Of course I cannot be absolutely certain, with the mind of God, that they are (1) Christians in fact. Nevertheless I can be sure that they are (2) representative of Biblical, evangelical Christianity.

Furthermore, the specific actions of this church, for which Bash Back attacked them, are actions that are in line with Biblical Christianity.

By that fact and by (2), Bash Back’s actions were indeed hateful toward Christianity, regardless of whether you and I can take the place of God and assert (1) with full confidence.

Over here, Outrage! confines itself to outing Christian leaders as gay and Peter Tatchell squaring up to Robert Mugabe.

But that takes a bit more guts than being stupid and dumb in a church….

How do you know the abused people were actually Christians?

CARR
Thank God that these Bash Back people never target real Christians, but only people who attend churches with crosses on them, such as Mount Hope church.

Of course, somebody attends church can become a real Christian as soon as anybody attacks that person.

Perhaps only God knows what is in that person’s heart, but if he is attacked, you hardly need to be God to know that he must be a True Christian.

STEVE K
I agree with what Tom said, but I want to emphasize two words he said that might get overlooked – very likely are not Christians. You and I can only judge by what we see and hear, but God knows the heart of the individual. Tom is right to think that Fred Phelps sure doesn’t fit the Christian template (I agree), but ultimately God will be the judge.

CARR
Quite right.

What right do we have to say that the people who were subject to such abuse were Christians?

None.

SO let us stop the talk of Christian-bashing, as we are not God and cannot judge these people to even have been Christians.

For the sake of completeness I’m going to sum up what I think are the problems with the theistic position on claims to access to superior, objective morality that haven’t been resolved for me through this discussion. I don’t mean this to be a definitive statement by me or an authoritative conclusion of the discussion – it’s just my attempt to articulate what I still find unsatisfying about the claims discussed.

I believe the Christian position on morality is this: Christian morality is superior because, among other things, it is objective and not relative. But I still don’t believe this is true. (I think the strongest position on Christian morality is that in some instances – like homosexuality – Scripture provides clear instruction. I would agree to that any time. But that is not the same thing as the first claim.)

Why don’t I believe that Christian morality is objective? Although I do think that we are able to access Scripture objectively, words themselves are not morality. If your position is that God created the universe you either accept that God created a part of reality called Morality for which he gave us instructions (Scripture), or that he gave us (often ambiguous) instructions on how to behave and Morality does not exist. (If morality does not exist, but what we call Morality is only a set of instructions, then this discussion and the argument itself is meaningless.)

So we are left with a thing called Morality. (Scripture itself is not Morality.) And as I outlined above, the decision about what is canonical is relative, and the interpretation of the words itself is (somewhat) subjective. Yes, you can say that the words of scripture present less ambiguity than moral axioms reasoned through to moral conclusions, etc., but at that point you will have conceded that your access to morality is not absolutely objective, and will have lost the claim of superiority that is based on objective apprehension.

As I said earlier, there are differences between moral approaches. You can claim that Christian morality is better than any other, and we could argue that. But I can’t, at this point, concede that Christian morality can claim superiority because of its objectivity – many other moral codes are written down and proclaimed to be eternal based on a moral sense alone (“We hold these truths to be self-evident…”), and could thence make the same claim.

Appreciated, and understood. I assumed exactly what your explanation confirmed.

In response, understand that there’s no personal animosity behind my response or my exit. I just don’t think there’s any more blood to get out of this stone.

I do owe you an apology — you didn’t write “You seem bent on dismissing Jordan’s and my requests for an argument from you.” as I quoted you in my previous comment.

I must have written that and later placed my blockquote in the wrong place and on a later re-read mistaken what I had done and attributed that sentence to you.

Please accept my explanation that it was an honest mistake — I was not intentionally misquoting you. (I agree that it seemed like an unlikely thing for you to say, and my comment on it was only to that effect.)

As for Jordan asking me for an argument I don’t recall that one.

Funny, neither do I. In fact, I can’t find this sentence anywhere but in your so-called-quote of me:

You seem bent on dismissing Jordan’s and my requests for an argument from you.

That’s the only reason I put in another comment here. I didn’t recall saying that, couldn’t think of why I would, and on further review realized that I didn’t. Where did you get that from?

I think you’ve clearly demonstrated my point, though. You’re more interested in giving misquotes and pedantic vocabulary lessons than really considering the arguments at hand.

The “silliness” that really inspired me to let this go was the absurd notion that written text can’t be relied on for any objective information whatsoever. Taking that inane level of skepticism to other written words makes written communication almost useless; therefore, the attempt to dismiss the objectivity of scriptural morality on those grounds is sophistic.

(note: I know what the words “inane” and “sophistry” mean, so please spare me the impromptu instruction)

My argument re: consistency was not deflated by your counter. Yes, you made claims to having some standard. I implied that you weren’t applying them consistently, not that you had none. The evidence point is a perfect example – I cited one of history’s greatest legal expert’s opinion that the Gospels meet the requirements of courtroom evidence. Your response:

As I said, I’m not a lawyer. But Greenleaf died in the mid 1800’s and I’m guessing he’s not going to be as up to date on case law as he could be were he alive today.

