From a Scientific American piece on free will:
Perhaps you missed it on your first reading too, but the authors are making an extraordinary suggestion. They seem to be claiming that the public “can’t handle the truth,” and that we should somehow be protecting them (lying to them?) about the true causes of human social behaviors. Perhaps they’re right.
Perhaps their initial research assumptions are all mixed up.
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Possibly related posts (automatically generated):
Hold on to the feelin’, Bering. What does a city boy, born and raised in south Detroit, know anyway? The debate: it goes on and on and on and on.
I freely choose not to believe in free will.
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So be it.
Is this anything really new for modern science and philosophy?
In “Quantum Enigma”, Rosenblum and Kuttner suggest that the results of quantum physics are downplayed by physicists, in part because of a fear that people will start speculating too much in unwelcome directions (I imagine ideas like Wheeler’s Participatory Anthropic Principle and other such are part of this.)
Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini have openly claimed that their criticisms of Neo-/Darwinism are met with discouragement even by people who agree with them, on the grounds that making the points they do will embolden creationists, Intelligent Design proponents, etc. Mazur’s Altenberg 16 touches on similar themes.
There’s other examples as well. But what I really find interesting in this particular case is that these accounts always focus on moral dimensions – but not (as JBS Haldane and others preferred) on the results for reason itself. I wonder if this is accidental oversight, or more because the ramifications of asserting the operation of nothing but blind law and chance is bad enough in the moral sphere, but when applied to science and reason itself, becomes too terrifying to contemplate.
Another possibility is determinism with inherent unpredictability. A simple example is x[i+1]=(1-x[i])^2, x={a+jb}<1. Such a system is obviously deterministic, yet future states cannot be predicted from its present state.
Would we say that an organism having this type of characteristic has free will, or not?
Joseph A.,
That’s a great way to put it. Time after time in discussions with scientists, I find it difficult for them to explore the presuppositions to their method. I don’t know why that is. I’ve always thought of it as uncritical thinking (e.g., “I don’t waste my time with philosophy”), but maybe it’s more along the lines of cognitive dissonance.
Olorin, it would have to depend on whether the unpredictability was introduced by the organism’s will or not. If it is, then it is free will; if not, it is free something-else. All the freedom in that case would be owned by whatever stochastic process introduced the unpredictability.
With reference to Joseph A.’s 9:56 pm comment, and with thanks to Telic Thoughts, here is this from Piattelli-Palmarini:
Tom: “Olorin, it would have to depend on whether the unpredictability was introduced by the organism’s will or not. If it is, then it is free will; if not, it is free something-else.”
The unpredictability is a mathematical property of the logistical equation that describes the behavior of the system. It doesn’t “come from” anywhere.
(I did misstate that equation. Sorry. It should have been x[n+1]=rx[n](1-x[n]). Full unpredictability over the entire range of initial conditions, x[0], occurs for r>3.564.)
Olorin, if you are right that it doesn’t come from anywhere, then it doesn’t come from the organism’s will. In that case it is not the organism’s will acting freely; hence, it is not free will.
The point is, how can we observe an organism’s behavior (i.e., state-space trajectory) to determine whether it has free will? In this example, the system (organism) selects arbitrarily among an infinite number of choices (bifurcations), yet it is deterministic.
Your answer that such a system has free will if its unpredictability comes from the system’s free will seems unhelpful.
The relevance is that descriptions such as the logistic equation are prevalent in the theory of complex systems. Such as the human brain. Arbitrary yet deterministic.
That is, suppose we ask, does system A have free will or is it deterministic? Is “both” one of the possible answers?
Olorin, the question is not about some “System A.” It is about humans, you and me. It is not just about observing an organism’s behavior, it is about being one of those humans. It is about what we know to be true of ourselves from living our own lives (philosophers say from “introspection,” but I find that rather clinical). It’s about being human, not clinically observing humans. It is about whether determinism is compatible with what we know of ourselves directly in that way.
There is a technical side to it, too, though, which is about about whether it is logically compatible with other things we know to be true about ourselves (we are morally responsible agents, we have the ability to reason, etc.). Determinism is logically incompatible with knowing what is logical. Apart from what we know about ourselves—face it, you know you make decisions for yourself!—determinism’s most fatal flaw is that it claims to be the logical conclusion of a chain of reasoning, while cutting the feet from under humans’ ability to draw logical conclusions from chains of reasoning. If it is true it must be false; it is self-defeating.
The article I referred to in the original post hints at the other great flaw of determinism: it undermines what we know to be true of ourselves with respect to moral responsibility and the ability to make moral choices. If we really have no free will, then why would it advise us how to act, and why would that advice be to deny determinism? It’s incoherent.
