(Note added 9/3/08: Comments are closed here, but the discussion remains open. See the final comment on this thread for explanation.)
The real question Christopher Hitchens was trying to get readers focused on here (as opposed to the one he said he was answering), was something like this:
“Why should we think people who believe in God behave better than those who do not?”
He goes on to tell about Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses whose behaviors are less than exemplary, and he insists (quite rightly) that atheists most certainly do good things. I have several brief responses from a Christian perspective.
1. Christians are by no means committed to believing that belief in God or gods taken generally is good, or that it leads to ethical actions. The Bible is full of people who believed in a God or gods, and yet sacrificed children to their gods, practiced temple prostitution, and committed other abominable acts. Christians believe there is but one God, revealed in Jesus Christ, that contradictory beliefs are in error, and that there is no reason to expect extraordinary good to come from believing in any other religions.
2. This may come as a surprise to some readers, but Christianity is not committed to the belief that Christians are more ethical than others. The explanation for this comes in three parts.*
a. Following Jesus Christ with one’s whole heart, in a supportive context and practicing the normal disciplines of the Christian life, will certainly lead to growth in one’s character, with outwardly visible effects. Christianity is quite committed to this belief. If followers of Christ came from a representative portion of any population, the difference in our lives ought to be apparent for all to see.
b. But Christianity is not committed to the belief that followers of Christ come from a random, representative sample of any population. We’re a bunch of sinners. That means me, and it means any other Christian reading this. It includes Billy Graham and the Pope, and it includes anybody who does not yet believe in Christ, but knows they are not perfect. We do not come to Jesus Christ, and we do not (or should not) present ourselves to the world, as any better than anyone else.
Quite the opposite, in fact. Consider what Jesus said about the Pharisee, who was a model of ideal behavior, and the tax collector, who represented greed, thievery, and betrayal of his people. It was the tax collector who “went home justified.” Jesus was considerably more comfortable with those who misbehaved than he was with the Pharisees, who were outwardly the party of the perfect. He came to call not the righteous, but sinners, to follow him.
c. Therefore even if Christians grow in character through following Christ, we may very well just be catching up with the rest of the world in our outward behavior.
3. Nevertheless, there is good sociological evidence that followers of Christ are, on average, are doing okay with respect to character and ethics, in comparison with social peers.
*Credit goes to Timothy Keller for bringing this to light.
Update 9/6/08: I have turned off threaded comments, as explained here. This will unfortunately jumble up the sequence of the comments on this post, for which I offer my apologies.
In Hitchen’s world there is no grounding for morality so the more general question he should be asking is “Why should we think that someone is morally better than someone else?”
I think his answer would be “We shouldn’t”, which begs the question, “Why then do you keep insisting that we should?”
Hitchens mixes scientific data with reductionistic philosophy and tries to sell it as a scientific conclusion - Ha! If he were true to the facts of the evidence, he wouldn’t draw arbitrary/subjective lines between people animals and machines. Instead he would go where the ’science’ leads him - people, animals and machines can be reduced to the status of matter and energy, nothing more.
Of course, Hitchen’s doesn’t believe what he says because if machines have the same status as people then why doesn’t he at least TRY to treat the machines he owns like his children?
I had a similar question for Sam Harris once. Scroll down to the Steve Turner poem….
Hitchen’s might, on a bet,
pretendtry to treat his machines like children, but I imagine he would never try to treat his children like machines - chaining them to his bedroom wall for future use. Good poem. I don’t expect Hitchen’s to carry out his beliefs perfectly but if you believe people have the same status as machines then at least TRY to live your life this way.[...] up time and again, and apparently Christopher Hitchens hears it quite often. Tom Gilson provides a good response to the question, which as he comments might surprise some Christians as well as atheists: 1. [...]
IIRC C.S. Lewis noted that when looking at the results of a Christians’s life, one should consider if that person was better than they would have been otherwise, not compare them to other people, as we all start from different places, advantages and disadvantages in our lives.
Tom: forgive me if this is an intrusion and off-topic, but it seemed the better place to mention this (rather than AiD). You wrote here:
I welcome this view, but I assure you that it is not unanimously shared by the contributors to the Atheism is Dead blog. Some of them have very explicitly stated their belief that Christian morality is axiomatically superior. The person you were defending (medicineman) argued essentially to the same effect only in different words.
Well, I just popped over to this blog to get an idea of who you are (I had not seen you posting at AiD before).
Greetings, Adonais. (For those who don’t know the abbreviation, AiD stands for the Atheism is Dead blog.)
I hope I didn’t misstate my point here, because what you seem to think I was saying here was certainly not what I was intending to say. I agree with Medicine Man’s assessment on Christian ethics. The topic here is different: it’s not the quality of Christian ethics, but of Christians themselves.
This is tricky, and it’s where arrogance often crops up in reality or in perception. The way of Jesus Christ is by far the most excellent way. That does not mean that followers of Jesus Christ are necessarily the most excellent people, as I explained the post above; though as I also alluded to, sociological research nevertheless supports the idea that following Christ yields good fruit in persons’ lives.
Christian ethics’ superiority is not the result of Christian people being better, smarter, or wiser in concocting a system. Christian ethics are better because they reflect the revealed character of the wholly good Person who is at the very foundation of all reality.
Mr. Gilson;
I am a contributor to AiD and I wish that Mr. Adonais would have provided some quotations as examples of AiD claiming the sort of moral superiority which he claims MedicineMan et al assert.
I think that the issue is more basic and comes down to a gut reaction when an atheist is asked about moral foundations and told something to the likes of, “We have absolutes and you do not” they take this to mean, “We are better than you” etc. Certainly, this is not what we mean to conclude.
We have discussed morality on various occasions on AiD and have had some very odd statements made from an atheist condemning incest because “I have a visceral dislike of…” to an atheist claiming that they do good deeds because their brain produces chemicals that make them happy when they do good.
Moreover, I have chronicles various well known atheist calming that atheism is not only more moral than Christianity but also holier (example here).
