I promised a post on the question, “Isn’t Christian ethics a matter of self-interest after all?” It’s turning out to be two posts rather than one. Some of what I write on this will be exploratory and experimental, the product of my own reflection and not others’ thinking. That means I’m especially wide open to discussion and correction as may be needed.
The question arises because the Bible promises rewards for those who follow God in his way and on his terms, and warns of consequences for those who do not. If that is so, then isn’t this just like secular ethics at its worst, “looking out for number one”? What makes biblical ethics any different?
Please note carefully what kind of question this is. It’s not about whether Christian ethics are true, but, what is the nature of Christian ethical beliefs, or what is true of ethics if Christian ethics are true?
I find that secularists discussing ethics consistently point toward practical ethics: what does it take for people to understand and to do what is good? Many times they have said that’s all that really matters anyway; what difference does it make to discuss ethics except in context of the way we actually act? Christian ethical considerations cannot begin there, however, but must start with the character of God. God is eternal and infinite, and he is good. Hence reality at its deepest foundation is good. It’s not just a matter of how we act, it’s a matter of the way all reality is constituted.
Before going on with the argument I want to invite believers (and others) reading this to pause and reflect on that: reality, at its deepest foundation, is good. It doesn’t always seem that way, but it is, because God is good. There is always a deeply personal side to this. Chances are you’re having a significant struggle of some sort, and the deep goodness of which I speak is not clearly apparent. It’s not that all that is, is good. It’s that where there is evil, God is at work correcting and redeeming it, restoring goodness. He’s doing it in his own time and in his own way, but that he is at work is as certain as the rising of the sun. To experience his goodness requires us to go deep in communion with him: and that is part of his purpose in working this way. He wants us to connect deeply with him that way.
Back to the question I started with: is Christian ethics a matter of disguised self-interest? No, because Christian ethics is not just a matter of what it takes to think and do what is good. Christian ethics is about what actually is good, and what would be good even if no human ever lived to practice or experience it. Love, truth, and faithfulness (to name a few) are good not for some instrumental reason, such as fulfilling persons’ maximum happiness. They are good because they are of the nature of a good God.
One effect of goodness being grounded in deepest reality is that good produces good. To do good will naturally lead to good outcomes. I use “naturally” here not in the sense of natural (scientific) laws, but in the sense that it is in the nature of God’s creation to align with the principle that good leads to good. This progress is frustrated and thwarted in many ways, but only on the surface and only for a time; for the goodness of God’s work will prevail.
I’m sure my skeptical detractors are already preparing to pounce with something like, “What you’re writing is just fairy-tale fluff, a deluded hope that some invisible God will come through for you some day by-and-by.” Let’s be sure, though, if you want to dispute what I’ve written, that you dispute the actual point in discussion. The question was not whether Christian ethical beliefs are true or false; it was whether Christian ethics are based on self-interest. The answer to that question must be based on Christians take to be true about ethics. What I have written here—whether you agree with it or not—is what Christianity takes to be true about ethics.
The next post in this series will be based in large part on this: goodness is fundamental to all of what is real, and when humans practice what is good, we are rising toward reality.
_______________
Possibly related posts (automatically generated):
Hi Tom
The argument does not answer the question you posited.
1. If what is good is what is in God’s eternal nature, this gives no reason to act for anyone, apart from God – that is no motivation – to act according to god’s nature. Why ought anyone act accordingly? So your response to arguing the Christians are not acting in self-interest is a non sequitur.
Plus the idea that what is good is in God’s eternal nature is unintelligible. Good is not the type of thing that can be in anyone’s nature, unless you can explain otherwise. One can say that a person’s actions is an examplar of what it is for right behaviour, but that does not explain what good is. You need to explain what you mean by good to make this argument intelligible.
You are ignorant about what the terms “good” and “nature” mean (and by extension, what analogical language is and to what degree it may be used). You a priori limit your understanding of “good” to moral actions, disregarding the fact that it is a philosophical term of art (a trancendental), like being, true, one, beauty, thing, etc. Please do some homework and serious critical thinking before making embarrassing and unsubstantiated assertions such as “Good is not the type of thing that can be in anyone’s nature, unless you can explain otherwise.”
(Of course, it’s another issue whether you reject these terms of art because they don’t fit your narrow preconceived notions.)
Desirism: a another form of self-centeredness (Ecclesiastes 1:9).
Martin, with respect to your item 1, you seem to have missed that this was the first post of two on this topic.
With respect to your second item, you have done again what you did with your previous comments on another thread. You have made an unsupported assertion and tried to lay the burden on me to argue its denial:
Your assertion is, “good is not the type of thing that can be in anyone’s nature.”
Your attempt to lead me to argue for its denial is, “unless you can explain otherwise.”
And your following sentence, if it is intended as an argument, is really too weak to count as one.
It would be just as easy for someone to respond to you with the bare assertion, “Good is the type of thing that can reside in one’s nature, unless you can explain otherwise.” But where does that get us? Does it increase understanding? Does it advance the discussion? No to both; just as your own bare assertion fails to advance the discussion or increase understanding. It’s just bellicose.
Maybe you’re not doing this on purpose. If you are, then please don’t try it here again. If not, then I suggest you develop a sensitivity to it so you can be better equipped to carry out discussions like this more in good faith. Whether your intent in it is purposeful or not, it’s not a game I’m to play. I’m going to call you on it again, and wait for you to explain what you mean by your assertion, and why you think anyone ought to believe it.
But I should add this. If you are genuinely puzzled over (for example), how I (or Holopupenko) think that good could be the sort of thing that could be in one’s nature, that would be quite an appropriate question to ask. I don’t have any problem at all with relevant questions. They’re a lot different from unsupported pronouncements of the sort you have been wont to make.
Holopupenko, I agree he didn’t demonstrate that he knew what he was talking about there, but I would caution you against name calling like “ignorant;” and to be aware that although you may consider his arguments (or lack thereof) embarrassing, it’s not helping the discussion when you use that kind of terminology. It’s bellicose, too. Considering that it’s a pronouncement you’re making that not all would agree with, in its own way it’s another kind of unsupported assertion, and a personally-focused one at that.
Corollary to my comment 4 here, Martin: if you think I’ve made unsupported assertions, by all means point them out to me. That kind of interaction is always welcome, too. (I think I said as much in the previous thread, the comment I linked to in my comment 3 here.)
Tom
As I said “You need to explain what you mean by good to make this argument intelligible.” I was asking a question and indicating why I thought it was a highly relevant question here.
You said “If you are genuinely puzzled over (for example), how I (or Holopupenko) think that good could be the sort of thing that could be in one’s nature, that would be quite an appropriate question to ask.”
Indeed I am genuinely puzzled, and until I see an answer, it remains unintelligible. So could you please answer the question.
(I will await post 2 to see what your answer to my main question is).
Thanks for that, Martin. I’m actually puzzled by your puzzlement, but that’s what these discussions are good for. I’ll be glad to try to clarify.
Holopupenko could probably do this in a more philosophically precise manner, but I’ll take the approach I know how to take.
Good either applies to some class of objects, actions, states, etc., or it does not. There are eliminativists who would say that good does not properly apply to anything in itself whatever; that it is merely a label we functionally apply toward objects or situations when we feel favorably about them, and thus its proper referent (in a sidewise fashion) is actually our feelings. “That is a good song,” actually means, “I feel fine when I hear this song,” and nothing more than that. That’s not so controversial, but it also extends to this: “Feeding hungry children is good,” actually means, “I feel fine when I think about hungry children being fed,” and nothing more than that. There is no goodness actually inherent in feeding hungry children. There is only persons’ internally-experienced sense of pleasure or satisfaction.
Oh, and by the say, internally-experienced pleasure or satisfaction cannot be called good, either. Nothing can, if one cares to be precise, for every use of good is indirect, a reference not to the action, state, condition, etc., but only to the fact that one has a certain internal response to it.
Corollary to this is that bad has no reference to objects, conditions, states, actions, etc., either. Its meaning is also indirect. What Pol Pot did in the killing fields was not bad. Although we call it that, it’s only a code word for “producing unpleasant sensations within one who thinks about what Pol Pot did.”
Now, I could go on and critique this further, but first I want to make sure I’m not heading off on a tangent. I’d like to know whether you take the term good in this indirect/eliminative sense. Then I’ll know where to proceed from there.
Hi Tom
You say “Good either applies to some class of objects, actions, states, etc., or it does not. ”
You then go on to discuss eliminativism and reject that. Well I reject that to. So you have not told me what good is yet.
What I am asking is what is the axiological theory upon which you can conclude that the good is a property of a god’s eternal nature? (I suggest that you get your axiology clear first before we examine claims in relation to gods).
You make it sound as if I’d done something awful. The reason I discussed eliminativism is because based on what you wrote earlier, I thought it possible you adhered to it; and if you did, I would take the discussion one direction, and if you didn’t, I would go a different direction. I explored the possibility and asked you the question. You could have just answered it.
