Evidences for the Soul? 


My post, "P.Z. Myers's Neurons Give Talk," has generated controversy and questions regarding the existence of the human soul. How do we know whether it exists? How could we possibly come to an answer?

I don't propose to give a complete accounting of the matter, but only to outline some responses. As I look over the previous discussion I'm impressed with two almost contradictory observations: the complexity of the question, and its simplicity. Regarding the complexity, there are a few book recommendations there--always a reminder of how much I haven't read and haven't learned yet. I think I've approached a piece of what can be known, but there is always so much more! Regarding simplicity, I think nevertheless that some of the most important parts of the answer to this question are both more complex and more simple (in different sense, of course) than some people have thought. 

Take for instance, the question of how soul interacts with body. Juno Walker recommended a book I have not had time to read, Susan Blackmore's Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. And Juno helpfully provided an excerpt regarding substance dualism (which was defined in that prior blog post):
 
"Known as Cartesian dualism, this is the idea that the mind and the brain consist of different substances. The trouble with this is obvious. How do the two interact? Descartes proposed that they meet in the tiny pineal gland in the centre of the brain, but this only staves off the problem a little. The pineal gland is a physical structure and Cartesian dualism provides no explanation of why it, alone, can communicate with the mental realm."
We can dispense with the pineal gland theory; it has no relevance to the current state of the discussion. Descartes can (I hope) be forgiven for being overly ambitious with that hypothesis. The core of the theory is that the mind or soul is immaterial, and that it nevertheless has some interaction with the physical world through the brain. The physical brain is necessary, but not in itself sufficient, for the mind or soul to have that physical world interaction. (For the rest of this post I will use the term "soul" for the immaterial aspect of self; I could as easily use "mind," for I don't think the distinction matters in this context.)

How can soul interact with physical reality? Well, what does one mean by this how question? I urge you to explore the mental pictures it generates within you. We are accustomed to how questions being answerable in terms of physical interactions: interactions of particles and forces and so on: one physical event precedes another and makes the second one happen. The substance dualist position challenges this approach: it says, if that is the kind of explanation you demand, you are begging the question. If you say the explanation must be given in physicalist terms, you are arguing in a circle. You are setting the rules of interaction such that the dualist isn't permitted to answer in dualist terms. We have to explain how our system could be true, using only principles that are acceptable in yours; we have to assume that you are right in order for us to explain how you are wrong.

So how then can the immaterial affect the material? I don't know, and I don't think I need to know. I only need to know that it can happen. It happened when God created the universe; as an immaterial being, he caused everything physical to come into existence. And it happens when my immaterial thoughts direct my fingers to type. Am I now guilty of begging the question? No, I'm not. Please be careful to catch the important distinction here, now--for, just what question do you think I am begging? The current question is not whether there is a God or an immaterial mind, but how such an entity could affect the physical universe.

We'll come back to more on that whether question in a moment. For now, let's take stock of what we have here. Blackmore has suggested that substance dualism is easily and obviously dismissed ("the trouble with this is obvious," she wrote) because the how question cannot be answered. In fact, our inability to answer the how question does not tell for or against substance dualism; certainly not obviously, in any event. It only counts against substance dualism if one allows only physicalist answers (begging the question, that is). Substance dualism is a live option in spite of Blackmore's objection.

So from there--the fact that substance dualism has not thereby been ruled out--we must move on to whether there is any positive evidence for the soul. Before we do that, though, please note again the simplicity and complexity of the issue, and that Blackmore and Juno Watcher have misapprehended it, thinking that the question can be quite simply be done away with. They tried to dismiss the whole matter on a very simple level, and failed. It's more complex than that.

Now, is there positive evidence for the existence of soul? Yes, of two varieties. First, the philosophical variety. Simply stated, the physical brain is insufficient to explain many of the common human experiences of life: consciousness, free will, rational thought or reason, ethical knowledge, unity of self, and so on. Neurological explanations can account for some but not nearly all of this.

Franklin Mason outlined a version of the argument from consciousness. C.S. Lewis, expanded by Victor Reppert (see also here), developed an Argument From Reason. I've worked on the question of free will by examining Daniel Dennett's physicalist view. (I wrote this before I learned to link related blog posts, so I'll refer you to here, here, here, and here. Sorry it's so inelegant.) I've done very little study on the unity of self so I will not try to cover it here. As to the ethical issues, that comprises an entire category of this blog (see the categories at the upper right side). You can see that it would be very cumbersome to re-state all those arguments here; the point is that there is good philosophical reason to doubt that a purely physical brain can account for all of human experience.

The second line of argument in favor of the human soul is from the Bible. The existence of the soul is taught throughout. Whether it is material or non-material in humans living on earth is not directly addressed; but it is clear that God is immaterial, and that the soul can and does survive the body. (Am I begging the question here by assuming the truth of the Bible? No, because there is strong evidence for its veracity for many other reasons--but again, there is too much of that to repeat all of it here.)

Finally--and still in brief outline form, unfortunately, what about the objection that science finds such close ties between the physical brain and our consciousness and experience? That is entirely consistent with substance dualism, which holds that the soul's expression in the physical world depends on the brain--both its health and its capacities.* Therefore brain damage certainly does inhibit the soul's expression--this is expected under both substance dualism and physicalism, so it does not tell for or against either theory. And what about the fact that memories or other phenomena can be stimulated in the brain by electrodes? Again, it's not telling, especially since in all such reported cases that I'm aware of, the subject is aware of being in one place and time while having "an experience" of another place and time. (If you know of exceptions I'll be interested to hear of them.) In other words, electrodes do not displace any unity of consciousness, reality, or self.

And what about mental illness, in which these unities are displaced? Well, as I said, this is a complex matter. I probably have more intellectual difficulty over this than just about any other question. But what I've written so far should, I hope, show that substance dualism is a viable option with considerable evidence to support it--more than the physicalist alternative, in spite of the unanswered questions.

*By the way, the soul's expression in the physical world, not its existence, is dependent on the brain's health and capacities. That answers some of the questions brought up in the discussion on the prior post, but I won't belabor that any further here. 

Posted: Thu - August 2, 2007 at 04:02 PM           |


© 2004-2007 by Tom Gilson. Permission is granted to quote up to two paragraphs of any blog entry, provided that a link back to the original is included or (in print) the website address is provided. Please email me regarding longer quotes. All other rights reserved.

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