I have also noted various reasons why Christians may actually be less moral than the average bear here (not to make excuses, by the way).
Lastly, I wish to mention that I too have taken to responding to some of Mr. Hitchens’ challenges beginning here.
Pardon me for dumping all of these hyperlinks but it seemed relevant.
aDios,
Mariano
Mariano (and Tom): honestly I don’t keep a score card of instances where atheists at AiD are accused of being amoral or having no basis for morality. Here’s one that I remember though and was able to find quickly; one of the AiD contributors wrote:
There have been countless more of the same or worse, who’s counting anymore. Do you really want me to dig up passages by stan, MM and yourself where you made yourselves guilty of the same? What purpose would that serve? You even wrote this jolly little article some time ago: A-theism is A-Potent and A-Moral. Your ostensibly humble posturing is not reflected by your actual arguments.
“Not being moral” and “having no basis for morality” are two entirely different things. The first means to act either in a manner that is manifestly immoral or with disregard for morality. The second could mean different things to different people, but this is how I take it: that atheism lacks a solid grounding for moral opinions and values, an answer to the question, “I don’t believe D moral duty or value applies to me, and I want you to tell me why I should. You might have some instrumental or pragmatic reasons for me to practice D, or you may tell me D is ‘what we customarily do in our culture,’ but I don’t know why D should be considered good in itself, or why I should take it on as a value or duty of my own.”
If anyone says atheists are (in general) immoral, they are wrong. See my original post above. I don’t care to have you dig up posts where someone has said that, because you and I will just look at them together and say, “that’s just wrong.”
If someone says atheism has no basis for morality, and if they mean it in the way I just summarized it, I believe they are right. So you don’t need to dig up comments from AiD (Atheism is Dead) to show that we said that there; I’ve gone ahead and said it here for you (saved you some work).
In my series of comments on a post over at AiD I tried very hard to define and draw out the distinction that I’ve made once again here. I wish you could catch it. Mariano’s post that you just linked to is on the second topic (atheism’s having no basis for morality). Are you bringing it forth as evidence he considers atheists immoral? I didn’t read his post through in careful detail, but I don’t think he said that.
Just to make sure I’m clear, I’m going to repeat the main message here. There are two propositions in play here:
(A) Atheists are immoral.
(B) Atheism lacks a basis for morality, as defined in B1:
- (B1) A solid and reliable answer to, “I don’t believe D moral duty or value applies to me, and I want you to tell me why I should… ” (see above).
I don’t know of anyone who affirms (A). I do affirm (B), but I do not believe (B) entails (A), or that (A) follows from (B).
If you are unhappy about people affirming (A), please do not use their affirmations of (B) as evidence that that is what they are saying or thinking.
Well Tom, the material point is that (B) is a veridically worthless statement because it is trivially true. You can replace (B) by any of the following propositions:
(B’) Swedish citizenship lacks a basis for morality
(B”) Being an astronomer lacks a basis for morality
(B”’) Believing in ghosts lacks a basis for morality
…….. etc.
There is a vast but finite set of trivially true but useless statements on the same pattern. No one would dream up an argument concerning morality based on any of the examples I gave above, it’s patently foolish. And yet, in the particular case of atheism, it apparently acquires significance and becomes a compelling argument to many people. I have not yet seen any explanation as to what exactly you think this argument is showing, but obviously you think that there is something special about atheism warranting the observation (B). But what is it? What moral significance does (B) carry that (B’) and (B”) does not?
Listening to you and Mariano (and the rest of the AiD crowd) often gives me a surreal feeling. On the one hand, a few of you are diligent to stress that atheists are not necessarily amoral. Happy thought and a fine concession, that. On the other hand, you aggrandize a trivial observation and apparently make it the basis of some argument – but what’s the argument? And finally, when one enters into debate at AiD, many religious apologists flat out deduce A from B or at the minimum leaves the implication lying on the table, leaving it up to my patience to argue otherwise if the discussion is to move on.
So let me be clear also. You said that there are two propositions here, and I say that there is none. The state of affairs is simply that A is false and B is worthless. So what are we discussing here? Nothing of substance.
Tom,
I, too, am confused about why you keep on repeating the fact that atheism lacks a basis for morality. I think you are refusing to accept the tenet that atheists do not see their lack of belief in the existence of God as having any moral consequence whatsoever.
Christian theists can say that they find their basis for morality in the Bible. (We could dispute the truth of this but that’s immaterial.) Atheists can say that they find the basis for their moral behavior in some INSERT PHILOSOPHY / RATIONALE HERE, but they can never say that it lies within their atheism because the source for morality lies outside their atheism.
I think maybe this dispute is based on your stated refusal to ever accept the fact that atheism is not a belief system. If one accepts that atheism is not a belief system, as I and many other atheists do, then it remains perplexing as to why you would continue to repeat that “Atheism lacks a basis for morality” as if this is somehow a failing or requirement of atheism.
I think you need to address why you think it is that atheism should provide a basis for morality. I’m also not entirely sure what it means to “lack a basis for morality,” and I’m curious how you define that term.
Then let me phrase it this way, to try to avoid trivial misunderstandings.
(B’) Only theism has a basis for morality in the sense that I defined it in my previous comment. Any system of thought that does not affirm the existence of a good, transcendent God has
ano basis for morality in that sense (typo noted by Tony, see below).(I’m going to have to write a post on the “atheism isn’t a belief” issue, but that will have to wait.)
The argument is that without theism you have no basis for morality. If you believe objective moral values or duties exist, then you have no explanation for them outside of theism. (If you don’t believe objective moral values or duties exist, then we have another discussion on our hands; see an earlier example here. But we are moving far from the point of the original post if we go there.)
Tom wrote:
Aha. Well then why don’t you just say so, because this is a non-trivial statement that can be addressed, as opposed to your original (B) formulation. I won’t take up anymore space here except to note that now you are saying not just that atheism in itself provides no basis for morality, but that it is only theism that does provide such a basis. That is a very different statement, and one that can be falsified empirically. Incidentally, the logical consequence of your new (B’) is essentially your statement A, which you had previously disavowed, unless you’re implying some mechanism for atheists to be moral individuals without having any basis for morality.