I’ll be back after lunch.
Tom
“You make it sound as if I’d done something awful”
.
I think you are reading far more into my reply #9 that can be justified. Now am I making your comment #10 sound awful? No!
I am interested in how you get to your claims over “good” but so far I am none the wiser, indeed, upon further reflection, I am more puzzled.
So far, if anything critique over eliminativism is equally applicable to your god hypothesis which makes it appear like you are contradicting yourself. On the pain of consistency, if it is not sufficient for good or bad to depend only upon anyone’s nature – and I agree – then it is not sufficient for this to apply even if it is a god’s nature we are talking about.
Lunch was quicker than I expected.
Martin, you reject eliminativism, as you have just said. I take it that means you think good can actually, properly, be used to describe conditions, states, actions, objects, etc., or some subset thereof. Yet you say that it cannot be used as a descriptor for God. I don’t want to lay out an entire axiological theory here when I might be able to answer your question in a much more focused and direct way. So help me with this, please: just what is it that makes applying the word good to God seems unintelligible, when there is nothing unintelligible about applying it elsewhere?
I see you have already anticipated my latest question. Thanks. And thanks for the smile, too!
We agree that good is not a property of anyone’s nature – we deny eliminativism as you call it – but then you say it is a property of a god’s nature. Surely that is a contradiction, that is it is incoherent, hence unintelligible, for you to assert them both as true?
Now, what is it about God’s nature that is different? You say,
What you say you agree with here is not something that I said, so it is not true that we agree. I did not say at all that it is insufficient for good or bad to depend on anyone’s nature. Rather I said that if good and bad apply only as sidewise descriptors of one’s experience of some condition, object, situation, etc., then the words good and bad are being inappropriately used. We ostensibly apply them toward the song or the feeding of hungry children or the killing fields, when what we are really referring to is our internal states on contemplating those things.
So there is no inconsistency (not there, at least) in saying that good can be used to describe something in itself, i.e. in its nature.
We do in fact speak of certain actions as being good. We speak of conditions being good. Do we speak of persons as good? We must be more cautious here, for there is none who is truly, unalloyedly good, and in comparison to God’s goodness, no human even makes it on the map. But I believe nevertheless we can at least speak comparatively among humans: there are those who are more good than others, and there are those who are worse: Martin Luther King, Jr., say, compared to Momčilo Krajišnik. We apply the term to humans’ character, which because of the mixed-up kinds of beings we are, is not quite the same as our nature. When we speak of God, though, we can speak also of his character, but morally speaking his character is his nature and his nature is his character. Thus we can speak intelligibly of his nature being good.
“I said that if good and bad apply only as sidewise descriptors of one’s experience of some condition, object, situation, etc., then the words good and bad are being inappropriately used.”[My Emphasis]
Not necessarily, it depends on what values are talking about. When we are referring to,say, beauty and ugly this is not inappropriate at all. However we are talking about good and bad in the ethical sense.
“Do we speak of persons as good?” That cannot be denied but as I already pointed out, they are exemplars of good, but you still have not explained what good is. If you could, we could drop reference to such labels as “good” and “bad” – and avoid any further accidental ambiguity- and then see if your description of what good means can apply directly to any person.
“We must be more cautious here, for there is none who is truly, unalloyedly good, and in comparison to God’s goodness, no human even makes it on the map. ”
This is begging the question. It is the argument for your conclusion that I am asking for.
“We apply the term to humans’ character, which because of the mixed-up kinds of beings we are, is not quite the same as our nature. ”
You are being very vague as to what “character” and “nature” are now. Surely a good person is a person with good desires? And this is far clearer that references to nature or character. We then need to know what makes desires good and, we agree, that this is not in solely virtue of them just being satisfied, or experiencing pleasure or happiness (at least when it comes to ethical good).
“When we speak of God, though, we can speak also of his character, but morally speaking his character is his nature and his nature is his character. Thus we can speak intelligibly of his nature being good.”
The only way this makes sense is to say that your God only good desires and no bad desires. However we deny that desires are intrinsically good, surely that was your eliminativist argument? Yet you are insisting that, inconsistently with your eliminativist position, that when it comes to your God, this is now acceptable? In addition to contradiction, this looks like the fallacy of a double standard.
Or are you saying that your God’s nature has no “experience of some condition, object, situation”? Then this looks like the fallacy of equivocation of any pragmatic
understanding of “nature” whether it refers to any person (human or a god).
Someone’s been reading Plato. 8^>
What is the true, the good, and the beautiful? If we accept the premise that the universe was created by a good God then the answer is self-evident. Good is that which conforms to the nature of God.
If, however, we are uncertain about our origin… if, for instance, we were created by a capricious and cruel god, or if we are the result of chance and necessity, then good is a feeling we experience. We cannot say for certain in anything is true, or good, or beautiful. We cannot even say for certain that the feeling we experience has any objective relation to reality or if there is a reality to which we relate.
Take your pick.
That’s correct, Dave.
Martin will probably say it is question-begging to say “good is that which conforms to the nature of God.” But I don’t think that’s the case at all. He did not ask for an argument but for a definition, and what you have provided is a definition. Goodness is exemplified in such things as justice, love, holiness, faithfulness, truth, creativity, beauty, and so forth. But its simplest definition is what you provided.
Back to Martin’s previous comment: when or how did I assert that desires cannot be good in themselves? I described that belief that as part of the eliminativist position, with which I disagree.
And how is it that a person can only be good on the basis of his or her desires? Does that mean it’s impossible for anything other than a person (or animal) to be good? For only persons (or animals) can have desires.
Hi Dave
“What is the true, the good, and the beautiful?”
This might be related but they are different questions that can have different answers.
“If we accept the premise that the universe was created by a good God then the answer is self-evident.
This is a non sequitur. If we did know what was good and accepted the premise that the universe was created by such a good god, it does not follow that “Good is that which conforms to the nature of God”. That is also a genetic fallacy. The answer certainly is not self-evident.
“if, for instance, we were created by a capricious and cruel god, or if we are the result of chance and necessity, then good is a feeling we experience. ” This is also a non sequitur.
You guys can clear all this mystery up by telling what you think good means and then I can examine your claims. Without that nothing seems to follow from your claims.
“Take your pick”. This is a false dichotomy given the genetic fallacy and no sequiturs.
Hi Martin
I think you forget, reason is a two part process. We reason from assumptions to conclusions. The assumptions are those things which cannot be proved. You might build an impeccable chain of reasoning on false assumptions and your conclusions, no matter how valid the chain of reason, will be false. I note that while your critique of Tom’s ideas are valid on the surface you have so far failed to reveal your own assumptions.
If you have been reading Plato you will be aware of the difficulty involved in saying “good = X”, and you will be aware that good, true, and beautiful are somehow connected. Like the way many mathematicians relate that valid mathematical formulae have a “beauty” in their structure.
By which standard will you examine our claims? Who are you that I should even consider you qualified to perform such examination? In other words, what are the hidden assumptions by which you pass judgement?
ReCaptcha = “not stodgy” but possibly pedantic. 8^>
Tom
“Martin will probably say it is question-begging to say “good is that which conforms to the nature of God.”
It is not question begging. It is failing to answer the question to make a notion of good intelligible and meaningful. What is God’s nature and what is it in God’s nature that is good and why?
“He did not ask for an argument but for a definition, and what you have provided is a definition.”
I asked for both and have so far received poor arguments and, as yet, no definition. Dave has certainly failed to provide one. No-one has yet explained what good is, only tried to declare by fiat that good is somehow in God’s nature, whilst failing to explain how that is even possible.
“Goodness is exemplified in such things as justice, love, holiness, faithfulness, truth, creativity, beauty, and so forth.” Yes these are all value or value-laden terms but that does not explain what good (let alone now “goodness” which hardly helps, indeed what does “goodness” mean – that look like a reification) means.
“But its simplest definition is what you provided.”
Well, where it it?
“when or how did I assert that desires cannot be good in themselves? I described that belief that as part of the eliminativist position, with which I disagree.”
Huh? What do you disagree with? You are now asserting that desire can be good in themselves or you disagree wiht that assertion, that they cannot be good in themselves or what?
“And how is it that a person can only be good on the basis of his or her desires?”
How else can they be good?
“Does that mean it’s impossible for anything other than a person (or animal) to be good? For only persons (or animals) can have desires.”
Another implied non sequitur. Surely, given your first argument, good can refer to various types of entities, desire being only one type of entity, so it does not follow that good cannot refer to other entities in other ways. It depends on what type of entity you are talking about.
Again until you explain what on earth you think good means and, preferably, talk in terms of what it means rather than using the label “good” you will likely continue not to make sense to someone who has no idea what you mean by good.
