values exist.
(3) Therefore God exists.
We have not argued for or discussed Premise 1 here recently, though it seems strong enough. Without a God there is no place for such objectivity to reside. Premise 2 has been the current point under question. Is it objectively true that Mother 1 is acting more morally than Mother 2? It certainly seems to be true. To use one of Craig's illustrations, suppose Hitler had won World War II and either exterminated or brainwashed every person in the world so that no one remained alive who disagreed with him: would it then be the case that the Holocaust had been ethically right? Would his brainwashing and extermination efforts have been right? I doubt you think so.
Consider the novel 1984. It's about a culture brainwashed to love Big Brother. Do we read it and say, "yes, that's fine, they all agree on this so it's perfectly ethical"? No--we are rightly outraged at the prospect.
I used the phrase, "it seems to be true" that Mother 1 is acting more morally than Mother 2. We have within each of us a kind of moral compass that leads us to our own answers to questions like this. The person who would say Mother 2 is morally superior to Mother 1 is one we would regard as having a defective moral compass. We would consider him wrong. But being defective implies there is a proper function; being wrong implies that there is a right. Being morally better or worse implies a sense of direction, a true north for the compass to point toward.
Why would someone assert that the comparative morality of (the actions of) Mother 1 and Mother 2 "just depends"? It can't be because he thinks Mother 2's actions are morally praiseworthy in any way comparable to Mother 1's; nor can it be because he's observed any culture that would regard it that way. There must be some principle by which he comes to that incredibly counter-intuitive conclusion. I think it's because of Craig's Premise 3, the conclusion that God must exist if there are objective moral values.
Late in one of those podcast lectures someone asked Craig whether someone might reject the existence of objective moral values just because one knows that there is no God. That would be a valid logical step: "I know there is no God, therefore I can conclude there are no objective moral values." But as Craig said, then we need to ask which of these has more evidence in support of it: (A) That at least some moral values exist objectively, or (B) that God does not exist? If one wants to say, "well, gosh, I think Mother 1 is more moral, but that's only my opinion, it's a matter of our preferences, and others might disagree..." then one ought to be sure that one has plenty of proof there is no God--because that statement is one of those extraordinary claims that needs a lot of support under it.
*Since then it has become unclear how much this question matters to ordinary seeker, but the dialogue is instructive anyway.
"Tom, you are asking what I think personally about your examples (1) and (2), you are asking for my personal opinion. Why? Whether I think (1) is more moral than (2) is a product of my culture and time in history. My point is that in another culture or at another time, I would very likely think differently; I would think according to the norms of that time and place, and my morals would be shaped by such. If I were raised in the culture that considers rough child rearing practices to be good, then I would think that rough child rearing practices were good."
Os was unwilling to commit to Mother 1's actions being actually, really, more morally right than Mother 2's. This is one manifestation of relativist ethics.
The question, again, is whether all morality is relative, or whether there exists some absolute reference point for some morality. The relativist position is that there is no such reference point. Moral realists (non-relativists) need not show that every moral question can be answered in terms of an absolute. We need only show that there is an absolute reference for at least one moral question. If an absolute reference point exists for that one moral question, then an absolute reference point exists.
Thus I asked, is it true that Mother 1 is morally more right than Mother 2? Os told us he has an opinion on the matter, but he says it's conceivable that in some culture somewhere, it could, with justification, be considered morally more commendable, more right, for a mother to starve and torture her baby than to nurture and feed her baby. Not only that, but we must conclude that if os landed in that culture somehow, he could not raise any moral objection to the way mothers treat their children. He could say he disagrees, that he finds their practice distasteful, not preferred; but he most certainly could not say to the cigarette-wielding baby-burner, "Stop it! That's wrong!"--for their moral basis would be as valid as his own.
