There are two groups of people in the world: those who divide the world into two groups of people, and those who do not.
No, really, there are two groups of people in the world with respect to moral opinions: moral realists and moral relativists. Broadly speaking, moral realists believe that there are at least some moral values that are objective. Objective means (as William Lane Craig says) that these values would hold as valid or true even if nobody on earth agreed with them. Moral relativists, in contrast, generally hold that all moral values are generated or constructed out of persons’ or cultures’ beliefs. They may believe there is a certain kind of reality to moral values, that values are not arbitrary; but this reality is the product of individual or social beliefs, not some ultimate source beyond human culture.
The following is a True/False Quiz that anyone can take. Do you consider the following statements to be true or false?
1. (T/F) All moral values are entirely constructed or produced out of persons’ or cultures’ beliefs.
If you answered False, that’s it for you on this quiz. If you answered True, please continue:
2. (T/F) Let us assume that everybody in some cultural grouping G believes that some behavior B expresses a good and valid moral value. (It doesn’t really matter what B is.) For that culture, at that time and in those conditions, B is good.
3. (T/F) Another cultural group H may disagree with G on this, but nevertheless for GB is still good; for cultures may validly hold different opinions on moral values. H’s disagreement with G does not make B bad or wrong in itself, it only makes it bad or wrong for H.
4. (T/F) Suppose there is no group H that disagrees that B is good. Then everyone would be in group G, and would agree that B is good. For that time and in those conditions at least, B is therefore good for everybody. It is a universal good in the sense that it is universally shared by all persons then living, though not in the sense that its value comes from somewhere beyond the persons who have made it a value.
5. (T/F) In most cultures of the world, the Holocaust of WW II is regarded as having been a severe moral evil.
6. (T/F) If, however, Hitler had won the war, and if he (and his followers) had been able to exterminate or brainwash everyone who thought the Holocaust was evil, then the situation would be like that of (4), where every person in the world agreed that the Holocaust was morally good. (This example also follows one given by W.L. Craig.)
7. (T/F) In that case, the Holocaust would be correctly regarded by the remaining population as having been morally good.
Self-check: compare your answers to (4) and (7).
We’re not done yet, though…
8. (T/F) Some remaining persons (call them Group H again) may think it was morally evil to massacre and/or brainwash the dissenters. Those persons themselves (the members of Group H) could conceivably be brainwashed and/or killed by the others (Group G), so that every remaining person would then be a member of group G and would believe the following:
(a) To exterminate the Jews was a morally good goal.
(b) To kill and/or brainwash those who disagreed with (a) was morally good.
(c) To kill and/or brainwash those who dissented from (b) was also morally good.
9. (T/F) With no Group H, and with every person alive believing that 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) were morally good, then those moral beliefs would indeed be universally good, taking “universal” as described in (4).
10 (T/F) In other words, relativism could coherently lead to a possible world, as philosophers term it, in which the Holocaust was morally good, and where brainwashing or killing off all possible dissent was also morally good–universally so, in fact. This moral good, as suggested in (9), would rest on a much stronger social foundation than, say, the current common Western belief that slavery is wrong. It would in fact be more clearly good than current beliefs that slavery is wrong.
Self-check: compare your answers to (9) and (10) with your answer to (4).
And that suggests the following final item in our short quiz:
11. (T/F) It would violate a solidly established universal moral norm, and would rightly be regarded as reprehensible, to suggest that is wrong to kill dissenters just for believing that persons ought to have the freedom of their beliefs.
From this you see one reason I am not a moral relativist.
Hi Tom:
I think the progression as you present is formally correct, but it nonetheless seems (partially) to reduce morality to a kind of robotic flow-chart… and that’s not what humans are about: simple-minded flow-chart morality based on utility may be left to transhumanism, atheism, and other disordered views of reality. My point is not to criticize your presentation but to suggest the following considerations be kept in mind as providing a bit more “meat on the bones” (the material aspect of a good argument) support for what you wrote, because surely someone out there will quite rightly ask how one is to determine whether a human act or principle is deemed objectively good or bad.
It’s not fully correct to employ the terms “value” or even “norm” because these are not objectively grounded in something beyond the moral actor. It is better to employ the term “principle” or “action” depending on what is being discussed.
Opinions are fine as far as they go. But in discussions such as the one you’re presenting, opinion has no relevance in the search for truth. As such, sound (not merely valid) arguments are required.
It is a fallacy for someone to conclude that all human acts or principles are by their natures subjective merely by virtue of the fact that there are varying opinions about the moral character of certain acts or principles.
The nature of an act, intention, or circumstance is deemed good or evil based on what we are as humans. Even way back in Aristotle’s day without the “answers at the back of the book” provided by Judeo-Christian faith there are some things that could be reasoned to as being good or evil. What we are is fully expressed in the Gospel message with our ultimate end in Him, but we as believers cannot beg the question this way. What is “good” for a rock depends on knowing the nature of a rock, and from this we see that “good” for a rock is not a “moral” good. What is “good” for a human depends on knowing the nature of a human being (rational animal), and “good” for a human being IS a moral good. It is always and everywhere and under all circumstances evil to murder an innocent human being. Casting a rock into a pool of lava is morally neutral for us, and utterly devoid of moral content for the rock.
An important distinction: (1) A human act is one which is based on a free will choice, where free will is understood as being freely chosen within the bounds of human nature (humans are not free to fly unassisted because of the nature of what it means to be human). (2) An act of a human being is not necessarily one that demands free will: our act of breathing is involuntary.
In order for the nature or character of a human act to be considered morally good (or at least neutral) then all three components of that act (distinguishing the order of intention from the order of execution) must themselves not be evil: (1) the act itself or means by which an end is achieved, (2) the intention behind the act or the desired end, and (3) the circumstances under which an act is undertaken. If any one or more of these is evil, then the act itself is evil: all must be rightly ordered for the act to be morally good. For example, if the good consequences (relief of suffering for others) could be attained only by the destruction of an innocent human life (say in embryonic stem cell research or the forcible removal of a vital organ), then such an act cannot be morally justified. If a researcher is forced to carry out such research (circumstances), then the act is evil but he is not morally culpable.
Human reason presents to the human will the object upon which a choice is made. If the object is deemed by the reason to be “good,” then the will has an “appetite” to choose it; if the object is deemed by the reason to be “evil,” then the will can reject it. There are, as always, nuances: (1) goods are “proximate,” “distant,” and “ultimate.” The reason may rightly present to the will that an extra hour’s sleep in the morning is “good” and it is no doubt correct. But if early-morning training is required to achieve another good, such as winning a race, then the greater “distant” good of winning a race overrides the lesser “proximate” good of sleeping an extra hour. (2) The reason may correctly present something as evil (such as pre-marital sex) to the will, but if the will has not been trained through the virtues of temperance and prudence to avoid evil, it will overrule the reason and “go for it.” (3) If the capacity of reason has been weakened through sin (say stealing) or worldview (say, atheism) or lifestyle habits (technically referred to as “vices,” e.g., such as homosexuality), or if the person is simply ignorant / lacking information, then the reason will not be able to fully correctly present the object as either properly good or evil to the will.