Tom:
Trancendentals are terms that characterizes things, but the these terms transcend (hence the name) division into the usual Aristotelian categories of substance and associated accidents because they apply to all beings (except, of course, to Being itself, i.e., God): unity, truth, goodness, beauty, thing. The key is understanding that a thing IS to the extent that it EXISTS, and in the same manner, a thing is TRUE to the extent that it EXISTS, etc. with the other transcendentals.
As pertains to real extra-mental substances, an electron (a real being) exists to a lesser degree (not kind) than a table or tree because, in fact, the beingness of electrons is subsumed under the reality of a tree or table. As pertains to accidents, a tree’s “height” cannot “exist” apart from the tree (or whatever real object). As pertains to logical constructs (in this case, beings of reason), the rules of chess exist only in the mind. As pertains to privations (lack of being), they are the most rarified form of existence. The term “nothing” means exactly that: nothing—no substance, no accidents, no nothing.
A thing is “good” to the extent that it exists as well: a human is, by its mode of existence, more “good” (NOT in the moral sense) than an electron. (If we stray into the theological realm, think creation: “… and God said it was good” because He created them, i.e., existence is “better” than non-existence, and “greater” existence is “better” than lesser existence.)
A human artifact can be properly termed “good”: a telephone is a “good” telephone if it works, i.e., if it’s existence properly meets its intention—to convey sound over long distances. A rock is also “good,” but, again, only to the extent of its existence. If it lies around and “acts out” its nature of “rockiness,” it is a “good” rock (NOT in the moral sense).
Moral acts are characterized as “good” or “evil” in a way different from mode of existence, although “good” and “evil” as moral acts are intimately tied to the nature of the moral agent—which is the important point: an act can only be morally termed “good” or “evil” if a moral agent (which implies a RATIONAL agent) undertakes that act. Why? Because a moral/rational agent must KNOW (reason) and choose (will) based on the knowledge in order to act, i.e., the capacity to reason and the capacity for free will (within the context of the particular nature of the agent) must be present and not coerced for the act to be called a moral (in this case “human”) act. Note that a “human act” is carefully and importantly distinguished from an “act of a human”: an example of the latter is breathing, an example of the former is not engaging in the evil of homosexual acts. A fully human act, that is, one proceeding from knowledge and free will, is either morally good or morally evil.
(Homosexual acts are evil because they are opposed to our natures as human beings, and those natures were created by God. And, Desirism (similarly to moral relativism) is an evil idea that if actualized is also an evil act because both the idea and the act are opposed to human nature.)
For a human act to be judged “good” or “evil,” all three of its components must be good: object, circumstances, intention or purpose or end. If any one of these three components are evil, the act is evil.
You’ll note I didn’t need to reference Scripture (except for the aside example) for this explication: it was done in the context of St. Anselm’s fides quaerens intellectum. Martin’s accusations of “non sequitur” or “question-begging” ring hollow and really are ignorant. Moreover, the above is why Martin’s self-serving view of morality is akin to a very thin gruel… and I stand upon my implied analysis of Martin’s intentions—not just his unsubstantiated assertions.
By the way, St. Anselm was neither trying to replace faith with reason, nor was he merely trying to edify and encourage believers—those are facile interpretations of his “faith seeking understanding.” Note what he says a the beginning of his Monologion: “If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard or because he does not believe, that there is one nature, supreme among all existing things, who alone is self-sufficient in his eternal happiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants and brings it about that all other things exist or have any sort of well-being, and a great many other things that we must believe about God or his creation, I think he could at least convince himself of most of these things by reason alone, if he is even moderately intelligent.” [Remember: sin dehumanizes us, which means it negatively impacts our ability to reason… compromising the capacity to reason of even the “moderately intelligent.] And, in his Proslogion Anselm’s clear intention is to convince “the fool,” that is, the person who “has said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1)
Martin, at the risk of being repetitious, here’s the definition of good you have been asking for:
Good is that which conforms to the nature of God.
You said we hadn’t provided a definition, but there it is for you, once again. Why do you say we didn’t give one?
How do we make it intelligible and meaningful? By understanding the nature of God. We learn, for example (and this too is a repeat of what has been said already), that God is just, faithful, true, creative.
You ask us to explain why this is good. Now, what is the request you are making here? The only sense I can make of it is that you are asking us to name some principle beyond God and beyond good that ties goodness together with God. But God is by definition that greater than which nothing exists or can be conceived, so there is no principle beyond God for us to refer to. If you disagree that these things are good, then please feel free to do so. Considering that God is the basis for all that is real, then you will simply find that you are wrong if you do that.
Once again, then, how do we understand what “good” means? God doesn’t try to explain it; rather he demonstrates it. He shows his character through his interaction with his creation. He doesn’t just say, “Beauty is good.” He creates beauty and calls it good. He doesn’t just say, “Truthfulness is good.” He speaks truth and exemplifies it. When he sees dishonesty he names it as not-good. Historically and practically speaking, this is how God has communicated his goodness, and what it means, to the people he created.
You say you are asking for an argument. Which assertion have I made for which you request an argument? I look at what you wrote, and all you have asked for prior to now was that I make my prior assertions intelligible.
We have a definition and we have exemplars. That’s how understanding terms usually moves forward.
If you couldn’t see that I disagreed with the elminativist position, then I guess I assumed far too much of you. Martin: theists are not eliminativists. When we speak of eliminativist positions, it is for the sake of clarifying others’ positions, not our own. (Does that come as news to you???) I am of course asserting that desires can be good in themselves, potentially. So can objects, states, conditions, relationships, and of course persons. I am not an eliminativist.
You say,
Thank you. I agree. I’d like to know (I thought I already asked this) how this squares with your earlier assertion,
I’m confused over what you mean by these things, taken together.
You said:”Good is that which conforms to the nature of God…You said we hadn’t provided a definition, but there it is for you, once again. Why do you say we didn’t give one?”
Not an intelligible one. You might as well have said “good is a colourless green idea sleeping furiously”. That is a definition too, but like yours it is pretty meaningless.
I am not asking for some principle “beyond God” but just a transparent definition not an opaque one, which is only a masquerade of a definition. Given your “definition”, you now need to explain what nature is. I gave the only plausible I know of, that God has good desires and if you agree to this, then we could explore that. If you do not agree to this then you need to provide an alternative explication of what it is this is in God’s nature that is good and why.
You said: “God is by definition that greater than which nothing exists or can be conceived… If you disagree that these things are good, then please feel free to do so.”
So good is not something that can be conceived? Hardly clear is it?
“Considering that God is the basis for all that is real, then you will simply find that you are wrong if you do that.”
On the contrary if you posit that God explains everything then it explains nothing since it lacks the relevant specifics to provide an explanation, at least if all you can say it is in God’s nature. Surely you can do better than that?
We have a wealth of explanations for many aspects of existence that do not refer to God. Maybe Berkeley is correct and God is the basis for all that but still we have explanations. However your assertions over good don’t seem to say anything meaningful. Someone mentioned Plato, at least he discussed some more meaningful, far less opaque definitions, if still not transparent. What you are are presenting is far worse than anything Plato considered that did not warrant him writing about AFAIK.
You said: “God doesn’t try to explain it; rather he demonstrates it. ”
So he cannot explain it! There is none greater than God yet he cannot offer a definition of good, it defeats even God???
I know you disagreed with the eliminatavist position, but you keep on contradicting yourself in your definition of good, at least in any interpretation I can think of. Can you provide a definition of God that does not require eliminativism, which is what your definition above fails to do? Or adumbrate your definition so that it means something and does not imply eliminativism?
“He doesn’t just say, “Truthfulness is good.” He speaks truth and exemplifies it. ”
Now you introduce another mystery “truthfulness” what on earth is that. If God speaks the truth why can he not explain “good”. Surely that should be easy for a god?
God’s nature is the way he is, his essence, his reality, his character. His nature is not exhausted in his desires, for his very being is a good.
Now, I did not say that good is not something that can be conceived. If you think it’s hardly clear, it’s because, Martin, you made it up. Please re-read what I wrote. And be responsible about what’s in the ellipsis you entered there.
I have provided relevant specifics, and this matter of “if you posit that God explains everything” is again something that you, not I have introduced into the conversation here. In some other contexts I might say something similar to that, but I didn’t say it here so I don’t accept the need to explain or defend it. What I said was that if you disagree that God is good, and that the expressions of his character are good, then you are wrong, for he is the basis for all that is real. Basis is different from explanation; basis is the foundation, the source, the reality-behind. I’m saying that to argue against the goodness of God, based on some other conception you think you might have, is to be arguing against reality itself.
You keep saying my assertions “don’t seem to say anything meaningful.” I could say the same back to you: your assertions don’t seem to say anything meaningful.
Did I say that? Did I say God cannot offer a definition of good? Once again, Martin, read what I wrote.
Could you also please explain just what on earth I have said that implies or entails eliminativism? I can’t begin to think of how I’ve done that.