Right. Sure. Whatever it takes, I suppose. If you’re going to throw out Greenleaf’s opinion on evidence, then you’ll need to take a few hundred thousand textbooks out of the hands of law students – and re-write the rules to fit your preferences. You’ve implied a standard, but you’ve done nothing to suggest that you’ll apply it the same way to the Bible as other texts.

Hence, the use of the word, “specious”, which you so conveniently defined for us. On first glance, your arguments that written text can’t be relied on for objective information, and all the rejections on the basis of this-or-that standard seem plausible. But they don’t hold up, because you can’t apply any of them consistently to non-Biblical documents without obliterating history, law, and so forth. Therefore, the arguments are “specious” and the conversation has gotten “silly”. Now that we’re on to the kind of response your last comment entailed, it’s gotten “surreal”.

(I also know what “surreal” means, thanks anyway).

I just needed to point out for other readers that I did not make the statement you attributed to me, that I do in fact know my own words, and that you’re not really focused on the arguments so much as disagreeing just to disagree, or so it seems. I think it’s a pretty logical conclusion to say that the kind of discussion you’re engaging in is not useful for anything positive.

Sorry you got pulled back in. Good to read your thoughts, however.

Medicine Man,

I glanced through the last string of comments and while I agree that this is getting silly I think it’s not rooted in the same cause you do.

You wrote:

What you’ve demonstrated is that you’re adamant on rejecting scriptural historicity and objectivity in ways you’d never apply to other fields. That’s pretty specious. You seem bent on dismissing Jordan’s and my requests for an argument from you.

The first sentence is patently false. Previously in this discussion, I wrote all of these:

Hearsay, of course, is so unreliable that it can’t be used as evidence in a U.S. court.

That’s me demonstrating that my standard applies in U.S. court.

Of course, we’re talking about ancient history. No one can claim to “know” with certainty the exact truth of events that happened just 2,000 years ago among people with whom we share so few sensibilities.

That’s me demonstrating that my standard applies to ancient history.

But reading ancient documents we are left with two choices: either people recorded lies (or stated things in fantastic terms not intended to be taken literally), or the people of that time were far more credulous than they are today.

That’s me demonstrating that my standard applies to ancient documents.

When I referred to “ancient documents” I met all ancient documents, not just the biblical ones.

That’s me demonstrating that my standard applies to ancient documents again.

Say what you want about the accuracy of ancient histories, I don’t know of any historian who gives much credence to head counts. Everything from city sizes to combatants in a battle are famously, and for obvious reasons, inflated with dependable predictability.

That’s me demonstrating that my standard applies to head counts in ancient histories, particularly the number of battle combatants.

In other words, your account of my position is a patent straw man. And that is silly.

Specious means that something appears on its surface to be plausible but is not really true on further study. So, to use that word correctly, one could say that your second sentence in the one I quoted above, claiming that I would never apply my standard to fields other than Scriptural historicity, is indeed specious.

So, using the rules of logic, your conclusion above that no further discussion on this topic with me could be productive is based on a false premise, and is therefore fallacious.

As for Jordan asking me for an argument I don’t recall that one. I also don’t recall your asking me for an argument either, although to be clear it is you making the claim that your morality is superior and objective. I have made no such claims, and the burden of proof is thus yours.

Like Jordan did, I might pick this up and try to reconstruct what I believe your argument to now be.

With that, I’m going to vacate the discussion. I’m starting to sense the “inverse ad nauseum” effect, where I’m just being asked to endlessly repeat my reasoning by someone who acts as though it was never made at all. No offense, that may be completely accidental, but it’s no less pointless.

I think we’ve reached that point where further talk, at least on my end, isn’t going to produce anything constructive. It’s worse than circular, it’s getting silly. Whatever others choose to add is all well and good, of course, but I think the discussion’s potential for progress is spent.

As I said, the problem with your approach is that it’s based first and second on your own “moral sense”. It’s how you apprehend the “axioms”, it’s how you judge the end results. It’s then punted to survey (after you claimed that anything other than your moral sense alone was superfluous), where you’d take a sort of poll of what others think. I know your view is a bit more sophisticated than that, but that’s the gist of the problem. I think you’d have a hard time arguing that some strong feeling you have about a moral “axiom” is really liable to change just because a lot of people disagree with you.

I also think you’re upside down on whether moral axioms are more applicable to major or “trivial” issues. Isn’t that what makes them “trivial”, that they’re not strongly tied to some fundamental moral principle? I don’t think that’s a sensible argument, that trivial issues are easily settled by moral axioms, while major issues are not easily settled. That’s a very weak form of moral applicability, to have the fundamental moral questions unanswerable and the peripherals assured, isn’t it?

The reason the apprehension of the moral axioms comes up first is because people have prejudiced apprehensions. You can’t escape that; but your view insists on an assumption that almost all people will have almost exactly the same interpretation of the axioms in any given circumstance. And if they don’t, you still have nothing concrete to use to untangle the disagreement – just more prejudiced moral senses.

The congregation was acting on a fundamental Christian principle – loving one’s neighbor as they love themselves. I’m now confused as to what you think “empirical” means.

I think it should be clear that I’m not talking about petty power or limited authority. I’m talking about a deity demonstrating absolute and universal power over fundamental universal concepts, like life and death. You’re asking about persons with limited authority. The authority George Bush has is limited to the property and territory of the U.S. (it’s limited and finite), and I’m fully aware that he’s not the originator of those properties or territories. Moral precepts are not subject to his level of authority.