How conscience plays into your presentation and in what I’ve presented (a conscience always binds but doesn’t always excuse) is very important and would require a separate post.
Just as there is an undeniable, not provable First Principle of speculative knowledge regarding real beings (the Principle of Non-Contradiction), there is a First Principle of practical knowledge (morality) that is undeniable and inescapable: Do good, avoid evil. No matter what one holds to be good or evil, one will pursue the one and avoid the other, and to deny this principle is to affirm it.
Consciously-accepted moral relativism is an evil—a repugnant one to boot.
Welcome back, my friend!
I was of course not presenting any of this flow as representing what I believe, as I hope was clear from the end of the presentation. I was presenting it as what I think moral relativists might believe, to display the outcome of their assumptions.
That question is both welcome and expected, but I hope it does not short-circuit any reader from thinking through this “T/F Quiz.”
After all: though one could ask, “How could morals be objective?” which is a very good question, and what you write here is certainly relevant to that, the question I’m raising here is a different one: “how could morals be relative, and still make sense?” Though related, the two are not the same question. So I hope to hear some relativists’ answers to the “quiz” questions (which are, in effect, a dialogue, in which one voice is merely implicit).
Tom, can you clarify a few things:
In #8 you mention some remaining people, group H. Does group H think the Holocaust was good? If not, then not everyone in the world thought the Holocaust was good as you laid out in #6. Or perhaps your logic doesn’t depend on *everyone* in the world thinking the Holocaust was good?
In #8, who are the dissenters? If they think the Holocaust is bad, then, again, not everyone in the world thought the Holocaust was good, as in #6, or perhaps this doesn’t matter?
In #8, “those persons themselves” refers to group H or the dissenters?
Tom, maybe I can cut to the chase. Is it a fair summary of relativism, as you’re trying to lay it out here, to say that relativism can lead to a situation in which mores that one might find repellent (either an moral objectivist or some/all relativists) are the norm? Or is your point something different?
Group H is defined as a subset of those who thought the Holocaust was good, for, by this time, that larger set – see (7) – comprises everybody. Thus Group H is made up of those who thought the Holocaust was good, but who deny that it was good to kill/brainwash those who disagreed that the Holocaust was good.
“Those persons themselves” refers to members of Group H. I will edit the post to clarify that.
Regarding your 1:58 comment, I prefer to put the question back to you. What do you think the conclusion of this “quiz” ought to be?
Hi Tom:
Sorry if my original post came across too negative: I did understand the points you just raised, but I wanted to flush them (and others) out into the open with what I added. As well, some of the points I raise are done so not even so much to support or flush out what you wrote but to preempt some illicit criticisms potentially lurking out there, e.g., my second and third bullet points.
I don’t know if Craig reads your blog and its comments, but my message was also “read between the lines” to him as well. William of Ockham, a Franciscan monk, around 1325 (near the end of a slowly decaying—from its glory—Scholasticism) promulgated among the most pernicious errors in philosophy (there are no universals) and theology (God could have redeemed us by becoming a donkey): that of nominalism. It was an error that, unfortunately, crept into the thinking of Luther (God justifies man, but man remains as sinful inwardly as before)—jettisoning (albeit inadvertently) the Scriptural “new creatures in Christ.” The upshot is that God works as he wishes and man cannot use his reason to determine what is just or unjust. Just as I argued on Saturday at the conference: if we are not permitted to act per our natures (which are distinguished from the brute with reason and free will), then we are reduced to robots. We are not, in fact, “totally depraved” because we are made in the image and likeness of God, we are made “new creatures in Christ,” and hence can participate in the Divine Nature.
Anyway, I don’t want to argue the theology but rather the impact Ockham had on the understanding of freedom—the sine qua non of moral acts. Ockham basically reduced freedom to a kind of neutral or “disconnected” choice—elevating (perhaps “denigrating” is a better word) choice to self-assertion, i.e., power, i.e., portending Descartes and Bacon with power over Nature, Nietzsche with power as the answer to nihilism (“There are no facts, only interpretations”), and later still post-modernism’s sick view of the world (“There is no truth, only opinions”) or deconstructionism’s silliness (Derrida’s “there is nothing outside the text”).
Freedom, instead of being “for excellence” or “for good” as Aquinas puts it, is severed from human nature (whose ultimate object is the Good)… with the further result that humans become “atomized choice-makers” effectively separated from each other. (What possible good could there be to make a choice for evil? What possible good is there in euthanasia… apart from its similarity to Orwell’s depiction in 1984 of EastAsia’s “death worship”? And what possible objective good could a moral relativist claim either way?) There can be, in this context, no common good… and there can be no common good if there is no objective good in the first place. Reason is thus placed in conflict with freedom: we’re left with either a deterministic (biological or ideological) vision or a relativistic vision… and freedom slowly kills itself. If one needs confirmation of this, look around: freedom is “imposed” over the weak and inconvenient (abortion, ESCR, euthanasia), people are fined in Canada for expressing positions on abortion counter to those in power, people get arrested in Germany for home-schooling their children, etc., etc. Where is the “freedom”… apart from the strong who are the only ones that benefit from such creeping fascism?
I think Craig and I would agree on the terrible outcome, but I might question the flavor of his approach (note: also based on the flavor of his other writings)… which is why my first set of comments was of a partially pre-emptive and partially reactive nature. Hence, I’m not suggesting you agree with a flow-chart approach to morality. Rather, I wanted to high-light and bring out that sense so that others might realize moral choices are not flow-chart-like “neutral” approaches: there is always important content involved.
I’ll end with a joke: How do you protest a moral relativist (or unitarian, for that matter) moving in as your next door neighbor? Burn a large question mark in their front lawn… (Remember, it’s only a joke!)
Tom, I having a hard time following your logic through the whole thing. It seems to me a too long version (at least for me) of my 1:58 summary.
Is there anything else to it besides that? I don’t mean to denigrate that, because perhaps for others your train of thought clarifies the issue or makes it stand out particularly clearly, and that’s fine.
For me, I fully understand under relativism that (1) reprehensible practices may be morally acceptable at a later time, as well as (2) morally acceptable practices may become unacceptable at a later time.
This is quite important so I’ll try to clarify.
