None of this is to deny, of course, that in the west there are still a lot of God-fearers among these God-ignoring atheists. But if we’re talking about such mixed “cultures”, how are we to decide to which part of that mixture is responsible for the violence, when violence happens?

You might call it a post-Christian atheism. Certain individuals’ rejection of belief in God depends on (what they assume to be) the Christian view of God that they are rejecting.

One huge discrepancy between current atheism and that of the Madman (Nietzsche’s character who spoke those words) is that the Madman, and Nietzsche, recognized the huge loss that came with the supposed death of God. He knew it mattered.

A couple of other elements seem necessary besides rigidity. The main one, I think, is a determination to change the world by whatever means necessary. Even if the change sought is a good one (better lives for the working class in the case of Marxism) it can still be a recipe for disaster.

Modern secular atheism is Nietzschean? The primary strain of western atheistic ideology is humanist. Not Nietzschean. I don’t know a single atheist who identifies himself as a Nietzschean. I’m sure a few exist. Just as there are still a few existentialist atheists in the Sartre vein. But they’re few and far between. Even the Randian Objectivist atheists vastly outnumber Nietzscheans.

I suppose there is probably a relation between rigidity and violence in the special case where the belief, by its content, condones or promotes hatred or violence. I would think that the more rigidly that kind of belief is held, the more likely the holder of that belief would be to act it out.

Consider also the way we choose words by their connotations: the more violent or hateful a belief tends to be (in one’s own estimation, at least) the more likely one is to call it “rigid,” rather than “firm,” “strong,” or “unwavering.”

Words are marvelous things. Take up a thesaurus and you can find all kinds of synonyms representing slowness to change (back down on, yield on) one’s beliefs. Some of them you can use to make the person look like a (rigid), unbending, unthinking, uncaring moral moron, and some of them you can use to praise the person’s strength of conviction.

But you have focused the question where it actually belongs: not how strongly a person believes x, but what x is (the content of the belief). Martin Luther King, Jr.’s beliefs regarding nonviolence were rather rigid firm, solid, and substantial, wouldn’t you agree?

Now, I don’t doubt that if one’s ideology endorsed violence, then a rigid adherence to that ideology would increase the risk that one would endorse violence. But again the point is that we must consider the content of belief, not just the way in which that belief is held.

So you see, you can define various shadings and gradations of religion, and I can point to the same in atheism.

You wrote, “…os would have us believe that ’some religions are more rigid than others’ means ’some religions are dangerous because they are religions; but atheism isn’t because it’s not rigid like religions are.’” Nope, I meant exactly what I said: Some religions are more rigid than others. Fundamentalist religions are more rigid than progressive or liberal religions–or, I suppose you could say that fundamentalist interpretations of religions are more rigid than non-fundamentalist interpretations. Fundamentalist interpretations require adherence to a rigid set of beliefs. Atheism has only one requirement: Lack of belief in God.

What conclusions ought we to draw from either of these observations? I can think of some, certainly. But I think (from past experience) that os would have us believe that “some religions are more rigid than others” means “some religions are dangerous because they are religions; but atheism isn’t because it’s not rigid like religions are.” If I’m guessing correctly, and that’s what os wants us to conclude, that inference in particular is without any merit.