When God demonstrates authority that’s absolute and universal, I have reason to accept His claim to universal and absolute authority, and that includes morality. If He gives me overt reasons to believe that He created the universe in the first place, those are good reasons to believe that He knows what is or is not moral in that universe.

So, I’m not making any leap at all. I’m just noting that evidence which proves that some entity actually was the Creator and designer of the very reality I exist in is, by definition, also evidence that the same entity is the Creator of the morality operative in that reality.

”How do you know?”

In brief, since this is getting silly, are you asking how I know what the position of Christian Theism is? Same for the question of apprehension: the definition is the answer. That’s essential logic, by the way. As God is defined in Christian Theism, His attributes make talk of morality as something separate from God “non-Christian-theism” to begin with.

I’ve said why I think the Bible is a better source for moral truth than just my own moral sense. Several times. I also noted that it’s the external nature of the Bible that makes it feasible to discuss the possibility that my perception of it may be wrong. My apprehension of the Bible can only be influenced by my passions so much – and other people have an objective way of determining if my apprehension is correct. All you can do is call people ‘handicapped’, and they either accept or reject that by personal fiat.

I’m absolutely not going to continue arguing whether or not one can glean objective meaning from written words. The discussion in that respect is getting ridiculous. I stand by my accusation that the attitude that one cannot do so, consistently applied, would make law, contracts, history, and just about all other uses of the written word totally worthless. It’s a bankrupt argument to make, and I’m just not interested in humoring a person’s approach to scripture that they’d never use on anything else. I don’t believe for one second that you’d accept that same reasoning in any other sphere.

Alternatively, I can just say that everything you have written is subjective to the point that I can’t really know if you mean “written down” as in “put in written form”, or, “transcribed vertically”, or “goose feathers drawn on paper”, or something else entirely. I can’t even go by the context, since that’s in that pesky “subjective” written form, too. Sure, there was an Idea there, but it’s a subjective idea that has to be subjectively interpreted, using my own subjective apprehension…which is why we all know that one just cannot know what a writer really means when they write. I’m helpless to continue the conversation, now that I’ve accepted the view of writing that you’ve espoused.

We don’t get morality from authority, in some ethereal sense. Demonstrations of absolute and universal authority, however, lend credibility to claims of moral authority. As I said, solipsism of all stripes can’t be rationally or logically refuted in a person committed to it. If every possible proof that God could offer that His morality is authoritative is going to be met with a “so what”, then why bother?

I think God’s given convincing evidence that He’s the supreme authority in all senses. That includes morality. If someone could out-do that, then I’d be willing to consider them more authoritative than God on moral issues. If Jesus was doing card tricks or escape artistry, I wouldn’t have that kind of confidence. Resurrection, raising of the dead, and instantaneous curing of diseases is another thing entirely.

Note that I didn’t answer your question as it was posed, because it was posed in a way that answers itself, from the perspective of Christian theism. A being of truly “supreme” power has power that extends to all aspects of reality. So, “supreme power” as it applies to the Christian God entails power over morality by definition. Therefore, it would be impossible to sensibly talk of God being anything other than perfectly reliable, given “supreme power”.

When the issue is not one of logical structure or empiricism, you have nothing to work with.

My contention is that most moral disagreements are due to logical or empirical errors. At bottom, we all use our Moral Sense to apprehend the same basic Moral Axioms. It’s the mistakes we make afterward that cause all the trouble.

Most moral statements are not so sterile that they can be summed up in a clean way using just logic and empirical data.

They don’t have to be “sterile” (whatever that means). They simply have to start with one or more Moral Axioms, and reach a logical conclusion. I realize that many people don’t reach a logical conclusion (although they usually accept the correct Moral Axioms) and in such cases their error will result in moral disagreements. That’s my point.

Logic and morality are very different in some important ways. For one, logic is not personal. Morality is very personal.

I didn’t claim that logic is personal. I claimed that it should be used to reach moral conclusions based on Moral Axioms & empirical data, and that its misuse is often a source of moral disagreement.

Logic simply tells us what things are or are not

I think that claim is a bit strong. All logic really tells us is what follows from what. That’s why a valid logical argument, with one or more unsound premises, can reach a false conclusion. Your premises have to be true (i.e., sound) in order to guarantee a true conclusion. That’s why empirical errors are another source of moral disagreement, even when logic is being used properly.

morality tells us whether or not they “should” or “should not” be.

I claimed that logic can be use to find out what follows from a given set of Moral Axioms and emprical statements–i.e., it can be used in conjunction with Morality to properly analyze moral issues.

You also need to recognize that the premises that you start from in these ‘logical syllogisms’ are not inert. They have to be moral statements themselves, and how then do you know if they are accurate?

We know from our Moral Sense. My point is that our Moral Sense only gives us basic moral facts (i.e., Moral Axioms), and that these facts, in conjunction with empirical data, have to be logically analyzed in order to reach a conclusion about a given, nontrivial moral issue. i.e., “Abortion is wrong,” is not a Moral Axiom. It requires empirical data, one or more Moral Axioms, and careful logical analysis. The Moral Axioms are apprehended through your Moral Sense, though; that is my claim, and I think you might actually agree with me; you would just add that they need external corroboration. More on that below…

Also, I note that you have to couch that analysis with the phrase “most nontrivial moral issues”. Weren’t you criticizing my view of morality for not being comprehensive enough?

