Now, I don’t know Jacob’s views, but from a phenomenological (Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian) point of view, meanings aren’t in propositions but are part of a context constituted most primordially by practices and skills, of being able to do things with things. If we accept this view, then logic and propositions are indeed secondary given the nature of practices as non-logical things. We could easily bring in Heidegger’s own analysis or Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Bourdieu, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus, Jeff Malpas, or Tim Ingold.

Also, if we accept this view, then we move beyond the forms of knowing already mentioned insofar as these practices are ontologically constitutive for things, not that they ‘determine’ a things nature, but that they disclose one of a being’s possibilities by situating it within various practices, values, goals, others (teachers, consumers, playmates, etc.), and other beings (a hammer’s relation to wood, nails, books/bookshelves, etc.). In other words, they are not epistemological in nature–as a means of determining the truthfulness of something–but ontological in nature–as disclosing a being as a particular kind of being.

On the latter, I like to use the example of a pen: when it is contextualized within the practice of writing, with its own context of paper, interlocutors, purposes for writing, means of distributing the writing (mail, word of mouth, by hand, etc.), then its meaning and truthfulness is contextualized in this way and emerges only by being embedded in this context (i.e. it is not inherent, or simply there for us to simply see). But the pen can also be other things when contextualized in different contexts: as a bookmark, a paper weight, ready made art, a weapon, etc. And given the nature of our disclosing practices, the pen can be disclosed only as one or the other of these things (of its modes of being) at any given time.

There certainly is a lot more to say about this issue and I hope that I am not misrepresenting Jacob, though I do think the above is what he is getting at. So, again, I think the nature of propositions are exactly what is at issue and is not a side issue that can safely be ignored.

Hey Paul, nice try.

Hope never dies.

Do your premises lead logically to the conclusion you have stated? I’ll recap them:

1. Propositional knowledge is not the only or best way of knowing.

2. It is only one way of knowing

3. Therefore the propositional nature of the Word of God is not self evident.

That’s a non-sequitir, my friend.

I don’t really know that the self-evident propositional nature of the Word of God needs a further test beyond its being self-evident. You seem to imply (your second sentence and your last one) that propositions (propositional knowledge, perhaps?) must be testable in order to be propositions (or propositional knowledge). Am I understanding that correctly? What kind of testing did you have in mind?

If you copy part of a previous comment and paste it into a quote, it may look like you’ve copied formatting that you don’t really want to include. Don’t worry about it, it will look fine when it’s done regardless.

Jacob, maybe that’s been part of the confusion here for us, too. When I refer to propositional knowledge, I mean knowledge that can be expressed and then received with at least approximate accuracy to the original intent; through the use of words in sentences, paragraphs, narrative or explication, etc. If your disagreement has to do with whether some Platonic entity relating to propositions - -  which you haven’t said, but I’ll raise the possibility - -  then that’s not what I’m referring to.

funny enough, I wrote up this big response.  But at the end of it, I thought, it doesn’t matter anyway.  

Too right.

Who can argue with you if you believe that propositional knowledge is self evidently part of the Word of God?

Who can argue if we live in different worlds and speak truths in correspondence to nothing but our own thoughts?

Hey Paul, nice try.

Placing the origin of propositional (not “prepositional”) knowledge in the 19th/20th centuries is unbelievable. Consider this stub of an article in Britannica, if you need a source:

theories of knowledge ( in epistemology: The nature of knowledge )
For the most part, epistemology from the ancient Greeks to the present has focused on “knowing that.” This sort of knowledge, often referred to as propositional knowledge, raises a number of peculiar epistemological problems, among which is the much-debated issue of what kind of thing one knows when one knows that something is the case. In other words, in sentences of the form…

Or look at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s history of the philosophy of propositions:

Arguably, the first employment in the western philosophical tradition of the notion of proposition, in roughly our sense, is found in the writings of the Stoics. In the third century B.C., Zeno and his followers, including Chrysippus especially….

The Stoics preceded the New Testament by centuries. That part of the world was inundated with Greek thought. Jesus obviously did not support the Greeks’ worldview - - he specifically taught a contrary theology. But he did not in like manner teach a contrary theory of language or logic. He employed logic. He spoke in sentences that quite evidently were intended to convey knowledge or understanding, in terms of the actual words and their actual meanings.

Paul was knowledgeable regarding Greek ways of thinking. He also spoke in sentences intended to convey knowledge by means of their words. (I think I must be out of my mind even taking the energy to say that! It’s like trying to mount an argument that water exists.)