You wrote,
I didn’t write exactly that. I wrote the converse; that if an organism exhibits unpredictability of the type you described in your April 9, 12:36 am comment, and that unpredictability does not come from the organism’s will, then what you proposed there as “free will” actually is not free will. Let me clarify now what I could have said then, but didn’t think was necessary at the time. I do not say that unpredictability of the kind you described (or unpredictability of unstable systems, chaos, randomness, or any such) defines free will. What defines free will is agent freedom; the ability of a person as such to act as an agent. The person, the self, can make decisions and act on them, and the person is not defined by or controlled in his or her actions by the ineluctable necessities of neurochemistry, by quantum randomness, or any pure law/chance combination.
Tom:
Determinism implies that you are not fundamentally distinct from the rest of the universe, you are, in a sense, part of the universe since all matter and energy ultimately affects you the same way your cells affect each other. Therefore it is entirely consistent to claim that you make decisions for yourself, as long as you are really a part of a chain of cause and effect, matter and energy that extends back to the big bang, while acknowledging that determinism is true.
If it is possible that determinism can give rise to biological drives like pain, pleasure, those drives could then be used to form highly successful social strategies and hence social organisms. Moral obligation is not primarily a cold, rational choice, it is a visceral, deeply felt motivation, similar to hunger, sadness, joy. It is a biological drive at its base, but greatly enhanced and codified by human intelligence and abstraction. If determinism is true, social organisms can have strong biological drives to enhance behavior that supports social structure.
People deny an obviously false concept of determinism that, if true, would make them feel like they have no choice. But real determinism is not like that since, if true, you will certainly feel like you have a choice as long as there is nothing stopping you from making a choice. Real determinism affects your desires, and your desires are beyond your ability to change. (Unless you have a desire to change your desires; but then how can one make a decision to have a desire to choose to change a desire, without the former desire in the first place?)
Tom: “Olorin, the question is not about some “System A.” It is about humans, you and me.”
I did note that System A could comprise a human being—a human brain. And that it seems likely that very lengthy equations[1] having the characteristics of the logistic equation do describe humans, introspection and all. (Introspection can be described as a form of recursion.)
In that case, the mathematics would imply that humans are deterministic, and yet capable of arbitrary choices not imposed by the environment, or even by physical law. Your comment of April 11, 2010 at 6:44am continues to assume that determinism and free will are mutually exclusive. My suggestion is that perhaps they are not.[2]
Tom: “It’s about being human, not clinically observing humans. It is about whether determinism is compatible with what we know of ourselves directly in that way.”
Of course, if free will is a subjective phenomenon entirely within oneself without any external consequences, than all bets are off. The reason for observing others is to test the objective reality of free will. This question does seem to interest philosophers.
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[1] S.Y. Auyang’s book “Foundations of Complex System Theories in Economics, Biology, and Physics” is interesting in that it discusses a number of philosophical aspects and implications of such systems—which, of course, includes humans and their behavior.
[2] An analogous situation concerns the nature of light. For centuries, we argued whether light is a particle or a wave—two mutually incompatible categories. Than we found out that it is both.
woodchuck64 and olorin,
I thought it might be interesting to list a couple of question-begging statements you’ve made in your last comments:
That view of moral obligation is dependent on materialist assumptions.
Assumed, not shown to be true.
Is a human brain equivalent to a human being? Is the mind the same as the brain? Only on materialist assumptions.
Now, if materialism is true, then determinism is true. That’s as simple as it could be. If determinism follows from materialism, then to assume materialism as your premise is to assume your conclusion in your premise. So if you’re going to take it as a premise that, for example, moral obligation is a “biological drive at its base,” you’re going to have to show some reason to think that is so. Otherwise all you’re doing is stating your position, which you’re free to do, but which isn’t at all persuasive.
Now to some other points. woodchuck64, you wrote,
This view of self places all agency (all ability to be the cause of effects) at the level of physical necessity and quantum randomness. If you call that free will, that’s an idiosyncratic view of freedom at best. woodchuck64 doesn’t actually decide what to type; it’s not a matter of decision at all. woodchuck64 types what woodchuck64 must necessarily type, with some wiggle room for quantum randomness, amplified perhaps through brain systems, to make him type something that at root is essentially uncaused.
olorin,
I do not assume that free will is absolute. I’m not free to teleport myself to wherever you live and have this conversation over coffee right now, much as I might like to do that. Belief in free will implies only that some decisions are free. In that sense, there is compatibility between free will and determinism: some actions are free, some are determined.
Now if your logistic equation (or some alternative to it) allows for person-agency (as opposed to neurochemical agency or quantom-random agency), then I would not be opposed to your presenting an idea along those lines.
You’ve made an unnecessary dichotomy here. I did not say that the only thing we know about free will is what we know internally. I said that what we know internally is valid information to use toward deciding the matter of free will.