I think you misunderstood what I was saying. I was implying that Moral Axioms, by themselves, are enough to reach conclusions about trivial moral issues, while logic & empirical data are needed when it comes to nontrivial issues.

The “third type” is a lot more common that your analysis suggests, since it comes up before you even get to your #1, most of the time.

I disagree. Like C. S. Lewis, I think most people “see” the same Moral Axioms.

All of this makes even the original moral question at hand a good example of why your approach can’t actually work. Empiricism doesn’t settle it, and logic doesn’t settle it. There’s a question of fundamental morals at work, and the best your view can do is call it “un-resolvable”.

No, the disagreement is not about Moral Axioms. It is likely empirical, which is why the congregation probably would have reacted differently have they not been Christians (i.e., had they not accepted certain empirical claims about how God wants us to behave).

Miracles demonstrate the power and authority of the deity. So when Jesus says, “I’m the creator and sustainer of life, and I say A is bad and B is good”, and then demonstrates His authority over life by raising someone from the dead, that’s good evidence that He really is the one with absolute authority.

What do power and authority have to do with morality? Does a moral proposition become more probable because it is affirmed by someone powerful–say, George Bush or Barrack Obama? Again, you’re not connecting the dots. You’re making a gigantic leap between power & authority, and morality, and I’m not willing to make that leap with you.

Remember, again, that Christian theism does not consider morality to be something God ‘apprehends’.

Well then, as you put it, I can only shrug, and say that I disagree with Christian theism on this matter. And why shouldn’t I?

Morality in Christian theism is inseparable from the nature of God.

How do you know?

An infinite, perfect entity who cannot change doesn’t “apprehend” the morals He relates to humanity. They’re part of who/what He is.

Again, how do you know? Seriously, I’m not being obtuse. I’m asking how you can possibly claim know all of these things about God–that he is perfect, infinite, unchanging, that morality is part of his nature, etc. Your theological views are starting to look like a house of cards…

What makes my approach “better” is that I can actually check my “perceptions”, or my “moral sense” against something not dependent on my prejudices, preferences, or passions. Despite what Tony says, it is possible to know what a person meant when they wrote down an idea in words, and scriptural morality is (at least) better in that it’s external to me, and unchanging.

Once again, why should you think the Bible is a better source of moral facts than your Moral Sense? And what makes you think one’s Moral Sense is dependent on prejudices, preferences, or passions, and that one’s view of the Bible is not?

I can actually use the logical and empirical techniques with respect to that written code, because I have something concrete and objective to start with (the text)

The physical book is “concrete and objective,” but the ideas it contains (which is what you’re really talking about) are not. How do you know the author can be trusted when it comes to moral/metaphysical ideas? How is your indirect, secondhand experience of someone else’s experience (via heavily translated text) more reliable than the direct experiential data of your Moral Sense?

Logically, your approach collapses into itself, because it’s overtly circular.

It’s not circular; it’s basic–i.e., it’s foundational. It’s not a thing to be proven, it’s a thing to serve as the basis of proof. We all have these sorts of beliefs. Yours (God) is just buried a bit deeper.

I noted that written text is more objective than “feelings” (or “senses”, or whatever); therefore, morality apprehended at least partly through written tenets is more objective than morality apprehended purely through feelings (or senses).

Written text is just an external approximation the author’s “feelings” (as you put it). How is that objective? An idea doesn’t lose its subjectivity just because it’s been written down.

I’ve already mentioned how the Gospels, if historically accurate, serve as evidence that what Jesus said came with supreme authority.

Again, I’d like to see how we can get morality from authority.

At some point, you’ve got to be willing to accept some sort of evidence that your own personal moral sense might not be accurate.

Ok, fair enough, and here it is: If a significant number of people, who I know and trust, disagree with me about certain Moral Axioms, while being in agreement amongst themselves, then I think that would count as evidence that there’s something wrong with my Moral Sense. In other words, corroboration does play a role in my view of morality.

In short, if no possible argument could convince you that God was the ultimate moral authority, what reason is there to make any arguments at all?

Let me ask you something: Given that God is supremely powerful, what evidence could convince you that he is not a reliable source of moral truth?

I think we’ve come to some level of agreement about the biggest problem with your view of morality:

3. X’s Moral Sense is damaged, and he is unable to “see” the correct Moral Axioms. Such disputes cannot be resolved….

I’ll concede this point. I don’t know that you’re morally handicapped, and, as stated above, now that I think about it, moral handicaps are probably quite rare.

When the issue is not one of logical structure or empiricism, you have nothing to work with. Most moral statements are not so sterile that they can be summed up in a clean way using just logic and empirical data. Logic and morality are very different in some important ways. For one, logic is not personal. Morality is very personal. Logic simply tells us what things are or are not – morality tells us whether or not they “should” or “should not” be. Logic has nothing to do with relationships; morality is meaningless outside of the context of a relationship.

Probably the most pertinent difference, to this discussion, is that logically “wrong” things cannot happen in reality because of LoC. It’s not possible to circumvent logic in practice – that’s why we know that logically valid arguments with distributed terms really are universal. It is possible, though, to be morally “wrong”, to do something contrary to the laws of morality. That means that we can’t prove, demonstrate, or perceive moral statements in the same way that we can logical ones.