Falsifiable empirically? I’ll be interested to see how you do that!
But of course! Biblically it’s understood to be “common grace”–the light that God shines on all persons, not just those who believe in him. See Romans 2:14-15 for one source on that.
For as long as I have personally posted on atheism I have personally made the point that one should not argue that atheists are immoral but what is at issue is the various moral concepts that atheists hold.
Tom is correct that posts such as my A-theism is A-Potent and A-Moral were about moral foundation type issues.
I think that we are reaching the point where we can note that atheism has carved itself out quite the niche: it is not a belief, it is not a philosophy, it is not even a worldview, it is nothing but a lack of belief in God (of course, some atheists such as Michael Newdow claim that atheism is a religion but I am sure that he is wrong according to another sect of atheism). Therefore, there is no athe“ism” to argue against.
God could exist and atheists could say that they choose not to hold to a God belief.
And so, I suppose that all anyone can do is to ascertain the particular views held by individual atheists and see if there is anything there to agree or disagree about.
aDios,
Mariano
Okay, so at least I think I understand that you mean that atheists can only get their moral basis from God. But you do recognize the circularity of the argument — that only God provides a basis for morality because God says that when anyone shows morality, even though it is among those who are not privy to God’s law, it is through God?
I am not sure if Adonais is going to return here to falsify that only theism can provide a basis for morality, but I wonder if he even should bother seeing as how you can resort to the argument above. In other words, what would be the point of demonstrating that morality can be derived from a non-theistic source if you can always resort to a claim of “common grace?”
Okay, so at least I think I understand that you mean that atheists can only get their moral basis from God. But you do recognize the circularity of the argument — that only God provides a basis for morality because God says that when anyone shows morality, even though it is among thos
Tony
Maybe if I rewrite your statement in naturalist terms you will see it’s not circular.
Only nature provides the basis for the laws of nature because nature is such that anyone who falls down, even though it’s among those who are not aware of nature’s laws, it is through nature.
The laws of morality are simply a matter of fact, not fiat, because literally everything flows from the nature of God.
My rewrite of Tony’s comment reminded me of one reason why I, and many others, conclude that naturalism is unable to explain the natural universe.
Naturalism can’t account for the laws of nature as being matter of fact because not everything flows from nature. We know Sagan’s often quoted statement, “The Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be” to be incorrect. Nature has a finite past - not everything can flow from nature because something preceeded it. From this we know the natural laws themselves are contingent because they too have a finite past. But contingent on what? Whatever it is, it can’t be something else with a finite past. It must be something non-contingent. It must be something eternal.
Mariano,
You wrote:
Since atheism is not a moral system I don’t see why you would argue this. That’s like saying that since the appreciation of concert music is not a moral system all that is at issue is the various moral concepts that concert music listeners hold.
Here’s a question I have for you: say that as an atheist I choose to follow the moral system as described in the Bible and I am in precise concordance with your own interpretations of it’s moral teachings. I am free to do this. Or, say that through what Tom would call “common grace” I behave impeccably morally in every way as you would, although I remain an atheist. Why should you take issue with my moral concepts? Lastly, whose moral concepts are worse – Christian-based cults like David Koresh or other interpreters of the Bible whom you believe misinterpret the Bible, or me, an atheist who behaves morally in every way as required by you?
I’m glad to see you’re on board. Can you explain why it takes so long for so many theists to come around to this view?
Absolutely true. Thank you for agreeing that I have the right to come to my own convictions. I hope that you believe that were you or anyone else to provide credible evidence for the existence of God I would become a true believer in seconds. But I can’t fake it — if God exists I’m sure he’d see right through my attempts at false conviction.
Hence.
Tony,
You agreed that there is no atheism to argue against. What, then, are atheists arguing *for*? They are arguing for lack of belief in God, which puts that argument in a position to be argued against.
Tony,
I tried posting before and it failed so if my previous comment shows up, please disregard it. I have since changed what I wanted to say.
Ultimately, morality isn’t about you and I, it’s about God. Following the ‘moral system’ as described in the Bible means you are no longer an atheist. You are a Christian. This moral system as you call it involves giving your life to Christ, recognizing God for who he is, etc. In other words, the ’system’ requires that your lack of belief go out the window.
Again, morality isn’t about what you and I think, but here I agree with you slightly. We are all saved by God’s grace and so I think a person can *honestly* not ’see’ God, which is technically atheist, and yet be saved. An example here would be an infant who is incapable of having such mental faculties.
However it doesn’t appear that you are in that situation. By the grace of God you can be morally perfect, yet without that bended knee, you would still fall short in God’s eyes because that pride signifies that you don’t want to enter into a proper relationship with him.
Sooooo…..God would NOT take issue with your moral concepts. He’d embrace them I think. I think God *would* take issue with your insistence that your relationship with him be an improper relationship. For that, we are told, you get the divine boot out of heaven.
Have I gone too far off topic?
Tony,
This was in response to Mariano on “various moral concepts that atheists hold.”
I agree that’s an ambiguous phrase. Atheists can hold all kinds of moral concepts. What they cannot hold is a moral concept that is well grounded in the sense I first brought up here and revised later at 4:25 pm.
Atheism is not a moral system, granted. If followed logically through to its conclusions, it entails a lack of a moral system, or at least the lack of an adequately grounded moral system, as previously defined.
Let’s grant for the sake of argument that the two horns of the dilemma are even possible. Let’s suppose that Koresh’s cult is really Christian-based, and that you could behave morally in every way as required by the Bible, though without (as I think you would want us to presume) believing in Christ.
Let me first explain how I take issue with both of those. First, I don’t know that much about Koresh, but I know enough to know that if he started with Christianity, he distorted it beyond recognition. No religion can truly be Christian-based unless it is Christ-based, and Koresh made his religion Koresh-based. Second, I take issue with your being able to be a fully moral atheist in the Biblical sense, for reasons Steve already explained. Take a look at all of the Ten Commandments, for example, and at Jesus’ statement of the greatest commandments (Exodus 20:1-6; Matthew 22:37-40).