Why can’t God explain “good”? He can: he points to himself. If you want him to point beyond himself to some principle above God, now, that not even God can do.
I have intentionally placed some burden back on you, Martin, to clarify what in the world you’re talking about, and to quit putting words in my mouth. I could have argued again, “you said I said x, when in fact I said y, and this is what I meant by y.” But since I have not said x, I’m willing to leave it to you do to the work, now that I’ve pointed it out, of figuring out what I actually said. It makes more sense for me to request you read what I write than for me to write it again, especially since if you read what I write, then I won’t have to say the same thing to you about misreading again the next time. Thank you.
Holopupenko
“Trancendentals are terms that characterizes things, but the these terms transcend (hence the name) division into the usual Aristotelian categories of substance and associated accidents because they apply to all beings (except, of course, to Being itself, i.e., God): unity, truth, goodness, beauty, thing.”
So goodness does not apply to God? And we are talking about good not goodness. Why is good a transcendental term or a substance or accident? So you disagree with Tom’s definition? And that God is neither unity, truth or beauty as well? Well, I supposes that makes more sense that what Tom is claiming.
“As pertains to privations (lack of being), they are the most rarified form of existence. The term “nothing” means exactly that: nothing—no substance, no accidents, no nothing.”
By implication, following Tom’s definition and possibly confusing the issue, a privation of God would surely be evil? But then the most rarefied form of existence is nothing, so evil does not exist?
“Moral acts are characterized as “good” or “evil” in a way different from mode of existence, although “good” and “evil” as moral acts are intimately tied to the nature of the moral agent—which is the important point: an act can only be morally termed “good” or “evil” if a moral agent (which implies a RATIONAL agent) undertakes that act.”
You seem interested in philosophy but your knowledge, at least of ethics. appears grossly out of date. Acts are “right” and “wrong” not “good” or “evil”. Actions of a moral agent are INTENTIONAL and not necessarily rational. It is intentional acts that are the focus of ethics, whether rational or not.
” fully human act, that is, one proceeding from knowledge and free will, is either morally good or morally evil.”
Or neither. Many acts are morally neutral, if your theory cannot explain that you have a problem.
“For a human act to be judged “good” or “evil,” all three of its components must be good: object, circumstances, intention or purpose or end. If any one of these three components are evil, the act is evil.”
So you are now defining good in terms of lack of evil in these three components but you have not explained what evil is. I presume my matching of Tom’s definition here that evil is nothing is incorrect, so what is your definition of evil?
“Homosexual acts are evil because they are opposed to our natures as human beings”. This is confused, nothing you have said about nature leads to this conclusion, not reason nor free will, not object, circumstances or intention. Saying “those natures were created by God” implies nothing about why homosexual acts are bad either.
“And, in his Proslogion Anselm’s clear intention is to convince “the fool,” that is, the person who “has said in his heart, ‘There is no God.’ ””
I have no doubt that fools might be convinced. However the wise man says it out loud. They need real arguments that do not rely on ignorance.
But this is besides the point. For the purposes of our debate I grant that a god exists. The question is how good relates to Tom’s notion of this god and this is still completely unclear.
Holopupenko uses unfamiliar terms and can be hard to understand at times. I don’t always catch all that he is saying. I know for sure he wasn’t saying two-thirds of what you apparently think he was saying, Martin.
You claim his knowledge of ethics (“right” and “wrong” vs. “good” and “evil”) is “out of date.” Your pronouncing it so is a grand begging of the question, however. We say that God is good, and his moral acts are good, and if you want to disagree with that, “out of date” is (ahem) not exactly an argument for your position.
Evil has been defined for you. Why do you keep asking for what has already been given????
Holopupenko’s statement on homosexuality is not confused, it’s parenthetical. That is, if you find there is no argument there, it is because he was speaking parenthetically, and did not intend to draw out an argument. It would be off the topic anyway. Although “those natures were created by God” really does relate to why some acts (not just this one) can be bad: if an act violates God’s intention in the nature of what he has created, it is bad or evil. That, I think, Holopupenko really did explain clearly enough.
Let’s not get off track here, by the way, Martin. It’s not up to us in this thread to prove all this is true. Read the closing of my original post. The point is to explain our position. I’m willing to work with you on making it understandable, of course, but I won’t go off track into proving theism’s truth in this context. That’s for another time and place. In your closing paragraph here you make a nod toward agreeing with me about what our purpose is here, but your objections keep circling around to “but that’s not true,” and not only to (as would be appropriate) “I don’t see what that means within your context.”
As to “the wise man says it out loud,” I respond with Psalm 2:4.
Tom
“God’s nature is the way he is, his essence, his reality, his character.”
Duh! The question is what is in his nature that makes it good?
“His nature is not exhausted in his desires, for his very being is a good.”
All you are saying is that God is God. Why is that good and in what way is it good? All I want is a intelligible definition, explanation and/or argument. All I have an assertion.
“Now, I did not say that good is not something that can be conceived.”
Fine you please can your write down your conception of what is good and if you refer to nature, describe what aspect of nature it is your are referring to.
“If you think it’s hardly clear, it’s because, Martin, you made it up.”
I have made up nothing, I am am just asking for a transparent definition of good. It does not have to be correct,that is for us to discuss. So far the discussion has been to get to something to discuss and you have offered nothing.
“I have provided relevant specifics”
Stating conforming with God’s nature is not a relevant specific, that is what I am waiting for.
“and this matter of “if you posit that God explains everything” is again something that you, not I have introduced into the conversation here.”
Maybe, but I presented it to indicate the problems I have with your attempted definition of good.
“What I said was that if you disagree that God is good”
My complaint is that you have given me nothing to disagree or agree with yet, since what you have presented, to use the parlance “is not even wrong”. If you give me a definition, I might agree or disagree but I am still waiting.
“and that the expressions of his character are good, then you are wrong, for he is the basis for all that is real. Basis is different from explanation; basis is the foundation, the source, the reality-behind.”
Ah so now you are not even giving an explanation at all. That indeed is my complaint! It is an explanation that I want and without which this looks like the Emperor’s New Clothes.
“I’m saying that to argue against the goodness of God, based on some other conception you think you might have, is to be arguing against reality itself.”
One does not need any other conception of good to make an argument here, if what is on offer, as so far appears to be the case, not even coherent.
“You keep saying my assertions “don’t seem to say anything meaningful.” I could say the same back to you: your assertions don’t seem to say anything meaningful.”
You could say that back to me, but you would be wrong. I have been repeatedly clear about my complaint. You have offered a purported definition, but when examined, appears to be no such thing.
“Did I say God cannot offer a definition of good? Once again, Martin, read what I wrote.”
I have and still you have not written what God’s definition of good so far.
“Could you also please explain just what on earth I have said that implies or entails eliminativism? I can’t begin to think of how I’ve done that.”
You deny that good is in a person’s nature and then that it is in God’s nature. Unless you make it clear what aspect of god’s nature that must entirely unlike human nature makes the one good and the other not, without equivocating over an as yet unclear notion of nature anyway I fail to see what is the difference between the two. So good is not the feelings or the desires of an agent yet it something else that is an agent’s nature – what? And why only when the agent is God and not when the agent is a human. Why?
“Why can’t God explain “good”? He can: he points to himself.”
That is not an explanation. That is non-verbal assertion. What reason and evidence is there to back this up?
“If you want him to point beyond himself to some principle above God, now, that not even God can do.”
I already said I am not asking for a principle, I just want to understand what it is you are claiming. This was, I thought, a fairly simple task, I am surprised you are struggling to make your point clear. Maybe it is not as clear as you thought it was?
Holo,
Thank you for that mini lesson in comment #22. I struggle to understand these things and don’t have the time to dig deep on my own so I appreciate your abridged version.
“Evil has been defined for you.”
Where?
“I won’t go off track into proving theism’s truth in this context.”
We are not here disputing theism. We are discussing your particular instance of theism which has the additional claim that moral good is, somehow, in your God, as to how (and why), well those are the questions. You not given a coherent answer yet. (I hope you do then we could actually have a proper discussion).
Normally when A asks “what is X” and B replies well “X is Y”, Y normally explains X. If this is not clear – and this can happen quite often for various reasons – A can ask “what is Y” and/or “why does Y explain X”? If B cannot expand and clarify what is meant by Y and/or why X is Y, then most likely B does not know that X is Y.
Here you are trying to reduce good to something in God’s nature. It is .. ahem…natural ask what is God’s nature and and how does this relate to good, in order for this to be a definition or explanation. Until you, in this case, do both and so far you have not, what else can I conclude that you have both failed define or explain good and that you do not know that good is in God’s nature.
“Why can’t God explain “good”? He can: he points to himself.”
This is just God asserting that it is an exemplar (the best maybe) of good, as I have already complained that is neither an explanation or definition of good.