You also need to recognize that the premises that you start from in these ‘logical syllogisms’ are not inert. They have to be moral statements themselves, and how then do you know if they are accurate? Also, I note that you have to couch that analysis with the phrase “most nontrivial moral issues”. Weren’t you criticizing my view of morality for not being comprehensive enough?

The “third type” is a lot more common that your analysis suggests, since it comes up before you even get to your #1, most of the time.

All of this makes even the original moral question at hand a good example of why your approach can’t actually work. Empiricism doesn’t settle it, and logic doesn’t settle it. There’s a question of fundamental morals at work, and the best your view can do is call it “un-resolvable”. Which is less useful: an approach to morality that can’t answer major questions, or the one that’s not specific on the minor ones?

I’m willing to explain the connection in my thought again, but not to start cranking out the dissertations. Miracles demonstrate the power and authority of the deity. So when Jesus says, “I’m the creator and sustainer of life, and I say A is bad and B is good”, and then demonstrates His authority over life by raising someone from the dead, that’s good evidence that He really is the one with absolute authority.

Remember, again, that Christian theism does not consider morality to be something God ‘apprehends’. Morality in Christian theism is inseparable from the nature of God. An infinite, perfect entity who cannot change doesn’t “apprehend” the morals He relates to humanity. They’re part of who/what He is. That’s why I’m not being dismissive of Euthyphro so much as noting that it’s not what some people think it is. It’s more a question about God’s nature than morality. The answer I gave (not A or B, but both) is not my own invention, it’s a fairly early one. Aquinas, at least, was making that assessment.

I’m saying that morality is not apprehensible in exactly the same way as logic or color. What makes my approach “better” is that I can actually check my “perceptions”, or my “moral sense” against something not dependent on my prejudices, preferences, or passions. Despite what Tony says, it is possible to know what a person meant when they wrote down an idea in words, and scriptural morality is (at least) better in that it’s external to me, and unchanging. I can actually use the logical and empirical techniques with respect to that written code, because I have something concrete and objective to start with (the text). I also have a way to answer the kind of “major dilemma” that your view is helpless against.

As far as apprehending scriptural morality “better”, that’s where we can have a meaningful conversation about logic, context, language, and so forth. I’m not really interested in hashing out the specifics of every moral speck we can think of, but I think you see the point. There’s something mutual and objective we can refer to when we debate which position is moral or immoral.

I’m not attempting to frame everything in syllogistic terms – that doesn’t mean I’m not making logical arguments. I noted your dilemma: perceive morals through moral sense alone, or not? In essence, your answer was, “sooner or later, yes.” Logically, your approach collapses into itself, because it’s overtly circular. It all starts and ends with “moral sense”. I noted that written text is more objective than “feelings” (or “senses”, or whatever); therefore, morality apprehended at least partly through written tenets is more objective than morality apprehended purely through feelings (or senses).

No offense intended, but if you can’t follow an argument that’s not put into diagrammed syllogistic form for you, then why talk about it at all? I think you’re more than capable of following the train of thought. I’m making arguments and supporting them with reasoning. I’ve shown why my reasons lead to my conclusions; I’ve shown why I make the assertions that I do. You’re really stretching the situation to suggest that I’ve done absolutely none of either.

I’ve already mentioned how the Gospels, if historically accurate, serve as evidence that what Jesus said came with supreme authority. Your response that that doesn’t mean that God’s got the right sense of morality is essentially a slip into “moral solipsism”. At some point, you’ve got to be willing to accept some sort of evidence that your own personal moral sense might not be accurate. You’ve got to be willing to accept some sort of evidence that someone else’s is. And if you’re arguing that overt demonstrations of God’s power can’t convince you that He’s the sole moral authority, then you’re basically unwilling to concede any moral perceptions outside of your own. Philosophical solipsism is essentially inarguable, and this “moral solipsism” is as well.

In short, if no possible argument could convince you that God was the ultimate moral authority, what reason is there to make any arguments at all?

We can argue semantics all day, but the point remains valid. People can have flawed vision, and flawed mathematical reasoning. I can determine who is right or wrong in those cases based on objective, external, fixed definitions and sources.

Likewise, you can determine who is right or wrong regarding moral propositions based on an external, objective source — Morality — just as the Laws of Logic provide an objective, external source with which to analyze logical arguments. In fact, the Laws of Logic provide a nice analogy here, since they share many of the same properties as Morality (they are immaterial, coeternal with the universe, immutable, etc., and we can grasp them intuitively).

That brings me back to repeating the same challenge: tell me how, using the only valid means of apprehension of morality (our moral sense) can one person ever tell another person that they’re morally incorrect?

Achieving the correct stance on most nontrivial moral issues involves a chain of reasoning (let’s call it a “Moral Argument”) that employs both atomic moral facts (these are what we “see” with our Moral Sense–let’s call them “Moral Axioms”), as well as empirical facts, to reach a conclusion. I see at least 3 possible sources of moral disagreement between person X and person Y:

1. X’s Moral Argument is not logically valid. All Y has to do is show X which portion of his argument isn’t valid.

2. X’s Moral Argument, while valid, is not sound–i.e., one or more of his premises is empirically wrong. These disputes can be resolved evidentially.

