Freedom Evolves, by Dennett: Final Chapters

Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves, in the end, was disappointing (though not surprisingly so), for he never established that his kind of freedom exists; therefore whether it evolves or not is irrelevant and uninteresting.

I've been reading too many books at once, so it's taking me a good while to finish Dennett's Freedom Evolves. I'm finishing it more or less out of a sense of duty. The first several chapters (which I wrote on earlier) set out to make a case that such a thing as freedom from determinism exists under materialist assumptions; and while they did more or less make that case, in the process he lost hold of agency or intentionality. In Dennett, freedom means that what happens to us is not mechanistically determined, but he does not successfully show that decisions are more than something that more or less happens to us inside the brain.

It was difficult, then to continue through the middle chapters of the book, where he shows that freedom of that sort could evolve. Maybe it could; I'm still doubting that sort of freedom is really freedom. Since he hasn't shown that it is, why should I care whether it evolves?

Chapter 8, "Are You Out of the Loop," attempts to address it, but it's a mish-mash of false dichotomies, misleading analogies, and straw-man arguments. The final chapter returns to the evolutionary theme.

Sometimes I wonder about myself: Shouldn't I be delighted when an intellectual opponent fails to make his case? Why does it disappoint me, then? For it does. I think in the case of my two favorite nemeses, Dennett and Dawkins, it has to do with the number of books they've sold and the number of people they influence, when what they have to offer is not all that strong after all. There are more effective challenges to Christian faith than theirs by far. Maybe I'm resentful of their success. Maybe I'm disappointed in the reading public (those who would read a Dennett or a Dawkins ought to be capable thinkers). Maybe I'm grieved that people are so committed to their materialist presuppositions that they'll buy into authors who don't make much of a case.

I'm not inclined to list the specific weaknesses I see in the middle and final chapters of Dennett's book, because if, as I've said, he hasn't demonstrated freedom exists under his system, then those parts are irrelevant. He can't persuade me freedom has evolved if he can't show that freedom of his sort actually exists.

As for chapter 8, I'll detail just one of the problems. ("Conrad" here is his devil's advocate personality.)

"CONRAD: Aha! You admit it then. You're just playing with words, and trying to pass off margarine for real butter. I exhort all people to demand real free will; accept no substitutes!"

[Returning to Dennett's own voice now] "And do you also advise diabetics to insist on 'real' insulin, instead of the artificial stuff? If your real heart gives out some day, will you spurn an artificial substitute that can perform all the functions of your real heart? . . . I claim that the varieties of free will I am defending are worth wanting precisely because the play all the valuable roles free will has been traditionally assigned to play."

I alluded to false analogies; this is one of them, for the free will Dennett espouses is not like a diabetic's insulin or an artificial heart. It's more like a plastic heart in a grade school science class, a fake that is no substitute at all. It does not perform all the functions of the real thing, in spite of his claim that it does, for it does away with agency and intentionality.

There is much of what seems merely playing with words in this chapter. The analogy to Cupid is really classic in that regard. He puts an argument in his opponents' mouth, saying, in effect, "if Cupid's arrows aren't literally real, how can there be true love? If free will isn't spiritual, how can it be genuine?" Improper analogizing and straw-man argumentation of that sort may also be why I'm disappointed in Dennett. It seems cheap.

I've run across a couple of extended responses to Dennett's views on intentionality: one by Bill Vallicella, the other by Angus Menuge. I suggest you start with Vallicella; it's a more manageable sized piece to chew on.

Posted: Thu - July 14, 2005 at 08:55 PM |

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Freedom Evolves, by Dennett: Final Chapters

Thinking Christian by Tom Gilson