However you also said: “if an act violates God’s intention in the nature of what he has created, it is bad or evil.”
Okay I missed this, maybe this is what you meant by a definition of evil? So a right (or good as you have it) act is an act “in conformance with God’s intention in the nature of what he has created” and a wrong (or evil) act is an “act in violation of God’s intention in the nature of what he has created”. Is this what you are saying?
Martin,
You don’t get it. I’m trying, but I need you to try with me.
There is nothing in God’s nature. God’s nature doesn’t have insides, and it doesn’t have parts; and there is nothing about it one could take apart and say, oh, I see how this attaches to that, and that connects to this other thing over there, and that’s what “makes it good.” It just is good.
To insist on something beyond God as a good-maker is to walk the first step of infinite regress: what makes the good-maker good? It has to stop somewhere, and the right place for it to stop is at the Being who is the foundation of all reality, than which no greater can exist or be conceived.
If your conception of God is anything other or less than that, then you are trying to get me to explain a God I don’t agree with or believe in. If you can’t conceive of God’s nature being good just in its being good, then that’s a failure of your own ability to conceive of it that way. It’s not a failure in our defining it.
The same goes for,
There is no answer to “why is God good,” because (as I have said so often already), the question implies something above and beyond God and goodness to which one refers the question. God is good. Disagree if you want, but don’t say that we haven’t defined it, don’t say we haven’t told you what we’re talking about. We’re talking about something that cannot be further explained, because there is no explanation beyond it.
Martin, you are either being dense or you are lying. I have not offered “nothing.” I have not offered something that you want, an explanation behond God, but I have at least told you why and now I have further told you why the call for such a thing is incoherent. If that’s what you want, then you are committing the Wrong God fallacy.
To substitute one word for another is not a presentation of what you think is wrong. It is to confuse the issue instead.
Kindly, then, tell us what you are looking for in an explanation. Are you not expecting me to “explain” God and his goodness in some terms that validate God or connect him to goodness? But God is not validated by something other than himself, he is self-existent and eternal, and his being or nature are not contingent in any way, especially in the sense that something apart from him could validate him.
“Not coherent” means, not internally consistent. It does not mean, “I don’t understand it.” I think that you don’t understand how God can be the ultimate that he is; and neither can I. God’s reality is beyond all of us. But there is nothing internally contradictory in what we have presented you.
That was in response to my question, “Could you also please explain just what on earth I have said that implies or entails eliminativism?” Now, does “you deny that good is in a person’s nature” amount to an explanation? Some things, unlike God, actually are susceptible to explanation, Martin, and if I have denied that good can be in a person’s nature, while at the same time I have repeatedly asserted that good can be in a person’s nature, it behooves you to do more than parrot yourself over again telling me that I have denied it. I haven’t denied it, and I’m really scratching my head over what I could possibly have said to cause you to begin to think that I denied it.
It’s not an explanation of the kind you insist on. It is the highest explantion possible nevertheless.
It’s clear within the framework of theism. I think you’re trying to make it clear within some other framework. It’s the “wrong God” fallacy again.
A definition has been provided. Exemplars have been provided. An explanation has not been provided in the terms you seem to want, because those terms are incoherent. So kindly settle for the fact that a definition has been given. You asked for it, you’ve been given it, lo these many times over again.
Reduce? REDUCE???!!! Reduce it to something in God’s nature? How is it REDUCING something to say it is essentially true of the most perfect being? What an unbelievable, ignorantly (thank you, Holopupenko) naive conception of theism you have! And to say that goodness is an added claim of my “particular instance” of theism? Incredible!
I’m guessing the problem, Martin, is that you are trying to conceive God in some non-theistic way; a God who fits some other non-God definition of reality that is familiar to you. And I’m guessing that as long as you try to fit what we are saying of God into that framework, you will find it utterly incomprehensible; as well you might, for God doesn’t fit any other frameworks.
This is why God revealed himself the way he did: by demonstrating his works, primarily, and only after that through the more philosophical discussions you find in Paul. It’s because there is nothing to look to, to understand God, but God himself; so we understand God by looking at his demonstrations of his character and being.
We live in a post-Christian world, where these things of God are foreign to many. The concepts are way beyond familiar to a whole lot of people, especially in Europe but increasingly also in the U.S. I can accept that. But Martin, you present yourself as one who has thought about these things; yet you are not thinking about them according to what we are saying, you are thinking about them according to your preconceptions. I call on you to set aside those preconceptions for these purposes here at least, and try to think of God as that than which no greater exists or could exist. If you can wrap your mind around that concept, or at least be at peace with the implications of that (for the sake of argument and discussion and clarity here at least), then you could quit asking us to define our concepts in non-theistic, wrong-God-fallacy, kinds of ways.
You did get this right, as far as it applies to acts:
Yes. Of course I stand with the terms “good” and “evil.”
It’s yours for the evening now; I’m setting this aside until tomorrow. Have a good night.
Progress!
So good is in God’s nature means God has only good intentions. Since an intention is a combination of beliefs and desires, God’s intentions are a combination of (presumably) true beliefs and good desires. However what makes a desire good and how do you or anyone know that God’s desires are only good? S
Martin:
Indeed, you don’t get it. I’m not holding you to the terms of art of moral philosophy of which you are clearly not in command. (By the way, “out of date” is the fallacy of historicism: the question is not how old the idea or argument is or who generates it (the genetic fallacy) but whether it is true.) I’m merely suggesting there’s a LOT you’ve got to catch up on.
(Your limitation of moral actions to intentionality is just plain silly [and I carefully drew the distinction for you]: Actions of a moral agent are INTENTIONAL and not necessarily rational. It is intentional acts that are the focus of ethics, whether rational or not. What, pray tell, is an intentional act that is not rational? Please tell me you’re weren’t serious about that.)
To address a particular confusion of yours: God is not good. That statement would be akin to heresy because it would be qualifying God by something outside Him. God is Being Itself: complete, utter actualization. God is Goodness Itself. God is Truth Itself. God is Beauty itself. You keep on applying limited terms to THE unlimited (meaning not numerically but in its actualization) Being. Anything is finite just because it is finite; it therefore lacks the complete goodness possessed by God alone.
Further: evil is the privation of good. Anything actualizing anything less than its full potential (by the way, there is no potentiality in God: He IS completely, utter, actuality) per its nature is not perfect, and anything not perfect is not fully “good.” A human who can’t fly on his own is not “less than perfect” because its not in the nature of a human to fly. Therefore, it is not an evil–moral, natural, or metaphysical–for a human not to be able to fly on his/her own. A man born without an arm or blind (due to a genetic defect) has undergone a natural evil. A man blinded intentionally by another has undergone a moral evil. A “man” who does not have the capacity to reason, is not a man because the very definition of a human is a rational (specific difference) animal (genus).
As for the rest, it would be silly to waste my time… and I go with Tom’s point: you are either being dense or you are lying.
Martin, one quick final note for the evening:
No, good is not in God’s nature; and what is true of goodness and God cannot be subsumed under the limiting phrase, it “means God has only good intentions.” Although “God only has good intentions” is true of God and true of God’s goodness, to say it the way you did reduces (the word applies here) God’s goodness to something far less than it is. Holopupenko covered that well just now.
Also for your consideration overnight: you asked,
The answer for purposes of this discussion is this: you wanted an explanation of what theism teaches, and this is what theism teaches. How, in theism, do we know that God is good and his desires are only good (and everything else we know about God)? By means we have already discussed here. I think it’s time for you to recognize that the question you asked originally has been answered, and that your continual probing for explanation and “how do we know” reveals that you are trying to fit it into your own non-theistic framework, as I discussed above, rather than seeing theism for what it is.
Holopuenko
“What, pray tell, is an intentional act that is not rational? Please tell me you’re weren’t serious about that.)”
I suggest you read any 101 book on practical rationality written later than 1900.
“God is not good….God is Goodness Itself. ”
This looks like a contradiction unless you are equivocating over good/goodness, but since that is the topic of our conversation, far from making this clearer you seem to be set upon making this concept as obtuse and meaningless as possible (which it most certainly is if the above is a contradiction).
“Anything is finite just because it is finite; it therefore lacks the complete goodness possessed by God alone.”
Does it make any sense to say good is finite or infinite? An infinite attribute seems to have no semblance to what how the term “good” is used by anyone (regardless of what they think it means).
Finally as far as I can see you seem to be saying that good is perfection and that evil is the opposite of perfection, in which case please define perfection without any circular reasoning.
Given the above, plus previous, you are quite right, it is clearly a waste of time to hold you to the terms of art of moral philosophy of which you are clearly not in command. And it is difficult not to conclude that you are either being dense or you are lying.
Regardless you have failed to provide any support to claiming you know what good means.
Tom
No, good is not in God’s nature; and what is true of goodness and God cannot be subsumed under the limiting phrase, it “means God has only good intentions.” Although “God only has good intentions” is true of God and true of God’s goodness, to say it the way you did reduces (the word applies here) God’s goodness to something far less than it is.