3. X’s Moral Sense is damaged, and he is unable to “see” the correct Moral Axioms. Such disputes cannot be resolved.

Here’s a question: How common is the 3rd type of moral dispute? I imagine it’s extremely rare. Most of us agree when it comes to Moral Axioms (e.g., “It’s wrong to cause unnecessary harm”), while disagreeing about empirical matters (e.g., “Allah says it is necessary that we harm his enemies”).

You are so sure about your perception of morality that you think I’m handicapped: so how do you know, and what makes that valid?

I’ll concede this point. I don’t know that you’re morally handicapped, and, as stated above, now that I think about it, moral handicaps are probably quite rare.

“First of all, why should we believe that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate?”

I’ve already given an answer for this. Referring to the historical, empirical, logical, and other such evidence supporting the Gospel accounts of Christ is pretty cogent. If you don’t accept it, so be it. But don’t ignore it.

How do the verifiable (i.e., empirical) Gospel accounts of Christ support the idea that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate? I’m not seeing the connection.

Also, I’ll ask you again: Even if we can trust God’s apprehension of morality, how do you know your apprehension of “God’s morality” is better than my apprehension of morality, per se? It’s not enough to show that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate; to be consistent, you must also show that your apprehension of God’s apprehension of morality is also accurate (at least, more accurate than my direct apprehension of morality).

“How exactly do miracles and “objectivity” count as evidence of God’s moral superiority; and, more importantly, how do they lend support to your supposed apprehension of God’s apprehension of morality?”

Said in same arguments as above.

You didn’t give an argument. You simply made a statement: That the historical, empirical, logical, and other such evidence supporting the Gospel accounts of Christ supports the premise that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate. Can you elaborate on this? Note that, for the sake of argument, I’m not disputing the historical accuracy of the Gospels. I’m simply asking you to show how the Gospels, if true, support the idea that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate.

Your P-points are badly flawed. God’s ‘perception’ of morals is not the issue. You’re projecting your own assumption that morals are defined apart from God’s nature. It’s not nearly so complex as you’re trying to make it. We have communicated moral precepts from an authority who has demonstrated the authority to make such edicts.

Tony has already showed you the problems with this line of thinking (i.e., Euthyphro’s Dilemma), so I won’t get into that here (except to note that you seem strangely glib about a theological problem that many respected theistic philosophers admit ranks right up there with the Problem of Evil). Divine Command Theory has fallen out of fashion for a reason.

Likewise, be careful what silly metaphors you bring up, as well. IPU and FSM are textbook examples of shallow strawmen. If you really think those are reasonable responses to the kind of arguments that I’m making

I haven’t seen a single logical argument from you. That’s why I had to try to formulate one for you, based on some of the vague statements (note: statements are not arguments) you’ve made throughout this thread. And my use of the IPU was intended as an overload objection. It was supposed to be silly. That’s the point.

If this discussion’s going to go anywhere, you need give us something formal & precise. Statements like, “…the historical, empirical, logical, and other such evidence supporting the Gospel accounts of Christ is pretty cogent,” are no substitute for a logical argument whose conclusion is, “…we believe that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate”; and, “You’re projecting your own assumption that morals are defined apart from God’s nature,” doesn’t tell me anything about why I shouldn’t make such an assumption (incidentally, it’s not an assumption; it is a fact apprehended via my Moral Sense), or why your assumption that morality is part of God’s nature is more sound. You have to connect the dots, otherwise all you’ve got are non-sequiturs and naked assertions.

If nothing else, at least show me how the Gospels, granting for the sake of argument their historical accuracy, support the idea that morality is part of God’s nature more strongly than our Moral Sense supports the idea that Morality, like logic, asthetics, math, etc., exists as a separate entity. If you can’t do this, then you have to admit that Morality exists apart from God, and the critique I gave in my previous post stands.

“…I said that morality is apprehended through our moral sense. Our moral sense is no more based on “feelings” than our sense of hearing or sight, or, more aptly, our apprehension of mathematical & logical axioms.”

We can argue semantics all day, but the point remains valid. People can have flawed vision, and flawed mathematical reasoning. I can determine who is right or wrong in those cases based on objective, external, fixed definitions and sources. Even with the semi-subtle differences between logic and morality, your argument does not work.

That brings me back to repeating the same challenge: tell me how, using the only valid means of apprehension of morality (our moral sense) can one person ever tell another person that they’re morally incorrect? You are so sure about your perception of morality that you think I’m handicapped: so how do you know, and what makes that valid? You painted yourself into a logical corner. If all we can use is our “moral sense”, then it’s just your sense vs. mine. If there’s something else, then apparently our “moral sense” isn’t enough.

“First of all, why should we believe that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate?”

I’ve already given an answer for this. Referring to the historical, empirical, logical, and other such evidence supporting the Gospel accounts of Christ is pretty cogent. If you don’t accept it, so be it. But don’t ignore it.

“How exactly do miracles and “objectivity” count as evidence of God’s moral superiority; and, more importantly, how do they lend support to your supposed apprehension of God’s apprehension of morality?”

Said in same arguments as above.

Your P-points are badly flawed. God’s ‘perception’ of morals is not the issue. You’re projecting your own assumption that morals are defined apart from God’s nature. It’s not nearly so complex as you’re trying to make it. We have communicated moral precepts from an authority who has demonstrated the authority to make such edicts.