It seems to me that if a person accepts (1), then it follows that (10) and (11) are conceivable to that person. That is, a situation can be conceived in which it is morally good that:
* All Jews have been killed (or at least a systematic attempt has ben made to kill them all), and Jewish body parts have been warehoused and used for manufacturing purposes;
* Every person who thought that was not good has been systematically killed or brainwashed; and
* Every person who thought that second step of killing or brainwashing was not good, has also been killed or brainwashed:
* Resulting in a world where everybody agrees that these genocidal and brainwashing acts were right and good.
Stating it another way, the person who accepts (1) can conceive of a world in which dehumanizing genocide is an honorable, valid, and genuine moral good, according to the definition given in (1), and not only that, but killing or brainwashing people who dissent is also an honorable genuine moral good (by that same definition).
And further (11), the person who holds (1) can conceive of a world where it would actually be morally reprehensible to suggest that any of this was not good.
True or false, Paul?
True. I don’t see what part of your statement of your final point isn’t clearly inferred from my summary.
I’d like to offer one slight revision to #1. You’ve defined a sort of pure relativism, but I’ve said here in the past that evolution apparently instills some moral tendencies, but they can be over-ridden by culture. Prohibitions against incest might have a basis in the genetic risk for offspring of incest, but some societies have allowed some form of incest (see Wikipedia on “incest”).
I don’t know what this revision might to do your chain of reasoning and your final point.
Tom,
You seem to almost define a moral relativist as a person who “can conceive of a world in which dehumanizing genocide is an honorable, valid, and genuine moral good”. If we now opened the Old Testament and started listing all of the genocides commanded/accepted by God, would you be able to judge all of these genocides categorically unethical? If not, would that make you a moral relativist?
Also, if you find that you must defend one or more of these genocides, can you find any better defense than the Nazis? (I.e. that the atrocities were, in your belief, necessary to improve the human condition?)
Thirdly, if you insist that we must be Absolutely Right about at least some moral issues, can you name a century whose moral absolutists’ Absolute Rightness you can best embrace? If it so happens that we are talking about our very own century, what are you so afraid of? It is precisely moral relativism that allowed us to outgrow the Popes of the Crusades, who in their Absolute Rightness knew that enslaving or killing a follower of Mohammed is more likely our duty than a crime. Isn’t it at least equally frightening idea at all that we might have remained right there, forever believing that we are Absolutely Right?
No, Esko, I define a moral relativist as stated in (1). The rest of it follows from that opening definition.
Your question about OT wars rests on a logical fallacy. I argued that
(1) —> (10) and (11)
That is, the belief stated in (1) leads to the conceivable condition of (10) and (11), summarized again, by the way, in my next comment after this one.
Your suggestion is this: if a person considers it possible that there be a condition in which one nation’s extermination is a moral good, then that person is a moral relativist. Note that this condition is not equivalent to (10) and (11). There is nothing in Biblical ethics that could conceivably support (10) and (11) under any circumstances.
However, even if (contra reality) there were such a condition, your suggestion would rest on a fallacy that may be diagrammed thus:
(1) —> (10) and (11),
therefore
(10) and (11) —> (1)
In more formalized structure:
p —> q
therefore
q —> p
Example: All cats are mammals, therefore all mammals are cats.
The Absolute Right I embrace is that which is affirmed by Scripture. We may (and sometimes do) make mistakes interpreting it, but the good exists regardless. Recall how I defined moral realism in the opening of this post: it says that some things are morally right or wrong, even if nobody believes them to be so.
Paul, I do not accept for a moment that evolution can instill moral tendencies. It could conceivably instill behavioral tendencies, but to call them moral would be a gross mischaracterization. Moral implies “ought,” and as even Dawkins has clearly stated, evolution cannot supply oughts.
Otherwise I think we’re in agreement regarding the result of believing (1). There is a conceivable condition in which the following may accurately be described, according to (1), as a genuine moral good:
* All Jews have been killed (or at least a systematic attempt has ben made to kill them all), and Jewish body parts have been warehoused and used for manufacturing purposes;
* Every person who thought that was not good has been systematically killed or brainwashed; and
* Every person who thought that second step of killing or brainwashing was not good, has also been killed or brainwashed:
* Resulting in a world where everybody agrees that these genocidal and brainwashing acts were right and good.
And it also follows that it would be morally reprehensible in that condition to suggest that any of the above was wrong.
But because we can make mistakes interpreting what this absolute right is, we can never be absolutely (!) sure that what we have currently interpreted things correctly. Of course, we must always try as best we can. But how do we know ABSOLUTELY that we haven’t made a mistake?
The answer to that question cannot be some form of “We’ve figured things out and it sure looks right to us,” or “How could X not be moral?”
Therefore we can never be absolutely sure that we are correct, this returns us to my Strong Skepticism position.
You’ve shifted from the current discussion of ontology (whether there exists an absolute right or wrong) to a different question, epistemology (whether we can know it with absolute certainty).
I think you accept the outcome stated in my 10:51 comment. Is that correct?
Tom:
Furthermore, Paul’s “strong skepticism” is an absolutist position (which he believes to be absolutely true) even as he denies we can know anything with absolute certainty. (We saw that in his strange attempt to deny non-contradiction a few weeks ago when it doesn’t appear to bother him that his own argument is contradictory.) And, notwithstanding Paul’s acceding to such an untenable position, he nonetheless uses it (as you point out) to shift from ontological considerations to hide behind epistemological ones he doesn’t appear to understand.
Then, when we move to the moral sphere, Paul continues to rely on a similar tactic: to think he somehow knows absolutely that we “know nothing absolutely” and shift (fallaciously) to thinking therefore there are no moral absolutes (my third bullet point in my original comment). We do know that “pursue good, avoid evil” is undeniable: if one affirms it, then no problem; if one denies it, one believes it is good and true to deny it—thereby undermining the denial by affirming the principle.
So, at issue is Paul’s tactic, and at this point one must honestly appraise Paul’s position as either intentionally manipulative, honestly ignorant or inexperienced, or so weighted down with emotional prior commitments that clear thinking is hindered… or perhaps some combination of these. It’s not simply a matter of disagreeing over the substance of your claim; it’s rather disagreeing while contradicting himself. If Paul were to provide a cogent argument that at least provides reasonable disagreement, the discussion could press ahead to examine more closely the premises. But that’s not what’s going on: in fact, many of the propositions and arguments he makes contain inherent contradictions—either intentional or burdened with prior commitments—and hence the discussion can never proceed. Reasonable people can disagree on tastes and tactics, but not (in the end) on truth. If Paul believe so strongly there are no morally, ontologically, epistemologically, and logically objective truths, what possible motivation could there be (apart from manipulation) to “prove” you wrong?