But suppose you could set that aside, and that you were perfectly moral in every way relating to your fellow human beings. Would you be more moral than David Koresh? In a way, yes, for Jesus directed his most significant displeasure toward those who distorted true religion.
In another way, the question is completely irrelevant, for several reasons. One is that we have already granted your point in part (this is not the first time I’ve asked commenters to re-read the original post!). For another reason, the discussion has turned now from moral behavior to moral grounding, which I’ve tried to explain more than once. And finally, comparing moral behavior is another instance of the pride that keeps people from God. Are you moral enough for God? See James 2:8-13 and Romans 3:23; also 1 Peter 5:5-6, Romans 6:23 and Romans 5:8.
SteveK,
I think that this
Only nature provides the basis for the laws of nature because nature is such that anyone who falls down, even though it’s among those who are not aware of nature’s laws, it is through nature.
sounds circular. Actually, I’m not really sure what it means, or what it has to do with my question to Tom as it relates to the question posed by Adionas. Sorry to be obtuse, but I don’t quite get your point, or your question.
Tom,
My questions to Mariano were to his comments, not those in your post. I apologize if that got us sidetracked.
You wrote
Actually, I wonder if maybe there’s a typo here – is the last article “a” you second sentence supposed to be “no?” Because if not, I think I’m even more confused.
Also, I am still looking for a definition of what you mean by “have a basis for morality.” I think that if you won’t define what that means, in a fairly short, concise way, then it will be very hard to have a discussion on the topic you see us discussing, which is moral grounding. So, I’m asking, can you define what it means to “have a basis for morality?”
In reference to what it means to have no basis for morality, you wrote:
As an atheist I can answer every part of that question on, say Mariano’s incest topic, and I am certain that we would agree with my choices. The fact is that I do feel compelled to act morally, I do know why it should be considered good in itself, and I know why I should take it on as a value or duty of my own. I imagine that my answers differ only superficially from yours.
Wow… this is everywhere! Fortunatly I have three words: Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma. Yes, basic philosophy answers this question.
As for people who believe morality and religion are related, our current pope would fall into this category.
Definitely a typo! I’m going to go fix it. Thanks for pointing it out.
Okay, Tony, let’s see how this works. I really do hope you’re right:
So perhaps you’re right, and we agree in almost everything with just surface differences.
I too feel compelled to act morally (imperfectly so, of course). Here is why it should be considered good in itself. There is a good God who defines ultimately reality. Goodness therefore is one of the fundamental attributed of ultimate reality. Goodness involves all kinds of things, including moral goodness. God created humans in his image, which means in part that we have the responsibility and the capacity (though this is marred) to reflect his good nature in the way we treat persons, animals, objects, and so on. So to act morally is good because it is a reflection of the nature of a good God who defines goodness.
This applies whether a person recognizes it or not. Those who do not believe in God are nonetheless created in his image, and have a sense of goodness (marred), derived from God and from ultimate reality. Goodness itself, then, is not contingent on any human attribute or belief.
There are first- and second-order goods, and human belief may enter into second-order goods. To love another person is a first-order good. To ground that person for six weeks may be a second-order good or it may be an evil: was that person your child caught with marijuana, or did you undertake a purely arbitrary act toward your child?
To nourish oneself is a first-order good. Some people nourish themselves with duck brains (a friend of mine just came home from a foreign country where he had duck head for one meal) and consider that good. Some of us do not consider that good. So there are some levels of goodness that are contingent, but goodness in itself is part of the eternal furniture of the cosmos, grounded in the eternal character of God.
Is that pretty much the same thing you were thinking, with just superficial differences? Remember, the current question is not the good things we may or may not do. The question is, on what do we ground our beliefs about moral goodness? How do we explain what moral goodness actually is, and why do we take moral values and duties to be “oughts”?
Tony,
I seem to be rambling a lot lately so I don’t blame you. I’ll step aside as Tom is stating it more clearly than I am. For what it’s worth, Tom’s comment below and my comments seem to be making the same point regarding moral grounding. Not just moral grounding but grounding for *all* reality.
Tom: There is a good God who defines ultimately reality. Goodness therefore is one of the fundamental attributed of ultimate reality.
Me: The laws of morality are simply a matter of fact, not fiat, because literally everything flows from the nature of God.
Me: Nature has a finite past - not everything can flow from nature because something preceeded it.
Tom,
Thank you for the explanation. The question I am asking is how does a theist justify the superiority of his moral system – how can you say that a theist’s moral system is more grounded (better?) than a moral system not based on theism.
You wrote, in reference to why to act morally is good in itself:
and later:
The second statement appears circular (to act morally is good because it is a reflection of the nature of a good God?). If that is your definition of theism alone being able to provide a basis for morality, why can’t I just say something like: “I base my moral system on the themes of great Literature. So, to act morally is good because it is a reflection of the nature of the themes of great Literature, which define goodness?”
That’s a hypothetical example. If you were to go to nature and study the behavior of animals you’d see altruistic behavior in monkeys, dolphins, and other highly social organisms. Most of this morality appears to be based on group dynamics, game theory, and intra-species competition. Among these different social animals a basis for morality is formed that balances individual competition for resources (and mating opportunities) using the principles of game theory – chiefly, the realization that assistance, weighed against the risks of cheating or non-reciprocation, provides a basis for moral systems in these communities. Those who aid are given aid in return. Those who cheat or fail to reciprocate gain short term advantages but at the expense of loss of support later from those they have cheated. In short, the species and their environments provide each group with the basis for their morality.
My point? There are philosophical alternatives to Theism (my Great Literature example) that could provide a basis for morality. Also, probably more importantly, there are behavioral studies (I highly recommend a book by Matt Ridley, “The Origins of Virtue”.) that provide many examples of social animals deriving moral systems based on their inherited characteristics and their environment.