In which case you are equivocating over good. I am only interested in what good in the ethical sense means and you are using the term in an entirely different fashion. I suggest you use a different word to avoid future confusion. As H emphasised rationality – that is about reasons. Good, if anything is an evaluative and action-guiding term, which requires reasons. Every time I try to point out where reasons could reside in God’s nature, you deny that is all there is and refer to some wholly mysterious and opaque non-reason, non-action guiding global but unspecified and unspecifiable feature of God’s nature. That is a complete failure of explanation on your part.
The answer for purposes of this discussion is this: you wanted an explanation of what theism teaches, and this is what theism teaches.
No you are making a category error. This is not what theism teaches. This is what your species of Christianity might teach, presuming that you and H are not mis-representing it.
I have had plenty of theistic education but never have I been presented with such obtuse, obscure and ultimately meaningless arguments. I can only conclude that this must be a speciality of your branch of theism.
Then I am not directly interested in what your Christianity teaches with respect to theism, I am only directly interested in your version of Christian ethics, and your theism indirectly and only to the degree that it is relevant to that, since it is ethics not god that is my topic of interest here.
I am not trying to fit this into my non-theistic framework, it is does not fit into any theistic framework I have previously been exposed to either.
If you cannot provide any remotely coherent and hence meaningful explanation of good, which you imply in the OP and comments, is the whole basis of your forthcoming explanation of moral motivation in your next post, then it clear that any such future explanation will fail, as would any argument being built upon such a non-existent foundation as you have so far presented.
Tom:
Martin is disingenuous and evasive. For example, to assert a human moral act can be both intentional AND not rational is one for the record books… and to then arrogantly deflect to “any 101 book on practical rationality written later than 1900″ without responding to the question betrays his ignorance. Martin simply doesn’t know what he’s talking about. He’s not interested in dialog that challenges his preconceived notions of morality, God, etc. I called that near the beginning… and it’s now coming home in spades. Waste of time indeed…
Holopupenko
“For example, to assert a human moral act can be both intentional AND not rational is one for the record books”
I am surprised that you so willingly display your ignorance of the topic of ethics unless of course you simply are ignorant and do not realise this. Come back when you have educated yourself on the topic of ethics.
Hi Martin,
In response to Tom, you said:
Just to pick a nit, that’s not exactly the claim. The claim is: God is essentially good. Continuing:
Do you require an exhaustive definition to know that anything is good, or will agreement to necessary conditions do to at least demonstrate that good and evil exist? For example, I may not be able to give an exhaustive definition of “good”, but can give at least one clearly correct example: justice is good (ethically speaking). So if there is any good at all, it would at least include justice, right?
Well, then what is the problem with the theist explaining that God has goodness (exemplified, say, in acts of justice) essentially? Is the problem supposed to be that the theist cannot enumerate all necessary and sufficient conditions to be able to define “good”? If so, then this doesn’t seem like a huge problem to me. Maybe an analogy will help. I could never actually enumerate each of the natural numbers, although I could list a few (1, 2, 3, for instance). But that shouldn’t preclude me from conceiving of the set of all natural numbers and listing their properties (for example, associativity), right? Similarly, just because we may not be able to give an exhaustive definition of what is good, that doesn’t prevent us from using the term “good”. Further, the theist can maintain that an essential property of each “good” act is that it accords with God’s will.
Or maybe the problem is supposed to be, how could good acts come to be good. In response to that I would say that the good doesn’t “reduce” to anything, and therefore there is no “process” by which something comes to be good. Similarly, the set of natural numbers simply includes the number “1″, there’s no process by which “1″ comes to be part of the set of natural numbers.
Also, are you faithlessgod?
Instead of deflecting, answer the question — the onus is on you since you made the assertion:
What is an intentional human act (i.e., one with a purpose or goal) in a human that is not rational, i.e., one in which the capacity for reason is absent?
Make sure you define intentionality and the capacity for reason very clearly and precisely before plunging in. Note also we’re not talking about an external valuative assessment of an act based on your personal whims (which you sneak in as “right” and “wrong” in your ignorant opposition to “good” and “evil”). If an acting agent cannot reason, then what could “intentionality” possibly mean in the context of moral acts? Don’t give us your visceral rejection of “good” and “evil.” Don’t give us a conflation of intention/purpose/goal with valuative nonsense. Don’t give us the fallacy of historicism that relegates to irrelevance an argument of idea simply based on is place in history. Answer the question.
Martin,
You have told us that atheists are more wise and rational than theists. Rationality is at least partly a matter of effectively handling the tools of thinking. I call on you to consider whether you are demonstrating those skills.
I have already pointed out to you more than once your tactic of making unsupported assertions and expecting me to argue for their denials. If you are doing that on purpose, that’s not irrational, it’s a clever rhetorical trick if you can get away with it (you can’t—not here, anyway). But if you’re not aware you’re doing it, then it could mean you are operating on the level of untested assumptions. The way you’re presenting these unsupported assertions is in the form of assumptions, at any rate.
Have you acknowledged that this is what you have been doing?
I have pointed out to you your incorrect use of the word “coherent.” You have by all appearances been trying to get us to present to you an account of theism that is coherent within your non-theistic framework. But that would be incoherent. What’s necessary for us to be coherent is to be coherent within the theistic framework.
Have you acknowledged this?
You have repeatedly missed my denial of eliminativism, and you have never explained to me how it is you think I have argued in favor of eliminativism, despite my repeated request that you do so. You have only repeated your claim that my position is eliminativist. Repeating a claim is not an argument.
Will you acknowledge this?
You said in comment 11,
But I responded to you that I did not agree, and I could not understand how you thought I could have been in agreement. I didn’t say it, but you put those words in my mouth.
Will you acknowledge this?
You have repeatedly asked for a definition, and when one has been provided, you have said it was not. You have switched gears and called for an argument, while insisting all you are asking for is a definition.
Will you acknowledge this?
When I asked you this,
Your answer was,
You missed something entirely there. I asked you to explain your position that good was a matter of one’s desires, and you responded by saying that if I believed that, it was a non sequitur from my own position. That’s rather silly. What matters is whether your conclusion follows from your premises.
Will you acknowledge this?
You have committed the wrong God fallacy more than once. This is really your fundamental error here, from a theist’s perspective.
Will you at least respond to this and work with us on it? You haven’t even acknowledged that I brought it up.
You keep saying our definition of good is meaningless, though we have given both a logical, dictionary-style definition and offered exemplars to illustrate. This may not fulfill all your requests for meaningfulness, but it is a gross distortion to say it carries no meaning whatever.
You confused the words “explain” and “define” in your comment 24.
Will you acknowledge this?
You said that I told you good cannot be conceived. I told you in comment 25 I did not say that in any way, shape or form.
Will you acknowledge this?
You committed the historicist fallacy in calling Holopupenko’s ethics out of date.
Will you acknowledge this?
You have most strangely spoken of “reducing good to something in God’s nature,” not recognizing that is inconsistent with theistic understanding. I explained this in my comment 35.
Will you acknowledge this?
You have failed to respond to my request for whatever it is you are looking for in an explanation (my comment 34).
Will you acknowledge this?
You misunderstand the logical fallacy of equivocation. In your comment 41 you quote Holopupenko and then respond,
Equivocation, the fallacy, occurs when one uses the same word with two different meanings in an argument. “Good” and “goodness” are not the same word. You cannot equivocate on two different words. Holopupenko used those terms with different meanings precisely because he wanted to clarify that they have different meanings (for purposes of what he was communicating there). He was not equivocating, and you have incorrectly accused him of a fallacy.
Will you acknowledge this?
In a recent comment you have again tried to get me to explain theism in non-theistic terms:
Theists cannot be “only interested in what good in the ethical sense means,” because good cannot be limited to that.
Will you acknowledge this (whether you agree with it or not)?
You have spoken twice as if theism does not generally teach the goodness of God. This is just false. I have never encountered any theism that does not teach God’s goodness. If there is such a variant of theism, it is not Christian theism, and Christian theism is the sort of theism under discussion here.
Will you acknowledge this?
You misunderstand the ultimate nature of God himself as an explanation, continuing to insist on an explanation beyond God, not recognizing how incoherent that would be within theism. This is the Wrong God fallacy cropping up again. Most recently:
It’s not a complete failure at all. It is taking explanation as far as it can go, which is to God, the ultimate explanation. Do you seriously expect to find an explanation beyond the ultimate explanation? And do you recognize the infinite regress you are asking us to enter into (I have already explained it in a prior comment) when you push for an explanation beyond the ultimate explanation?
Will you acknowledge the difficulty that presents?
You again confuse what theism is when you say,
God and ethics are inseparable in theism.
Will you acknowledge that (whether you like it or not) this is what is true within the framework of theism, the framework you are ostensibly seeking to understand?