I’m willing to have my analysis of Paul’s position and arguments openly corrected in public. My sense, though, is we won’t hear that, but rather the oft-repeated (by him or others) “sorry, got to run…,” or “your argument is too complex,” or “you tone (?!? isn’t that an attempt at a morally-objective chastisement?) is unbecoming a Christian.”
Tom,
If (10)&(11)->(1) does not necessarily apply, then you are basically saying that
(1)->(10)&(11)
and that you haven’t got the foggiest whether also
~(1)->(10)&(11).
(Or that at least under some further conditions ~(1), (10) and (11) may all be true.)
Hence, “logically”, you choose ~(1) or something your argument apparently knows nothing about.
But how about some practical ethics for a change? I think it is rather interesting curiosity in this thread that it is likely you, and very unlikely the moral relativist, who is defending certain supposedly historic genocides. (Although you insist on calling them “wars”. I think it is rather odd to call e.g. the systematic and intentional destruction of a whole nation, including infants and livestock, “a war”, especially after starting a topic about genocides). Shouldn’t we be startled by the fact that the most likely Western version of a moral absolutist, i.e. a Biblical literalist, tends to actively defend Biblical genocides?
In contrast, why should we be startled by the purely theoretical idea that moral relativists would be all for genocides if all other kinds of moral relativists had been already genocided from the population. Obviously, you assume that also moral absolutists would have been eliminated at that point. Your scenario kind of makes me think that you can’t see the forest behind the trees. I mean, would it really comfort you, in that situation, to be able to say before being exterminated: yeah, but I was still Absolutely Right! Let’s face it: your scenario is precisely as horrible for both you the moral absolutist (who opposes most genocides) as it is for me the moral relativist (who opposes all historic and most conceivable genocides).
And one more practical point. Even if the ethics of no century accurately reflects your view of the Scripture, would you agree that we are better off living in the golden age of moral relativism, as opposed to the golden age of moral absolutism (undoubtedly the Medieval Age in Europe)?
Esko, I’m just applying formal logic to what you’ve brought up symbolically here. Further, I’m trying to draw out the logical implications of (1). You’re trying to take us off topic, and I’m trying to focus on something else. Remind me later and I’ll write a post on OT
About being startled: are you saying that (10) and (11) do not startle you, as potential (and entirely logical) implications of (1)? You said genocide horrifies you. Are you contradicting yourself, or am I misunderstanding you?
I’ll follow you off topic here just long enough to answer that I don’t think there’s ever actually been an age (golden or otherwise) of actual moral relativism. Practically speaking, the current relativism has been limited to culturally acceptable areas like sexuality. Compare, for example, the moral outcry against people like Ken Lay of Enron, or corporate polluters of the environment. I strongly suspect your view of Medieval Europe is seriously skewed, too, but that’s too far afield to pursue it any further.
Note also, by the by: you made an extended complaint about my “insisting” on using the word “war.” I used it once; and I also used the terminology of a “nation’s extermination” in reference to the same thing. Just settle down, please, and note what I have written.
Further on my second-to-last paragraph there: I was speaking about practical ethics, which has never been as relative as Esko seems to suggest. In terms of the grounding for ethics, relativism certainly reigns, much to our detriment. But the question was about practical ethics.
And that’s all the further I intend to continue with this side topic.
The latter part of this had me confused so I hope you don’t mind if I rephrase it to make it more clear (to me!)…
if one denies this principle then one believes in pursuing the good of denying it and avoiding the evil of accepting it - thereby affirming the principle of ‘pursue good, avoid evil’.
Righto. I’m just bringing up another aspect of the situation.
Yes.
I’ve previously admitted some uncertainty as to whether we should be uncertain about everything.
Then that raises this question, Paul, which Holopupenko already mentioned in a different form. What is it that seems so attractive to you, in a philosophy that can lead to those conclusions? Don’t you feel the force of what you’ve admitted to—how horrific those things are?
I chose those words carefully. I did not say, “how horrific they feel.” I am quite sure that they are in fact utterly horrific. I am quite sure you also consider them wrong. You might be prone to put that wrongness in feeling language (”it feels wrong to me, given that I’m not a part of that culture”), but I submit to you that there is more than feeling there. There is actual wrongness to killing off the Jews and everyone who thinks that was wrong, and everyone who thinks that was wrong. Don’t you recognize that?
And I urge you to let this question do more than float on your consciousness as a mere logical plaything. Let this condensed statement help you with that: Your view says that anything bad can be good, and I mean absolutely anything: no matter how vile or destructive it may be, no matter how it denies freedom and humanity, no matter how perverse or twisted it might be, it could still become a universal good.
Is there some First Principle that requires this?
I think this ties back into our discussons about ‘perceptions of the heart’ that can lead to knowledge about reality - remembering that you can’t know what you can’t perceive. Nobody perceives a First Principle with their 5 senses. So, in addition to Tom’s question above I would ask Paul if the concept of ‘perception of the heart’ makes more sense?
It’s the philosophy that evidence and reason has led me to. If it’s not attractive, that doesn’t make it false.
Do I feel how [they. . .] are? What does that mean? Do I feel that they are true? Huh?
No. Period. I feel a visceral, gut reaction when I see horrific things, but that doesn’t mean that they are actually or truely or objectively wrong. This is the fundamental issue.
Furthermore, nearly every one I’ve met considers me a nice guy. I donate time and money to charity, I help little old ladies across the street, etc. So holding a relativistic outlook doesn’t make one immoral (at least more than normal). I’m not saying, Tom, that you’re implying that.
Except that evolution probably limits some types of behavior that we would call immoral.
Evidence and logic.
Which evidence and logic???
The only ones I know. If you’ve got better ones, I’d love to see them.
The only ones I know. If you’ve got better ones, I’d love to see them.
I don’t mean to be flip, but if I take your question seriously and literally, we’re in for a *realy* long conversation, I think.
In other words, Paul, you don’t seem to have any first principles you can or will supply that explain why you would hold to your position.
Extraordinary claims, it has been said, call for extraordinary evidence. There are certain epistemological problems with that statement, but I’m going to put it before you anyway. The claim you are endorsing is this:
Absolutely anything bad can be good: no matter how vile or destructive it may be, no matter how it denies freedom and humanity, no matter how perverse or twisted it might be, it could still become a universal good.
That is an extraordinary claim.
Tom, I just told you what my first principles were, in my 3:30 post.
You are putting relativism in a certain rhetorical light that glosses over the crucial distinctions. The contradiction your wrote (bad = good) glosses over the way that relativism makes sense. Bad in one culture can equal good in another culture, that is a fact, do I need to cite examples? There’s nothing contradictory about it, unless you assume that morals are absolute, and then that would make sense of your apparent outrage and disbelief over relativism. I grant you that, if you assume moral absolutism, then moral relativism is insensible. But when you ask me to defend relativism, it must be on a basis *prior* to assuming that absolutism is true, because otherwise would be absurd.