It seems clear to me that there are multiple (countless) bases for morality. I will concede, of course, that your system may be the best, but the only to have a basis?
The other part of my question still seems unanswered, although I don’t see how you’re going to answer it without resorting to circularity. If Theism is the only to have a fixed basis for goodness, but premises 1) God exists, and b) God is goodness, are not proven, then is there another argument for your system that I’m missing?
Hi Tony,
As you attempt to ground morality without theism you have pointed to (alleged) instances of altruism in animals and in the next sentence relabeled that behavior as “moral”.
But, as Paul and I have discussed many times, animals exhibit all kinds of behaviors.
Some eat their young, steal, kidnap, commit murder, cheat, bully, assault, etc.
These animals obviously survived and evolved, so it would appear that nature did not express any obvious disapprobation. So why are these behaviours not the basis of our morality?
I forgot cannibalism and slavery.
Hi Charlie,
I guess that by morality you mean “good human behavior.” I meant it more broadly, as in a code of how to behave, depending on what kind of organism you are, what your social-relatedness is, and what your environment is like.
Yes, animals do exhibit all kinds of behaviors. So do humans. They all, including humans, do everything you have listed (including cannibalism and slavery). Even Christians, for that matter.
I don’t understand what you mean by “so why are these behaviors [the list of animal behaviors] not the basis of our morality?”
Do you think that behavior that our society considers bad is the basis for morality? (Because it seems obvious to me that value judgments of behavior are not the basis of those judgments, but the outcome of it.)
If so, I think you should ask Tom to clarify what is meant by the basis for morality, as I find the term vague as well, and can lead to this kind of confusion. I do not insist on the term, mostly because I don’t understand exactly what it means, or what Tom means by it.
I’m not sure where to start with a question like this:
Do you think it is the purpose of nature to express disapprobation of what we deem bad morality? Because man oh man does that not make sense when you look at what happens in nature. (Insects eating the heads off of their mates, parasites stealing resources from a host without aiding said hosts in any way, cowbirds, don’t get me started.)
I can’t tell if your last question (”So why are these ["bad animal"] behaviours not the basis of our morality”) is sincere or not, but it sounds rhetorical. Do you understand what I mean by the statement, “In short, the species and their environments provide each group with the basis for their morality,” and why this statement and your last question are unrelated?
Tony,
Because Literature is contingent; God is necessary, pre-existent, the ground of all reality.
Please explain how they could do this then. I’ve studied various alternatives at great length, and they’ve all come up short. Your assertion that there might be some other option needs some meat on it.
How am I going to avoid circularity? Here is how:
1. God is the ground of all reality.
2. God has a moral character that is an essential aspect of his eternal character.
3. The ground of all reality has moral character as an essential aspect.
4. Therefore there is an essential aspect to morality.
That’s not circular.
You asked, how am I going to prove theism based on this? Well, that’s a different question entirely. I haven’t tried to prove theism. I have only tried to prove that theism provides the only solid grounding for morality.
Elsewhere I have carried this another step, but I see no need to introduce that here. It would complicate the main point, which is that there is only one system that provides a solid grounding for moral values and duties (as specified above in comments that I don’t care to repeat again this time).
HI Tony,
“Code of how to behave”.
Now, is it good, bad, or neither that one adhere to this “code”?
How does an animal know that it is violating this code and what are the consequences?
That’s the point.
In humans we call violations of this code “bad” and adherence “good”.
But, if we inherit behaviour from animals we inherit both types - but we don’t inherit categories “good and bad” from them. Therefore, we do not inherit our morality via evolutionary means, therefore, morals are not grounded by reference to animals which may or may not be altruistic or may or may not be murderous, slave-holding cannibals.
How could this possibly be obvious? Animals obviously get along quite well with both “good” and “bad” behaviours, just as we do - as you just pointed out.
It better, if nature is to ground our morality.
Good to see we’re on the same page. So how does supposed animal altruism make any more sense of morality than these actions? Notice how those “bad” traits are just as evolvable, natural and, therefore, “moral”?
Not in the least. It sounds like you’re saying “whatever is natural, whatever evolved, and whatever worked” is moral.
There is nothing normative in this kind of morality and no way to make it normative.
How do you know which human traits are “moral” under this system? Reproductive fitness? Longevity? Dominion?
Tom,
You wrote:
You’re saying so doesn’t prove it. There is no logical proof for God. Pretending there is doesn’t make it so.
Without a better understanding of what you mean by “a basis for morality” then I guess I will have to assume that you are content and that I and others like me who read this blog have nothing more to gain here. For the record, I think that all of my examples counter your statement that “without theism you have no basis for morality.”
I guess you’re also content to hold that as long as propositions are related to one another there can’t possibly be any circularity to your argument.
I didn’t ask how you were going to prove theism; that’s a straw dog of my counter to your argument. I asked if there’s a way to prove your argument (that only theism can have a basis for morality) that doesn’t rely on the premise that God exists.
I’ve noticed a pattern recently here where you seem less able unwilling to engage in what I believe are sincere challenges to your arguments. In my reply to you on a previous topic ( http://www.thinkingchristian.net/2008/07/despite-overwhelming-evidence-creationists-cling-to-unreality-rights-and-liberties-alternet/#comment-7838 ) I asked why you would:
1) wonder why anyone would consider ID an attack on science;
2) dismiss my response to your question, explaining that I do not understand what science really is;
3) provide your own definition of science;
4) deny that you provided a definition of science; and
5) pronounce that “Defining science is known to be a hopeless venture.”
I understand that we do not share convictions on every topic. But providing contradictory arguments, failing to respond to demonstrations of contradiction, and dismissing valid questions as already proven or unnecessary without reference is, to say the least, a tad dismissive.
Hi Tony,
Charlie:
That’s an odd way of looking at it. We inherit animal behavior because we are animals.
Of course we don’t form our morality by looking at animals, that’s a version of the naturalistic fallacy. Are you not confusing moral behavior with theoretical ethics?