Martin, will you acknowledge at least to yourself that you are not demonstrating rationality—here, the effective and proper tools of rational argumentation—that you say characterizes atheism over theism?
And while you’re at it, would you consider acknowledging to us that we have put questions and problems to you that you are not handling adequately from a rational perspective?
That’s the atheist game:
“Hey, foolish Christian — this is your god and morality because I know what these are better than you do: [inane, straw man descriptions follow]. These are meaningless, foolish, unscientific, irrational, etc., and I don’t need to provide reasoned arguments why… so there. And, anything you say is meaningless and dated. Boy, am I wise!”
See: self-serving narrow-mindedness for atheists works just fine!
Holopopenko
You asked “What is an intentional human act (i.e., one with a purpose or goal) in a human that is not rational, i.e., one in which the capacity for reason is absent?”
If you understood practical reason etc. you would know that your “i.e.” is a non sequitur. There is nothing to answer, as I make nor defend such a position as you ignorantly insinuate. You have done nothing but further demonstrate your ignorance. There clearly is no point chatting to such an ignoramus as you, and I presume this is all an rhetorical technique to avoid answering questions that you are incapabe of answering. I will continue solely with Tom, who, whilst we obviously disagree, has demonstrated none of your arrogance and ignorance.
And the atheist whines, “run away!”
Martin, with respect to the tools of rational thinking (dare I mention “ignorance” again, in this context?), you have done it again. Whatever error may or may not exist in Holopupenko’s “i.e.,” it certainly is not a non sequitur. A non sequitur is a conclusion that does not follow from the premises. An example such as this “i.e.” could not be a non sequitur, because an example is not a conclusion.
Will you acknowledge this?
Tom:
The acknowledgement(s) you call for presupposes understanding and honesty. Are these hallmarks of atheism?
Just in case it’s overlooked, Thomas Reid posted a comment earlier this morning that got stuck in moderation for some unknown reason. I just noticed it there and released it a moment ago.
Holopupenko, they are hallmarks of honest rational thinking, and I believe Martin can step up to the plate for that.
On May 19, 2010 at 7:02 pm (#27) Martin asserts: It is intentional acts that are the focus of ethics, whether rational or not. (emphasis added)
The question posed on May 20, 2010 at 10:03 am (#46) was: What is an intentional human act (i.e., one with a purpose or goal) in a human that is not rational, i.e., one in which the capacity for reason is absent?… we’re not talking about an external valuative assessment of an act based on your personal whims.
Martin’s emotional and evasive response on May 20, 2010 at 1:36 pm (#49) I make nor defend such a position as you ignorantly insinuate. Followed by (paraphrasing): I won’t play with you anymore!” (sniffle)
Liar?
Tom: and you base your hope in #54 on…?
Common grace.
You are a better man than I, Tom…
I would also add, shared humanity. Common grace is essential along with it.
Tom
“You have told us that atheists are more wise and rational than theists.”
Not true. H told us that atheists are fools who do not speak out loud, I gave a reasonable response to his arrogant unsubstantiated assertion. I have never said that atheists are wiser than theists, although the evidence is indicative that is likely true with respect to H and the average atheist
“Rationality is at least partly a matter of effectively handling the tools of thinking. I call on you to consider whether you are demonstrating those skills.”
Here we go, another meta-conversation. Lets see if there are any surprises.
“I have already pointed out to you”
And I have not pointed this out to you but the following applies to your assertions not mine:
“more than once your tactic of making unsupported assertions and expecting me to argue for their denials.”
What greater unsupported assertion in this thread is there here than that good is God’s nature. Nothing could be bigger than that. I thought you could support it but so far there has been nothing.
Will you acknowledge this?
“If you are doing that on purpose, that’s not irrational, it’s a clever rhetorical trick if you can get away with it”
(you can’t—not here, anyway)”
Well I am not but you are. It is your blog and you can do wiht it what you want but as long as you allow critical comments expect to be called on it, as I have here.
Will you acknowledge this?
“Have you acknowledged that this is what you have been doing?”
I suggest you say that looking in the mirror.
“I have pointed out to you your incorrect use of the word “coherent.” ”
Where? I have clearly pointed out that holding two statements that contradict each other as both true is incoherent. That is one of the problem with your definition of good.
Will you acknowledge this?
“You have by all appearances been trying to get us to present to you an account of theism that is coherent within your non-theistic framework.”
That is not true. Your claim over good is not consistent with a theistic framework, because it is not consistent period, regardless of framework, unless you reject logic.
Will you acknowledge this?
“What’s necessary for us to be coherent is to be coherent within the theistic framework.”
Which you have so far failed to demonstrate unless you think that arbitrary and multiple non-definitions count as definitions in a theistic framework. Regardless the issue is not over theistic versus non-theistic frameworks but an ethical framework neither assuming nor rejecting theism. your arguments fail in that framework and that is why and from where I have been questioning you. That is after all the basis of the OP, ethics, for which you attempt to use God as an explanatory variable in your ethical model. I have no issue with that, except your method of doing it fails, at least so far.
Will you acknowledge this?
“You have repeatedly missed my denial of eliminativism, and you have never explained to me how it is you think I have argued in favor of eliminativism, despite my repeated request that you do so.”
I have repeatedly said that we agree upon the rejection of eliminativism. The difference is I am consistent on this where as you keep on making an unadmitted exception with respect to God, hence your inconsistency hence incoherence in that sense.
I have asked repeatedly for you to explain your mysterious concept of “nature” to which you map and think explains and/or defines good or goodness and you have rejected every one, upon which there is nothing to conclude but that what is in God’s nature is its feelings about what is good, or its feelings are good if you will, either way this is eliminativism, as you call it. Unless you can provide a meaningful alternative and you have not I cannot but conclude that your claim is incoherent.
P1: Good is God’s nature
P2: Eliminativism is false
P3: If good is God’s nature, then eliminativism is true
P4: Therefore good is not God’s nature
(Modus Tolens)
You assert P1 and P2. You do not assert P3 but until you can explain your mysterious definition there is nothing else to assume given the notion of “eliminitivism” that P3. I am still waiting.
Will you acknowledge this?
——
I said “it is not sufficient for good or bad to depend only upon anyone’s nature – and I agree – then it is not sufficient for this to apply even if it is a god’s nature we are talking about.”
You said:”But I responded to you that I did not agree, and I could not understand how you thought I could have been in agreement. I didn’t say it, but you put those words in my mouth.”
So what is it you do not agree with? Are you now contradicting yourself by denying that good and depend only on god’s nature?
“You have repeatedly asked for a definition, and when one has been provided, you have said it was not. You have switched gears and called for an argument, while insisting all you are asking for is a definition.”
Duh! Since your definition fails to provide any substantive meaning I asked for an argument.
Since apparently goodness, truthfulness and beauty are all God’s nature (not “in”) how can any of these server as definitions.
If I ask what are X,Y and Z and how do they relate, being clearly different, if you answer well X is G, Y is G and Z is G and these are the definitions of X, Y and Z and you refuse to detail how any relate to G apart from these assertions then such definitions look hopelessly confused and fail to describe let alone explain anything.
Will you acknowledge this?
——
You asked: “And how is it that a person can only be good on the basis of his or her desires? Does that mean it’s impossible for anything other than a person (or animal) to be good? For only persons (or animals) can have desires.
I replied:”Another implied non sequitur. Surely, given your first argument, good can refer to various types of entities, desire being only one type of entity, so it does not follow that good cannot refer to other entities in other ways. It depends on what type of entity you are talking about.”
You are now asking: “You missed something entirely there. I asked you to explain your position that good was a matter of one’s desires, and you responded by saying that if I believed that, it was a non sequitur from my own position. That’s rather silly. What matters is whether your conclusion follows from your premises.”
I have made no position here that “good is a matter of one’s desires”. The sense of your question “And how is it that a person can only be good on the basis of his or her desires?” was clearly implied by you asking “Does that mean it’s impossible for anything other than a person (or animal) to be good?” to which I gave the appropriate reply, which still looks correct in spite of your new question.
Will you acknowledge this?
——-
“You have committed the wrong God fallacy more than once. This is really your fundamental error here, from a theist’s perspective.”
I am letting your define your God and its relation to good and seeing if it makes sense, which so far it does not. There are logical limits to what and how you can define things. Now you have brought it up, where I am supposedly doing this?
“You keep saying our definition of good is meaningless, though we have given both a logical, dictionary-style definition and offered exemplars to illustrate. This may not fulfill all your requests for meaningfulness, but it is a gross distortion to say it carries no meaning whatever.”
See my X,Y, Z point above. You have offered no exemplars that demonstrate it either. The one I keep suggesting, that God is an exemplar of the good, is one you keep rejecting.
Will you acknowledge this?
As anyone can see I have a laboriously acknowledged and clarified your points. OK this post is long enough, that is enough for now.