Furthermore, I keep on qualifying the range of variability that you are concerned with in relativism, and you keep on ignoring that qualification when you characterize relativism (”Absolutely anything bad can be good”) in, dare I say it, absolute terms.
I take it you meant the 3:50 post; the font makes the 3 and the 5 look similar.
“Evidence and logic” are not first principles, Paul. “Evidence” is, well, just a word, and “logic” is a tool. You’re not close, in other words. I don’t think you’re even stepping up to this one. Even if there’s some room to quibble about extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence, one hopes that the support for your claim would be stronger than “I have evidence and logic.”
Paul, please! My whole post was an example. Why would I need to be shown more? The point is that this thinking logically leads to an incredible absurdity.
Two responses: First, to say there’s nothing contradictory in the situation I summarized at 5:37 pm is very, very strange.
Second, I think most people would agree with that, and without assuming morals are absolute.
Let me ask you this about your “first principle:” I think it’s this. I think you know that if there are moral absolutes, there must be a God. You’re so committed to atheism you would rather affirm the despicable, foolish nonsense summarized at 5:37 pm than open your mind to the goodness of God—and the accountability to him that that comes with it.
Tom, I don’t know what you mean by a “first principle.” Can you explain the concept in general?
It doesn’t lead to an absurdity when one understands it in terms of relativism. You can phrase anything in terms that will make it seem horrible or disgusting - all you have to do is to look at the current level of political discourse to confirm that one.
Of course relativism is not obvious because it requires stepping outside of oneself. It’s vaguely similar to hearing a foreign language for the first time and trying to imagine that people can actually communicate through those weird sounds. We can’t imagine that people could think different things are moral.
Tom, here’s a question for you. Is there *any* moral issue that isn’t objective? If so, then you have a model of moral non-objectivity to which you can apply to other moral differences that you/we find horrible.
A first principle, and I know I used the term non-technically, would be something to explain why you choose to believe as you do.
Two disputes with this:
1. It doesn’t just seem horrible or disgusting. It is.
2. It is not just a phrasing. It is a legitimate conclusion to a line of thought that you have endorsed.
This is not a failure of imagination, as you suggest. This is pointing out that something you have endorsed is just wrong.
Moral realism says that there at least some morals that are objective. It’s fine with me (at least in terms of the current discussion) if, say, the south Chinese approve of eating dogs. I don’t like it, I don’t agree, but that’s an area of relativism that is within the pale. As I said, this is not a failure of imagination. This is about very extreme moral outrages that you continue to let float on your mind as logical playthings, and have thus found it possible to endorse in principle. I still don’t think you’ve thought about it deeply enough.
Tom,
It seems that you are assuming that a moral relativist is not allowed to have moral axioms of any kind. But I don’t think such an assumption holds. Certainly the ethical opinions of moral relativists, too, are rooted in axioms. (And the axioms of both moral relativists just as well as moral absolutists may vary wildly from individual to individual or from group to group.)
The point with moral relativism is that relativists don’t think that axioms can be defended logically — so they don’t bother to pretend so. Moral absolutists, on the other hand, do bother: they pretend that their axioms can be defended by saying e.g. “it is absolutely so because I believe that it just is so” or, more likely, “it is absolutely so because I interpret that the Scripture says so, and because I believe that God says whatever the Scripture says, and because I believe that whatever God says, always holds”. (No matter how vile, destructive and horrible?)
In practice, both relativists and absolutists know that they need to defend their opinions by force. (That would be the democratic process in our case.) In the parliament, you don’t have to prove your axioms. (Perhaps to the annoyance of moral absolutists who apparently think that they could have proven their axioms in their own version of logic.) You just vote.
Note also, by the by: you made an extended complaint about my “insisting” on using the word “war.” I used it once; and I also used the terminology of a “nation’s extermination” in reference to the same thing. Just settle down, please, and note what I have written.
Quite. I apologize. I managed to see actually two versions of your post, and even after editing the inital one, you kept on using the word “war” instead of the more thematic “genocide”. Still, it was a clear overreaction on my part. This topic probably does not benefit from such sensitivity.
Esko,
The axiom I was working from was stated in (1), and the rest follows from that. What you are describing is a variation that was not included in this thought exercise.
But what about these axioms? Are they grounded in anything at all? It sounds to me like you are saying they are not. Then are they simply arbitrary? And if arbitrary, why should anyone think they hold, or matter, when challenged?
Perhaps power is the axiom. But that seems to contradict the ruling axiom of democratic cultures and countries. It was checks-and-balances, the separation (and thus limitation) of power that made the U.S. Constitution so strong a foundation for our country. The same could certainly be said for Parliamentarian democracies.
Thanks for your second comment here.
Tom,
Before responding to you, I would ask you to addess this part in my post that you left unaddressed, and which I happen to think sums up rather well the difference between relativism and absolutism (in fact, not only concerning ethics but also epistemology):
“The point with moral relativism is that relativists don’t think that axioms can be defended logically — so they don’t bother to pretend so. Moral absolutists, on the other hand, do bother: they pretend that their axioms can be defended by saying e.g. “it is absolutely so because I believe that it just is so” or, more likely, “it is absolutely so because I interpret that the Scripture says so, and because I believe that God says whatever the Scripture says, and because I believe that whatever God says, always holds”. (No matter how vile, destructive and horrible?)”
I’m sorry, but I am kind of feeling that you are taking a lot of liberties in deciding, rather one-sidedly, what is relevant here and what is not. Especially considering that your initial thought experiment, although clothed in a veil of rather unnecessary “logicalism”, is purely rhetorical.
Hmmm… I thought I had addressed it, by discussing what axioms might mean under relativism.
I’m going to be unavailable for most of the rest of the day, and I don’t have time right now to work on it. I’ll come back to this when I can.
I’m guessing what you mean, then, is that, while relativism might hold for some things, like eating dogs, when the outrage passes a certain point, it will overwhelm relativism and make it not possible.
So now we have the outrage fallacy: if something is outrageous enough, it must be objectively wrong, morally. Why can’t one feel outraged and disgusted as much as anyone ever has but still not conclude that there is something *objective* about it, that must be wrong for everyone?
No wonder you believe in God: you’re letting your gut control your head.
So what part of evidence and logic doesn’t fit this definition of a first principle? You may argue with how I’ve applied the evidence and logic, and disagree with my conclusions, but the question about first principles, *as you’ve defined it above,* as been asked and answered.
Ok, take your time. Meanwhile, I will clarify this misconception:
“Perhaps power is the axiom. But that seems to contradict the ruling axiom of democratic cultures and countries.”