I think this strains credulity and defies the evidence. No such culture can be imagined, and I'm sure none has ever been realistically described in anthropology or literature. If, per impossibile, one stumbled into such a culture, I'm sure that visitor would find it simply true and obvious that they were treating their babies wrongly. If os stumbled in there, he would quite certainly want to say, "That's wrong! You don't torture your own babies for your own pleasure!" It seems to me that, from the dispassionate distance of a blog dialogue, os is reaching for refuge from something, from a conclusion he would have to face if he allowed that Mother 1 really and truly is acting in a more morally commendable way than Mother 2.
That conclusion is that there is a God. William Lane Craig has a series of podcasts (the "Moral Argument" sessions here ) in which he argues:
(1) If objective moral values exist, then God exists (where "objective values" means values that are valid and binding independently of whether any human person believes in them or not).
(2) Objective moral values exist.
(3) Therefore God exists.
We have not argued for or discussed Premise 1 here recently, though it seems strong enough. Without a God there is no place for such objectivity to reside. Premise 2 has been the current point under question. Is it objectively true that Mother 1 is acting more morally than Mother 2? It certainly seems to be true. To use one of Craig's illustrations, suppose Hitler had won World War II and either exterminated or brainwashed every person in the world so that no one remained alive who disagreed with him: would it then be the case that the Holocaust had been ethically right? Would his brainwashing and extermination efforts have been right? I doubt you think so.
Consider the novel 1984. It's about a culture brainwashed to love Big Brother. Do we read it and say, "yes, that's fine, they all agree on this so it's perfectly ethical"? No--we are rightly outraged at the prospect.
I used the phrase, "it seems to be true" that Mother 1 is acting more morally than Mother 2. We have within each of us a kind of moral compass that leads us to our own answers to questions like this. The person who would say Mother 2 is morally superior to Mother 1 is one we would regard as having a defective moral compass. We would consider him wrong. But being defective implies there is a proper function; being wrong implies that there is a right. Being morally better or worse implies a sense of direction, a true north for the compass to point toward.
Why would someone assert that the comparative morality of (the actions of) Mother 1 and Mother 2 "just depends"? It can't be because he thinks Mother 2's actions are morally praiseworthy in any way comparable to Mother 1's; nor can it be because he's observed any culture that would regard it that way. There must be some principle by which he comes to that incredibly counter-intuitive conclusion. I think it's because of Craig's Premise 3, the conclusion that God must exist if there are objective moral values.
Late in one of those podcast lectures someone asked Craig whether someone might reject the existence of objective moral values just because one knows that there is no God. That would be a valid logical step: "I know there is no God, therefore I can conclude there are no objective moral values." But as Craig said, then we need to ask which of these has more evidence in support of it: (A) That at least some moral values exist objectively, or (B) that God does not exist? If one wants to say, "well, gosh, I think Mother 1 is more moral, but that's only my opinion, it's a matter of our preferences, and others might disagree..." then one ought to be sure that one has plenty of proof there is no God--because that statement is one of those extraordinary claims that needs a lot of support under it.
*Since then it has become unclear how much this question matters to ordinary seeker, but the dialogue is instructive anyway.
Posted: Sat - December 1, 2007 at 07:04 AM |
Quick Links
Categories
"Do Christians believe we hold the truth? No, it holds us; we submit to it and to the One who gives it. We seek the truth to know it and follow it, that it may grip us tighter yet."
Personal Profile
Guest Speaking
Articles Published Elsewhere
Frequently Discussed Topics
My Other Blog
Email this link to a friend
XML/RSS Feed: Blog Entries
Feedburner Feed
XML/RSS Feed: Comments
Guest Speaking
Articles Published Elsewhere
Frequently Discussed Topics
My Other Blog
Email this link to a friend
XML/RSS Feed: Blog Entries
Feedburner Feed
XML/RSS Feed: Comments
Archives
Knowing God
Recent Comments
Blogroll
Statistics
Total entries in this blog:
Total entries in this category:
Published On: Dec 06, 2007 01:04 PM
Total entries in this category:
Published On: Dec 06, 2007 01:04 PM