There is some controversy over the metaphysical nature of propositions, but I don’t see this discussion here as having much to do with that. The root of the question here has been whether we can draw knowledge from words, or whether they are in some sense opaque. It has also been whether we can draw true knowledge from words (in context, obviously). If, however, Jesus did not intend us to draw true knowledge from words - - knowledge that can also be expressed in words - - then we’re all condemned to falsehood, error, and hell. If Jesus did not intend words to convey knowledge, why did he command his followers to preach using words?

For my purposes, I intend to let this be all the support and defense I will make regarding propositional knowledge in the Bible. The reason I am stopping at this is because I have no hope of coming to agreement with Jacob on the matter. Without something as basic as a propositional knowledge, no other discussion can even be entertained. If I cannot put forth the statements of the Bible as the indicators and expressions of knowledge that they are - - without being constantly challenged on their expressing propositional information - - I need not even bother beginning this effort. So I will call an end to my part in this discussion.

4.  I want to be clear.  Are you saying that our results can be true or false?  Or are you saying that the word “truth” in the Bible can be true or false?

How in the world would you determine “If God is soft on truth or falsehood, or if there’s any ambiguity about his stand on the existence of real truth or falsehood”? 

I do not think that our analysis of the meanings of “truth” in the Bible will determine whether or not “God is soft on truth or falsehood.”  I think that you are conflating our analysis of the word “truth” and our results for God himself.  Our results don’t determine anything about God. To be honest, I don’t even believe that we humans have the capacity to determine whether or not God is “soft on truth.”  So, I very much disagree with your claim that God’s stance on truth “should be apparent from the text.”

How can the creator of truth be “soft on truth”?  That just doesn’t make sense to me.

What value are these three basic laws of logic to this analysis?

How can a word have multiple meanings and the law of noncontradiction be in effect?  It seems that we would have an empirical fact (a word with multiple meanings) and some abstract law that declares this fact to not be the case.
Tell me more “identity” and “excluded middle.”

5.  Why would you call that a limit?  Because you’ve already declared that one possible meaning of “knowledge” in the Bible is propositional before you’ve begun your analysis.  Would you take that declaration back?  If not, then there is a limit.

How do you know this is anachronistic? How do you know these present day understandings are not the same as prior understandings? It seems you would have to know what those prior understandings were, to know that today’s are different. But your point is that we can’t know those prior understandings!

The credibility of my claim hinges on the various histories of the philosophy of knowledge that have been written.  Prepositional knowledge, for instance, was formalized in the 19th and 20th centuries.  A great book about the development of modern epistemologies is Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.  The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy is also a nice resource.  The point is that my claim to know that Jesus didn’t talk about prepositional knowledge hinges on the authority of others that have written far more about it than myself.  And they can make credible arguments because they’ve investigated the primary texts.

Jesus expressed an extended series of propositions in the Sermon on the Mount.

I disagree with that claim.  Jesus gave a sermon, as the Bible refers to it.  And then you interpreted his words as propositions that can be tested as true or false. Jesus didn’t attempt to persuad the listerns then or us now that his words were or were not propositions.  You should remain agnostic about whether they are or are not propositions.  Why?  Because there is no good Biblical reason for your insistence on claiming Jesus’ sermon on the mount was a set of propositions.

I don’t personally think that there is anything that I can do to make (and I mean make as in effect) you think that I am communicating honestly.  I would say that you didn’t trust me before the interation started and I don’t really suspect you’ll have a change of heart any time soon.  You seem pretty set.   

I can’t believe you didn’t know that. And as Charlie noted, I can’t believe that after all our prior discussions, you would think that I would think I could change God by a word. 

Now, to those assumptions:

2. “Reliable conclusions” mean conclusions that we can rely on, that we can trust. Yes, I believe words can have different meanings in different contexts. I think that’s clearly implied in what I wrote.

4. How can I assume the meanings of truth can be true or false? In one sense that would be the point of the study. If God is soft on truth or falsehood, or if there’s any ambiguity about his stand on the existence of real truth or falsehood, that should be apparent from the text. Further, I rely on the three basic laws of logic: noncontradiction, identity, and excluded middle, without which reason and meaningful discourse would be impossible.

5. I’m not setting the limits of possible meanings of words, I’m giving examples with “and/or some other kind of knowledge.” Why would you call that a limit?

I’m chuckling inside at this: 

these are present day understandings and it would be anachronistic to import them back in time and claim that Jesus was talking about propositional knowledge.