Clearly I didn’t promote centralized power nor the use of violence. I merely pointed out that on practical level it still is power, even if decentralized and controlled by democratic processes, that counts. You don’t turn your opinions into norms by being Absolutely Right. You do it by gaining political support. And quite a few of the current norms are, in fact, enforced by arms. A democratic country which does not have armed authorities (organized carefully to minimize the risk of a coup, and monitored carefully to avoid excessive use of force in law enforcement) would likely crumble within a week.
Besides, I did not think of political power as a “moral axiom”. An example of a moral axiom would be that life must be protected, especially human life. Is there some reason why a moral relativist could not have such an opinion, to be used axiomatically for building up a system of ethics? Would such an opinion, for example, somehow turn the relativist into an absolutist?
Esko,
And now for the rest of the story. I delayed answering you because I had a colonoscopy yesterday morning. I ran out of time to reply beforehand, and I wasn’t about to try to think straight afterward. If you’ve experienced this you’ll know what I mean. They instruct you not to drive, cook, sign checks, etc., after having the procedure, and they could just as well also advise you not to blog! Today I’ve been catching up at the office. Thank you for being patient.
Anyway, now I’ll try to address your comments from 2 July, 3:42 am and following.
You raise the idea that relativists and absolutists may both have moral axioms. I think that is correct. Now we need to think through what that implies.
Let us first clear away a potential misconception. You wrote,
What this means in regard to relativists is clear, I think. Its meaning with reference to absolutists may be muddled, however. Recall that the definition of moral realism is that there are at least some moral values or duties that hold as valid regardless of whether any person accepts or believes them. If moral realists have different beliefs as to what those values or duties are, moral realism could very well still be true.
You made that point parenthetically, so I don’t know where you were headed with it. But I want to caution other readers not to assume that relativism and realism can be evaluated the same way on account of different values held by their proponents.
Second, you suggest that the difference between realists’ and relativists’ axioms is that relativists do not pretend they can defend their axioms logically. I think some relativists have pretended that, but I’m willing to stipulate that as a definition for relativism, because I think the attempt, if it is made, is doomed to failure at any rate.
Realists have a number of ways of defending our axioms. We believe that some moral facts are simply known, almost as immediately as we know that a polygon with three sides also has three angles. We know that murder is wrong, child rape is wrong, etc., just because it is plain to the healthy mind that it is so. That is taking these moral facts as axiomatic in the plain sense of axiomatic.
Theists also believe that there are moral values and duties given by a good God, and that what he orders is never ultimately vile, destructive, or horrible. It may be proximately horrible or destructive, to be sure, but not ultimately so; just as my experience of a colonoscopy yesterday was unpleasant but for good purpose; not to mention the very difficult surgery I went through 30 years ago that saved my life. Many others could say the same.
Third, I have already (2 Jul 6:20 am) pointed out that relativists’ axioms are utterly ungrounded except in the sense that I pointed out two paragraphs above. This moral sense is quite adequate to most of us but cannot stand the pressure of serious disagreement. One example of that is the thought experiment of the original post here. Another is the Islamist who believes it’s good to fly airplanes into buildings. There is no answer one can give to such a person except to say, “I don’t like that,” or “I disagree.”
But don’t misunderstand that. I do not mean, “there is no way to persuade the person to stop other than by saying, ‘I disagree.’” What I mean is this: there is no way to tell the other person what they did is wrong. You can only say you disagree. From within their perspective, they are not wrong. They are right. In that sense, it was perfecty right for the terrorists to fly those planes into those buildings. It was right from within their culture, and that is the only place (for them) where right and wrong are decided.
Moral axioms alone are not enough for us to be able to say to bin Laden, “That was wrong,” for according to moral relativism, it wasn’t.
Finally, regarding your point at 10:22 am about power, you made a distinction regarding centralized power or the use of violence. I don’t think you can sustain that distinction from within relativism. If the only thing that decides right and wrong is power, then that is the only thing that can decide it. If you decided it by “gaining political support,” then you have been more effective garnering power for your side than your opponent has. What makes that moral?
Paul, that was just rude:
Not that I’m unwilling to listen to my gut; God speaks to the whole person, and he is God for the whole person. You’re a musician, too, aren’t you?
But here you have missed the point. Moral realism says that there are at least some values and duties that hold as true, regardless of how many people subscribe to them. It does not say that all values and duties apply to all persons at all times. It does not say that eating dogs is wrong at all times for all people, though I consider it wrong for me. It does not say that eating with your left hand is wrong for all times and all people, even though for certain south Asians it certainly is wrong.
I have been crediting you with enough intelligence, and granting grace to think that you might treat this argument seriously. Please do not make a straw man out of it! You’re not making your own position look any stronger that way.
So yes, there is considerable cultural variance regarding certain norms. I’m asking you to listen to your gut (you brought up the term, I’ll go ahead and use it) and not just your arguing logical head, and realize that cultural variance reaches far beyond its limits when it says there’s a system that could potentially say that (10) and (11) are universal goods.
More and more I think you’re arguing in bad faith, Paul, because I just cannot believe you would say what you said on 1 July at 1:17 pm. I cannot believe that you would agree that the situation I outlined in this thought experiment could possibly be describable as good. But that’s what you said. Do you really believe this? Or are you just trying to escape the implications that would force themselves on you if you disagreed?
Tom, my sincere apologies. I hope it helps if you know that I had written
“[left caret]hitting below the belt[right caret] . . . . [left caret]/hitting below the belt[right caret]”
before that rude sentence. I knew it was right up to or across the line, and I hoped that the “hitting below the belt” thingie would communicate that I knew it was such, and therefore we should focus on the substance, not the rhetoric; I wasn’t doing it unconsciously. Perhaps I was trying to have my cake and eat it to, and I’ll ask forgiveness for that. It came off way beyond what I intended when the tags didn’t show up, and I didn’t check to see if the tags would show up as text.
I fear with that mistake that you have become more suspicious of my intentions, and that I regret. I’m trying to be honest, within the limitations that people (including me, and you, too) can sometimes fool themselves.
Now, to the substance:
I think it is a fact that, given sufficient enculturation, that someone, or even an entire society, could adopt as moral *any* behaviors that you would claim to be immoral. Can you prove this wrong?
Bill Vallicella put up a post today on subjectivity and the meaning of life. I think it will help us here. I could be wrong, but I don’t see any reason why it can’t be applied to morality.
“the subjectivist appears to be astride the horns of a dilemma. Either the acts of meaning-bestowal are meaningful or they are meaningless. If the former, then a vicious infinite regress ensues. If the latter, then the life of which they are essential parts is meaningless.”
Charlie
The infinite regress that Bill Vallicella talks about reminded me of a C.S. Lewis quote (I think) you gave in the comments not long ago. Something about seeing through everything means there is nothing to see. Is that quote relevant here?
