From Trent Dougherty at the Prosblogion:
I just can’t take naturalism seriously. That is, I can’t take seriously any view that entails either the proposition that some contingent fact occurred for no reason or that in essentials, the universe (or world or nature or whatever you want to call it) couldn’t have been relevantly different from the way it in fact is….
I try extremely hard to take seriously all positions, especially rivals to my own views (there weren’t always, after all, my views). I read every academic book I can find defending atheism (which excludes about anyone who might appear on television, especially people who’s name starts with “D”). I try to enter into the mind of the naturalist, really try to see it from the inside. I publish more against views I hold than in favor (in PR, not Epist/Lang). I spend so much time considering the problem of evil–the only possible rational basis for disbelief I’m aware of–that I may well have damaged my psyche even more. I’m a haunted, hunted man.
But when it comes to “Scientific Naturalism” in its many and varied forms, I draw a total blank. The Dennet/Dawkins/Hitchens/Harris stuff is a total loss. But there’s not much better…
So here’s a question. Has anyone given a decent academic case for naturalism?
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Possibly related posts (automatically generated):
Mr. Daugherty’s view of naturalism:
Actual naturalist:
It seems pretty clear that actual naturalists have no problem with thinking the universe could have been relevantly different from the way it is.
Mr. Daugherty may wish to consider the possibility that the reason he can’t find a ‘decent academic case’ for his definition of naturalism is because no one shares it.
Nice try but incorrect, Eric… for the point revolves about the extremely important qualifier “relevantly.”
Any material or physical difference alone is not a “relevant” one, for this type of view is the mechanistic one, and you’re sneaking in a value judgement. Perhaps you’d like to provide us with your understanding of the meaning of the word “relevantly” as you use it in your “It seems pretty clear…” paragraph. Perhaps you’d like to propose to us a “definition” (assuming you understand what a proper definition is) of “relevancy” from the perspective of Naturalism or any of the modern empirical sciences?
(Interestingly, you share the same error as those who claim human beings are “irrelevant” because of the sheer size of the universe. Dumb on its face, because that’s a value judgement that is certainly non-scientific. Then there’s the Dawkinesque anthromorphic nonsense of the “universe doesn’t care about us”… but I digress.)
Point one.
Point two: Mr. Daugherty did not, as you incorrectly impute, provide a “definition” of Naturalism. Rather, he provided examples of the difficult implications Naturalism faces. So, your accusation of “no one shares it” rings hollow.
The ellipsis in your comment really distorts things, Eric. You do understand, don’t you, how or works as a logical operator?
Perhaps you’d like to provide us with your understanding of the meaning of the word “relevantly” as you use it
Sure. Obviously from my quote I take ‘relevantly different’ to mean a universe in which life on earth is very different from what we see today. Maybe only single-celled organisms arise or something.
But lets broaden that Holo, in case you don’t like it or in case Mr. Daugherty meant something like fundamental physical constants (rather than life). Do you think philosophical naturalism requires the belief that the fundamental physical constants of the universe cannot be different? I thought naturalism was essentially the proposition that what we see is all there is. That proposition says nothing about whether what we see is a contingent or necessary result. Am I wrong? Does naturalism require some commitment to the idea that the universe must be the way we see it? Because if I’m right and naturalism does not require this commitment, Mr. Daugherty’s second ‘entails’ comments is wrong regardless of how you interpret the word ‘relevantly.’
The ellipsis in your comment really distorts things, Eric.
Okay, I revise my comment by saying of the two possible forms of naturalism Mr. Daugherty suggested – ones that entail either A or B – he got at least one of them wrong for the reasons I state above, but my argument says nothing about the first type. Does that un-distort it?
Eric:
I thought it was clear, so I apologize for not being so.
Your example of “only one-celled organisms” is (1) merely a contrasting example, not a definition or explanation of what YOU mean by “relevantly,” and (2) it continues to sneak in a value judgement.
The example you provide remains on the level of a physical-only universe: it presupposes naturalism, and assumes “relevance” (a value judgment) is somehow capture by the ONE AND ONLY ONTOLOGICAL KIND OF BEING permitted by naturalism. In such an ontological flatland, “relevance” (or “symbol” or “logic” or even the concept “naturalism” itself) can never mean anything beyond any collection of material-only beings you may throw at us as examples. Show me a “relevance” in a material-only world, and I might start agreeing with you.
Holo,
Do you think naturalism requires a commitment to Dougherty’s second proposition or not?
That proposition – Dougherty’s proposition, not mine – is “that in essentials, the universe (or world or nature or whatever you want to call it) couldn’t have been relevantly different from the way it in fact is…”
It sounds like your opinion is that ‘relevantly’ sneaks in a presumption of naturalism, making the definition circular??? I have no idea whether that’s true, but if it is, would you agree with me that a circular definition of naturalism leaves something to be desired?
Eric:
You commented on Dougherty’s proposition as being a definition of naturalism. I responded (1) it is not a definition, (2) the word “relevantly” is a value judgement that cannot properly be captured by a world view that admits ONLY OF ONE KIND OF BEING. In other words, your criticism of Dougherty’s proposition is incorrect… and your question is posed incorrectly. I’m not trying (at this point) to go beyond that, and I’m not sure how I could make it clearer.
The key word, again, is “relevantly”: no differences limited to material beings and physical phenomena can be “relevant.” The only way we can accept “relevantly” (which I’m convinced is Dougherty’s careful intent by inserting that word) is if a knowing mind (rational agent) can stand above and beyond the ontological flatland of naturalism to impose a value judgement… but that would go against the nature of naturalism (no pun intended).