Observing others could not be a test of free will on its own, though; not unless we had our own experience to compare others’ behavior to. I couldn’t know just by looking at my neighbor that he does anything freely, if I didn’t see him behaving in ways that are consistent with my own experience of making choices of my own.
There is an objective test of free will, however. It begins with this question. Is the system of causation exhausted by physical necessity and quantum randomness? Is the universe of causation closed, such that all causes are either by physical law or else by chance? That’s the position entailed by materialistic determinism.
If that is the case, then it would be misleading to say that you disagree because you think the reasons I’ve given for my position are wrong. Right and wrong (logical right and wrong) do not exist within the closed causal system entailed by materialism. They cannot influence decisions.
More precisely, you could say that you disagree with me because you think I am wrong, but why do you think I am wrong? Is it because you have inspected my chain of reasoning and found it wanting, either in evidence or in the train of logic? Is it some weakness in my logic or evidence that has caused you to think what you think? How could that be? Where does logical weakness fit into physical necessity or randomness? The truth (on materialism) would have to be that you think what you think just because of neurochemical necessity and/or randomness in your brain. And if you think your neurochemical necessity is more true than my contrary neurochemical necessity, then I challenge you to state coherently what it could mean for one neurochemical necessity to be more true than another, or even what it could mean for two neurochemical necessities to be contrary to one another in a relevant sense.
This is the downfall of materialistic determinism: it cuts the feet out from under rationality itself; but rationality is necessary to conclude that determinism is true. It cannot be true unless it is false.
Tom: “Is a human brain equivalent to a human being? Is the mind the same as the brain? Only on materialist assumptions.”
Please don’t pick nits. Define “human” any way you like.
Tom: “Now, if materialism is true, then determinism is true. That’s as simple as it could be.”
It’s also wrong. As a simple example, atomic decay, tunneling, and other quantum phenomena are not deterministic, even under materialist assumptions. (Resolution of the EPR paradox nailed that one.) In the situation under discussion, determinism can be mathematically compatible with arbitrary choice independently of the nature of the system.
Tom: “Now if your logistic equation (or some alternative to it) allows for person-agency (as opposed to neurochemical agency or quantom-random agency), then I would not be opposed to your presenting an idea along those lines.”
Well, I thought that’s what I’ve been saying. The type of “agency” exhibited by the system is not relevant to the mathematics, therefore was not specified.. The system–whether physical or non-physical—can be entirely deterministic, yet make some choices that appear to be free; that is, they are unpredictable, arbitrary, and independent of any aspect of the environment and of any component of the system itself, based upon total knowledge of the system. Is that “free” enough? (If “free” depends upon some subjective sensation of freedom, then it is illusory—we could easily design a system that thinks it is acting freely whether it is or not.)
I’m afraid I’m not leading you toward an understanding of the math. Auyang’s book is helpful here, but it’s a long slog. Complex systems present a number of seemingly paradoxical issues, both scientifically and philosophically.
Anyway, think about it. Can a deterministic system—including a human—also exhibit free will?
Olorin, you probably nailed it when you said you’re not leading me to an understanding of the mathematics. I’ll be honest and let you know I assumed the variables in that equation were specific to some theory, and that the equation could not even be read separately from that theory and knowing what the variables represented. So I’ve taken your equation as a black-box illustration of your point that a system can be deterministic and yet unpredictable, and I haven’t studied it in more detail to see further what it might show. If there is more to get out of it than that, I’m certainly interested to hear it.
You’re also correct (on one level) in saying that I erred in saying materialism entails determinism. We know there is random unpredictability in quantum phenomena. I should have said that materialism implies the denial of person-agency. Note that I have been consistently been speaking of the materialist view’s implications that all of our actions are directed or determined by law plus chance. There is no more free will in quantum physics than in Newtonian, because what unpredictability exists in the system is entirely unintentional, undirected, complete randomness. That doesn’t sound like free choice to me, does it to you?
Unless—and here’s the interesting potential exception—unless there’s really something to the observer effect, and there’s really something to the idea that it’s a person who influences how quantum unpredictability settles out into discrete effects. This is a mystery still within physics. What is the person (the observer) to the quantum particle? What is a person, really?
Daniel Dennett swept all dualism aside in just a paragraph or two (or so he thought) by pointing to the conservation of energy: a non-physical soul or mind could not add energy to a system, so such a thing could not cause any effects in the world. But what if the observer effect, which we know of now in particle physics, is just a clumsy and poorly controlled hint of what the mind does precisely and intentionally within the brain; and what if the brain is a highly efficient quantum amplifier? In that case there could be free will and person-agency within the parameters of quantum physics.