Paul, thank you for providing the rest of that response that didn’t survive the last publishing. I appreciate and accept your apology.
I believe this is wrong. I can’t prove it because I’m not about to run the experiment. On the other hand, Western culture actually has been trying to run the experiment, in regard to throw-away marriages, unmarried “hooking up,” same-sex “marriage,” and killing unborn children.* The response so far has been very, very mixed.
But what would it show even if you were right and I were wrong about this? Moral realism says there are some values that obtain regardless of who adheres to them. And the conclusions of (10) and (11) above would still be very, very, very wrong, even if we reached a point where everyone living believed they were right.
*I am not saying these are the only major sins of Western culture, but you used the word “adopt,” and these are the newest ones being proposed for adoption lately.
Tom,
No worries, this is your hobby not your job. Hope the colonoscopy pays out.
What I meant with my parenthetical quote was simply that both moral relativists and moral absolutists can hold a myriad of differing
opinions, even if absolutists considered their opinions absolute
truths. No, this variety does not logically prevent moral
absolutism. It merely hints that there might be something
intellectually dishonest about moral absolutism.
I am aware that you are actively trying to counterbalance this observation by largely being a moral relativist yourself and only saving your absolutism for moral axioms or scenarios which you apparently think are somehow clear-cut, trivial, and necessary to accept (this combination or hybrid is, I gather, what you call “moral realism”). I (too) am rather sceptical about your relativist-absolutist hybrid. Not only does the distinction between absolute and relative “truths” remain quite arbitrary in your thinking, but also even your most “confident” cases fail to impress me. Which is precisely why I have e.g. brought in examples of how easily you yourself accept, for example, genocide, given the right conditions.
Some quite revealing quotes follow.
1. “Realists have a number of ways of defending our axioms. We believe that some moral facts are simply known”
I have difficulties finding any essential difference in these sentences compared to my earlier:
“Moral absolutists, on the other hand, do bother: they pretend that their axioms can be defended by saying e.g. ‘it is absolutely so because I believe that it just is so’”
So, I guess I just have to conclude that, by your very demonstration, you really do bother. You bother to pretend that it is valid persuasion, either rational or rhetorical, to stomp on your hat. That’s all you’re doing here and you are puzzled by the fact that I don’t bother to do the same.
2. “We know that murder is wrong, child rape is wrong, etc., just because it is plain to the healthy mind that it is so. That is taking these moral facts as axiomatic in the plain sense of axiomatic.”
This is another thing I feel that I predicted. You do seem to have your own version of logic. Since when has the “plain sense” of axiomatic been “just knowing it is true”? No, my friend. The “plain sense” of axiomatic is “just assuming it is true”, for the purpose of an argument (quite literally!). There are predicates that are just assumed true, called axioms, and all other predicates have to be derived from axioms. None of this has anything to do with our confidence in axioms. I.e. they can be entirely subjective. Instead, it is a very special case if we claim to have axioms known to be true. If the axioms of our formal system are ontological predicates (i.e. descriptive claims), it is quite possible that we could raise our confidence in the axioms by testing the formal system against our observations about the reality. If, however, some of our axioms are moral (i.e. normative claims), we can only explore what kind of strategies (behavioral models) our system produces, but there are no observations that could raise our confidence in the moral axioms. We can’t really say: “Ah, Thou Shalt Not Kill must be a correct moral axiom, because the maxim of not killing just somehow seems to fit the observed reality so well. For example, this maxim produces less of those awful genocides which, I always think, don’t fit the reality at all.” Agreed?
3. “But don’t misunderstand that. I do not mean, there is no way to persuade the person to stop other than by saying, I disagree. What I mean is this: there is no way to tell the other person what they did is wrong. You can only say you disagree.”
A thousand dollar question. Can you very carefully elaborate the practical consequences. My opinion is that this has no other practical consequence except that:
a) I look slightly more attractive in my moral opponents’ eyes due to my lack of self-righteousness
b) I feel slightly more intellectually honest because I don’t pretend to be capable of doing something I in reality can’t (define Right or Wrong objectively)
c) you, on the other hand, likely feel emotionally satisfied in believing that you are Absolutely Right (regardless of whether you are absolutely right or not).
d) if we later change our opinions, it is possible that we both feel shame, but very likely that you feel special shame for your “theoretical” self-righteousness
Most importantly, the difference does not prevent either of us defending our opinions equally passionately, as you seem to agree. It also does not give either of us any new argument over the other, against our common moral opponent. Well, when I compare “I disagree” with “I disagree, and mind you, I believe I’m absolutely right”, I’d say that the first sentence is a tactically better move, especially in the parliament, but you may disagree.
As per contract, I will soon respond to your suspicion that a moral relativist’s opinions are grounded on nothing.
Thanks for that thoughtful response, Esko, and another opportunity to clarify.
Recognizing that different norms may exist in different cultures does not make one a relativist. I’ve repeated the definition of realism twice recently so I won’t restate it this time, but I’ll add this: these different norms’ validity is contingent on their being congruent with bedrock moral realities.
The Bible treats this in 1 Corinthians 8-10 and Romans 14-15 (lengthy passages, elucidating a crucial principle). There were people in both Corinth and Rome who were squabbling over whether it was okay to eat meat that had been offered to idols. Paul wrote that it did not matter essentially, but that we ought to be sensitive to one another’s consciences nevertheless, and respect one another’s sensitivities. The bedrock principles there are freedom in one respect, and love in another respect.
So I am not being “largely a moral relativist,” and the distinction between absolute and relative is not as indistinct as it probably appears. There are certain fundamental principles of finite number. There are virtually infinite applications of those principles, and within those principles, considerable freedom for different kinds of applications.
In response to your points:
1. I am not working on the question of persuasion here, which is epistemology, but on the question of ontology. That is, I am not trying in this particular post to show you which moral principles must be accepted, but rather that there must be at least some moral realities, for relativism in general leads to unacceptable absurdities. It’s really a rather limited purpose I’ve been pursuing. So I don’t think your point 1 addresses what I’ve been saying.
If I were trying to persuade you of the reality of a particular moral principle, I would start with the reality of God and his word. That’s not where I started this time, as I’m sure you will see upon review.
2. On the other hand, and almost conversely, I am appealing to what I see as common human knowledge in regard to a limited number of moral principles. I don’t think this is an attempt at persuasion; it’s an appeal to already-shared knowledge. Murder is wrong, child rape is wrong, and you and I both know it.
I stand corrected on “the plain sense of axiomatic.” I agree I was wrong on that. The knowledge I was referring to here is something that is known, not something that is assumed for the sake of developing a further argument.
3. The practical consequences of this boil down to this: the words right and wrong in their normal meanings must be discarded, to be replaced with I agree/I like that or I disagree/dislike that. And then you have to live with that reality, if reality you think it is.