Blimey. Well, since you think that only God can explain morality I can sort of understand why you might believe this! Listen, in the naturalistic explanation of morality, moral behavior does not come about because someone or something thought it was a nice idea. First of all, morality is something that we have defined ourselves, rather arbitrarily, as a loose collection of behavioral patterns that have something in common. It’s just a definition, and a vague one at that. Second, moral behavior can become manifest in a species when it produces an increase in the inclusive fitness, raising the probability of these individuals to pass on their genes to the next generation, gradually producing a population with innate altruistic instincts (among many other instincts). Nature does not need to have a theory of ethics in mind for this to work, it just happens by itself. And many hundreds of thousands of years later, along comes the philosophical ape and declares: “I shall call this type of behavior ‘moral’ behavior. I wonder where it came from.”
Now you’re saying that (we would claim that) anything that eveloved is “moral”, putting an equal sign between the two. That’s of course nonsense. Evolution can explain our inherited behavior, both good and bad - it is up to you which parts you want to later label vice and virtue.
Looks to me like you’re the only one saying that.
That is absolutely true, and I don’t think anyone has argued otherwise! Understanding where our moral behavior came from, which is what we’re trying to do here, is an entirely separate topic from the issue of constructing viable ethical systems for our modern day society. We do not derive ought from is.
Tom:
But you can’t prove that by only looking at theism, you have to look at the alternatives. At best, you’re arguing for God as a basis for morality, but you have done nothing to prove either its veracity nor its exclusiveness.
You say you “haven’t tried to prove theism” but you implicitly or explicitly assume the existence and character of God at the beginning of every argument. But you should know by now that atheists just don’t buy that assumption a priori and without argument: you have to argue for it. And when you do, you’ll no doubt spring the “moral argument” for God, and then you’re back into circularity: our morality indicates God, and God is the basis for our morality.
HI Adonais,
Trivially true and irrelevant.
That’s a funny way of looking at it - we are animals. See how pointless that was?
Of course we don’t. The point was about evolution, inheritance and grounding of morality.
I don’t know. I don’t equate morality merely to behaviour, but rather to the oughtness of behaviour, and I don’t know what you mean by theoretical ethics.
This, the entire point. Vaguely defined loose collections of behavioral patterns do not ground normative oughts. This is not morality and a system which tells us that it is cannot ground morality.
How can non-human species vaguely define their loose collection of behavioral patterns? How can they define what they ought to do?
Question-begging across the board. But a nice admission that nature does not ground morals.
True enough, it is nonsense. You continue to affirm the point that neither pointing to non-human animal behaviour nor our inheritance of any derived traits has anything to do with grounding morality.
Our perceptions disagree.
Then they have no basis for morality!
“Moral” behaviour is normative . The entire question in grounding or providing a basis for morality is to determine the ought.
re: Tom’s alleged circularity.
While objective morality is a great evidence of God’s existence one can’t use it in an argument where objective morality (morality itself) is being denied. Therefore Tom could use any other evidence for the existence of God to ground his argument. His personal experience and properly basic belief will suffice just fine as proving God is not necessary in order to demonstrate that morality does not exist without Him.
Charlie:
I’ll not humor your game of equivocation, but I would encourage you to read some books on evolutionary psychology if you want to know what you’re talking about. Tony gave some good references, look them up.
Regarding this:
This is simply not true. For it to be true, you’d have to show that a mode of morality exists which can not be explained by natural theories, and which can only be explained by invoking the supernatural. This has not been shown. And count it to the opposition that the natural theories of morality do have substantial (and ever growing) evidence to back it up. Your cited evidence for objective morality can not be weaker than the case made by evolutionary biology, population dynamics and psychology, it has to be stronger.
Hi Adonais,
That’s quite accusatory.
What am I equivocating and why don’t you clear it up?
adonais
I think you are giving much credit where none is due. These disciplines can test cause and effect and determine correlations. The question of what cause/effect or what correlation is a morally good one is *not* something these disciplines can determine. To do that requires the knowledge and expertise of the philosophy and theology departments, and it is here that we have strong support.
Charlie:
Ok then. To be fair, I don’t know if you were deliberately equivocating or just didn’t understand what I wrote.
You use the word “morality” with different meanings, sometimes referring to de facto behavior and sometimes referring to a normative system of thought or social policy. This makes you apply your concept of “morality” incorrectly to what I wrote.
To understand the naturalistic explanation of morality, we must distinguish between innate behavioral traits, which are ancestral, and modern environmental factors that act to alter or constrain the former. The latter are in modern society our theories of ethics, justice and moral conduct, while the former are ancestral evolutionary traits.
But here’s the point: both of these contribute to our modern day behavior. There is upon our ancestral animal instincts imposed a layer of social contracts and reciprocal altruism, which makes life in a dense modern society, relying so heavily on cooperation and mutual aid, possible. Now when we look to understand human behavior, both good and bad, vice and virtue alike, we have to look at both aspects to get the full picture. Yes, we can in evolutionary psychology understand the origins of our behavior, but no, evolutionary psychology is not normative and it will not tell us how we ought to behave in modern society. Yes, we do have normative theories of ethics and culturally distinct (normative) moral systems which are entirely distinct from the issues in evolutionary psychology.
We can not conflate the two, but you and many others frequently do, as in for instance saying:
Here you have mistakenly assumed that if evolutionary psychology, which describes elements of human behavior, does not offer an ethical system, then nothing does. That is of course false.
Here is another equivocation of “morals.” Nature does indeed lay the foundation for moral behavior, but whether we at some point begin to theorize about “oughts” and implement modern ideas is not something that the same theory speaks on. Can not conflate the two.
Then this:
Does not make much sense: theories of ethics and moral conduct can be normative, but behavior is simply behavior, it is what it is.
This in a sense is true but you are again missing the point that a basis for moral behavior has been produced by evolution. By “grounding morality” I must again assume that you mean a normative ethics, which is a separate issue from the aforementioned.
If by “grounding a basis for morality” you mean constructing a normative ethic, then this is true, but for understanding the roots of our morality it is not.