Again, you can ignore the reasons I’ve given, but I’m not going to repeat them just because you say I never made them.

Be careful what you ask for: does your apprehension of morality give you a totally comprehensive, black-and-white read on the morality of all possible events and actions, past, present and future, in some way that no person could ever disagree with? If not, then I guess your sense of morals is invalid, by your reckoning. Laws are not invalid merely because they sometimes need careful consideration to be applied correctly. Just because we need to carefully consider what “freedom of speech” means does not mean that it is meaningless…and that’s orders of magnitude more vague than Biblical moral statements.

Likewise, be careful what silly metaphors you bring up, as well. IPU and FSM are textbook examples of shallow strawmen. If you really think those are reasonable responses to the kind of arguments that I’m making, then you have far too much to learn about logic, history, scripture, and theology to bother continuing the conversation. I’m referring to concrete documents, historical facts, and other empirical ideas. You’re bringing up a joke deity that people use as a substitute for actually considering the claims they’re trying to refute.

You never backed up your own statements. I gave reasons for why what I believe is valid. All you’ve done is ask me to repeat them, and you haven’t defended the validity of your own views. If you don’t want to, fine, but if you’re not going to try, then don’t ask me to.

Since most of your arguments regarding morality have dealt with Jordan’s statements, I responded to what Jordan stated. If you didn’t want to discuss his ideas, then you shouldn’t have discussed his ideas.

Your assertion is not modest at all – you’re disagreeing with my premise that written words can convey a moral premise in an objective way. That words are interpreted subjectively is not a problem for me, because rational people realize that that interpretation can only go so far. I don’t hear people arguing that we can’t really trust the conditions of a contract, since written words must be subjectively interpreted.

As I said, I don’t think you’re making an application of these principles to everything else in the same way that you are the Bible. Law needs lawyers and such, not because we can’t ever really know what the laws are saying, but because we need to be sure what in fact it is saying. That’s what theologians do, in part.

We all have a system of checks against our personal morality.

No, you don’t. At least, you haven’t hinted at one here. What system of checks are you going to describe that I can’t write off as irrelevant on account of it being based in some slightly subjective perception? That was part of my point before: if you’re going to reject the objectivity that written words bring to the transmission of that idea, you cannot coherently argue that something even more subject to interpretation is somehow more objective.

Your “here’s the problem as I see it” paragraph is incoherent. You might have had a cut-paste snafu, but for whatever reason, it doesn’t make enough sense to reply to.

Jordan was asked to demonstrate how he could objectively apprehend morality through purely subjective means (a “moral sense”). He still hasn’t (see below). Don’t you see how strained your criticism is getting? He could “propose” to “demonstrate” how? So, he can suggest the possibility that he could suggest an answer, and that’s more convincingly objective than me pointing towards a particular codified set of morals?

Subjectivity, within reason, as well as a limited amount of relativism, can be compatible with rational discussion. My criticisms, however, are not straw men. You’re not applying your criticism of the objectivity of scriptural ideas to anything else. You’re totally rejecting the idea that there’s anything objective to be gleaned from scripture – otherwise, you wouldn’t disagree that there’s at least something objective about the written word.

I have no problem agreeing to disagree. What you’ve demonstrated is that you’re adamant on rejecting scriptural historicity and objectivity in ways you’d never apply to other fields. That’s pretty specious.

But I feel obligated to jump in briefly to defend myself…

MedicineMan wrote: Jordan made two claims: A) morality is apprehended purely through feelings

I did not make this claim. I said that morality is apprehended through our moral sense. Our moral sense is no more based on “feelings” than our sense of hearing or sight, or, more aptly, our apprehension of mathematical & logical axioms.

By what means he can tell, I don’t know, given that he does not feel there is any external standard that can be appealed to (remember that he thinks ‘feelings’ are all that can be apprehended).

I said quite clearly that there is an external standard: Morality itself. Asking for a more fundamental standard (which is what you seem to be doing) is like asking someone to prove an axiom. Morality (in terms of individual moral propositions, at any rate) is basic.

So, my apprehension of morality (not mine, but God’s, as I said) is at least somewhat ’superior’ to his because it has a system of checks against it.

First of all, why should we believe that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate? Secondly, why should we expect your apprehension of “God’s morality” to be any more reliable than our direct apprehension of morality? I brought these points up earlier, and you guys waffled. I’m asking you to provide cogent arguments (not vague references to the “objectivity” of scripture, etc.) that will convince us that God’s apprehension of morality is accurate, and that we should trust our apprehension of God’s apprehension of morality more than our direct apprehension of morality.

In a nutshell, I think the moral tenets I follow have weight behind them in several forms. The empirical and other evidence behind the claims and miracles of Jesus contribute, as do the consistency they have with human experience. The reliable written form is also important. It’s the combination of demonstrated authority and written objectivity that I’m relying on when I choose to call God’s morality superior, not merely whether or not it happens to align with my preferences.

How exactly do miracles and “objectivity” count as evidence of God’s moral superiority; and, more importantly, how do they lend support to your supposed apprehension of God’s apprehension of morality?

Basically, here’s what I think your argument boils down to:

P1. God’s apprehension of morality is more reliable ours.
P2. God is always truthful.
P3. God claims that M is true, where M is a coherent set of moral propositions.
P4. N, our translation of M, is semantically equivalent to M.
P5. Our apprehension of P1-P4 (not to mention our understanding of N) is more reliable than our apprehension of morality.
C. Therefore, N is more reliable, as a source of moral truth, than our apprehension of morality.