If you assume that any behavior could be enculturated as moral, then we can put to rest the following issue:
I can’t prove this either, and wouldn’t want to run the experiment, either.
Wait a minute, you keep on getting me to defend a type of relativism that I don’t believe in and keep trying to limit. It’s probably not any behavior that can be enculturated; not because it’s objectively wrong, but because evolution has limited what a group, for its benefit, will tolerate.
There’s no reason to believe that relativism, limited by evolution, isn’t self-contradictory.
They pay you for these? Can’t wait for mine!!
Tom,
I was dumb enough to not compose my post in a separate text editor during the availability problems of your web server (your hobby must have felt like a job lately, eh?), so this is my 2nd attempt to fulfill my promise of responding to your:
“But what about these axioms? Are they grounded in anything at all? It sounds to me like you are saying they are not. Then are they simply arbitrary? And if arbitrary, why should anyone think they hold, or matter, when challenged?”
I guess these questions are very close to the more usual: “is secular ethics grounded in anything at all?” My answer is “yes it is “, especially when you helpfully clarify that answering “no” would mean that the moral axioms of moral relativists are “simply arbitrary”.
What does “simply arbitrary” mean? To me, this means “random”. And what does that, in turn, mean? It means that a moral relativist in an unknown time and culture is equally likely to have (a) “never brush your teeth during the same hour in two consequtive days, especially not with a soft brush” as a moral ground rule as he is to have (b) “protect life, especially human life” or (c ) “destroy life, especially human life” as a ground rule. I claim that such an idea does not reflect our reality well. To be more specific, I claim that:
An unknown moral relativist is more likely to have matters of life and death as his moral ground rules than he would be to have, say, style issues in toothcare as his moral ground rules. (Using my example: (b) and (c ) are more likely moral ground rules than (a).)
This was my first step, but in my eyes an important step, in criticizing the idea that moral relativism is not grounded on anything at all. I start by simply weakening the idea. It is, in my opinion, too much to claim that relativists’ moral axioms were essentially just random utterances (even if syntactically correct and free of semantic inconsistencies). And this already suggests that they are grounded in at least something, even if they are no objective truths.
Before I continue, it is important to verify whether you can agree with my criticism so far, i.e. whether you agree that “simply arbitrary” is too strong an expression.
Tom,
Regarding your last post to me, I feel rather helpless. You “appeal to already-shared knowledge” and declare that “murder is wrong, child rape is wrong, and you and I both know it”. (While denying the possibility that this might be an attempt at persuasion instead of just stating factual claims.)
It is hard to argue against someone who is simply stomping on his hat. To me, it would seem dead obvious by now how I will respond to your claims. No, we don’t know murder is wrong, no matter how passionately we might oppose murder. We merely have an opinion. Which, I once again repeat, is pretty much the same thing for all practical purposes.
Perhaps an analogy might be helpful. I was once startled when I learned that Mr. Empiricist, David Hume, was himself the first critic of his empiricism. More specifically, I was startled by how efficiently Hume devastated the foundation on which his own philosophical “school” rested: the inductive logic. You just can’t defend inductive logic logically, because your defense is likely inductive in nature (”inductive logic has worked just wonderfully in the past so why not continue using it in the future”) which would be circular reasoning. To be sure, Hume works hard to persuade us to still rely on inductive logic, but the important thing for our purposes here is that he openly admits that inductive logic is not a epistemological method somehow magically known to be correct. Of course, similar problems lie at the core of all rational thinking. You can’t logically defend any epistemological system: if you could prove its axioms, you would be committing circular reasoning, and when you can’t, well, what does your system rest on? The answer is that we just have to choose methods that we subjectively feel to be the most useful, fully admitting that we can’t prove them. And yet, some epistemological systems are much, much more popular than the “simply arbitrary” epistemological systems.
A “snide” comment was made in this thread towards Paul who, like me, admits that nothing can be known with absolute certainty. But here, too, as with ethics, I wonder what are the practical consequences of our intellectual honesty (as I call it) or “absurdity” (as you call it)? We aren’t exactly crippled by admitting that the strategies we have chosen concerning e.g. moral issues or epistemology aren’t any objective truths. It is not equal to thinking that our thoughts are mere paper cups floating on a stormy sea. Not all thought patterns are equally probable to become normative.
So was Hume, too, absurd when he admitted that he can’t defend inductive logic logically? Should Hume have started stomping on his hat instead and yell: “But we just know that the Sun will definitely, absolutely rise tomorrow!”
I know it’s wrong to the same degree that I know I’m alive, I know I can think rationally, I know I have free will and I know I love my family.
Esko:
With all due respect, you hold a less-than-properly-informed understanding of David Hume’s views—especially with regard to the implications of his ideas (how they influenced subsequent bad philosophy and how his disordered view of causality pretty much makes science impossible)… which, interestingly, stem largely from his fallacious understanding of what an idea is in the first place. And, I would caution you to actually read his works with a critical eye, and not simply swallow his (literal) book-burning condescension aimed at metaphysics, his amateurish understanding of causality (that results from his abandonment of metaphysics), and a moral relativism that suits his needs… simply because they “sound” good or are in fashion.
A good, fairly short summary critique of Hume’s ideas may be found here:
http://radicalacademy.com/phildavidhume1.htm.
With no personal flag-waving intended, here are some more:
http://reasoningrepaired.blogspot.com/2007/02/david-hume-you-want-fries-with-that.html
http://reasoningrepaired.blogspot.com/2007/01/memento-homo-quia-pulvis-es.html
http://reasoningrepaired.blogspot.com/2006/09/david-hume-book-burner.html
http://reasoningrepaired.blogspot.com/2006/07/moral-relativists-and-little-girls.html
SteveK:
Sorry, that’s not quite correct: your knowing that you’re alive is undeniable because to deny it would be to assume that you’re alive in order to deny it. Knowing that something (like murder) is wrong is not like knowing you’re alive. Murder is wrong because of what we are per our natures (philosophically) and who we are in our relation to God (theologically). There’s nothing wrong per se to depend on gut revulsion to the murder of an innocent because this can nicely set one off on a correct path of philosophical reflection to arrive at a reasoned argument. Moral relativists discount the gut revulsion because of their prior disordered reasoning. (Consider, for example, Esko’s self-stultifying absolutist claim against absolute certainty and his objective moral complaint—all in one sentence!: “A ‘snide’ comment was made in this thread towards Paul who, like me, admits that nothing can be known with absolute certainty.” In other words, moral relativists talk the talk, but will never adhere to their own rules.) Gut revulsion has its place in understanding, but it is a means to getting to the truth—not the truth itself: rhetorical reasoning is