SteveK:
I think you are in part misconstruing the message in the same way as Charlie: I do not claim that these “disciplines” form a basis for normative ethics. Understanding the underlying principles and origins morality is a different project from implementing new schemes of social conduct. We are helped as moral beings by having evolved behaviors that enable cooperation and altruism within our species, as accounted for by those disciplines. But there is of course much more to modern day morality than this basis provides.
As for “much credit where none is due”…I’m not sure how to interpret that. If you’re referring to the merits of sociobiology qua evolutionary psychology, it is the only explanatory framework even attempting to include evolutionary constraints and consequences as a theory for understanding human and animal behavior. Run the simple thought experiment through your head: “Can we understand the present by ignoring the past?” and the rationale for studying the implications of evolution on human and animal behavior becomes clear. So far, having read a handful of books on the subject, it looks to me like a genuine success story, but it is still a relatively young branch of psychology that has much yet to accomplish.
Hi Adonais,
Not really. I never refer to morality as behaviour. I pointed out through the animal example that Tony’s evolutionary theory reduces to behaviour, and I said that discussions of behaviour are not discussions of morality. I always treat morality as the normativity of the behaviour. This is why I say you can’t explain it with reference to how animals behave.
So far so good. Behaviours may be the result of evolutionary influences. Our consideration of them as moral or not, normative or not, is not the same thing.
Therefore, it makes no sense to say that animals exhibit this or that behaviour and claim that this has anything to do with our moral feelings/thoughts/assessments about those behaviours as we have no idea what the animals feel/think about theirs. It seems you and I agree on this point as I was making it to Tony.
It is a fact that our thoughts affect our behaviours and we can grant that evolution also affects them - this does not evidence that evolution has created out thoughts. Worse yet, if it did then the case is already made - the objectivity of morality is defeated in that our beliefs about the normativity no longer relate to the truth of that belief.
I agree with your conclusion and can grant the premise for the sake of argument.
As you say, the human construct that is the theory provides whatever normativity exists in the system. Anybody not agreeing with that theory is not obligated to obey its precepts or accept the behaviours entailed as “moral”. As the normativity lies in the human construct it does not transcend human cultures and so loses its universal normativity - moral oughtness loses its grounding.
I wasn’t commenting as to whether or not there is an ethical system - I was refuting one putative source of it. Now, however, I am saying that no such system, absent a transcendent standard, can ground the morality. Anybody can opt out of the system and is no longer obligated by it. Thus, it loses its universality, defeats objectivity, and cedes tot eh fact that moral oughtness is not grounded.
Which I do not. Repeatedly I said that behaviours are not morals. We have no evidence that anything in nature theorizes about “oughts” so we cannot extrapolate from behaviours or our observations of nature to our “oughts”.
The quotation marks on the word moral were meant to emphasize the morality as what is normative. There was no reason, ,as demonstrated from here on, to presume any equivocation here.
From the first comments to Tony I asked how behaviours could be the basis of morality, I discussed not “behaviour” but knowledge of a code, categories of good and bad (which we did not inherit). To flesh out Tony’s position I made explicit that if nature does not provide the disapprobation of our behaviours then nature is not the source of our morality (I know you’ll dispute this, but the point is that I was disputing the implication that behaviour=morality.
I flat out said to you right off the bat:
Further as I responded to you:
Again, explicitly stated that behaviours do not = morals.
Your quote of me:
““Moral” behaviour is normative ”
follows all of these explicit statements and not a single equivocation. As though it weren’t clear enough from each and every statement, when you quoted this you cut off the second sentence which again made it apparent:
It is all about the ought of the behaviour, not the behaviour itself.
So, to be truly fair, I wasn’t equivocating at all - either deliberately or not.
So here you agree but presume I am missing a point about the development of the system by which the behaviour is judged. I have not missed it, I was polishing off first the idea that observing so-called altruistic behaviours in animals (non-human) has anything whatsoever to say about human morality.
What I mean is basically defined in the statement. If a system of morality is to be grounded, if we have a basis for our morality, we actually have to know that there are oughts.
A system that allows us to opt out or that does not hold true for all humans does not provide oughts and does not actually define morality at all.
Tony, you wrote (and repeated the same question later also),
I defined it informally in this comment as
Tony, I think I can respond satisfactorily to this:
In this thread I am not trying to prove theism. I said that last night. I am trying to show that theism provides a ground for morality. You could take it this way if you prefer: theism, if true, provides a ground for morality. Conversely, then, naturalism (or any non-theistic system), lacks a ground for morality.
I guess you’re also content to charge me with circularity without bothering to show how I have committed circularity; viz, by showing that I have used my conclusion as one of the premises of the argument.
You did?? Then I missed it. I would have had an easy answer: if theism does not include the premise that God exists, then it is not theism, and your question cannot be answered. Please see my clarification on what I’m trying to show: that theism, if true, provides a ground for morality, and that naturalism (or atheism) lacks one.
Adonais,
You missed the point. The point was not behavior (how many hundreds of times do we have to say that!), it was the concepts of behavior being good or bad.
You wrote,
Arbitrary? Loose? Then it’s a completely unsatisfactory grounding for morality as I have asked for it to be defined. (See my first comment to Tony this morning.)
There you go again…
Grounding, not behavior!
If you can show me a genuine grounding for morality (grounding, not behavior!) in another system, great. I actually am considering the alternatives, my friend! But “arbitrary” and “loose” don’t qualify as grounding.
This is arguing out of court. The discussion here is about whether theism provides grounding for morality, and whether other systems of thought can provide grounding for morality. Let’s stick to the topic.
If we come to a valid conclusion to this topic, then it is perfectly legitimate to take that valid point as a premise in another argument. It is also perfectly legitimate to set that other argument aside for the moment. That is what I’m doing here.
Adonais,
Again and again, we get behavior confused with grounding for morality. I am not unfamiliar with EvoPsych. It is, for one thing, a pseudo-science in that it is unfalsifiable. It provides the same answer to why we like broccoli and why we do not; why people are monogamous and why they are not; and on and on.