Naturalism can neither adequately nor properly impose value judgments when it presupposes value judgments are reducible to material beings and physical phenomena. It’s the similar thing as trying to claim a rock is “true”: only logical propositions can be true, while rocks cannot be “true” in a logical sense. (Rocks can be true, beautiful, good, one, etc., but only if it’s quite clear we’re not talking about mere logical propositions but transcendental [a philosophical term of art] aspects of real beings… which I noted under separate cover.)
Naturalism is sloppy in the sense that it eliminates proper ontological distinctions, and yet presupposes them to argue its case.
I’m not sure how you could make it more obscure. We’ve got naturalism. We’ve got the idea that the world could not be different from the way it is. In your opinion, does the former require a commitment to the latter?
Eric:
You’re not in command of certain philosophical terms of art that are quite important in such discussions. If you don’t understand that naturalism entails an ontological leveling to one KIND of being, then we’re just going to spin our wheels… something in which I’m not interested. It’s not that your questions aren’t valid; it’s just that without the terms being understood (note I’m not requiring agreement), we’re wasting our time.
To close by repeating (with no follow up to come): naturalism cannot properly deal with terms like “relevant” without reducing them to nothing but material entities.
Holopupenko,
naturalism cannot properly deal with terms like “relevant” without reducing them to nothing but material entities.
I agree, but I wonder what you’d say to the (seemingly growing number of) naturalists who reject materialism? David Chalmers, probably Galen Strawson, etc. (Though Strawson may be making the move where he’s redefining ‘material entities’ to the point where he’s accepting the existence of what would once have been called extra-material entities, not trying to reduce them to the material, and then just calling them material anyway.)
naturalism cannot properly deal with terms like “relevant” without reducing them to nothing but material entities.
Daugherty isn’t talking about naturalism’s rejection of non-material entities. He’s talking about nature. He says that right up front.
What does he think (one form of) naturalism entails? The view that “the universe (or world or nature or whatever you want to call it) couldn’t have been relatively different.”
Daugherty is talking about naturalists rejecting the proposition that nature could be different. I disagree: I think naturalists can accept that material nature could be different, and because of that I think this particular description of naturalism is wrong.
I can’t help thinking the word “relevant” could have an altogether different relevance: we could test this discussion by it. It doesn’t seem it should that important to us here if he did or did not get that part of it right.
Hi eric
With all due respect to both you and the late S. J. Gould, from where does this notion that
As far back as Epicurus it has been understood that the materialist universe is deterministic. If we rewind the tape to the identical initial conditions (and if we are “rewinding” then we will always return to identity with some previous state) everything should play back in the same order and pace as the original, just like rewinding the tape in your VCR. Epicurus was aware of this, Darwin was aware of this, Dawkins is aware of this, and most of the “no free will” crowd are aware of this.
Materialism is simply cause, effect, and time. Random is a word we use to describe a cause and effect relation which involves too many factors for us to compute. Even the (apparently) random factor in quantum theory are, in priciple, deterministic… we just don’t know what determines their action.
Joseph A:
I’m not conflating the two (naturalism and materialism), and I am familiar with Chalmer’s and Strawson’s work. Strawson is interesting because he seems (I’ll defer to the experts) to be heading in the direction of widening what materialism means. Here’s the catch: without the use of analogous language (i.e., if he sticks to the univocal language of the MESs), he won’t be able to do it. For example, a premise is the material cause (the “stuff” if you will) out of which a syllogism is “made”, while the structure of the syllogism is the formal cause. Clearly, “material” and “form” are being used analogously, but certainly not without basis.
Dave:
It depends somewhat on whether the “methodological” or “ontological” qualifier is used to modify “naturalism.” The ontological one is the real problem child because it can’t help but reduce itself to a material-only ontology. There’s also a long-standing error promulgated by those who loosely bandy about the word “supernatural.” Really, angels, are part of the “natural” world because nature is that which is created: the only possible “supernatural” entity is God. That angels are incorporeal substances is in no way a contradiction–except in the eyes of hard materialism (physicalism). It’s naturalism whose focus is EFFICIENT cause-and-effect–not materialism, which simply asserts ALL entities are material–even logical propositions can be reduced to the material.
Hi Holo… don’t you get tired of all the qualifiers? I get a little tired of the obfuscation by qualification involved in “I’m not a materialist – I’m a naturalist and I don’t believe X.” Naturalism “nature is all there is” and materialism “the matter-energy continuum is all there is” both have a problem with determinism because both acknowledge the primacy of deterministic cause and effect laws which govern the universe. Epicurus invented the “atomic swerve” to leave the door open for agency and som “naturalists/materialists” try to use quantum uncertainty in the same fashion but if you scratch the paint off you will find a deterministic philosophy.
C. S. Lewis made the same observation in his book “Miracles” when he commented (2nd Chapter?) that if the rumors he was hearing about QM were accurate then naturalism is dead in the gate. I, for one, am tire of rolling over and playing nice whenever a materialist/naturalist introduces another layer of obfuscatory qualification without any methodological, ontological, or just plain logical, foundation.
And that’s why I can’t take naturalism seriously… Well…. perhaps I should qualify that statement… 8^> … that’s why I can’t take naturalist arguments seriously, the worldview permeates western civilization and it is a poison I take very seriously. I will, whenever I am able, point out the inadequacy of naturalism as a worldview.
Hi Dave:
Largely, I agree with you.
There is qualification and distinction to increase understanding: it’s called philosophy.
There is qualification to deflect and obfuscate: it’s called atheism (with its associated animating -isms de jure).
Hi Holo
I know we agree on the big picture, it’s just the details we quibble over. 8^> That’s a good thing since it forces me to consider my position more thoroughly. It keeps me from getting lazy and dogmatic – a tendency I am told I sometimes exhibit.
ReCapcha “slouched aspect”