Those are huge what-ifs. The science isn’t there to support it, yet there’s no science to deny it, either, as far as I know. Arguments for soul or mind (and for free will and person-agency) depend on philosophical and theological considerations still. But what if some neuroscientists took up the challenge of asking what’s going on inside the brain on a quantum level? Would it be possible to study that question within the parameters of proper research ethics? Do we have the tools today to study it at all? I don’t know. I’m just wondering.
(And just a parting thought: if I can define “human” any way I like, then I’ll certainly include created in the image of God and composed of mind, soul, and body in the definition.)
Tom,
My intention is not to assume any controversial or question-begging conclusions but merely show what determinism would logically entail if it were true.
If determinism were true, it would be “felt” in one’s desires, not in one’s choices. We feel like our choices are free, yes, and that would be true even if determinism is true. It’s our desires that do not feel free; but neither do we expect them to be free. Desires define us as unique human beings. We do not expect nor require that our desires be as freely changeable as our choices. Yet our desires are what would be determined by environment and genetics if determinism were true. Therefore, what we know about ourselves is compatible with determinism.
Free will means the ability to freely make choices. It does not mean the ability to freely change your desires. I want to freely choose according to the sum total of my desires, good, bad or neutral; I don’t want anything else restricting my choice. Yet, my desires have restricted my choice. People don’t seem to worry about how their free will is restricted by their desires.
I freely type what I want to type. Is this statement compatible with free will? Yes, because it expresses my desire to type whatever I want to type. It is also compatible with determinism because it implies that my typing will be determined by my desires, which in turn are ultimately beyond my control.
The true freedom you describe above seems idiosyncratic to me because it implies people are free to do what they don’t want to do: for example, despite being happy, content, optimistic and healthy, I might suddenly decide to commit suicide tomorrow. That would be true free will, but it also seems fundamentally different from what free will means colloquially.
If determinism were true, the colloquial use of free will fits perfectly: we want to be free to do what we want to do (whether base or noble), but the idea of being free from our own desires is just weird, self destructive almost.
Tom, thank you for the detailed exposition. Whether I agree with your positions or not, I can always count on a thoughtful answer.
A couple of peripheral issues. “[I]f I can define “human” any way I like, then I’ll certainly include created in the image of God and composed of mind, soul, and body in the definition.” The definition of a system is a list of its components (with their rules and interactions), not its source or qualities. Mind, soul and body are components; “created in the image of God” is not.
Tom: “You’re also correct (on one level) in saying that I erred in saying materialism entails determinism. We know there is random unpredictability in quantum phenomena.” Not quite true; quantum physics introduces a new kind of determinism—naked chance at one level, yet statistical predictability at another. The philosophical implications of this are still up in the air, and lead to many popular misconceptions.[0]
Such as, “Unless—and here’s the interesting potential exception—unless there’s really something to the observer effect, and there’s really something to the idea that it’s a person who influences how quantum unpredictability settles out into discrete effects. This is a mystery still within physics. What is the person (the observer) to the quantum particle? What is a person, really?.” The apparent problem is caused by moving from a quantum system to a measuring instrument large enough that quantum coherence cannot presently be maintained. We are now beginning to devise experiments where quantum phenomena can be measured with quantum instruments, and the “observer effect” disappears.
“Arguments for soul or mind (and for free will and person-agency) depend on philosophical and theological considerations still. But what if some neuroscientists took up the challenge of asking what’s going on inside the brain on a quantum level?” Again, ditch the quantum woo. A much more likely explanation will issue from complexity theory, by treating the mind as an emergent entity of the brain. Emergent entities rattle the reductionist position in science; they depend upon space/time and matter/energy, yet are not reducible to their physical substrates.
Complex-system theory is a fascinating new area that promises to open up previously intractable areas in a number of sciences. As I’ve noted, it comes with philosophical implications as well. One of Auyang’s caveats is relevant here: “Downward causation[1] is often accused of being mystical…. Mysticism results if the system’s causal power is credited to independent sources such as vitality or psychic energy that are totally detached from the forces among the constituents and stand above them. Such attribution is not necessary.”
Auyang’s treatise is illuminating because it considers these issues equally with the technical aspects. One can get a flavor of the novel concepts from Melanie Mitchell’s “Complexity: A Guided Tour,” which is more introductory— also more recent and less expensive.
More generally, I believe that scientific results can inform philosophical, and even religious, questions.[2] I believe this of my own free will.
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[0] A good non-technical reference is David Lindsey’s “Where Does the Weirdness Go?” (BasicBooks 1996), although it misses some recent results.
[1] This term denotes the effects that a non-physical system as a whole has upon its individual physical components. For (a contentious) example, the effects of mind upon brain neurons.
[2] For example, the conundrum of how an incorporeal entity such as the mind manages to induce changes in a physical object such as the brain. (a la Descartes’ pineal gland) See [1], supra.