More to the point here, however: evolutionary psych, as you have just said, can provide descriptions of what has been declared to be good or bad behavior. It could (at best) explain how it came to be through evolution that we considered certain behaviors good and bad. But it always does so by reference to one thing: that which contributes to reproductive fitness of a population. The ultimate good, in evo psych, is reproductive fitness.
Now, what is it about reproductive fitness that is good? Please avoid circularity in your answer.
Let’s cut to the chase here:
Does naturalism (or any version of atheism whatever) provide an answer to the question by which I have (informally) defined grounding?
A proper ground for morals would be something that, if true and if understood by the subject (the questioner, in this case) to be true, would provide sufficient reason for the subject to change his or her mind about the goodness of the behavior, value, or duty in question. It would explain how said behavior, value or duty actually is good in itself; not merely instrumental, pragmatic, or customary.
It would do so by reference to some condition of reality that can bear the weight placed upon it. For example, if it is suggested that D is good because it contributes to reproductive fitness, then reproductive fitness’s goodness would have to be good in itself (or based on something else that is good in itself).
I maintain that only theism can provide a grounding for moral values and duties in that sense. Am I wrong?
You may want to answer by saying, “That’s your definition of moral grounding, and it seems important to you, Tom, but I don’t think it’s accurate, or I don’t think it matters that much.” If you want to talk about that I’ll be glad to start another discussion thread on that.
But here I am calling for an answer to the question of whether any version of atheism can provide moral grounding in this sense.
Tom,
I have found your definition for what it means to have a basis for morality to be inscrutable. You say that you defined it informally in this comment:
The above is not a definition. It is a series of statements of what you consider to be failings of atheism. Definitions usually read something like: “Communism is the final stage of the political reform started with a revolution, according to Marx. First masses of workers will rebel in a industrialized country; they will implant a socialist government in order to adapt the country for later changes. After private property is banished, and the people possess everything, then there will be no need for government, thus the state will be destroyed, to form a society with no social classes.”
Your definition for what it means to have a basis for morality has read to me so far like my defining communism as “Capitalism allows great disparity in economic outcomes, and fails to equitably distribute wealth among wage earners and the holders of capital.”
So, I am looking for something that reads like: “To have a basis for morality means that…”
Tom,
Definitions for circular reasoning:
- Circular reasoning is an attempt to support a statement by simply repeating the statement in different or stronger terms. In this fallacy, the reason given is nothing more than a restatement of the conclusion that poses as the reason for the conclusion.
- Circular reasoning is problematic because the claim is made on grounds that cannot be accepted as true — because those very grounds are in dispute.
- In contemporary usage, circular reasoning often refers to an argument where the premises are as questionable as the conclusion.
If you can’t admit to the circularity in this…
… and this…
… then we have truly reached a point where discussion is useless.
Evolutionary psychology is not falsifiable? That statement reads a tad reckless to me — it sounds like something someone says when they have only read criticism of a field, and not any works from the field itself.
There are apparently still a few small tribes in the Amazon that have virtually no contact with the outside world. Were we to make contact and observe utopic behavior then, yes, evolutionary psychology would be falsified.
There are, of course, plenty of primate societies that have not been studied. Given facts about the primate’s physical characteristics and their environment evolutionary psychology can make predictions on behavior. Again, failure by a control group of evolutionary pyschologists to adequately predict the behavior of said primates would be falsification.
Aah, this is the kind of definition / framing of the issue I was looking for.
I’ll think about this and reply.
Tony,
You haven’t shown circularity in these statements. If you show it to me and I see it, then I’ll admit it. Perhaps I’m blind and I need it shown to me very, very plainly.
That would involve this: show that the conclusion of the argument is contained in one or more of its premises. State how the conclusion is contained in that premises.
I think this is the problem, and I addressed it already this morning: I am setting forth what theism says, and how the system of theism, if it is true satisfies the conditions for a grounded morality. I have said over and over again that I am not trying to prove theism in this thread. Let me state it more plainly:
In this thread I am describing what theism affirms, and the implications of those affirmations. I am not trying in this thread to prove theism.
Therefore when you see this:
… please read it this way, for the sake of this thread:
This argument contributes, non-circularly, to showing that theism (if it is true) provides a solid grounding for morality. That is my objective here: to show that if it is true, then theism provides a solid grounding for morality; and also that no version of atheism of which I am aware can do likewise.
By the way, this is a poor definition for circular reason and I do not accept it:
If the premises are questionable, then it’s a poor argument for sure, but it’s not (on that basis alone) a circular argument. Some other fallacy or evidential problem must be named instead.
Sorry. Evo Psych is not falsifiable, and I stand by that. But I don’t think that’s essential to this argument, so I’m not going to go into it further.
I’ll look forward to it!
*sigh*
This discussion is just another one of the futile kind. I don’t know why I even ended up here, I’ve had this discussion ad nauseam over at AiD over and over. You seem to use a different language here though, obsessing about “grounding” instead of some other word.
What absolute grounding do you have for, say, how to furnish your house? We must admit that there are a vast number of arrangements that nobody ever applies, like placing the sofa upside down in the kitchen or the stove in the bathroom. We all tend to do things in rather similar ways, variations on a pattern. Is that because there is an absolute grounding for that pattern?
Or is it perhaps because some things just don’t work? Some arrangements are outright dangerous and may remove us from the gene pool, and yet others will make us the laughing stock of the neighborhood and ostracize us from society. Could these sort of things be incentives to voluntarily adopt some constraints? To choose to follow a traditional pattern even though we know of is no absolute grounding for that pattern?
Clearly that can not be: we shall need a transcendent standard for how to furnish one’s house, or we have no basis at all for how to do it.
Sort of like God, then?
Hi Adonais,
Your home-decorating example ignores everything we’ve established and equivocates, analogously, on what we have been discussing as “moral”.
How you furnish your house is a behaviour and says nothing about your duty.
Behavoural descriptions all. Talking about what we do, and even why we do them, is not talking about ought. You might be providing a grounding for the behaviour, or the pattern of behaviours (no difference) but you are