How do you know this is anachronistic? How do you know these present day understandings are not the same as prior understandings? It seems you would have to know what those prior understandings were, to know that today’s are different. But your point is that we can’t know those prior understandings! 

Like you, I do not assume that propositional knowledge is the best, right or true way of knowing; it is one among several ways of knowing, each of which in their proper contexts and relations may be the best, right, or true way of knowing. My knowledge of my wife is not primarily propositional; but if you were to ask me what her birthday is, the best, right and true way to answer would be for me to offer you my propositional knowledge. Sometimes she asks me what I like about her, and she’s looking for propositional answers.

And the reason I know that you have issues relating to propositional knowledge is because you have expressed them propositionally.

Jesus expressed an extended series of propositions in the Sermon on the Mount. Your skepticism about anachronistic thinking is not enough to persuade me that when he expressed propositions, he wanted us not to take them propositionally.

I don’t think we’re close enough on these assumptions. The problem Charlie expressed at 12:24 pm is part of the reason. I’m not at all convinced that you are communicating honestly.

Why would I leave it off?  For a couple of reasons.  One: because you are setting the limits of the possible meanings of the words prior to the study.  We should inductively search out the meanings of the words as they appear in the text and not limit them prior to our findings.  Two: these are present day understandings and it would be anachronistic to import them back in time and claim that Jesus was talking about propositional knowledge.
6.  Same problem.  See #5.
I recognize propositional knowledge.  I just assume that it is only one among a number of different kinds of knowledge.  I do not assume that propositional knowledge is the Best, Right, or True way of knowing.
And from your last post:
So Jacob, did you think that I was being literal when I used that word? That I really was accusing you of, through your language, fashioning a God who is small; that I thought you were causing God actually (in whatever reality you were creating) to be small?
Yes, I thought that you were claiming that my words could “make” God “very, very small,” as you put it.
What else did you mean?  And could you show me from what you originally wrote how I might have understood it differently?

So Jacob, did you think that I was being literal when I used that word? That I really was accusing you of, through your language, fashioning a God who is small; that I thought you were causing God actually (in whatever reality you were creating) to be small? 

Given your humble opinion regarding words, Jacob, and that all we have to offer one another here are words - - and that you have run so far in a strange direction with your misconception of a common idiom - - I am having severe second thoughts about the value of proceeding with this, or of trying to answer your questions in a way that would satisfy you.

So let me check some assumptions with you:

1. We’re not going to change the subject. If we proceed, it will be on the subject of truth and knowledge.

2. If I undertake to do a Biblical study as proposed, I will be studying words and their context. My assumption is that words have meanings, and that they communicate content. Context (historical, cultural, literary, and grammatico-syntactical) is significant and appropriate for study. I believe that with study one can generally come to reliable conclusions regarding the meaning of words, propositions, stories, etc.

(By the way, for one who is so tuned into context, you sure missed it on my use of the word “make.”)

3. I intend to report the result of my study using words, and my assumption is that those words have meanings.

4. My assumption also is that the results of my study have the potential (in whole or in their several parts) to be true or false; that is, that truth and falsehood, right and wrong, are categories that apply to conclusions that may be presented in a report.

5. I further assume that if you disagree with the results I present, you would be generous enough to explain the reasons, and to refrain from evading through methods like, “your words do not have meaning,” or “your conclusions are not the sort of things that have the potential to be right or wrong.”

I think a study of the way knowledge and truth are presented in the Bible could be very fascinating and fruitful. Both of them have multi-faceted meanings and usages. But especially for the sake of this discussion here, I would want to define the question. I propose this as a research question, based on our discussion to this point:

Is there reason to believe, based on the Bible’s statements regarding truth and knowledge, that God values the pursuit of truth and  knowledge by humans, and gives humans at least some capacity to discover truth and knowledge regarding God? And what forms can that knowledge take? For example, is it relational, experiential, tacit, propositional, and/or some other kind of knowledge?

Which leads to my 6th assumption:

6. There are such things as relational tacit, propositional, and experiential knowledge. There’s also a kind of knowledge associated with physical skill, but the word for that won’t come to mind right at the moment. And there are other knowledges beyond these. The main question at issue is whether you would acknowledge the reality of propositional knowledge.

Jacob, I think I’m going to proceed with this study because it sounds like an interesting thing to pursue. Your response to these assumptions will determine whether I will treat it as a response to your questions or whether I’ll just conduct it as a study for my personal edification and for presentation to the blog audience in general, without trying especially to satisfy your questions.