Now after all that can you provide a meaningful definition of good, there are many ways to do this, even as a theist, however all you have provided so far is grossly rationally unacceptable. That is really the only question I am interested in your answering. If you cannot that is fine by me, but then you have no foundation to your Christian ethics.
CAPTCHA: “nauseate”! Indeed
H
Non sequitur is a latin phrase which means “it does not follow”. This phrase is used to label a rhetorical device in debate and humour. Here your “i.e. phrase” was an expansion that did not follow from what the point I was making, so I called you on using this rhetorical device. It was quite appropriate for me to use it there.
Maybe in your world of Christian ethics one is held only responsible for one’s rational actions, but in the real world one is held responsible for one’s intentional actions, rational or not. That is probably another mark against Christian ethics, but that is another debate.
I am only interested in charitable, fun and rational debate, Since you are either tediously incapable or unable to provide one, there is nothing more to say, except go and study practical reason.
Martin, a quick response to your latest: we know what the Latin means. The “it” refers to a conclusion, and “does not follow” refers to its not following premises that are claimed to support it. Holopupenko’s example was not a non sequitur, because it was not a conclusion, nor were the premises his own but rather yours. Please acknowledge.
I’ll need to spend more time working on your prior comment. But this one is not hard.
Martin:
You have asked me to acknowledge:
Atheists and Wisdom
You say here,
But you said earlier in response to Holopupenko (quoted herein)
And I believe that attitude was also implicit here and here.
I have written nothing wrong that I should acknowledge here. But you still have something to live up to.
Unsupported Assertions
Going on: You answered my charge of unsupported assertions not by acknowledging them—though I listed them in detail—but by charging this in response:
First, these assertions have been supported and your description of “nothing” is a bald lie. That is to say, in the case of your unsupported assertions (detailed here, the assertions are bare even of attempts at support. Suppose my assertion you name here has been weakly argued for. Suppose you do not accept my arguments. I have still offered arguments, whereas the unsupported assertions I have specified from you have, as far as I saw at the time (and you have not contradicted me on them in any specifics) no attempt at argument. This is what I mean, and all along have meant, by “unsupported assertion.”
Second, you are shifting the game again. You have asked us to make the assertion intelligible, and we have been working on that. That has been the point of this discussion, beginning with the closing of the OP. I have reiterated that fact. And now you complain that I have not provided support to prove the definition is true. Martin, I have not tried to support the assertion “good is actually and truly in God’s nature,” because this post has not been about proving that the Christian’s perspective on it is true, it has been about explaining what the assertion means from the Christian’s perspective.
So with respect to unsupported assertions: you have not answered a single point I have made to any of them, though I have pointed them out quite specifically. Yours have been numerous. Instead, ducking that type of honest response completely, you have counter-charged me with an unsupported assertion. I have here given you an accounting of my position with respect to that alleged unsupported assertion. The score is:
Martin’s attempted accountings for his alleged unsupported assertions: 0%
Tom’s attempted accountings for his alleged unsupported assertion: 100%
Now, suppose you think my attempted accounting for my alleged unsupported assertion is inadequate. I think it’s at least arguably more honest and forthright to attempt to give an accounting than to duck it altogether. But I think my accounting is at least arguably adequate, besides.
The Wrong God Fallacy
You write, responding to me (quoted herein),
You know, it’s interesting. I’ve brought up the “Wrong God” problem more than once previously once this thread, and you haven’t even acknowledged it until now. Now this is the argument you give me in rebuttal. Not an argument, Martin.
“Arbitrary … non-definitions”
The definitions are not arbitrary, they are tested by time and by much philosophical work. They are not non-definitions, either. They include descriptive language, they include exemplars.
The Point of the Whole Discussion
No, Martin, the issue is (read the OP) what do theists believe about ethics. I can’t believe you’re unclear on this!
Eliminativism
No, I don’t, and your following paragraph has nothing to do with anything I have said. Or at least as far as I can tell, it doesn’t; the grammar of the following is impossible for me to parse:
How you get from your P2 to P3 is a complete mystery to me. An absolute stumper. It’s not from anything I wrote, I assure you.
I’m not sure what this means; something is missing:
I do say, at any rate, that God’s (capital G, it’s a proper noun, please read the discussion policies on that) nature is goodness. Apparently you think there’s a contradiction with this, which you placed immediately above that quote:
But since you’re mixing up my words with yours here, it’s impossible for me to see what you’re saying I myself have said in one place that contradicts what I myself have said in another place. You have put words in my mouth in this thread, and this appears to be one of those places: I appear to be contradicting myself, but this is only apparently so because the contradiction is between something I actually said and something you only claim I was saying.
Definitions Again
Could you point to a place where we said they did?
I will most certainly acknowledge that there is no definition of God’s nature beyond God’s nature. That, my friend, I have been emphasizing all along. But that doesn’t mean we can know nothing of God’s nature or of what those aspects of his nature are. We know by his demonstration of himself in time and history.
Good and One’s Desires
You write here,
But earlier you had written,
That earlier statement of yours was the reason I posed you the question, “Does that mean it’s impossible for anything other than a person (or animal) to be good?” It was a question based on your assertion, and you keep treating it as if it were my assertion. Strange.
Wrong God Fallacy (Again)
This is not the first time I have brought it up. Use your “find on this page” function to search “wrong God.” And I don’t need to answer the question again, because where I have brought it up, I have already answered it.
God as Exemplar
Where on earth have you “kept suggesting” that? I wouldn’t reject it. That is, in a technical sense God is far more than “exemplar” of the good, but he is not less than that. That is to say, “God is an exemplar of the good” is a true though woefully inadequate statement of the relationship between God and good.
Definitions (Again>
Good is that which conforms to the character of God.
What is unmeaningful about that?
Summary
Now: you still have a lot to acknowledge, my friend. Like the issues of equivocation and non sequiturs. And unsupported assertions. And more
And like once before, you seem to have a mild problem (or worse) with meta-discussions. So be it. If I see a certain pattern in our discussions, and that pattern is hindering progress, I can’t hope to make progress without addressing the pattern, can I?
Further with respect to my summary statement: if the pattern holds, and there is no hope of progress, then I do not intend to keep beating on the issue. I’ll let the discussion stand for others to judge as they will.
Hi Tom
Over the last few years I have been working my way through the Socratic dialogues which, at one point or another, cover the nature of “virtue”, “truth”, “good”, “knowledge”, etc. In each case, despite a thorough investigation of each topic, the answer is “I don’t know”. It’s an interesting read and I think Plato has done a great job of investigating the ineffable. Defining “good” is virtually impossible.
Martin is playing Socrates and asking the unanswerable questions. I suspect he is well aware that these questions cannot be adequately… answered just as he is equally aware the the inability to adequately define “good” does not prevent us from recognizing the “good” when we encounter it. That’s why he never responded to my questions, it is easy to be a gadfly… a little more troublesome to be a philosopher.
Very insightful, Dave. Thanks for that.
Ummm… actually… a “bald lie” gadfly.
David Hart’s exasperation at not being able to find a single substantive “argument” (assuming what’s put forth by atheists deserves the title of “argument”) in all his readings of New Atheist material rings so empirically true at this blog.
Tom:
Very good: perhaps without realizing it, you’ve come fairly close to St. Thomas fourth way — variously known as the Argument from Gradation of Being or the Argument from Degree (of Perfection). You’re an excellent example of a thinking Christian!
Tom:
Re: Martin’s weirdness (and presumed “objectivity”) you may find interesting C.S. Lewis’ take on the Cross posed here: http://firstthings.com/blogs/evangel/2010/05/cs-lewis-on-the-cross/. Martin has chosen madness…
Thanks, Holopupenko.
Your 8:03 comment is out of context, and it’s all my fault. I posted a comment here, and then without any warning whatever to you, my friend, I pulled it from here and made it a blog post instead. Very rude of me; apologies extended.
Hi Dave and Tom
Dave
You make some good points but that is not what I was trying to do here. I was discussing semantics rather than ontology or epistomology. I was not looking for some ultimate meaning – that is an unreasonable demand on anyone – but just the pragmatic sense of the term that Tom was seeking to explain. I will continue this in the new post. For now I need to take one thing from this thread:
“Good is that which conforms to the character of God.
What is unmeaningful about that?”
That is far better that “Good is God’s nature”. That had no useful meaning in relation to how anyone uses the term “good” but the above does.
I’m glad that was helpful to you, Martin, though it’s not new in this thread, other than my substituting the term “character” for “nature.” Dave said it first, a couple days ago.
The difference between “character” and “nature” is that nature is a broader, more encompassing term that can apply to more goods than ethical goods. Character (as I take it) is focused more on the ethical aspect of one’s nature.
If that works for you in this discussion, since it’s a discussion on ethics, then good. (Not just ethically good, but also relationally/epistemological/doxastically/rationally good.)