Does God Explain Anything At All? (Part 3)There is no denying the power of scientific
explanation. How far does this power go? doctor(logic), a physicist, has worked
with us to define what "explanation" means in his terms, and I'll hazard a guess
that his view comes almost entirely from his scientific background. His
perspective is a good representation of
scientism,
the view that there is either no truth or no knowledge but what can be gained or
confirmed through science. In my view this is a corrosive view, not just to
Christianity but to all kinds of human experience and knowledge. In the end it's
self-corrosive, for it defeats
itself.
Here's his statement again: - A) An explanation must be more than a restatement of observations - B) An explanation must be more than a reference to an explanation that we don't yet have, but hope to have in the future. - C) Vague references to God do not qualify under (B) - D) Predictiveness does qualify, and in fact is the only thing that does qualify (see especially here for that) - E) Prediction has the implication that some future observations will raise your confidence in the explanation, and other future observations will lower your confidence in the application (see especially here for that) - F) That which is not explained in this model is just unexplained; no other explanatory schema are admitted (There's more on (F) here.) There we have it. It's time to take a close look at it. First we have to acknowledge the validity that is
there in this formulation. (A) and (B) are obvious, yet they are also important
foundational statements for any theory of explanation. (C) is certainly true,
though not every reference to God is vague, so it does not apply as generally as
doctor(logic) has suggested in previous discussions. We can agree with the first
half of (D); we'll have much more to say about the second half later. (E) is
fine as a principle for defining what is meant by prediction.
The physical sciences have operated under principles like this, and very successfully, so let's give credit where due. The model works for many purposes. doctor(logic) says it works for all purposes, though. But there is so much we take as explanation in life that has little obvious connection to predictiveness. Why do I like jazz music? Is there an explanation for it? Is it predictive? Why do I think I had a blueberry scone for lunch? Is there a predictively-connected explanation for that thought in my head? doctor(logic) says yes. An excerpt or two from his comment there: "a) Tom, putting the pot of water on the stove, explains the boiling water. "When this is used in common English, what is assumed? Stoves are for heating things, and are used by intelligent agents who can't heat things simply by wishing them heated. Tom is a human, and humans have the ability to place pots on stoves. Humans often do this to meet common goals, e.g., in food preparation. "IOW, this is an explanation of who boiled this particular pot of water, not the boiling of water in general. As an answer to this question, it seems quite predictive. We can go and ask Tom whether he placed the pot on the stove, and use established statistical facts about how people answer such questions to arrive at the conclusion he will say yes if he placed the pot there. We may find witnesses or fingerprints. It may be that Tom places a characteristic amount of water in the pot. Or perhaps he is slicing some broccoli on a nearby chopping board." We may not do this detective work, but we could; so the explanation fits the principle of predictiveness. But later we also read: "On the last thread, Michael said: "'Intangibles, such as love, hate, anger, etc. clearly exist and have real effect on humans. Yet, to try to use the scientific method to prove such intangibles, or as a basis of explanation for observations does not work very well.' "Just because the data collected and the inferences made aren't in publishable form doesn't mean we're not building statistically predictive explanations. "How do I know another person loves me? By an informal statistical method. Love is that which leads to affection and selfless behavior, and something that triggers characteristic feelings and emotions. Yet love is statistical. If the other person screams at me and calls me names, that does not prove they don't love me, even if this "outlier" is inconsistent with the general trend. Within all of us, there are other factors all brewing in a complex soup of behavior and emotional displays. "And love is also predictive. If I theorize that a person gave me a gift because they love me, there are actions and behaviors in that person that I would consider less likely. If they steal my wallet, I'm probably going to reduce my confidence in my theory. If they buy me a Valentine's Day card, I'll increase my confidence. "This is Bayesian statistics, albeit rather informally done." Now we're in strange territory. Love and hate, he says, can be treated statistically, in a Bayesian sense, and in fact that's how everyone does it. ("Bayesian" statistics are rather friendly toward fuzzy, loose conclusions. That's probably all you need to know about that here.) I have a complaint here, one that I'm sure doctor(logic) could respond to, but I'm going to raise it anyway: he's putting predictiveness in strange places. He suggests that all our interactions involve hypothesis testing. It seems to me that this could only be suggested by a modern Westerner. The vast majority of humans in much of the world today--and everyone, before a few centuries ago--would consider this completely foreign to their experience. This is a culture-bound view. Maybe doctor(logic) thinks everyone actually does operate this way, and they just don't have the vocabulary to conceptualize it so. I don't know how we would prove him right or wrong on that. But the thing seems to be forced into a modernistic, scientistic framework. That's enough for now. My purpose here has been to place doctor(logic)'s viewpoint in context of modern science, to appreciate its successes in some aspects there, and to remind us that this is not the only way of looking at the world. Next time I will ask some questions in areas where I think this version of "explanation" has very serious problems. We'll have to look also at whether explanations involving God meet any agreeable standards. Part of a Series • Part
1
• Part
2
• Part
3
• Part
4
Posted: Thu - September 13, 2007 at 03:48 PM | |
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