Ehrman's Assumptions

Yesterday we began looking at the Craig-Ehrman debate on the historicity of Christ's resurrection, starting with four facts that enjoy general historical agreement. While that discussion continues, it's worth looking at the attitudes William Lane Craig and Bart Ehrman each brought into the debate. In one comment on this blog today, Dr. Craig has already been accused of basing his historical conclusions on his prior presuppositions. In fact, Dr. Ehrman was much more obviously guilty of that.

Certainly, Dr. Craig does believe in the historicity of the Bible. One would be hard pressed, though, to find where he uses his belief in revelation as a premise for any argument in this debate. Dr. Ehrman, on the other hand, peppers his presuppositions throughout. On page 12:

"Historians can only establish what probably happened in the past, and by definition a miracle is the least probable occurrence. And so, by the very nature of the canons of historical research, we can't claim historically that a miracle probably happened. By definition, it probably didn't. And history can only establish what probably did."

We can't find fault with treating history as an attempt to determine what probably happened. Dr. Craig showed in his first rebuttal, though, that this view of probability is naive and incomplete, and he sketched out a more technically accurate use of probabilities. Dr. Ehrman, in his responses, was simply quite unprepared to deal with it on that level. We won't go into that here, though; our topic is presuppositions in research. Later on page 12 Dr. Ehrman brings up an alternative scenario and says of it:

"I don't believe this. I don't think it happened this way, but it's more probable than a miracle happening because a miracle by definition is the least probable occurrence."

Now, that's an interesting definition. Let's see where he's heading with these views. After relating this scenario he says,

"This is a highly unlikely scenario, but you can't object that it's impossible to have happened because it's not."

Notice how he has switched terms here, from improbable to impossible. Later in that paragraph:

"This alternative explanation I've given you--which again is not one that I believe--is at least plausible, and it's historical, as opposed to Bill's explanation, which is not a historical explanation. Bill's explanation is a theological explanation."

Do you see what has happened here? He has defined the resurrection out of existence. Suppose for the sake of argument it might have happened. By this standard, it could never be historical. Ehrman's conclusion that it is not historical is entirely independent of whether it happened or not. It is independent of all evidence. The resurrection, a "theological explanation," could never rise to the level of an historical explanation--even if it happened.

More along those lines--on page 25:

"People who are historians can be of any theological persuasion. They can be Buddhists, they can be Hindus, they can be Muslims, they can be Christians, they can be Jews, they can be agnostics, they can be atheists, and the theory behind the canons in historical research is that people of every persuasion can look at the evidence and draw the same conclusions. But Bill's hypothesis requires a person to believe in God."

Recall that Dr. Craig does not use his belief in God as a premise in his argumentation; he is arguing toward the conclusion of a God, not from the assumption of a God. His conclusion does require that one be open to the possibility of a God, but isn't openness to possibility a good thing? How open is Dr. Ehrman? His standard here requires that absolutely no conclusion of any theological import can be drawn. It is impossible, in his terms, for any historical fact relating to any religious belief ever to be established. As before, he's made it impossible by definition! Why bother doing historical research about any faith if you already know you can't ever discover anything by it, other than what every dissenter would be happy to agree with?

Also on page 25:

"I'm asking, suppose miracles do happen, can historians demonstrate it? No."

And on page 27:

"Even if we want to believe in the resurrection of Jesus, that belief is a theological belief. You can't prove the resurrection. It's not susceptible to historical evidence. It's faith."

~~It's almost comical when in the Q&A (page 30) he says,~~

~~"So the historian can't have a presupposition; they have to back up whatever their metaphysical beliefs they're going to bring to the table."~~

[That line was in error.]

Be sure to check out Dr. Craig's answer on that page, where he shows that Dr. Ehrman's methodological atheism is self-refuting [that portion remains relevant]. Don't dismiss the argument before you've read it, by the way. His conclusion there is nothing too remarkable, but it's far from Dr. Ehrman's approach:

"So it seems to me that the historian has to be open, at least, methodologically."

Finally, on page 33, Dr. Ehrman says,

"In every single instance [of a reported miracle] you have to evaluate whether it's a probable event or not. And it can never be a probable event."

I hope it's clear by now who employed a closed set of presuppositions in this debate.

(One final housekeeping note: Dr. Ehrman said Dr. Craig "cannot prove the resurrection." The position Dr. Craig in fact took is that there is historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. That's different from claiming proof. He explicitly speaks of a probabilistic interpretation of that evidence.)

Posted: Thu - June 29, 2006 at 07:49 PM |

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Ehrman's Assumptions

Thinking Christian by Tom Gilson