You haven’t given us reasons to accept any of your argument’s premises, much less all of them. And there’s the matter of N’s applicability & exhaustiveness. What exactly does N have to say about transvestites, marijuana, gun control, censorship, war, cloning, birth control, etc.? N is incomplete, mostly irrelevant, vague, and, in places, outright contradictory; which shouldn’t come as a surprise, I suppose, given that its a (probably imperfect) translation of ancient hearsay. Why on earth should I take it more seriously than my direct apprehension of morality? Would you take me seriously if I argued, as follows, that the sky is pink?:

P1. The Invisible Pink Unicorn’s apprehension of the sky’s color is more reliable than ours.
P2. The IPU is always truthful.
P3. As recorded anonymously on the Internet, in conjunction with a whole bunch of less controversial historical facts, the Invisible Pink Unicorn claims that the sky is “Plaargh.”
P4. “Pink” is an accurate translation of “Plaargh.”
P5. Our apprehension of P1-P4 is more reliable than our apprehension of the sky’s color.
C. Therefore, the sky is pink.

You made an assertion that your claims to morality are both superior and objective. If you want to argue exclusively with Jordan, then let me know and I won’t address you in a way that invites dialogue.

I never said or implied that written language is infinitely subjective, but there is a reason we have things like lawyers, constitutional interpretation, religious schisms, literary criticism, etc. That’s because words are not objective. Words must be interpreted. That is not to say that words are not representational or accurate. My assertion is a very modest one – that words are not objective, and you therefore have not demonstrated that Scripture allows you to objectively apprehend Morality. Sorry, but you made the claim for objectivity, not me.

Regarding moral superiority, you now hinge your claim on your morality having “a system of checks against it.” The problem there is that doesn’t distinguish your morality from Jordan’s (or mine, for that matter). We have laws, societal pressures, etc., all of which impose a “system of checks” against our own feelings and reasoned conclusions about morality. We all have a system of checks against our personal morality. So, there goes your distinguishing claim to moral superiority as well.

Here’s the problem as I see it. Your overall claim to moral superiority is that you cannot rationally justify that your morality is based on something objective, and you cannot demonstrate that it is superior without being circular. (“My system of morality is better because it’s the only one that is moral.”)

Now, at least Jordan is consistent with his assertion, because, unlike you he is not constrained by the Eurythro dilemma, and he could propose to demonstrate how Morality itself can be apprehended objectively. Like I said, I don’t know how he can do this so I am not convinced of that one either.

Your last paragraph is another litany of straw dog aspersions. I do think that it’s interesting, though, that you seem to have an underlying conviction that subjectivity and relativism make interaction meaningless.

So, as a result of this and other debates, I, too must shrug and simply say that I am becoming convinced that a Theist assertion of grounded, objective morality is indeed a specious one.

Jordan made two claims: A) morality is apprehended purely through feelings and B) my disagreement with his ‘perception’ of morality made me ‘handicapped’.

In other words, Jordan was simultaneously saying that morality could only be grasped by subjective means; and that his subjective perception was still 100% obviously, undeniably better. By what means he can tell, I don’t know, given that he does not feel there is any external standard that can be appealed to (remember that he thinks ‘feelings’ are all that can be apprehended).

I was (and am) challenging his ability to claim a better ‘perception’ when he has nothing to compare but feeling vs feelings.

So, my apprehension of morality (not mine, but God’s, as I said) is at least somewhat ’superior’ to his because it has a system of checks against it. That’s going to be the sticking point here, and if you’ll forgive a little bluntness, it’s the reason I’m not really interested in developing the point much further.

In a nutshell, I think the moral tenets I follow have weight behind them in several forms. The empirical and other evidence behind the claims and miracles of Jesus contribute, as do the consistency they have with human experience. The reliable written form is also important. It’s the combination of demonstrated authority and written objectivity that I’m relying on when I choose to call God’s morality superior, not merely whether or not it happens to align with my preferences.

We’ve agreed to disagree (I think) on historical evidence. We need to do the same on written language. You seem insistent on the idea that there is no objectivity whatsoever possible in written words (or at least your use of the argument suggests this). It’s also possible that you’re trying to make ad hoc excuses to reject the objective nature of scripture alone, while retaining it for modern documents or less controversial works.

Either way, I don’t know how to argue this any more than I know how to argue with a person who’s committed to a belief in solipsism, and I don’t know that it would be fruitful to try. Interpretation of written language is not infinitely subjective; it is possible to glean specific meanings from literature. I don’t see how one can argue otherwise without wiping out ideas like contracts, textbooks, or all of recorded history itself.

You’re bent on rejecting the possibility of any truth in the historical claims of the Bible, even if consistent application of that level of skepticism would make the study of history a farce. You’re equally bent on rejecting the possibility that objective ideas can be expressed through writing, even if consistent application of that level of skepticism would make law, education, and literature meaningless. We literally have no common ground from which to discuss. In fact, if written words were as subject to interpretation as you imply they are, I have to wonder why you’d engage in a conversation like this anyway – what reason is there to think that any knowable meaning could be conveyed?

So, no offense, but at this point all I can do is shrug.